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RESTRICTED ISSUE

THE COLLECTED PAPERS

OF

JOHN BASSETT MOORE

IN SEVEN VOLUMES

IV

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PROBLEMS OF WAR AND COMMERCE¹

AS the seat of a national foreign trade convention no place more stimulating to reminiscence and to forecast could have been chosen than that in which we meet to-day. As the chief city in population, in commerce and in industry of what is historically known as the Southwest, it is identified with one of our earliest and greatest struggles for the right freely to trade with foreign nations. The United States, when their independence was established, found themselves hemmed in by a system of monopolies. Although their Western territory extended to the Mississippi River, the navigation of that river was denied to them by Spain, the sovereign of the region through which it flowed to the sea.

Madison on a certain occasion declared that the Mississippi was to the inhabitants of the West what to the people of the East were the Potomac, the Delaware and the Hudson combined. The struggle for its navigation ended in 1803 when the vast Louisiana territory peacefully passed to the United States by purchase. Nor should we in our retrospect forget that among the statesmen of the time when the United States, advancing its boundaries still farther to the West, became a power bordering on the Pacific, none foresaw with clearer vision nor predicted with more confident prophecy the development of our trade with the Far East than did Thomas H. Benton, one of Missouri's first senators.

COMMERCE AND WAR

Unhappily we are at present witnessing the progress of one of the greatest wars the world has ever seen. Apart from the exceptional stimulation of certain branches of industry the effects of such a conflict upon commerce are necessarily injurious; and, in those effects, neutrals as well as belligerents are involved. In place of the regulated competition which exists in time of peace, commerce and industry, when war supervenes, become subject to extraordinary restrictions and limitations. Of some of these obstructions the character and scope have been definitely determined, while of others the nature and extent have not yet ceased to be a subject of controversy.

1. Address reprinted from *Report of the Second National Foreign Trade Convention, St. Louis, Mo., January 21-22, 1915; Chicago Legal News*, XLVII (February, 1915).

Taken as a whole these obstructions may be divided into two categories, comprising (1) those that proceed from the duties imposed upon neutrals, and (2) those that proceed from the rights belonging to or asserted by belligerents. For convenience they may be discussed in this order.

UNNEUTRAL ACTS

Viewed from the government point of view unneutral acts may be divided into two classes: (1), those that neutral governments are obliged to prevent, and (2), those that neutral governments are not obliged to prevent. A neutral government is not permitted itself to commit any act that may savor of aid to a belligerent. It may not, for instance, furnish arms or munitions of war, or give or lend money to either belligerent; but the question of what a neutral government may itself do, and the question of what it is obliged to prevent its citizens from doing are two distinct things. For reasons of convenience, which more or less lie at the foundations of all law, neutral governments are not required to assume the entire supervision and control of the commerce of their citizens in the interest of belligerents; but belligerents are permitted to protect themselves against injury by means of certain recognized measures.

The duties of neutral governments in this regard are fairly well defined. As enumerated in the statutes of the United States, which have served as a model in these matters, they embrace the prevention (1) of enlistments of men for belligerent service, and (2), of the construction, fitting out or arming of vessels of war, or the augmentation of their force in men or materials for such service.

These inhibitions affect commerce only in so far as they place a restriction upon the building or fitting out or arming of vessels for purposes of war; but it is important to note here a distinction which forms the basis of the law in regard to the manufacture and shipment of arms and munitions of war. The comment is often made that it is strange or illogical that a neutral government should forbid its citizens to build ships for a belligerent, while it permits them to manufacture and sell arms and munitions of war without restriction. But, the distinction is substantial and has an historical origin.

The first conception of neutral duty was that which required a government to prevent the enlistment of men or the organization of hostile expeditions within its territory for the purpose of taking part in a war in which it was itself neutral. This was not an unnatural or unduly burdensome obligation; and it was by an extension of this conception that the duty was

imposed upon neutral governments of preventing their territory from being used for the purpose of fitting out or arming vessels of war for belligerents. In other words, such fitting out or arming was likened to the setting on foot of a hostile expedition.

RIGHTS OF BELLIGERENTS

But, when we come to consider the rights belonging to or asserted by belligerents for their own protection, we enter the sphere of serious interference with neutral commerce. Generally speaking, the breaking out of war between two or more countries does not take away the right of neutrals to trade with them. Any denial of that right must rest on specific grounds, and can be asserted only by specific measures. And, in order that a government at war may protect its acknowledged interests, there is conceded to it what is called the belligerent right of visit and search, which signifies the right of a belligerent man-of-war to visit and search on the high seas the merchant vessels of neutrals for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are violating the laws of war, and, in case there should be disclosed a reasonable ground of suspicion that such a violation is in course of commission, to take them in for adjudication by a prize court.

The belligerent right of visit and search is only a means to an end, and the end with which it is chiefly concerned is the prevention of any infraction of the law relating to blockade and to contraband. The impulse of the belligerent is to cut off his enemy altogether and to prevent him from getting anything from the outside. The neutral, on the other hand, naturally desires that his trade should not be unduly hampered by an armed conflict to which he is not a party. During the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the early part of the nineteenth century, which so largely related to contests for colonies and for commerce, or, in other words, for monopolies in trade, a constant struggle went on between belligerents and neutrals as to their respective claims. This struggle related chiefly to three measures, namely, (1) blockade, (2) the treatment of enemy's property, and (3) contraband of war. In the end an agreement was reached as to blockade and the treatment of enemy's property, but the question of contraband, although it at one time seemed to be in course of adjustment, was not definitely settled.

BLOCKADES

The object of a blockade is to cut off all intercourse with the enemy so far as the blockade extends. It will be recalled that

during our Civil War all the ports of the Confederacy were blockaded with results that became more and more appreciable as time wore on. Blockade respects neither the nationality of the ship nor the nationality or character of the cargo. The penalty of an attempt to break a blockade is confiscation both of ship and of cargo, no matter what the character of the goods may be. In former times attempts were often made to forbid access to belligerent ports by proclamations of blockade which were not actually enforced. These were known as "paper" blockades. But, this practice was eventually done away with, and the principle as announced in the Declaration of Paris of 1856 came to be universally accepted, that a blockade, in order to be binding upon neutrals, must be effectively maintained, that is to say, maintained by a force reasonably sufficient to prevent entrance to the blockaded port.

The contest as to the treatment of enemy's property was at length ended by the establishment of the principle that such property should not be subject to capture when borne on a neutral ship. This is known as the rule that "free ships make free goods." By what was called the "common law of the sea" the fate of a cargo depended upon the neutral or enemy character of the owner. If it belonged to an enemy, the ship, though neutral, was seized and carried in, in order that the goods might be confiscated. Even apart from the difficulty that may often arise in determining the question of property, this practice was extremely vexatious to neutrals. By the Declaration of Paris of 1856 it was declared that the goods of an enemy should be exempt from capture on board a neutral ship. This rule was universally accepted, even by the Powers which, because of the inhibition of privateering, declined to adhere to the Declaration as a whole; and on the outbreak of the war with Spain, in 1898, was proclaimed by the United States—one of the non-adhering Powers—as a principle of international law.

But, the rule that an enemy's goods are not subject to capture on a neutral ship is subject to a notable exception, namely, that of contraband of war. If the goods are contraband the ship and cargo are subject to seizure, just as before. Nor does the rule that blockades must, in order to be binding, be effectively maintained, affect the question of contraband, except so far as it may tempt belligerents to strike at each other by adding to the articles embraced in that category; and it is quite possible that this temptation may be increased by the difficulties and hazards which the invention of submarines has added to attempts to maintain men of war on a blockading station before a hostile port. Indeed, no matter from what point the subject

may be approached, it is evident that contraband, both in itself and in its relation to other rules, has been for a number of years, and still is, the question of capital importance as affecting trade in time of war.

PENDING NEGOTIATIONS

At the present moment a negotiation is in progress between the United States and Great Britain in regard to the exercise of the right of visit and search, particularly in relation to the question of contraband. Into the discussion of this pending negotiation it would not become me now to enter further than to remark that the representations of the United States were not only friendly in tone but were evidently inspired by the desire to reach an arrangement which should be duly considerate of the interests of all concerned, of belligerents and neutrals alike. But, no matter what arrangement may be made, it can, in the present state of the law, hardly be expected to be more than a makeshift. The question requires for its eventual adjustment a more radical solution than any of the compromises attempted in recent years have offered. If, instead of the naval supremacy now exercised in its own interest, and in that of its allies, by the largest consumer of our agricultural products and foodstuffs, the control of the seas were actually contested by powerful hostile fleets, it is almost appalling to reflect upon what might be the present state of our commerce. The bare suggestion of such a predicament, for the study of which conditions in the more or less distant past furnish ample materials, justifies us in giving to the subject our most serious consideration; for we must look to the future as well as to the present.

CLASSES OF CONTRABAND

Since the days of Grotius, articles have been divided with reference to the question of contraband into three classes, (1) those primarily and ordinarily used for war, (2) those of double use, i. e., capable of being used either for peace or for war, (3) those not at all useful for war. Articles in the last category are altogether excluded from the domain of contraband. The first and second classes have lately been denominated "absolute contraband" and "conditional contraband." Previously it had been usual to speak of the articles embraced in them as "absolutely" contraband or "conditionally" contraband, and this phraseology is, in my opinion, much to be preferred. To speak of articles as "absolute contraband" and "conditional contraband" seems to imply that these articles are in themselves somehow to be considered as contraband and can be

saved from condemnation as such only by some process of exculpation. In reality, no article is intrinsically contraband either "absolute" or "conditional." Even arms and munitions of war are not contraband when they are not destined for a belligerent. There is, in other words, no such thing as contraband without destination for a hostile use.

The practical and substantial distinction between articles absolutely contraband and articles conditionally contraband is that the former become contraband merely upon destination to a belligerent country, while articles conditionally contraband may be shipped directly to a belligerent country unless it be affirmatively shown that they were destined for a hostile use. This distinction has been clearly maintained both by the United States and by Great Britain. It was laid down in the British Manual of Prize Law, and was definitely set forth by Lord Salisbury during the Boer War, when, in a communication to the United States, he said:

"Foodstuffs, with a hostile destination, can be considered contraband of war only when they are supplies for the enemy's forces. It is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used; it must be shown that this was, in fact, their destination at the time of the seizure."

POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

The position of the United States had been equally clear and unequivocal. Indeed, for more than a hundred years the United States had sought altogether to exclude from the category of contraband raw materials and foodstuffs. In the treaties with Prussia of 1785 and 1799 the United States had gone so far as to agree that even arms and munitions of war, when seized as contraband, should not be confiscated, but that the captor should pay for them if he converted them to his own use, or pay damages if he only detained them. In many later treaties, culminating in that with Italy of 1871, the United States, while admitting the principle of contraband, included in it only articles primarily used for war. In 1898, during the war with Spain, the United States, being then a belligerent, designated as articles "conditionally contraband" only the following:

Coal, when destined for a naval station, a port of call, or a ship or ships of the enemy; materials for the construction of railways or telegraphs, and money, when such materials or money are destined for the enemy's forces; provisions, when destined for an enemy's ship or ships, or for a place that is besieged.

When, in March, 1904, the Russian government, on the outbreak of the war with Japan, published instructions to its naval commanders which forbade the conveyance of contra-

band "to Japan or to Japanese armed forces," and denounced as contraband "foodstuffs," including all kinds of grain, fish, fish products of various kinds, beans, bean oil and oil cake, the United States protested, and, acting coincidently with Great Britain, secured the modification of the instructions to a certain extent, though not to the extent desired.

THE UNITED STATES PROPOSITION OF 1907

Such was the position of the United States up to the Second Hague Conference in 1907, in which the subject of contraband came up for discussion with a view to a general international agreement. In that conference the delegation of the United States submitted, in the first instance, a proposition the precise scope of which is at least open to interpretation. According to this proposition "conditional contraband" was to consist of provisions, materials and articles which are employed for a double purpose, in peace and in war, but which, by reason of their character, or special qualities, or their quantity, are suitable and necessary for military purposes and which are destined for the use of the armed forces or for the military establishments of the enemy.

The things to be included in the category thus described the belligerent was to designate, prior notification to neutrals being a prerequisite to seizure or confiscation.

The British Government, on the other hand, proposed that the principle of contraband should be abandoned altogether, and that the right of visit should be confined to the ascertainment of the merchant vessel's neutral character. Lord Reay, in explaining this proposal for the British delegation, adverted to the fact that, while it had in spite of all efforts been found to be impossible to prevent belligerents from obtaining the munitions which they needed, the attempt to do so had by reason of the increase in the tonnage of ships, the carrying of mixed cargoes, the lack of any single destination of ship or cargo, the multiplication of the number of articles used in war and the development of railways and other means of transportation by land, become more and more futile on the part of belligerents and more and more injurious to neutrals. Upon the strength of these reasons, which as we recite them today have a prophetic sound, it is not strange that twenty-six of the Powers represented in the conference voted for the British proposal, while only five voted against it. Among those five we find the United States in association with France, Germany, Russia and Montenegro. Japan, Panama, Roumania and Turkey abstained from voting. With the exception of the United States and Panama, all the American countries voted for the

British proposal, as also did Austro-Hungary, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Servia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

Recalling the treaties between Prussia and the United States in 1785 and 1799 for the virtual abolition of contraband, it is singular to find the United States and Germany acting together as two of the five Powers which voted against its abolition in 1907; but, although the United States voted against the British proposal it is gratifying to note that Admiral Sperry, on behalf of the United States delegation, after the British proposal had failed to secure the unanimous approval of the conference, maintained the historic American position that the right of capture should be confined to articles agreed to be absolutely contraband. But no agreement was reached.

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON

Such was the international situation immediately prior to the so-called "Declaration of London." This declaration, which was signed on February 26, 1909, by representatives of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain. The Netherlands and the United States, was designed to furnish a uniform law for the administration of an international prize court under one of the conventions adopted at The Hague in 1907. As is well known, prize courts are courts of the captor's country. For this reason they have been supposed to be susceptible to national influences and prejudices, and they may even be controlled by national legislation. It was, therefore, a real step in advance in the development of international relations when Germany and Great Britain submitted at The Hague Conference in 1907 plans for the establishment of an international court of appeals in prize cases.

But, when the powers, whose representatives assembled in London in 1909, came to provide this court of appeal with a uniform law, they were not so fortunate. It is far from my intention to criticize the work of any particular delegation in the naval conference by which the Declaration of London was framed; but a cursory examination of the text of the Declaration suffices to show that it was the result of compromises, and that these compromises proceeded upon concessions to conflicting tendencies rather than upon a uniform principle. No doubt this was necessary in order to secure a unanimous agreement at the conference, but the results were not harmonious.

THE DECLARATION AND "CONDITIONAL CONTRABAND"

In two particulars the provisions of the Declaration, so far as they relate to contraband, were favorable to neutrals. They

proposed to make a neutral destination in the case of conditional contraband conclusive of innocence, thus abolishing in respect of that category the doctrine of continuous voyages, and they undertook to establish a "free list," comprising articles (one of which was raw cotton) which were not to be declared contraband. But when they came to deal with "conditional contraband" the provisions of the Declaration were not so fortunate. Under "conditional contraband" there were grouped fourteen classes of articles, including such things as "foodstuffs," "forage and grain suitable for feeding animals," "gold and silver in coin or bullion," "fuel" and "lubricants," and "clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes, suitable for use in war"; and to the fourteen enumerated classes, belligerents were, except so far as restrained by the "free list," to be permitted to add other articles "susceptible of use in war" as well as in peace.

QUESTION OF DESTINATION

With regard to the articles enumerated or to be enumerated it was provided (Article 33) that they should be liable to capture if "destined for the use of the armed forces or of a government department of the enemy state, unless in this latter case the circumstances show that the articles cannot in fact be used for the purposes of the war in progress." As to the proofs of such destination the terms of the Declaration were complicated. A hostile destination was to be presumed (Article 34) "if the consignment is addressed to enemy authorities, or to a merchant, established in the enemy country, and when it is well known that this merchant supplies articles and material of this kind to the enemy," or "is destined to a fortified place of the enemy, or to another place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy."

These grounds of inference are so vague and general that they would seem to justify in almost any case the presumption that the cargo, if bound to an enemy port, was "destined for the use of the armed forces or of a government department of the enemy state." Any merchant established in the enemy country, who deals in the things described, will sell them to the government; and, if it becomes public that he does so, it will be "well known" that he supplies them. Again, practically every important port is a "fortified place"; and yet the existence of fortifications would usually bear no relation whatever to the eventual use of provisions and various other articles mentioned. Nor can it be denied that, in this age of railways, almost any place may serve as a "base" for supplying the armed forces of the enemy. And of what interest or advantage

is it to a belligerent to prevent the enemy from obtaining supplies from a "base," from a "fortified place," or from a merchant "well known" to deal with him in his own country, where, the entire community being subject to his authority, he can obtain by requisition whatever he needs, if dealers in commodities hesitate to sell voluntarily. No doubt the advantage of such prevention may readily become greater, if the enemy be, like Great Britain or Japan, an insular country with no adjacent countries bounding it by land to draw from.

NOT INTERNATIONALLY BINDING

The Declaration of London was approved by the Senate of the United States. In Great Britain a bill was passed by the House of Commons to give it effect; but, an adverse agitation, partly due to the supposed menace to the country's food supply, having sprung up, the Lords withheld their assent, and the Declaration never became internationally binding. In view, however, of the place it has occupied in international discussions, and of the action of certain governments in regard to it, it cannot be left out of account in the consideration of the subjects to which it relates.

The difficulty with what that great lawyer and judge, Lord Loreburn, has called the "labyrinth of shifting presumptions" applied by the Declaration to "conditional contraband," is that to be caught in its mazes may mean ruin even to the most well-meaning and candid merchant. The supposition that all chances may be taken, provided an impartial court of appeal is to render the final judgment, can scarcely be regarded as a commercial conception. Even the eventual escape of his property from confiscation may not console or save from bankruptcy the merchant whose fortune, and possibly a certain amount of borrowed capital, have been tied up in prolonged detention, attended with suspension of business, costs of litigation, possible deterioration of goods and probable loss of a market. The interests of commerce cannot be properly conserved under such conditions, and it is highly desirable that when nations come again to deal collectively, as they will be obliged to do, with this question of contraband, commercial interests, which are now receiving instruction in the laws of war at an expense not wholly attributable to the legal profession, should take their part in bringing about a just solution.

THE SOLUTION

Such a solution must, in my opinion, be sought, if not in the abolition of the principle of contraband, at any rate in the adoption of a plan embracing (1) the abolition of "conditional

contraband," and (2), a single list having been agreed upon, in the co-operation of neutrals and belligerents in the certification of the contents of cargoes, so that the risk of capture may be openly borne by those who may voluntarily assume it, and harassing "searches" and detentions no more be heard of.

USE OF MINES

In addition to the woes arising from developments of the contraband question, neutral commerce has had to meet in recent years a new obstacle potentially more deadly than any ever previously devised. The discharge of projectiles and explosives from aircraft, which exposes men, women and children, and the strong and the helpless alike, to indiscriminate peril of death and of mutilation, may be regarded as the counterpart on land of the use of floating mines at sea. Nearly or quite a year after the Russo-Japanese War, a peaceful merchantman was blown up at sea by contact with a drifting mine.

The Second Hague Conference sought to restrict this evil by a "convention relative to the laying of automatic contact mines," by which it was forbidden (1) to lay such a mine unanchored, unless it was so constructed as to become harmless an hour at most after it ceased to be under control, (2) to lay it anchored, unless it was to become harmless as soon as it broke loose from its moorings, or (3) to use torpedoes which did not become harmless when they had missed their mark. It was expressly forbidden "to lay automatic contact mines off the coasts and ports of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping." This convention was signed by thirty-seven Powers, six making reservations, and has been ratified by twenty-one, four making reservations. The Powers neither signing nor ratifying were China, Montenegro, Portugal, Roumania, Spain and Sweden, and among the Powers signing but not ratifying are Greece, Italy, Servia and Turkey.

The convention also contained a stipulation to the effect that its provisions should not apply "except between contracting parties, and then only if all the belligerents" were parties to it. This stipulation alone may deprive the convention of binding force in the present war in Europe; but we may safely affirm that the employment of contact mines in the open sea is forbidden by international law. The seas outside territorial waters are the common highway of nations, and none of them has the right to render the use of that highway insecure. Few days pass in which one does not read a report of the blowing up of a merchant or fishing vessel by contact with a mine. As a method of warfare this must be regarded not only as an atrocity which no nation is at liberty to perpetrate, but also as a direct viola-

tion of a clear international right which governments are justified in asserting on all occasions. Wholly apart from the danger to life, it places the neutral merchant in a worse position than he ever occupied before. Heretofore, if his ship or his cargo was seized he knew to whom to look for redress. If vessel and cargo are sunk by a mine, proof of its identity being impossible, his case is hopeless unless he carries adequate insurance; and in this event the insurer is placed in a like situation of helplessness.

MARINE INSURANCE

The mention of insurance brings us to the consideration of a subject of prime importance to the American mercantile community. As the result of the destruction of the American merchant marine during the Civil War in the United States many of the companies which had previously carried on the business of marine insurance were ruined, and with a few important exceptions, the business has since been largely controlled by foreign capital. The practical experience of the present war has shown the importance of expanding in the United States the business of marine insurance, so that the country may in case of wars in which it is neutral no longer be dependent upon the resources and aid of foreign companies. The insurance granted by the government of the United States during the present war, although it has been of value, has been of very limited scope, because it has been confined to vessels under the American flag and to cargoes on such vessels, and even in respect of such cargoes the restrictions have been such as to make it often unavailable; a fact merely illustrative of the embarrassments which attend the government in attempting to deal on its own financial account with questions of neutrality in the transaction of business, a neutral government being always obliged to bear in mind that it is itself forbidden to perform any act that savors of unneutrality.

EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

In concluding this survey of commercial problems growing out of war, I am led to comment upon a phrase often heard to the effect that "commerce is war." This view is obviously one-sided. While commerce undoubtedly involves competition, it is in its essence an exchange of benefits. Conducted upon lines of monopoly as in the days of the old colonial system, commerce does indeed assume the aspect of warfare; but the experience of the world has shown that the old colonial system, instead of promoting trade, fettered it.

In the preamble of the preliminary peace between Great

Britain and the United States of November 30, 1782, we find, from the pen of Franklin, these words:

Whereas reciprocal advantages and mutual convenience are found by experience to form the only permanent foundation of peace and friendship between states, it is agreed to form the articles of the proposed treaty on such principles of liberality, equity and reciprocity as that, partial advantages (those seeds of discord) being excluded, such a beneficial and satisfactory intercourse between the two countries may be established as to promise and secure to both perpetual peace and harmony.

A great Brazilian statesman, the late Baron Rio-Branco, in defense of a boundary settlement under which a large sum of money was to be paid to a neighbor for the purpose of building a railway, declared that "arrangements in which neither of the interested parties loses, and still more, those in which both gain, are always the best." Speaking in a similar strain our own Webster once boasted that he was not among the number of those "who regarded whatsoever others had as so much withholden from themselves."

What Americans desire, and what they are entitled to, is opportunity—equality of opportunity. If they demand more than this, they ask for more than they need. Their commercial expansion, great as it has been, has but begun. The future is theirs.

THE GROWTH OF PAN AMERICAN UNITY¹

THE STORY OF A FLUCTUATING FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS

THE American Republics number just twenty-one. The youngest, Panama, which came into being eleven years ago, was very shortly preceded in existence by Cuba. Even the eldest, the United States, if its life be measured by that of many nations, is still comparatively young, for scarcely one hundred and forty years have elapsed since the "embattled farmers" at Concord "fired the shot heard round the world." But, if there was ever a case in which time should be counted by heart-throbs, and not by fingers on a dial, it is this. The shot of which Emerson sang did not cease to echo. On the contrary, it continued to reverberate, and as it reverberated grew in volume. Its significance was not at the time unnoticed. Although France, having lost the greater part of her colonies in

1. Reprinted from *The Independent*, January 11, 1915.

America, gave her support to the American Revolution, Spain —whose vast trans-Atlantic possessions still remained intact —understood the menace to her colonial system. In a prophetic paper submitted to the King of Spain after the independence of the United States had been established, Count d'Aranda, who was Spanish Ambassador at Paris during the American Revolution, said:

The independence of the English colonies has been recognized. It is for me a subject of grief and fear. France has but few possessions in America, but she was bound to consider that Spain, her most intimate ally, had many, and that she now stands exposed to terrible reverses. From the beginning, France has acted against her true interests in encouraging and supporting this independence, and so I have often declared to the Ministers of that nation.

The chief significance to Spain of the American Revolution lay in the fact that it marked the beginning of the end of the old system of colonial monopoly. In the Orient, as well as in America, colonies had been held by European nations purely for purposes of national exploitation. The movement for independence in America indicated the fact that the time would come when, with the development of colonial resources, dependence would be succeeded by independence.

THE BEGINNINGS OF LATIN AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

For a number of years after the American Revolution the Spanish colonies in America continued to be comparatively quiet and contented. Grave misfortunes, however, awaited the mother country. In 1808 Spain was invaded. Her King, Charles IV, was forced to abdicate and to transfer to Napoleon all right and titles to the Spanish Crown and to its colonial possessions. On June 15, 1808, Napoleon's brother, Joseph Bonaparte, was crowned as King of Spain at Bayonne. The people of Spain refused to bow to alien rule. Juntas were formed in various parts of the country for the purpose of resisting, in the name of Ferdinand VII, son of the dethroned monarch, the new government. Not long afterward similar movements took place in South America. Loyal juntas were formed, modeled on those that were organized in Spain. But owing to various causes, among which was the refusal of the Regency at Cadiz to recognize the American juntas, the loyalist movement in the colonies, although originally leveled against the Napoleonic Government in Spain, was gradually transformed into a genuine movement for independence. And as a result, Spain, after the restoration of her legitimate government, found herself in a state of war with her American colonies.

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RECOGNIZING THE NEW REPUBLICS

In this struggle the government of the United States maintained a neutral position; but the sympathies of the people ran strongly in favor of the revolutionists. At that moment every movement indeed for national independence naturally made a strong appeal to the sympathies of the people of the United States. Of the sympathy with the revolution in South America, the principal spokesman in our public life was Henry Clay.

In 1817 a commission consisting of Caesar A. Rodney, John Graham, and Theodoric Bland, with Henry M. Brackinridge as secretary, was sent out to examine into the conditions existing in South America, and particularly in Buenos Aires and Chile. The views of the commissioners, which in many respects differed, were embodied in separate reports. These reports were duly submitted to Congress, as was also a special report from Joel R. Poinsett, who had acted as an agent of the United States at Buenos Aires. The general tenor of the reports was unfavorable to the recognition of independence at that time, but this did not deter Mr. Clay from moving in the House of Representatives in March, 1818, an appropriation for the salary of a minister to the government which had its seat at Buenos Aires. It was not, however, till 1822 that recognition of independence began to be extended to the new American nations. Against such recognition, the Spanish Minister at Washington, in the name of his government, solemnly protested, but the action of the United States was vindicated, with his accustomed ability, by John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, on grounds both of right and of fact.

In spite of the protest of the Spanish Minister against the action of the United States, and of the refusal of his government for many years thereafter to recognize the independence of its former colonies, that independence had become an irrevocable reality. That of which Bolívar and his disciples had dreamed had come to pass.

THE PANAMA CONGRESS

Soon after the recognition of the South American governments by the United States, a situation arose in which it became necessary for the latter to consider what seemed to be a momentous step in its relations with the countries whose advent into the family of nations it had so heartily applauded.

On December 7, 1824, Bolívar, as head of the Republic of Peru, sent out an invitation to Colombia, Mexico, Central America, the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, Chile and Brazil, to send representatives to a congress at Panama. Subsequently, an invitation to attend the conference was extended

to the United States by the ministers of Colombia and Mexico. The subjects to be discussed by the Congress were divided into two classes: First, those peculiarly and exclusively concerning the countries which were still at war with Spain; and, secondly, those between belligerents and neutrals. In the discussion of the former, it was not expected that the United States would take part, but the occasion was thought to be opportune for the establishment of fixed principles of international law in matters in respect of which the previous uncertainty had been the cause of many evils.

At this time John Quincy Adams was President of the United States and Henry Clay was Secretary of State. Although they were careful to safeguard the neutral position of the United States, the proposal for a congress met with their warm and enthusiastic approval. With a long vision of the future, they sought to grasp the opportunity which lay before them to establish between the independent nations of this hemisphere the foundations of an enduring friendship.

Having been the first [said Adams] to recognize their independence and to sympathize with them, so far as was compatible with our neutral duties, in all their struggles and sufferings to acquire it, we have laid the foundation of our future intercourse with them on the broadest principles of reciprocity and the most cordial feelings of fraternal friendship. To extend those principles to all our commercial relations with them, and to hand down that friendship to future ages, is congenial to the highest policy of the Union, as it will be to that of all those nations and their posterity.

Entering into the matter more particularly, he placed the interest of the United States in the congress on four grounds: First, that of promoting "the principles of a liberal commercial intercourse"; second, the adoption of liberal principles of maritime law, including the rule that free ships make free goods, and the proper restriction of blockades; third, an agreement between all the parties that each would "guard by its own means against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders," as had already been announced in the message of Monroe; and fourth, the promotion of religious liberty.

Animated with these liberal sentiments, the President nominated to the Senate Richard C. Anderson of Kentucky and John Sergeant of Pennsylvania as envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary of the United States to the Congress. The proposed mission was strongly assailed in the Senate. It was charged that it involved a departure from the wise policy of non-intervention established by Washington. Another ground of opposition was that one of the questions proposed for discussion in the congress was "the consideration of the

means to be adopted for the entire abolition of the African slave trade." An apprehension was also felt that the congress would be called upon to consider plans of international consolidation which would commit the United States to a more hazardous connection with the fortunes of other countries than was desirable.

In the end, the nominations of the President were confirmed, but when our representatives reached the Isthmus of Panama the congress had adjourned. Four governments were represented in it, namely, Colombia, Central America, Mexico and Peru. The assembly held ten meetings, the last of which took place on July 15, 1826. Representatives of Great Britain and of the Netherlands were present on the Isthmus and, although they were not admitted to the congress, no doubt freely advised with its members.

A PREMATURE LEAGUE OF PEACE

Four agreements were signed in the congress: (1) A treaty of perpetual union, league and confederation; (2) an engagement for the assembling of the congress every two years, and, while the war with Spain lasted, every year; (3) a convention specifying the contributions in men, in ships, and in money, which the parties should make for the prosecution of the war against Spain; and (4) a plan for the organization of their common force. To a great extent these agreements related to the interests which the parties had as belligerents, but there were some of the stipulations which had a far wider scope. An attempt was made to establish a council for the interpretation of treaties and for the employment of conciliation and mediation in the settlement of international disputes. It was provided that all differences between the contracting parties should be amicably compromised, and that if this were not done, such differences should be submitted to the General Assembly, as it was called, for the formulation of an amicable recommendation. In case of complaints or injuries, the parties were not to declare war or to resort to reprisals without first submitting their grievances to the decision of the General Assembly. Nor was any of the parties to go to war against an outsider without soliciting the good offices, interposition and mediation of the allies. Any contracting party violating these stipulations, either by going to war with another, or by failing to comply with the decision of the General Assembly, was to be excluded from the confederation and was to be incapable of restoration except by a unanimous vote. The contracting parties also pledged themselves to co-operate to prevent colonial settlements within their borders, and as soon as their

boundaries were determined mutually to guarantee the integrity of their respective territories.

These benevolent proposals, which strongly remind us of some that are put forth today, were not destined to be carried into effect. The agreements signed at Panama were ratified by one only of the contracting parties—Colombia—and by Colombia only in part. In reality, the conditions at the time were such that effective co-operation was scarcely possible.

THE SEEDS OF DISTRUST

The practical failure of the United States to be represented at the Congress of Panama was an unfortunate omen. Indicative in itself of an attitude somewhat unsympathetic, this impression was deepened by the arguments by which the opposition to the mission was sustained. But, in addition to this, the continuance of the war with Spain, and the prevalence of revolutionary conditions in the new states, gave rise to frequent complaints and controversies. In the southern part of the hemisphere an unfavorable sentiment was no doubt created by the breaking up by the United States of the establishment which the government at Buenos Aires had made on the Falkland, or as the Argentines call them, the Malvinas, Islands, the title to which was generally believed to belong to Great Britain, by whom they were afterward effectively occupied. But the greatest source of disturbance was that which existed at the north, where Mexico labored in the constant throes of revolution. This cause of divergence was greatly accentuated by the revolt in Texas and the cry which sprang up in the United States for the “re-annexation” of that imperial domain which was alleged to have been a part of the Louisiana territory. As I have elsewhere remarked,² no acquisition of territory ever made by the United States was more natural or more completely in conformity with the aspirations and habits of thought of the American people. But the annexation, no matter how justifiable it may have been, followed by the war with Mexico, had upon our relations with the states of Central and South America a more pronounced and more unfavorable effect than any other event that has ever occurred. Of this fact, practically nothing is said in our histories, and I think it has never been fully understood; but its influence may easily be traced in the acts of the Central and South American Governments.

For some years after the Congress of Panama steps were from time to time taken to bring about another meeting. In this movement Mexico was the chief factor, no doubt because

2. *Four Phases of American Development*, p. 174.

of her apprehension as to the continued retention of her northern territory. The object which she proposed was a union and close alliance

for the purposes of defense against foreign invasion, the acceptance of friendly mediation in the settlement of all disputes . . . between the sister republics, and the framing and promulgation of a code of public law regulating their mutual relations.

Sixteen years later, in 1847, a congress composed of representatives of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, New Granada (now Colombia) and Peru, assembled at Lima for the purpose of adopting measures to insure "the independence, sovereignty, dignity and territorial integrity" of the republics concerned. Other American republics were to be admitted to the deliberations of the congress or to adhere to the agreements which it might conclude. The congress even decided to extend an invitation to the United States, but a favorable response could hardly have been expected, the United States being then at war with Mexico and in occupation of California and New Mexico, besides having annexed Texas. The invitation was probably intended to convey to the United States an intimation of the views and objects of the congress.

A UNION FOR MUTUAL PROTECTION

On September 15, 1856, there was signed at Santiago, in Chile, the so-called "Continental Treaty," between Chile, Ecuador and Peru, for the purpose, as the text declared, of cementing upon substantial foundations the union which exists between them, as members of the great American family . . . and promoting moral and material progress, as well as giving further guarantees of their independence and territorial integrity.

The government of Peru was authorized to communicate the treaty to other American governments and to request their adhesion. Brazil, although then a monarchy, was invited to join the union. The United States was not approached.

In reality the chief cause of the attempted alliance was the feeling of continued apprehension toward the United States caused by the expeditions of William Walker and other filibusters to Central America and Mexico in the years following the Mexican War.

The alarm created by these expeditions, and particularly by those of Walker to Central America, was profound, nor can it be said to have been destitute of foundation. Costa Rica, apprehensive as to her own future, undertook the necessary sacrifices of men and of money for the expulsion of the so-called Walker-Rivas government from Nicaragua. In their extremity, the countries of Central America then looked for help to Eu-

rope rather than to the United States, and they felt that, so far as thanks were due to any foreign power for aid in the suppression of filibustering, they were due chiefly to France and Great Britain, who eventually took concerted action in that direction.

THE MEXICAN PROBLEM

Moreover, ten years after the close of the war with Mexico, a serious condition of affairs again arose between the United States and that country. By the so-called Gadsden Treaty of 1853, the United States acquired by purchase the Mesilla Valley from Mexico. Five years later, in 1858, President Buchanan, referring in his second annual message to Congress to the unhappy condition of affairs existing along the southwestern frontier of the United States, earnestly advised Congress "to assume a temporary protectorate over the northern parts of Chihuahua and Sonora, and to establish military posts within the same.

This protection might [he said] be withdrawn as soon as local governments should be established in those states capable of performing their duties to the United States, of restraining lawlessness and of preserving peace along the borders.

The disorders continuing to increase, he recurred to the subject in his third annual message and recommended that he be authorized to "employ a sufficient military force to enter Mexico for the purpose of obtaining indemnity for the past and security for the future." In making this recommendation, he referred to Mexico as "a wreck upon the ocean, drifting about as she is impelled by different factions." In these circumstances he intimated that if the United States should not take appropriate action, it would not be surprising if some other nation should undertake the task.

Having discovered that his recommendations would not be sustained by Congress, he sought to accomplish the same object by means of treaties, but the United States was then on the verge of a great convulsion which was to shake the structure of its own government to the very foundations, and attention was drawn from affairs in Mexico and other American countries to the approaching crisis in affairs at home.

But for the occurrence of the Civil War in the United States, there is every reason to believe that the relations between this country and the other independent nations of this hemisphere would have been substantially different from those that now prevail. The opposition to the extension of slavery having always operated as a force antagonistic to expansion toward the south, the outbreak of the Civil War put a sudden

end to the tendencies in that direction, and also served to create a readier sympathy with countries afflicted with domestic dissensions. The attitude of the United States underwent an instantaneous and profound change. The government of Costa Rica, when discussing with the government of Colombia in 1862 a proposal for a "Continental League," observed that there were not always at the head of the great Republic of the North "moderate, just and upright men such as those who now form the administration of President Lincoln." This utterance is highly significant, not only of the impression that had so long prevailed, but also of the change which was taking place. The feeling of sympathy was also quickened by the sense of common danger which followed the French invasion of Mexico. And later, when Spain went to war with the republics on the west coast of South America, the good offices of the United States were employed for the purpose of bringing about a termination of the conflict.

This was done by means of a conference, which was opened at the Department of State at Washington, on October 29, 1870, under the presidency of Hamilton Fish, who was then, Secretary of State. Representatives of Spain, Peru, Chile and Ecuador attended. And on April 11, 1871, the contending parties agreed upon an armistice which was to continue indefinitely, and which could not be broken by any of the belligerents except after three years' notice given through the government of the United States of its intention to renew hostilities. During the continuance of this armistice all restrictions on neutral commerce which were incident to a state of war were to cease. Mr. Fish signed these articles "in the character of mediator."

This important act affords a notable illustration of the change which had supervened in the relations between the United States and the other independent nations of this hemisphere. But it was only an augury of what was to take place in the future.

Toward the close of the decade in which the perpetual armistice was signed, there broke out what is commonly known as the War of the Pacific, between Chile on the one side, and Peru and Bolivia on the other. This unfortunate conflict naturally revived the thoughts which had so often been cherished of the formulation of a plan for the preservation of peace among the American nations. A step in this direction was taken when, on September 3, 1880, the representatives of Chile and Colombia, on the initiative of the latter, signed at Bogota a treaty by which they bound themselves "in perpetuity to submit to arbitration . . . all controversies and differences" of

every nature whatsoever which could not be settled by diplomacy. And it was further agreed that if they should be unable to concur in the choice of an arbitrator, the arbitral function should be discharged by the President of the United States—a provision which bore eloquent testimony to the growth of friendly sentiments. The two governments further engaged at the earliest opportunity to conclude similar conventions with the other American nations to the end as they said, “that the settlement by arbitration of each and every international controversy shall become a principle of American public law.” On the strength of the signing of this treaty, the Colombian government, on October 11, 1880, issued an invitation for a conference to be held at Panama; but, as Chile and Peru continued at war, action upon the invitation was deferred.

THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN CONFERENCE

The project, however, was not abandoned. On November 29, 1881, James G. Blaine, as Secretary of State, extended, in the name of the President of the United States, to all the independent countries of North and South America an earnest invitation to participate in a General Congress to be held in the City of Washington on the twenty-fourth day of November, 1882, for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America.

“To this one great object,” Mr. Blaine declared it to be the desire of the President that “the attention of the congress should be strictly confined.” The continuance of the war between Chile and Peru led to the subsequent withdrawal of this invitation. But, in reality, the accomplishment of its great design was only postponed; for, after the submission and consideration from time to time of many proposals, the Congress of the United States, at length, by an act of May 24, 1888, authorized the President to invite the Republics of Mexico, Central and South America, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and the Empire of Brazil, to join the United States in a conference to meet at Washington on October 2, 1889. The subjects proposed for the consideration of the conference were: (1) Measures tending to preserve the peace and promote the prosperity of the American nations; (2) measures toward the formation of a customs union; (3) the establishment of frequent communications between the various countries; (4) uniform customs regulations; (5) a uniform system of weights and measures; (6) laws for the protection of patents, copyrights and trademarks; (7) extradition; (8) the adoption of a common silver coin; (9) the formulation of “a definite plan of arbitration of all questions, disputes, and differences that may now or here-

after exist" between the American nations, "to the end that all difficulties and disputes between such nations may be peaceably settled and wars prevented."

When the conference assembled, Mr. Blaine again occupied the post of Secretary of State. His address of welcome to the delegates was worthy of the occasion, and he was chosen to preside over the deliberations of the assembly. This was the first of what have come to be distinctively known as The International American Conferences, of which four have already been held, and the fifth of which would now be in session but for the breaking out of the unfortunate conflict in Europe.

A PLAN OF ARBITRATION

The first conference continued to sit until the nineteenth of April, 1890. Various important international agreements were formulated. Among these, one of the most notable was the plan for international arbitration, which was adopted on April 18, 1890. By this plan it was declared that arbitration as a means of settling disputes between the American nations was adopted "as a principle of American international law"; that arbitration should be obligatory in all controversies concerning diplomatic and consular privileges, boundaries, territories, indemnities, the right of navigation, and the validity and enforcement and construction of treaties; and that it should be equally obligatory in all other cases, whatever might be their origin, nature or object, with the sole exception of those which, in the judgment of one of the nations involved in the controversy, might imperil its independence. But it was provided that even in this case, while arbitration for that nation should be optional, it "should be obligatory upon the adversary power." As yet this plan represents but an aspiration, since it failed to receive the approval of the governments whose representatives adopted it. In connection with it, there was also adopted a declaration against the acquisition of title by conquest which was designed to form, in effect, an integral part of the arbitral plan.

DEFINITE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE

An agreement destined to produce practical result was that by which was constituted the Bureau of the American Republics, now known by the short title of the Pan-American Union. This organization, after twenty years of active usefulness, had the good fortune four years ago to be installed at Washington in a building which is one of the finest examples of architecture in the country.

Another measure that has yielded definite results was the

agreement for the prosecution of surveys for what is popularly known as the Inter-Continental Railway. Although it is not probable that such a railway will, in the near future, furnish an actual means of transportation between, for instance, New York and Buenos Aires, yet the various links in the chain of railways to which the name of Inter-Continental is applicable have been steadily progressing and many of them are in actual use for purposes of transportation.

A notable event of the first International American Conference was the transformation of the Empire of Brazil into the Republic of Brazil. This transition from a monarchical to a republican form of government was brought about by a revolution which was substantially bloodless. The wise and patriotic ruler, Don Pedro II, scarcely more eminent as a statesman than as a student of science and of philosophy, retired without a contest before the demonstration on the part of his people of a desire for a change in the form of their government. There was thus fulfilled the aspiration, manifested in Brazil just a hundred years before, when, in 1789, a movement for independence was started in the State of Minas Geraes by a group of Brazilian students, one of whom had met and talked with Thomas Jefferson in France in 1786. And in this relation it is interesting to note that, by the constitution of Brazil, the republic is forbidden to undertake, directly or indirectly, a war of conquest either by itself or in alliance with another government.

LATER CONFERENCES

Between the first and second International Conference of American States, an interval of more than eleven years elapsed. The second conference sat in the City of Mexico from October 22, 1901, to January 31, 1902. One of its notable results is the fact that, by means of it, the American nations became parties to The Hague Convention of 1899 for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Moreover, a project of a treaty was adopted for the arbitration, as between American nations, of pecuniary claims. This treaty was signed by the delegations of all the countries represented in the conference. It obligated the contracting parties for a period of five years to submit to the Permanent Court at The Hague all claims for pecuniary losses or damage which might be presented by their respective citizens, when such claims were of sufficient importance to justify the expense of arbitration; but it also permitted the contracting parties to organize a special jurisdiction in case they should so desire.

The Third International American Conference was held in

Rio de Janeiro in 1906, and resulted in the conclusion of certain treaties or conventions, two of which may be specially mentioned. One was the convention for the renewal of the treaty concluded at Mexico for the arbitration of pecuniary claims. The other is the convention providing for the creation of what is known as the International Commission of Jurists, to formulate codes of international law for the American nations. This commission held its first meeting at Rio de Janeiro in the summer of 1912, and is to hold a second meeting at the same place in the summer of 1915. At the first meeting the commission was divided into committees, to each of which is entrusted the preparation of drafts of statutes on certain designated subjects. The work of the commission is to be submitted for final approval, to the governments concerned, or to the International American Conference, and, so far as its provisions may be of general application, it is not improbable that they may be brought before the Peace Conference at The Hague when conditions are such as to admit of the revival of that assembly.

The Fourth International American Conference was held at Buenos Aires in 1910. It was notable for having finally dealt with all the subjects on its program, including treaties relating to patents, trade-marks and copyrights. A treaty was also made for the indefinite extension of the agreement for the arbitration of pecuniary claims. In the report of the delegates to the Fourth Conference, special reference is made to the harmony which characterized its deliberations. There can be no doubt that, quite apart from the actual work accomplished, the free interchange of views in friendly conference between representative men from all parts of America cannot fail to create a better understanding and to draw closer the relations between the countries concerned. This is indeed one of the chief benefits of the International American Conferences. The process of assimilating or harmonizing legal rules and remedies in countries whose systems of jurisprudence are derived from different sources is necessarily slow and uncertain. But this by no means implies the existence of a serious obstacle to the promotion of a free and beneficial intercourse.

IS THERE A LATIN AMERICA?¹

NO doubt one of the chief impediments to the development and preservation of relations of amity and intimacy between the United States and the other independent nations of this hemisphere is the want of real information as to the conditions which actually exist in the various countries and the erroneous impressions that consequently prevail in regard to those conditions. As the result of the fact that the countries to the south of the United States have not all a common origin, and that, while all but one formerly belonged to Spain, the largest of them all, Brazil, was once a colony of Portugal, it has become the fashion to group them indiscriminately as "Latin America." The employment of this phrase, although it may be necessary, has tended to confirm two radically erroneous impressions, one being that all the countries called Latin are really Latin; and the other, that all the countries called Latin are alike. In saying this, I do not advert to the fact that the impression seems widely to prevail that Spanish, and not Portuguese, is the language of Brazil. What I mean is that it seems to be generally supposed that in population, in institutions and in administration, they are all alike. In reality, in these respects, and particularly in the constituents of their population, they exhibit as between themselves differences more pronounced than those that exist between the United States and some of them. The circumstance has already been mentioned that Brazil, on severing her connection with Portugal, continued, till 1889, under a monarchical form of government—a fact that constituted not the slightest hindrance to the maintenance of the most cordial relations with that country.

LATIN AMERICAN STABILITY

As a result of the misapprehensions to which I have adverted, little has been understood in the United States of the causes of the internal disorders by which some of the Ameri-

1. *In the last number of The Independent Mr. Moore outlined the history of Pan-American diplomacy. In this paper he analyzes the present situation in the South and Central American republics in so far as it affects our own relations with them and challenges the superficiality of our attitude to these neighbors of ours.*—THE EDITOR. Reprinted from *The Independent*, January 18, 1915.

can republics have been afflicted. Regarding all Latin-American countries as one, a tendency has existed to assume that government in all of them is equally unstable. That this impression is altogether erroneous may be demonstrated by a few examples. In more than one of the states of Central America, for instance, revolutions have been frequent and have seemed at times to be chronic, but the very opposite is the case in Costa Rica, sometimes called the "Athens of Central America." No change in government by revolution has taken place in that country since 1870. Habits of statesmanship have developed there, and when, two years ago, a question arose under their local law as to the presidential succession, the problem was solved in a manner that would have done credit to any country. Her people are intensely devoted to the maintenance of their national independence and are proud of the skill which they have achieved in government. In Chile there has been only one serious civil disturbance in a long stretch of years, namely, the Balmacedist or Congressional Revolution of 1891. Chile has justified the prediction of Bolivar that the spirit of liberty there would never be extinguished. In Argentina one government has for many years followed another in orderly succession. Her capital is one of the world's finest cities, and boasts of a press which may well share our admiration with that of Rio de Janeiro. In Brazil, since the sudden governmental change of 1889, there has been but one civil disturbance of serious proportions, and this lasted only a little more than six months. Nor should we forget that there is no country that can boast a constant and assured immunity from disturbances, either domestic or foreign.

I have already adverted to the bloodless character of the transition in Brazil from monarchical to republican government. This fortunate issue may largely be ascribed to the element of idealism which has so often distinguished the political conduct of American statesmen, an idealism which can be fully appreciated only when we reflect upon the struggles in which they at times have been compelled to engage, in their efforts to maintain liberal institutions, such as exist in the United States. The same tendency accounts for the peaceful abolition of slavery in South America, and particularly in Brazil, where the system, having gained a strong foothold, tended to linger, but where it was eventually destroyed without forcible resistance. While it would be going too far to say that those whose material interests were directly affected accepted emancipation with universal gratitude, they at any rate accepted it intelligently as a duty to country and to humanity.

LATIN AMERICAN STATESMEN

Another misconception that more or less prevails in regard to the countries of Latin America is that which relates to the personal integrity of their statesmen. Certain bad examples, which it is unnecessary to enumerate, have served to spread the supposition that the chief cause of revolutions in those countries is the desire for the possession of the custom houses. Here, as elsewhere, it is necessary to exercise discrimination. Perhaps there is no country in which the desire for the emoluments of office has not more or less influence on the conduct of individuals, or where the desire for illicit gains does not furnish an occasional motive. The existence of such conditions and the extent to which they prevail necessarily depend upon the character of the society and the general state of the population. The supposition, however, that in the countries of Latin America a want of integrity in public officials is general, involves an error of fact and a serious injustice. Personal integrity is the rule, and not the exception, among the statesmen of the American republics, even outside the United States. I have often thought of one of my colleagues in the Fourth International American Congress, Señor Gonzalo Ramírez, as one of the finest examples I have ever known of public integrity, and I feel at liberty particularly to mention him because since the adjournment of the Conference he has past away. He had spent nearly all his life in the public service; was a jurist, and a professor at the University of Montevideo; and was also a diplomatist, holding at the end of his life the important and responsible position of Uruguayan Minister at Buenos Aires. I saw his modest home at Montevideo, whose dimensions betokened a life in which fortune had been sacrificed to fame, and private interest to public duty. At the conference at Buenos Aires he was appointed chairman of the committee on the renewal of the treaties between the American republics for the arbitration of pecuniary claims. At that time he was in the last stage of his fatal illness. In consequence of his infirm physical condition, regular sessions of the committee could not be held, and it was agreed among the members that its meetings should be held at his lodgings at any time during the day or evening when he might notify us that he should be able to preside. He did his share, and indeed, more than his share of the work of the committee, making himself the first draft of its report. I can see him now before me, seated in an invalid's chair, his mind alert, his interest eager, his sense of duty supreme, devoting the last efforts of his fast-ebbing life to the promotion of justice, mutual respect and friendship among the American nations.

Many other illustrations might be given, but I will mention only one—the case of the late Baron Rio-Branco, of Brazil, who died in February, 1912, after having held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs for a longer period than a similar position has been held by any other person in this hemisphere. At the time of his decease he was serving under his fourth President. Having past many years in the public service, it was a well known fact that, although he was the son of another eminent Brazilian statesman, he was destitute of private fortune and depended for his support upon the rewards which had been voted by a grateful nation. After his death, his library was purchased by the government for the benefit of his family, as an additional mark of the national gratitude.

LATIN AMERICAN POLICY

Lastly, I desire to refer to the misapprehensions which have existed in regard to the Monroe Doctrine. The Third International American Conference, which sat at Rio de Janeiro, was held in what is known as the Monroe Palace, named in honor of the enunciator of the famous American policy. Brazil was one of the first, perhaps the first, of the American nations to applaud that doctrine. The Baron Rio-Branco, of whom I have just spoken, was a strenuous asserter of it. But he asserted it, not as the exclusive concern of any one nation, but as the direct and immediate concern of all the American nations. When, therefore, a so-called Anglo-American syndicate, incorporated in one of the states of the United States, proposed, in the exercise of extraordinary political powers and commercial privileges granted by a neighbor of Brazil, to introduce European colonists into the upper reaches of certain affluents of the Amazon, he protested against what he called "the first attempt to introduce in our continent the African and Asiatic system of chartered companies," or government by foreign "semi-sovereign entities," and took the necessary measures to obtain from the syndicate the renunciation of all rights and claims under its concession, the effect of which was thus completely nullified.

So far as the Monroe Doctrine is held to guard the political system of this hemisphere against external subversion or attack, the American nations cordially accept it and look to the United States as its author and mainstay. In this sense it is eulogized by the statesmen of Latin America. In closing the Fourth International American Conference in 1910, one of Argentina's great orators, who, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, presided as honorary president at the final session, paid an

eloquent tribute to American solidarity and to the United States as the proponent of the Monroe Doctrine.

In this year [said Dr. Rodriguez Larreta] the majority of our republics complete a century of independent life. We can now say, with Washington, "America for humanity," because we are sovereign nations and the place we occupy in the world we owe to the strength of our own arms and our blood heroically shed. But let my last words be to send a message of acknowledgment to the great nation which initiated these conferences, which preceded us in the struggle for independence, which afforded us the example of a fruitful people organized as a republican nation, which, on a day memorable in history, declared "America for America," and covered as with a shield our hard won independence.

In this sense the Monroe Doctrine is received in South America with sentiments of the most friendly and cordial concurrence. But there is another sense in which the other independent nations, and especially such powerful states as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, find themselves unable to accept it. This sense, which is said to represent the view of the "man in the street," was expressed not long ago in an editorial utterance in one of our journals in the following terms:

Whatever its interest at stake or wrong suffered in Latin America, we sternly enjoin every European power to keep its hands off of what we make our international business and what we decree must be the business of nobody else.

In other words, it is said we have decreed not only that the international relations of all the independent states of America are subject to our control, but also that other nations can deal with them only through us or under our supervision.

Of this view it is to be observed that it must, in the first place, arouse resentment in the independent countries of America, since it places them all in the subordinate position of protectorates, subject to our dictation. And it must, in the second place, provoke the opposition of all other powers, since they are naturally unable to admit that they cannot conduct their affairs directly with states which are professedly and in law and in fact, independent.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE FACTS

Let us consider for a moment what such a conception as that above defined really signifies. The area of the United States embraces less than 3,000,000 square miles. We often have difficulty in preserving order and insuring the protection of foreigners in our own jurisdiction, over which we possess exclusive legal control. The countries of Latin America comprise an area of more than 8,000,000 square miles, or almost three

times our own; and over these more than 8,000,000 square miles we exercise no governmental control. And yet, within this vast area, it is asserted that we are to assume the protection of aliens and the redress of their grievances as a matter that concerns us, to the exclusion of all other foreign governments. Does not this assumption appear to be somewhat superficial and extravagant?

Again, the passage above quoted speaks of Latin America. On this phrase I have already commented, and I can only repeat that no one possessing the slightest acquaintance with the American countries called "Latin" would think of putting them all in one category of political and international treatment. Even in regard to population they differ radically. While Mexico has a population chiefly composed of indigenous races, Argentina, on the other hand, has a population almost wholly European. Brazil, although possessing a far larger indigenous element, has had a strong government and has produced many able, enlightened and progressive statesmen. Chile has had, since 1850, few years of civil war. The record of Costa Rica has already been mentioned. Uruguay boasts of the large proportion of her revenues spent on public education. I advert to these things merely as illustrations of how a want of information leads the way to misconception.

Examined historically, the assumption that the independent states of America are to be regarded as mere protectorates of the United States is even more destitute of foundation. From the first dawn of the independence of American states down to the present, our Government has never denied the right of other powers to conduct their relations directly with the nations of America. In numerous instances, indeed, force has been employed—a contingency to which even we ourselves might conceivably be exposed. In the fourth decade of the last century, France and Great Britain blockaded the ports of Buenos Aires and Uruguay. France resorted to reprisals against Mexico in the same decade. We ourselves were at war with Mexico for the redress of our own grievances from 1846 to 1848. In 1861, France, Great Britain and Spain resorted to reprisals against Mexico without protest on our part. Later, when France (Great Britain and Spain having withdrawn) essayed to set up and maintain a monarchy in Mexico, we rightfully and necessarily protested and eventually brought the attempt to an end. I have already adverted to the war between Spain and the republics on the west coast of South America in the sixties. In 1894 Great Britain seized the port of Corinto, in Nicaragua, to collect an indemnity. In 1903, Germany, Great Britain and Italy blockaded the ports of Venezuela, with the

acquiescence of this Government, it being expressly understood that there should be no permanent occupation or acquisition of Venezuelan territory. Although I mention these incidents, I am not to be understood as advocating or justifying the employment of force in any particular instance, or as intimating that the United States is not justified in exhibiting special concern in regard to what may tend to jeopardize the independence of states for whose preservation it has assumed a contingent responsibility. I refer to them, on the contrary, for the purpose of showing the baselessness of the supposition that our statesmen have understood that the Monroe Doctrine involved a diminution of the primary rights and liabilities of the independent states of this hemisphere.

Within the past year we have witnessed a remarkable incident in the relations of the United States with the American republics. I refer to the mediation of the representatives of the so called A B C powers of South America—Argentina, Brazil and Chile—in the conflict between the United States and Mexico, beginning with the occupation of Vera Cruz. This proceeding was purely international in character, and did not embrace the settlement of the domestic questions which continue to produce disturbances in our southern neighbor. It resulted, however, in the relief of the strained situation between the United States and Mexico, and set a precedent which must have a pronounced effect upon the attitude of the mediating powers toward the United States, for not only did it recognize the equality of those powers with the great republic of the north, but it impliedly admitted that differences which gravely menace the relations of individual American states are matters of concern to all the American nations.

Let us hope that the principle thus acknowledged will continue to produce beneficent results, till it shall have realized the aspirations which generous minds have entertained for the establishment of the relations between the American nations on the basis of confidence, respect and friendly co-operation.

PAN AMERICAN FINANCIAL CONFERENCE SUMMARY OF GROUP CONFERENCE REPORTS¹

GENTLEMEN, as the president of the Conference has stated, a great deal of work has been devoted to the preparation of these group reports. Although I have been connected with a number of conferences, I have not known any whose members applied themselves more constantly and assiduously and devotedly to the performance of their duties than have the members of this Conference. It may be said that they have dined while they worked, and worked while they dined. They have worked all of the time.

A few of the delegations presented written suggestions to the Secretary of the Treasury on their arrival here. Those papers have been printed, and are in your hands. A few of the reports of the group committees—three or four—have been printed. A number—I should say seven or eight additional reports—have been handed in in manuscript. Others probably will be submitted in the course of the day. As the president of the Conference has stated, those that have been presented within the past 24 hours in manuscript have been turned over to the printer.

I have undertaken to make a brief summary of the group reports, so far as they have been received:

BOLIVIA

The report of Bolivia presents a full review of the financial conditions and trade and commerce of that country, including its natural resources, particularly its minerals, rubber, timber, fruit, and live stock. It also deals with the question of railway extension and transportation, ocean and interior, and with the monetary situation, banking, and finance. It suggests the organization of a central commercial agency in connection with, or under the supervision of, the United States Chamber of Commerce.

BRAZIL

This report deals with the financing of transactions involving the importation and exportation of goods, with questions of local commercial banking and with the various ques-

1. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1915.

tions of trade and of commerce. It recommends in particular, first, that greater prominence be given in the public schools and other educational institutions of the United States to the study of the Central and South American countries, their geographical location, natural resources, government, and languages; second, that emphasis be given to the necessity of greater liberality being exercised in the interpretation of customs regulations by the countries of North America and Latin America, especially with respect to the free entrance or drawback of duty on travelers' samples or other samples introduced into the respective countries solely for the purpose of promoting trade. It accentuates, in the third place, the necessity of the more effective protection of trade-marks; fourth, the facilitation of reciprocal business relations between merchants and manufacturers of both nations, the granting of such reasonable credits in both directions as may be safe and desirable, and the establishment of trustworthy means whereby merchants and manufacturers of either nation can determine with reasonable accuracy the financial responsibility of the purchaser of the other nations; fifth, the establishment is recommended between the United States and Latin American countries of a system of direct exchange based on the dollar unit of the United States; sixth, in order to facilitate the interchange of products adapted to the needs of American countries, it recommends the formation of bureaus of standards of the respective countries to standardize, in so far as possible, the requirements of each country, and recommends to the manufacturers and purchasers of the several countries the immediate recognition of such standards and corresponding weights and measures; seventh, attention is drawn to the favorable results which have followed the granting by Brazil and Cuba of preferential duties applying to certain products of the United States, and the extension of reciprocal tariff concessions between the Latin American countries and the United States is strongly urged; eighth, it emphasizes the extreme need of rapid, frequent, and dependable marine transportation service to provide adequately for the maintenance and development of commerce between the countries of North and South America.

CHILE

The group report of Chile recommends the adoption by the various countries of legislation, first, to facilitate the drawing of bills of exchange upon one another, by the financial institutions of South American countries and the financial institutions of the United States; second, to make bonded warehouse

warrants and receipts available as collateral security for the development of international commerce. It recommends the advisability of permitting the payment of such parts of the export duties on nitrates from Chile to the United States as are now paid in 90 days' drafts, sterling, on London—in 90 days' sight drafts in dollars in New York, at such rates of exchange as may be periodically fixed by the Chilean authorities; also that such changes be made in the laws of the United States as will enable bankers to extend their credit, discount, and rediscount facilities, so as to conform to the trade customs and necessities of Latin America. It also recommends that a permanent inter-American commission be established to study commercial problems and conditions.

COLOMBIA

The Colombian delegates have submitted to the Conference comprehensive pamphlets dealing with the financial and economic situation in that country and with the question of public works. They recommend, first, special committees for each country similar to those appointed in connection with this conference; second, the cooperation of those committees in financial and commercial matters; third, the consideration of the establishment of a general executive council to meet in Washington at least once a year; fourth, the consideration of the appointment of a board of engineers to investigate projects which require financing.

COSTA RICA

The report of the Costa Rican group gives a full survey of the public finances of that country, its monetary situation, banking situation, and financing of private enterprises. It emphasizes the importance of foreign credits to the extension of inter-American markets. The subjects of merchant marine and improved transportation facilities are very fully covered.

CUBA

The report of the Cuban group, after a study of commercial relations, recommends that the high duties that hamper the importation of Cuban tobacco into the United States be ameliorated, and in view of the abolition by the United States of import duties on sugar, that the principle of the reciprocal reduction of duties be extended by treaty stipulations, in addition to those that already exist, so as to preserve the principle of reciprocity as the foundation of trade relations between the two countries. This report also deals with the question of transportation and with those of the parcels post, the exten-

sion of credits, and the sending out of expert commercial travelers with samples. It also urges the making uniform, so far as may be practicable, of commercial laws, and the extension of the system of arbitration for the settlement of commercial disputes.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The report of the Dominican Republic reviews the present state of the public finances in that country and suggests remedies for present inconveniences. Particularly, it advises a reduction of the duties on Dominican tobacco in the United States, and the making of an adequate reciprocity treaty between the Dominican Republic and this country. The present banking situation and the extension and liberalizing of banking facilities are dealt with; also, the financing, first of public improvements, and secondly, of private enterprises. There is, besides, a discussion of the extension of inter-American markets, while the development of the merchant marine and the improvement of transportation facilities are emphasized. Attention is drawn to the desirability of modifying existing postal conventions in these particulars: First, the extension to the countries embracing the Pan American Union of the same letter rates as now exist between the United States, Cuba, and Mexico; secondly, the extension to those countries of the same rates of newspaper postage as exist in the United States, and thirdly, the adoption by the same countries of uniform service for postal money-orders and parcels post.

ECUADOR

Conditions in Ecuador are very fully presented in a memorandum handed to the president of this conference—the Secretary of the Treasury—before the conference met. The memorandum is full of suggestions as to the work that might properly be undertaken by this conference. These suggestions are grouped under 11 heads and in all embrace 32 different topics, and I may say that this paper was very useful in the work of the subcommittee of the committee on uniform laws.

I will first summarize the report of Ecuador, which has come in since the morning. It refers to the subject of public finance, the monetary situation in that country, the present banking situation; it deals with the subject of financing public improvements and financing private improvements. It also treats of the subject of the extension of inter-American markets, of the improvement of the merchant marine and transportation facilities, and of better regulations for commercial travelers and their samples.

I have referred to the previous very full memorandum presented by the Ecuadorian delegation to the Secretary of the Treasury at the opening of the conference.

GUATEMALA

The report of the Guatemala group contains a review of financial and commercial conditions of that country. It recommends, first, that practical demonstrations be given in Guatemala of agricultural machinery and tools made in the United States; second, that the attention of American manufacturers be drawn to the opportunity for the use of portable sawmills in cutting the woods of the country, and of improved sugar cane machinery; third, that the shipment of wares be made in packages suited to the transportation facilities or requirements in the various countries; fourth, that the American manufacturers maintain in Guatemala City a permanent exhibition of their products; fifth, that a uniform postal system throughout the Americas be adopted; sixth, that there be a uniform classification of articles for the purpose of levying customs duties; seventh, that American merchants grant credits of not less than 90 days for the payment of purchases; eighth, that expert agents be sent out to sell goods; ninth, that facilities be afforded in American schools for young men from Latin America; tenth, that increased attention be bestowed in Latin American countries upon the study of political economy, finance, and business questions in the schools; eleventh, that professors and students be interchanged; twelfth, that the teaching of Spanish and of courses in the history and geography of Latin America be more generally provided in the United States; thirteenth, that chambers of commerce be more generally established; and finally, that the improvement of transportation facilities, the appointment of consulting commissions in each country, and the extension of banking facilities be always borne in mind.

HONDURAS

The next report which I have to summarize is that of Honduras, which deals, first, with the public revenues and expenditures as affected by the war in Europe; the measures or remedies to meet the situation, and the possibilities of international cooperation. It deals also with the monetary situation in its different aspects and the banking situation; recommends the establishment of branch banks and direct exchange. It also treats of the financing of public improvements by, first, national loans and, secondly, provincial or State loans; also the financing of private enterprises, including railways and elec-

tric lighting companies. It recommends an improvement in the laws relating to trade-marks and the classification of merchandise and urges the extension of inter-American markets by more liberal credits, acceptances, and discounts and the employment of dollar exchange. It strongly recommends the improvement of transportation facilities, of the postal service, and of the parcel post. Honduras, it is stated, will, in the manner indicated in its report, stand ready to grant subventions to steamship lines. It endorses the Argentine proposition as to the arbitration of commercial disputes.

NICARAGUA

The report of the Nicaragua group, which is in type, and which has probably reached your hands by this time, reviews the political, commercial, and financial conditions of that country, describes its natural resources, emphasizes the importance of improving banking facilities, draws attention to the fact that Nicaragua is a promising field for the investment of capital, and recommends the ratification by the United States of the pending treaty between the two countries.

PANAMA

The report of the Panama group makes recommendation in regard to the acceptance by local banks and dealers of coupon books, issued by the Panama Canal Co., in the purchase of commodities, and certain changes in the practices of commissariat owned, directly or indirectly, by the United States. It also recommends that discriminatory freight rates on the Panama Railroad Co. be abolished; and that the use of the canal for transportation between the ports of Panama and Colon be secured freely. It also recommends that the Federal Reserve Board open branch banks in North, Central, and South America; that shipping facilities be improved, and that in sending out quotations of prices, and in the drawing of drafts, computation be made upon the United States dollar.

PARAGUAY

The next report, which has just come into my hands, is that of Paraguay. It also deals with the internal monetary situation, recommends the improvement of banking facilities, points out the need of foreign capital for the development of Paraguayan resources, showing that there exists there a profitable field for investment of capital from the United States. It also strongly urges the establishment of a system of obtaining information as to the financial and business standing of merchants of the countries concerned, and also indorses the pro-

posal for the establishment of a system of arbitration for commercial disputes.

PERU

The next report is that of Peru, which recommends the establishment of branches of American banks in that country, and advises that steps be taken by the United States financial institutions to facilitate the placing of loans in South America. It urges uniform custom regulations, the adoption of methods in the United States to place the resources of the country at the disposal of foreign commerce, the establishment of bonded warehouses and the issuance of receipts or warrants which will be accepted by banks as security for loans, the establishment of exchange on the dollar basis, and the appointment of an international commission to deal with the various questions mentioned. It also treats of the need of improved transportation facilities, and again indorses the proposal for the arbitration of commercial disputes. It finally recommends the countries, which have not as yet done so, to adopt pure-food and pure-drug laws.

In connection with this recommendation the report asks special attention to an accompanying memorandum signed by Mr. Eduardo Higgenson, the Peruvian delegate, and approved by the Hon. Isaac Alzamora, chairman, in which information is given regarding the present situation in Peru, the desirability of investments there. It touches upon the possibility that when the present conflict in Europe is over it may be necessary to exercise vigilance and to be energetic here unless trade should tend to revert to former channels. No doubt the American merchants will be alive to that. This memorandum recommends the establishment of American banks in Peru; also of branches of American manufactories, and the formation of agricultural, land, and real estate banks, the want of which is greatly felt in Peru. It refers to the importance of improving domestic as well as foreign transportation; of the establishment of direct passenger service under the American flag to Callao, arranged so as to avoid quarantine difficulties. It also urges the reduction of cable rates and points out the need of high-power wireless stations in Peru.

In conclusion, it states that perhaps the measure of greatest necessity is that which deals with the condition of foodstuffs coming into Peru. The laws of the United States governing this matter are very strict, and properly so, and therefore it recommends that the benefit of the pure food and drug laws be extended to importation and exportation in all Pan American countries.

SALVADOR

The report of the Salvador group emphasizes the lack of commercial treaties between that country and the United States. It recommends the establishment of a chamber of commerce in Salvador; it strongly urges co-operation of banking institutions in establishing reasonable credits, and lastly, the exchange of students and the wider dissemination of commercial and agricultural information.

URUGUAY

The report of the Uruguay group deals, first, with the improvement of transportation (a) by abolishing discriminatory duties, and (b) by granting direct or indirect subsidies to shipping, or both; second, with the adoption of the metric system of weights and measures, and, meanwhile, the making up of prices, invoices, and bills of lading in the metrical unit. Thirdly, it urges that cheaper cable rates be secured, and that the governments undertake, in co-operation, the development of wireless telegraph systems. The report recommends the establishment of an international monetary unit and of improved banking facilities, the granting of more liberal credits, and the adhesion of the North American countries to the South American postal convention of Montevideo of June, 1911. The report further recommends the making of reciprocity arrangements, the interchange of students, and lastly, the decrease of duties on the necessities of life, and the adoption of progressive taxes on inheritance, and also the co-operation of the governments forming the Pan American Union in devising and in enforcing measures to overcome frauds in these particulars.

This, gentlemen, is a summary of the group reports in so far as they have been received up to the present moment.

VENEZUELA

The last report which I have to summarize is that of Venezuela. It deals with the subjects of merchant marine and ocean transportation and of improved postal facilities, and a summary is given of Venezuelan trade. It urges the extension of inter-American markets by the establishment of more liberal credits. It indorses the project for the arbitration of commercial disputes. It advises that our newspapers and periodicals should more rigidly examine material that comes to them, particularly that which contains an element of liveliness, based upon supposed troubles that do not actually exist. [Applause.] It treats of the desirableness of the development of public

utilities, railroads, and public improvements. Much information is given as to the monetary system of Venezuela and to the present state of the public debt.

DIGEST OF THE WORK OF THE PAN AMERICAN CONFERENCE¹

THE report of Bolivia is a review of the financial conditions, trade and commerce of that country. It also deals with the question of railway extension and transportation, both ocean and interior; with the monetary situation, banking and finance and suggests the organization of a central commercial agency in connection with, or, under the supervision of the United States Chamber of Commerce.

Chili recommends the adoption by the various countries of legislation, first, to facilitate the drawing of bills of exchange upon one another by the financial institutions of South American countries and the financial institutions of the United States; second, to make bonded warehouse warrants and receipts available as collateral security for the development of international commerce.

It recommends the advisability of permitting the payment of such parts of the export duties on nitrates from Chili to the United States as are now paid in ninety days sight drafts, sterling on London, in ninety days sight drafts in dollars in New York, at such rates of exchange as may be periodically fixed by the Chilean authorities; also, that such changes be made in the laws of the United States as will enable bankers to extend their credit, discount and re-discount facilities so as to conform to the trade customs and necessities of the Latin-Americas. It also recommends that a permanent inter-American commission be established to study commercial problems and conditions.

Colombia recommends, first, special committees on laws and transportation for each country, similar to those appointed in connection with this conference; secondly, the co-operation of those committees in financial and commercial matters; third, the establishment of a general executive council to meet in Washington at least once a year; fourth, the appointment of a board of engineers to investigate projects which require financing.

1. Reprinted from the *Pan American Magazine*, XXI (June, 1915), 109-111.

Costa Rica emphasizes the need of trade facilities and the extension of inter-American markets, and the improvement of the merchant marine and transportation facilities.

Cuba recommends that the high duties that hamper the importation of Cuban tobacco into the United States be ameliorated, and in view of the abolition by the United States of import duties on sugar, the principle of the reciprocal reduction of duties be extended by treaty stipulations in addition to those that already exist, so as to preserve the principle of reciprocity as the foundation of trade relations between the two countries. This report also deals with the question of transportation, with that of the parcel post, the extension of credit, sending out of experts, capable and commercial representatives, with samples, and also of making uniform, so far as may be practicable, of commercial laws and the extension of the system of arbitration for the settlement of commercial disputes.

Ecuador is very fully represented by a document and report presented in a memorandum to the President of this Conference on conditions in that country. It is very full of suggestions which are grouped under eleven heads, and in all embrace thirty-two different topics.

Guatemala recommends, first, the practical demonstration in Guatemala of agricultural machinery and tools made in the United States; second, that the attention of American manufacturers be drawn to the opportunity for the use of portable saw mills in cutting the woods of the country, and of improved sugar cane machinery; third, that the shipment of wares be made in packages, suitable to transportation facilities or requirements in the various countries; fourth, that the American manufacturers maintain in Guatemala city a permanent exhibition of their products; fifth, that a uniform postal system throughout the Americas be adopted; sixth, the uniform classification of articles for the purpose of levying on customs duties; seventh, the granting by American merchants of credits of not less than ninety days for the payment of purchases; eighth, the sending out of expert agents to sell goods; ninth, affording facilities in American schools for young men from Latin America; tenth, increased attention in Latin-American countries to the study of political economy, finance and business questions in the schools; eleventh, the interchange of professors and students; twelfth, the teaching of Spanish in the United States and in courses in history and geography of Latin America; thirteenth, the more general establishment of chambers of commerce; also the improvement of transportation facilities, the appointment of consulting commissions in each country and the improvement of banking facilities.

Nicaragua reviews the political, commercial and financial condition of that country, describes its natural resources, emphasizes the importance of improving banking facilities, and draws attention to the fact that she has a field for the investment of capital.

Panama makes recommendation in regard to the acceptance of coupon books, issued by the Panama Canal Company, and the purchase of commodities and certain changes in the practices of commissariat owned directly or indirectly by the United States; recommends the abolition of discriminatory freight rates of the Panama Railroad Company, and that the use of the Canal for transportation between the ports of Panama and Colon be secured freely; that the Federal Reserve Board open branch banks in Central and South America; that shipping facilities be improved, and that in sending out quotations of prices, and in the drawing of drafts, computation be made upon the United States dollar.

Salvador emphasizes the lack of commercial treaties between that country and the United States; recommends the establishment of a chamber of commerce in Salvador; strongly urges co-operation of banking institutions in establishing reasonable credit, and the exchange of students and of the wider dissemination of commercial and agricultural information.

Uruguay deals with the improvement of transportation—first, by abolishing discriminatory duties, by granting direct or indirect subsidies to shipping, or both; the adoption of the metric system of weights and measures, urges cheaper cable rates, and that the governments undertake in co-operation, the development of wireless telegraph systems. She also recommends the establishment of the international monetary unit; improved banking facilities, the granting of more liberal credits, and the adhesion of the North American countries to the South American postal convention of Montevideo, of June, 1911; the making of reciprocity arrangements; the interchange of students; the decrease of duties on the necessities of life; the adoption of progressive taxes on inheritance; the co-operation of the governments forming the Pan American union in devising and enforcing measures to overcome frauds in these particulars.

Brazil deals with the financing of transactions involving importation and exportation of goods, and the question of local commercial banking and the various questions of trade and commerce; recommends, in particular, that greater prominence be given in the public schools and other educational institutions of the United States to the study of the Central and South American countries, their geographical location, natural resources, government and languages; that emphasis be given to

the necessity of greater liberality being exercised in the interpretation of customs regulations by the countries of North America, and Latin America, especially, with respect to the free entrance or drawback of duty on travelers' samples or other samples introduced into the respective countries, solely for the purpose of promoting trade; the more effective protection of trade marks; reciprocal business relations between merchants and manufacturers of both nations, and the granting of such reasonable credit in both directions as may be safe and desirable; and it recommends the establishment of a reliable means whereby merchants and manufacturers of either nation can determine with reasonable accuracy the financial responsibility of the purchaser of the other nations; recommends that there be established between the United States and Latin-American countries a system of direct exchange based on the dollar unit of the United States of North America; recommends the formation of bureaus of standards of the respective countries to standardize, in so far as possible, the requirements of each country, and recommends to the manufacturers and purchasers of the several countries the immediate recognition of such standards and corresponding weights and measures; draws attention to the favorable results which have followed the granting by Brazil and Cuba of preferential duties applying to certain products of the United States, and recommends the extension of reciprocal tariff concession between the Latin-American countries and the United States; rapid, frequent, and dependable marine transportation service to provide adequately for the maintenance and development of commerce between the countries of North and South America.

AMERICAN IDEALS¹

EVERY great nation has made, to the history and civilization of the world, some distinct individual contribution. In no case has this been more emphatically true than in that of the United States. The entrance of the United States of America into the family of nations was, as I venture to believe, the most important event of the past two hundred years and one of the most important events of all time. For centuries, transitions of government in Europe had been com-

1. Address written for a Symposium on American Ideals at the Saturday Discussions of the Republican Club (New York City), March 27, 1915.

plicated with settled, fixed traditions. In America the ground was relatively clear, so that the people might plant as they liked and gather the appropriate harvest.

The Declaration of Independence itself presaged the development of a theory and a policy which must be worked out in opposition to the ideas that had then long dominated the civilized world. Of this theory and policy the keynote was freedom: freedom of the individual, in order that he might work out his destiny in his own way; freedom in government, in order that the human faculties might have free course; freedom in commerce, in order that the resources of the earth might be developed and rendered fruitful in the increase of human wealth, contentment and happiness.

Intimately associated with the idea of freedom was that of opportunity—equality of opportunity. When the late Chief Justice Fuller was nominated for the Supreme Court of the United States by President Cleveland, the circumstance was recalled that, only a few weeks previously, when his name had not been mentioned in connection with the post of Chief Justice, he opened an address before a club at Chicago with the declaration, "The Republic is opportunity." The truth of the declaration was strikingly illustrated in his own case.

It was inevitable that the American people, possessed of a measure of freedom and of opportunity such as no other people enjoyed, should develop the ideal of democracy. I, of course, speak of democracy in its broad and philosophical sense and not in the sense of party politics. It is a well known historical fact that the party first professing the ideal of democracy, as opposed to the conservation of existing privileges, called itself "republican." But, no matter what might be the party title, the broad democratic spirit grew and flourished and eventually carried everything with it. The so-called Federalist party, because it came to be associated with certain policies of unpopular tendency, lost its following and ceased to exist.

The popular party, first called "republican," then "democratic-republican," and finally simply "democratic," eventually came to embrace for a time substantially the entire population, and for a considerable period divided on personal rather than on political lines. The election of the President of the United States was practically taken from the hands of the small and select electoral body in which the Constitution had placed it and was transferred by popular action to the people of the United States. Candidates came to be nominated by national conventions, and it was for the purpose of casting their ballots for the one candidate or the other that the electors in the several States were chosen. In recent years an effort has been

made still further to popularize the selection of candidates for the Presidency.

The revolution in national methods was only a reflection of what had been going on in the several States. In the colonial times the right of suffrage was closely restricted. In some instances, special moral qualifications were prescribed; in others, religious tests were exacted; but everywhere property qualifications were imposed. An accomplished student of our political institutions has estimated that, as the result of the conditions thus imposed upon the exercise of the elective franchise, the number of voters down to the year 1800 was only from 15 to 20 per cent of what the number would have been on the basis of to-day.

Not only was the number of electors increased, under a system practically based on universal manhood suffrage, but a tendency was manifested to make all offices elective. As a result, not only were executive officers and members of legislative bodies chosen by popular vote, but even judicial magistrates were placed in a similar category. The system of electing judges by popular vote, which seems first to have been adopted in Georgia in 1812, for the purpose of selecting judges of the inferior courts, was made applicable to all judicial magistrates in Mississippi by the Constitution of 1832. The method thus introduced was soon adopted in other States, and in time the popular election of judges became general. That it has everywhere worked with entire satisfaction is a claim which even those who are convinced of its general soundness would hardly make for it.

All the movements of this world, whether conservative or radical, tend to go to extremes. The great task of statesmanship is to preserve a proper balance. In one instance the desire to secure equality of opportunity was carried so far as to abolish all qualifications for admission to the practice of the law. This was done in Indiana, and was made a part of the constitution of the State. How the system worked may be inferred from the fact that unlearned and unskilled practitioners came to be known as "constitutional" lawyers—a phrase employing, in this particular instance, a certain measure of disrespect. Recently, however, this particular privilege of ignorance and incapacity has been done away with by a new constitutional provision.

In this change we have an illustration of the disposition of the American democracy to profit by experience and to correct errors when they are shown to exist. This is in reality but a manifestation of what may be called the sound conservatism of the American people. No doubt one of the greatest perils to

which democracy is exposed is that of the exaltation of inefficiency and incompetency. There may be, and doubtless are, persons who honestly believe that knowledge and experience may beget prejudices which are more to be reprobated than the mistakes that proceed from a want of knowledge and skill. But I am far from believing that this is the general sense of the American people. I believe, on the contrary, that they desire the best service that can be obtained and fully appreciate the importance of being well served.

Another American ideal which I wish to mention is that of legality. The great end of democracy is the incorporation of its purposes and aspirations in the form of just and equal laws. Acting in what I have called the spirit of legality, the American people have committed to their courts a larger and more important part than is perhaps elsewhere borne by judicial tribunals in the administration of the affairs of the community.

What a combination of ideals is here exhibited—freedom, opportunity, legality! In the combination of these ideals we find the true basis of peace, national and international.

THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES¹

IN contributing an introductory note to the present volume, I yield to the request of Dr. Leavell, by whom the preface is written. The extent of my acquaintance with the author, the late Senator George of Mississippi, would scarcely justify me in offering to connect my name with the publication of his work. It happened, however, to be my fortune, while he occupied a seat in the United States Senate, to see something of his labors, to observe the high ability and integrity which he brought to the consideration of public questions, and also to appreciate the strong human qualities and attachments which, although they came little to the notice of the general public, peculiarly endeared him to his friends. His colleague, the late Senator Platt of Connecticut, a most competent judge, has borne testimony to the extraordinary ability which characterized his minority report on the bill to provide for Inquests under National Authority. It is not going too far to say that the same ability and earnestness generally characterized whatever he did. His understanding was both sure and profound.

1. Introduction to *The Political History of Slavery in the United States*, by James Z. George. (New York, The Neale Publishing Company, 1915), xxii–xxiv.

His premises granted, he reached his conclusions by an unerring logic. United with this gift was an unusual capacity for labor, and a conscientious eare that knew no weariness.

Senator George's exposition of eonstitutional questions naturally attracted wider attention than did most of his other public discussions, but he manifested no less ability in dealing with questions of a different order. In the debate on the unratified fisheries treaty with Great Britain, which took place in the summer of 1888, he bore an important part. The subject was entirely new to him, but it may confidently be affirmed that there was no speech made in the course of the long and exhaustive controversy that exhibited a more thorough investigation of the subjeet, a fuller comprehension of its history and legal relations, or a more eandid treatment of it than did his.

While our author marshalled his facts and his arguments with logical precision, he habitually expressed himself accurately, forcibly and often with singular felicity. These qualities he exhibited even in writings entirely devoid of any element of popular interest or excitement, such as his digest of the decisions of the Supreme Court and of the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi, which was published in 1872. This work, which was produced in the course of five years in the intervals of absorbing professional pursuits, he declared to have been a labor of love. This circumstance accounts not only for the exceptional excellence of the performance, but also for the distinct and marked personal element in it. This trait may be said to have given to all his work a certain characteristic. His heart as well as his mind entered into his task. Just as the encouragement and commendation of his brethren at the bar led him to prosecute to completion his digest, so, when he reached the end of his labors, his feelings led him to give to it an additional personal flavor by dedicating it to an old companion in arms. This dedication I have never heard mentioned; but, having chanced to see it on the first occasion when I made use of the volume, I was so much struck with its simple eloquence, and its depth and tenderness of feeling, that it has ever since occupied a place in my recollection. It reads as follows:

TO THE MEMORY OF
FRANCIS MARION ALDRIDGE,
WHO FELL AT THE BATTLE OF SHILOH,
THIS WORK IS DEDICATED.

A profound lawyer—a pure and an honest man—a firm and upright patriot; he offered his life, and its rich and varied gifts, to the cause of his native land.

That cause was to him a faith—and its followers, brothers; and no one was more devoted to its fortunes than he.

Our brethren of the Bar, in this as in all times past, were the stern advocates of freedom, and they staked all upon the issue of that cause, in the bloody arbitrament of battle. Our heroes were vanquished, and the victor is now the judge.

As misfortune endears the sufferer, so he who falls in battle in the defence of his convictions, bears thenceforth a charmed name.

To that cause, which bound up my own most cherished sympathies, and to my professional brethren, who bore so large a share of its burdens, I desire to place the expression of my attachment and admiration upon this record, frail though it may be.

"It is a cause, and not the *fate* of a cause, which is a glory."

All those who, like Aldridge, whether they fell or survived, gave their best efforts to their country, are enshrined in my recollection; but I here select his name, not because it is the highest or the brightest amongst them all, but because it was to me the best beloved.

In the sentiments expressed in this dedication may be found the key to the present work. Senator George was convinced that the struggle between the North and the South was to be regarded as a contest over the principle of the balance of power. Candidly admitting (p. 52) that the main purpose of the South in advocating the annexation of Texas was to increase "its waning power," he maintains that the North, in opposing the annexation, was animated by an antagonistic design. Whether the reader shall agree or disagree with the contention that the question of the balance of power rather than that of slavery was the fundamental cause of the conflict, it serves to denote what the author means when he speaks of those who sustained the cause of secession as being the advocates of freedom. The contest being, as he contended, in its essence a struggle for political power, the South, according to this view, in supporting what it conceived to be its rights under the Constitution, was asserting the cause of political freedom.

Although Senator George strenuously maintains on this ground the justice of the Southern cause, he is yet ready to concede that the passions of the hour were not confined to one side. Referring to the debates on the Wilmot Proviso and other measures associated with the controversy as to the extension of slavery, he remarks (p. 56) upon the "passion and heat of the debates" and observes that "there seemed to be insanity on both sides with reference to the Territories." His present argument is intended as an appeal to the calm and deliberate judgment after the passions of the hour have subsided and the embers of controversy have ceased to glow; and as such it will be accepted and pondered by the reader in a fair and dispassionate spirit. This is what the author obviously desired; and he would have asked for nothing more.

THE REAL GLORY OF THE MODERN WORLD¹

IF one were asked to specify the particulars in which the modern world is superior to the ancient, he would not find it difficult to satisfy those who complacently assume that the development of physical forces and their application to the conveniences of life are the beginning and the end of civilization. If, on the other hand, the inquirer, not content with proofs of material advancement, were to insist upon proofs of spiritual progress, one might, unless he exercised great circumspection, often find that his probatory efforts had led him into the realm of controversy.

The demonstration of physical progress is obvious; and each generation, holding fast to what was previously gained, may add to the sum of scientific knowledge. In spiritual things, progress is less sure. Changes in the human spirit come slowly and painfully; and only too often, at the very moment when a permanent gain seems to have been secured, the elemental passions burst forth and sweep away all barriers.

THE SENSE OF HUMANITY

Such is life, as we see it upon the surface. But, in spite of all relapses and discouragements, is it not a fact that the great glory of the modern world is the development of a sense of humanity? One of nature's rarest poets, who understood the heart of man as few have understood it, avowed the belief that the time would come when man to man, the world o'er, should "brothers be"; and it is related of a great teacher that he placed above his rostrum the motto, "Above all nations is humanity."

As we look about us today, we are obliged to confess that these aspirations are still far from fulfillment. Nevertheless, the ideal has been implanted in the minds and hearts of men; and if proof of this fact should be demanded, we know where to turn for it. We have only to point to the Geneva Conventions, and to the devoted men and women who have worn and who are wearing today that sacred symbol of service, the Red Cross.

Today there goes forth from the battlefields of Europe the cry for succor. The response is worldwide. To "soften the evils

1. Reprinted from *The American Red Cross Magazine*, April, 1915.

of warfare, to suppress its useless hardships and improve the lot of wounded soldiers on the field of battle," the servants of the Red Cross are gathering from the East and the West to render their aid.

Exemplifying, as they do, the highest spirit of benevolence, we bid them godspeed in their mission of mercy.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION¹

1. Presidential Address, Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, May 19, 1915. Reprinted from *The Advocate of Peace*, July, 1915; *International Conciliation*, March, 1916. Abridgment in *World Court*, January, 1916.

THE Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration assembles this year in the midst of the greatest catastrophe that has befallen the world since the close of the Napoleonic Wars a hundred years ago. This unfortunate situation inculcates the importance of facing candidly the realities of life and the grave problems which they involve. The tendency of the human mind, running in advance of results, to treat as an accomplished fact that which it desires to bring about, may often exert in the affairs of life a useful and helpful influence; but when, following the "illusions of hope," it bids us close our eyes to actual conditions and to rely in comfortable security upon safeguards that either do not exist or are so defective as to be practically non-existent, it may become a peril as well as a hindrance to wise and essential effort.

We do not meet today for the purpose of discussing the rights or the wrongs of the present appalling conflict. It is upon us, and nothing that we can say can allay or retard it. But, apart from the merits of the cause of any particular belligerent, it does teach us the necessity of something in the direction of international co-operation more far-reaching than has heretofore been tried, if the part which war has played in international affairs is to be appreciably diminished. I say international co-operation; for, after all is said and done, there is no device by which peace can be preserved unless nations co-operate in making it effective. Sixteen years ago, when the nations agreed to the establishment of the permanent Court at The Hague, it seemed to many that the millennium had come; and they certainly were justified in thinking that a great step forward had been taken. Gradually the whole world was brought into the arrangement; but, with the lapse of time, it

became apparent that, although a "world court" had been established, the spirit of co-operation was lacking to make it thoroughly effective. Wars broke out without resort to it and when it was sought to render the resort obligatory, nations were found to be indisposed to bind themselves to submit questions of serious importance, such as were likely to produce a conflict.

In view of the abundant, constant warnings which history furnishes against relying upon any one device for the prevention of war, I propose to-day to make a general survey of the international situation with a view to ascertain the fundamental conditions with which, in our efforts after peace, we are obliged to deal, and the nature of the measures which we must devise in order to meet them.

The record of man on earth, as we know it, relates to the activities of various tribes, peoples and nations, and, until a comparatively recent time, is concerned chiefly with their wars one with another. During the past two hundred years a marked development had taken place in the conception of nationality. International law, since it came into systematic existence, has assumed as its foundation the principle of the independence and equality of nations. This principle, as expounded by Grotius and his followers, represented a progressive and enlightened sentiment, which was intended to assure even to the feeblest member of the family of nations the preservation of its rights. As the great Swiss publicist, Vattel, eloquently declared: "Power or weakness does not in this respect produce any difference. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom." Or, to employ the graphic phrase of our own John Marshall: "Russia and Geneva have equal rights."

But, with the principle of independence and equality, there was associated another principle antagonistic and potentially fatal to it. This was the principle that every independent nation had the right to declare war, for any cause deemed by it to be sufficient; and that, having declared war, it immediately acquired all the rights pertaining to that condition, including the right of conquest, under which the stronger power, even though it were the aggressor, might lawfully proceed to destroy or absorb its adversary.

It was for the purpose, among others, of limiting the exercise of this right and of maintaining the independence of nations, that the European Concert, so often superficially criticized, came into being. This Concert, however, never undertook to place any theoretical limitation upon the rights of war. It rep-

resented merely a union of nations, and incidentally of their forces, to the end that the balance of power in the existing system should not be unduly disturbed. At the present day, the world is groping about for something beyond this, for a measure more radical, which will establish a reign of law among nations similar to that which exists within each individual state.

It is evident that the first condition of the establishment of such an international system is the regulation of the conception of nationality. Exaggerated to the point where it either subordinates human rights to supposed national interests, or regards the interests of humanity as being capable of realization only through a particular national agency, there can be no doubt that this conception directly incites to the transgression of the bounds of law and of justice. This tendency, often aggravated by confused declamatory, transcendentalist teachings evolved from the emotions rather than from the observation of existing facts, has not been confined to any one nation or to any particular age. It has nowhere been more strongly manifested than among the ancient Hebrews, who, regarding themselves as the "chosen people of God," conceived themselves to be merely the instrument of the Almighty in obliterating their enemies. It was in the 137th Psalm, in the phrase "Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones," that Grotius found an unquestionable proof that the right of war permitted the slaughter of women and infants with impunity. Nor can it be denied that, in a milder form, the doctrine of the "manifest destiny" of certain nations to extend their boundaries, by force if necessary, is tinctured with the same thought.

Nevertheless, when we come to analyze the conception of nationality, as expounded by philosophers, we find that its principal ingredients are largely imaginary. We have often been told, in phraseology supposed to be highly scientific, that the "nation" is an ethnographic unity within a geographic unity, or words to that effect. Except in remote, restricted areas, inhabited by savage tribes, this combination of conditions can scarcely be said fully to exist. It is found least of all in some of the most enlightened and most progressive countries of to-day, such as Switzerland; and with the constant movements of population resulting from improved means of transportation, is less and less likely to continue anywhere as a stationary condition. Tried by such a theory, or definition, what should be said of our own United States, with its admixture of races from all quarters of the globe? And as for

the element of geographic unity, it suffices to say that the applications of steam and of electricity have rendered it an anachronism.

Assuming, then, that our goal is the establishment among nations of a reign of law, in such sense that each nation is subject to the law, the fundamental object which it is essential to accomplish is to limit the present unrestricted right of the individual nation to declare war and incidentally to acquire the right of conquest. This object would be attained by establishing the principle that a nation before declaring war upon another must submit its grievance to the judgment of its associated nations, and that without such submission it should not be regarded as acquiring the right of conquest.

In this relation it is interesting to refer to one of the transactions of the First International American Conference, which was held in Washington in 1889-90. On April 18, 1890, the committee on general welfare, acting upon a motion submitted by the Argentine Republic and Brazil, recommended the adoption of resolutions declaring that the principle of conquest should not thereafter be recognized as admissible under American public law; that in the future cessions of territory should be void if made under threats of war or in the presence of an armed force; that a nation from which such cessions should be exacted might always demand that the question of their validity be submitted to arbitration; and that any renunciation of the right to have recourse to arbitration should be null and void under all circumstances. This report was subsequently taken up in connection with the project of an arbitration adopted by the Conference. By this project all questions were to be submitted to arbitration except that of national independence, and even in this case arbitration was declared to be obligatory upon the adversary power. Combining this project of a treaty with the proposed abolition of the right of conquest, Mr. Blaine presented a plan upon which the Conference unanimously agreed, with the exception of one delegation that abstained from voting. Under this plan it was agreed that the principle of conquest should not, during the continuance of the treaty of arbitration, be recognized as admissible under American public law.

It may be doubted whether the far-reaching significance of the plan thus outlined was at the time fully grasped. The plan was in reality in advance of the times. It was not ratified by the governments concerned, and never became effective. But it clearly presented the fundamental principle upon which nations must unite if they would place their relations upon a thoroughly legal basis.

Far more difficult than the statement of the object to be attained is the formulation and application of measures to carry it into effect. Here again it is of the first importance to grasp in its details the problem with which we are dealing. During the past ten years we have, for instance, often been assured that what the world needs is an arbitration tribunal and an "international police" to enforce its awards. This statement seems to disclose both a misconception of fact and an incomplete grasp of conditions. The misconception of fact is the supposition that the evil from which the world to-day suffers is the disregard of arbitral awards. In reality, arbitral awards have been remarkably well observed, in spite of the indulgence now and then lately shown to the vicious notion, by which the domestic administration of justice is so much enfeebled and impaired, that every sentence of a judicial tribunal ought to be subject to some kind of an appeal. The actual problem with which the world is confronted is how to induce nations to accept not the results but the process of arbitration.

The proposal for an "international police" requires a more extended examination. As originally advanced, it seems to have contemplated the maintenance by a certain number of the larger powers of an international force for the purpose of correcting or restraining the misconduct of smaller or weaker states. Even in this restricted form it involves certain assumptions the correctness of which is by no means self-evident; for, while the possession of physical strength is by no means an invariable proof of virtue or of disinterested devotion to the cause of justice, it is also true that some of the finest examples of national rectitude and enlightenment are to be found in the conduct of the smaller states.

When so expanded as to embrace all nations, the underlying idea of an international police appears to be that of a force to compel all states, without regard to their strength or weakness, to observe international law; and, when so extended, the proposal is at once seen to be closely connected with the question of the limitation, or of the development, as the case may be, of national armaments. How large a force, it may be asked, would have to be maintained in order effectually to hold in check any of the great powers of Europe, if their national armaments were continued on the scale of the past twenty-five years? History tells us that the force of a great united nation is exceedingly difficult to overcome. Without recurring to earlier examples, it suffices to point to the fact that for almost twenty-three years preceding the close of the Napoleonic Wars, France fought and at times seemed to vanquish the vast European combination formed against her, and yet in the end emerged

from the contest with her boundaries little diminished. It is manifest that an international force, organized to assure the preservation of peace, would have to be, as against any individual national organization, far stronger, in numbers and in equipment, than anything we are accustomed to think of under the term "police." It would need to be practically overwhelming, unless it were merely to have the effect of the great armaments of Europe to-day in involving in hostilities a larger number of men and making armed conflict more bloody and more costly. And it is equally manifest that, unless national armaments were greatly reduced, a proportionate contribution to such an international force would require on the part of the United States a development of its military resources far beyond that which has usually been contemplated. I mention this not as an argument but only as a fact.

These considerations are equally important and vital, whether the force which it is proposed to employ is to be in a strict sense international, or whether it is to be composed of the forces of united nations, combined for the attainment of a common end. In the present state of the world, the latter conception would appear to be simpler and more immediately practicable. But, viewed in either aspect, continuous union and co-operation would be the first and essential requisite of the success of the plan.

The fact cannot be too often or too strongly stated that, for the preservation of order, national or international, we cannot rely upon force alone. Force is not an end; it is merely the means to an end. Situations often arise in which the resort to forcible measures tends to provoke conflict rather than to prevent it. Economic pressure may in many instances be far more efficacious than attempts at direct coercion; nor are proofs wanting that forbearance may sometimes be more effective than either, even leading to the eventual acceptance of wise solutions which were in the heat of controversy rejected. We must not forget that, back of all effort, moral or physical, lie the feelings, the sentiments, the aspirations of humanity; and it is only by the organization of forces, moral and physical, in such manner as to assure justice and contentment through co-operation, that widespread outbreaks of violence can be avoided.

In order to attain this end, it would be necessary to provide for the employment of three different kinds of agencies, which may be designated by the titles Arbitration, Conciliation, Legislation. We may briefly consider them in this order.

1. *Arbitration.*—This represents the judicial process. As defined in The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of

International Disputes, "international arbitration has for its object the settlement of differences between states by judges of their own choice, on the basis of respect for law." With the object of facilitating the "immediate recourse" to this process, the convention provided for the establishment of a "Permanent Court of Arbitration, accessible at all times" and proceeding in accordance with definite rules. This court was duly organized. It is still in existence. It has dealt with a number of cases, some of which were important, and its decisions have been carried into effect. Proposals have been made for its improvement or alteration, as well as for the establishment of another or additional tribunal differently constituted. Into the discussion of these proposals it is not my purpose now to enter. Some criticisms of the present court have, as in the case of its decision upon the preferential claim of the blockading powers in Venezuela, disclosed a defective appreciation either of the law and the facts or of the proper functions of a judicial tribunal. But, speaking for myself individually, I would support any measure that tended to render the resort to international arbitration easier, more general, and more efficacious.

2. Conciliation.—The fact is generally admitted that for the preservation of peace and order judicial methods will not alone suffice. Even though it be demonstrable that international arbitration may be carried, because it has been carried, far beyond the limits set in some of our general treaties of arbitration, it is nevertheless true that the judicial process is not adequate to all the needs of international life. It often happens that differences can be effectually adjusted only by the removal of their causes, and this may require the exercise of a power of discretion beyond the application of existing rules. The exercise of such a power would properly be vested in a tribunal of conciliation.

Under the supervision of such a body there could be carried on the process of investigation which is properly entrusted to joint commissions, and which may be essential to the success of arbitration as well as of conciliation. With this object in view, provision was made in The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes for mediation and for international commissions of inquiry. Investigation by means of joint commissions formed a conspicuous part of the unratified treaties concluded by the United States in 1911 with France and Great Britain. It also forms the chief means provided for in the so-called peace pacts concluded during the past two years between the United States and various powers; for, although these agreements have often been criticized as unlimited treaties of arbitration, they do not in fact provide for

arbitration at all, but merely require an investigation and report, and expressly reserve to the contracting parties, when the report shall have been received, full liberty of action.

The defect in all measures for investigation and report is one which it is difficult to meet by a prior formal agreement. This is the case of a continuing injury which one nation may seek to inflict upon another, an injury of such a nature that human interests or human feelings are not likely to tolerate its continuous imposition for a continuous space of time. Such a situation might have to be met by a *modus vivendi*, and the attempt to employ such an expedient would again bring us face to face with the fact that, without the spirit of co-operation and the willingness to observe the limitations of law and justice, the use of force cannot be avoided.

3. *Legislation*.—In the formation of an international organization, provision for the definition and improvement of the rules of international intercourse would form an important and essential part. A step in this direction was taken in the Peace Conference at The Hague, but it fell far short of what is necessary to make the legislative process effective. This is particularly the case in respect of the power to enact rules of law. In The Hague Conferences unanimity was necessary to the establishment of a rule binding on all the powers; and even in the treaties relating to the conduct of war, it was provided that they should not be obligatory unless all the parties to the particular conflict had ratified them. It is probably true, that, if there were allowed to each independent state, as has heretofore been done, a single vote, a mere majority rule would be quite unacceptable. While I am not so much disturbed, as many persons seem to be, by the apprehension that small states would be found systematically to unite against larger states, yet the rule of a mere numerical majority of nations would necessarily meet with strong opposition. The requirement of unanimity must, however, be done away with before an international law-making power can be effectually established, and there should be no difficulty in abolishing it, when the principle, so essential to international organization, is once accepted, that no nation is so high or so powerful as to be above the law.

THE MEANING OF NEUTRALITY¹

THE subject of American neutrality and the European war is one intimately and vitally connected with the history and policy of the United States. One hundred and twenty-two years ago, or less than five years after the federal constitution was established, the government of the United States was required to make a momentous decision. The wars growing out of the French Revolution were well under way and the circle of conflict had just been rounded out by the entrance of the power which then held and has since continued to hold the world's naval supremacy.

Those who speak in awe-struck whispers of the problems, grave though they be, that confront us today, perhaps are not always acquainted with the appalling uncertainties and awful responsibilities that rested upon the statesmen of an earlier day, who furnished us with the chart and compass by which we have since sailed. Regarding Europe as having a set of primary interests in which the United States, with its geographical and political detachment, had no direct concern, the administration of Washington announced to the world that the United States would pursue a neutral course. The history of American diplomacy during the twenty-two years that followed, down to the close of the Napoleonic Wars, is chiefly concerned with the efforts of the United States to perform the duties and maintain the rights appertaining to it as an independent and neutral nation. This period of storm and stress has well been denominated the struggle for neutrality, and in it were formulated the fundamental principles on which the modern system of neutrality is based. In the task of formulation, the chief part was borne by Thomas Jefferson, whose philosophic discernment, keen intelligence, and extended learning enabled him to give to his work a peculiar logical and original character. What we call neutrality is a system of conduct regulated, not by the emotions nor by individual conceptions of propriety, but by certain well defined rules, and it is synonymous with

1. Remarks as presiding officer at the third session of the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, held in Philadelphia on April 30 and May 1, 1915. Reprinted from the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. LX, No. 149 (July, 1915).

impartiality only in the sense that those rules are to be enforced with impartial rigor upon all belligerents.

It is proper to advert to the fact that, during the war that is now going on in Europe, various neutral nations have issued embargoes under which the exportation of various articles is forbidden. These are commonly interpreted, I think erroneously, as "neutrality proclamations." In reality they are essentially regulations of a domestic nature, employed for the purpose of preserving a proper supply of articles, including even arms and munitions of war, in the countries concerned.

A SECRETARY OF STATE FROM BROWN

WILLIAM LEARNED MARCY¹

IT might seem to be presumptuous on my part to undertake to designate the three greatest alumni of Brown University; but, whoever they may be, I venture to claim that the subject of my address today is entitled to a place among them. In his day and generation, he stood among the foremost men of the country. He barely lost the nomination for the Presidency of the United States, and if nominated would have been elected. A few years after his death, his fame suffered the eclipse which befell that of so many able statesmen whose public career ended just prior to the Civil War. The great conflict naturally cast into oblivion the men and the measures that immediately preceded it unless they were distinctly identified with the controversies which brought it about. Such was the fate of more than one of the most capable and most eminent leaders of the old National Democratic party, and among these was William L. Marcy, the subject of the present address.

William Learned Marcy was born December 12, 1786, in Massachusetts, in that part of the town of Sturbridge which is now called Southbridge. His father was Jedediah Marcy, a farmer; his mother, whose maiden name was Ruth Learned, was a husbandman's daughter. After studying for a time at Leicester Academy, their son, William L., entered Brown University, where he was graduated with high honors in 1808.

Being obliged to rely upon his own resources, young Marcy

1. Sesquicentennial address, Brown University, June 15, 1915. Published, under the title "A Great Secretary of State," in the *Political Science Quarterly*, XXX (September, 1915), 377-396.

soon after his graduation at Brown set out to seek his fortune in the world, and to this end footed it across the State of Massachusetts to what must then have been regarded, in Sturbridge, as the distant city of Troy, in the State of New York. Here, supporting himself by employment in a store, and perhaps also to some extent by teaching, he entered upon the study of the law, and was in due time admitted to the practice of that profession. From the very first, he also took an active interest in politics, and became a contributor to the columns of the *Troy Budget*, an anti-Federalist organ. It was an age of warm political controversy, in which foreign questions loomed comparatively at least as large as they do today. Marcy early espoused the principles of the Republican or, as it was afterwards called, the Democratic party. It was a favorite story of an old friend of mine, the late Francis Wharton, that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts once formally decided that Jeffersonian Republicans were *feræ naturæ* and might be shot on sight. I have never sought to verify this tale by an examination of the reports of that exalted tribunal, but its humorous exaggeration perhaps scarcely over-emphasizes the antagonism and the horror formerly excited in certain quarters by what appeared to be the subversive and impious creed of the Jeffersonian sect. Marcy, in a brief autobiographical memorandum, a copy of which I have in my possession, narrates that he was excluded from a literary society formed by the principal of Leicester Academy because of his Republican proclivities. Upon this incident he remarks that it served only to increase his devotion to his principles.

In June 1812, the war with Great Britain broke out. A military company in which Marcy was a lieutenant, offering its services to Governor Tompkins, was sent to the front. It was subsequently dispatched to French Mills, later known as Fort Covington. On the night of October 22, 1812, a detachment under Colonel Young was sent out to capture a company of Canadian militia at St. Regis. Marcy was of the party. At the head of a file of men, he approached the house in which the militia lodged, and himself broke open the door. The inmates were captured and disarmed. These were, with the exception of some troops captured by General Cass in Michigan but afterwards recaptured, the first British troops taken on land during the war. Their flag was also captured and was the first standard taken on land. Marcy with his company subsequently joined the main army under General Dearborn. When his first enlistment expired, he returned to Troy; but later, when the city of New York was threatened, he volunteered a second time and was for a while again in service.

In 1816, Marcy was appointed Recorder of Troy. He had already formed an intimacy, personal and political, with Martin Van Buren, and like Van Buren reluctantly voted for DeWitt Clinton as the Republican candidate for governor in 1817. His well-known dissatisfaction with some of the measures of Clinton's administration gave rise to threats of his removal from the office of Recorder; and the desire to subject him to discipline was increased by his criticism of Clinton's administration in the columns of the *Albany Argus*, to which he became a frequent contributor. As a result, he was in June 1818 removed from the Recordership and a Clintonian was appointed in his stead. This act, which Marcy never ceased to resent, greatly intensified the repugnance he had always felt to proscription for political opinions. For the next three years, being out of office, he actively pursued the practice of his profession; but he also continued to engage in politics. He supported Van Buren in his efforts to reorganize the Republican party in 1819 and 1820 by the exclusion of Clintonians, and powerfully contributed by his pen to the success of the anti-Clintonian cause.

In January, 1821, a new Council of Appointment composed entirely of Republicans having been chosen, Marcy was appointed Adjutant General of the State. In this position there was little opportunity for distinction; but in February, 1823, he was chosen to fill the office of State Comptroller, which had been left vacant by the appointment of its incumbent, John Savage, as Chief Justice of the new Supreme Court under the Constitution of 1821. On his election to the comptrollership, Marcy removed to Albany, where he afterwards continued to reside. The office of Comptroller was then a highly important one, owing to the large expenditures required for the Erie and Champlain Canals and the consequent increase of State debt. It was universally conceded that Marcy performed the duties of the office with marked fidelity and skill. He introduced an improved system of collecting tolls and making disbursements, and first exacted the payment of interest on moneys of the State deposited with banks.

In 1829 Marcy was appointed a justice of the Supreme Court of New York. He discharged the duties of this office with great credit to himself, and with entire satisfaction both to the bar and to the public. During his term of service on the bench, it fell to his lot to preside over one of the most celebrated criminal trials ever held in the United States. This was the trial of the alleged slayers of William Morgan, of Batavia, New York, a case that for several years excited the liveliest interest, and divided families, society, churches, and political parties. Moved

partly by differences with some of the members of the Masonic order, of which he was a member, Morgan conceived the design of exposing its secrets. To this end he wrote a book, the publication of which he committed to a printer named Miller. When the existence of this design became known, it produced in Masonic circles an agitation and alarm for which there was less reason than excited minds were then disposed to think. Attempts were made to destroy Miller's printing house; and after the failure of these and of other efforts to prevent the publication of the volume, certain misguided persons resorted to the desperate expedient of getting Morgan out of the way. He was accordingly seized and taken to Fort Niagara, where, after a brief detention, he was, as came generally to be believed, thrown into the Niagara River. Trials of persons concerned in the conspiracy were held at various places; but, for what may be regarded as the principal trial, that of the actual slayers, the Legislature of New York, in 1830, passed a law for the holding of a special circuit of the Supreme Court in Niagara county. For this difficult task Marcy was selected. Thurlow Weed had sought to make of Morgan's case a political issue, because of the identification of leading Democratic politicians with the Masonic fraternity; but, after the trial was over, although it resulted in a doubtful verdict for the defendants, it was conceded on all sides that Judge Marcy had conducted his part of the proceedings with distinguished ability and entire impartiality.

But, to the upright judge, the recollection of the case was not without its pangs. History, if truly narrated, does not always move on the stilts of dignity; and it is my duty to record that there was a trivial incident of Marcy's brief sojourn in Niagara county that caused him greater mortification than any other event of his life. The statute under which the special circuit was held provided for the payment of the judge's expenses, and while sitting under it, Marcy was compelled to invoke the reparative skill of a tailor. As Comptroller of the State he had strongly objected to the lumping of charges, insisting upon the itemization of all accounts. Obeying as a judge the rule he had enforced as Comptroller, he included in his account for expenses at Niagara an item reading: "For mending my pantaloons, 50 cents." When he ran for the governorship in 1832, some curious and diligent enemy, closely scrutinizing his accounts, saw in this charge an opportunity to expose the scrupulous candidate to public ridicule. The result was startling. Public questions were forgotten, while the people of the State were absorbed in the story of "the patch on Marcy's pantaloons." It is said that the story did not always work to

his detriment, a rural elector having been heard profoundly to remark that "if Bill Marcy wore patched clothes," then Marcy was the man for him. Nevertheless, the victim of the incident found himself at a loss for means to counteract its effect, till he discovered, also among the accounts in the Morgan case, a charge for the "transportation" of his political enemy but personal friend, Thurlow Weed, to Auburn, which happened to be the seat of the State penitentiary. Taking this item as his text, Marcy contributed an article in his best vein to the *Albany Argus*, in which he declared that the people of the State could well have afforded to pay for Weed's "transportation" to Auburn, if he had only been permanently detained there. To the extent to which this good-natured rejoinder turned the laugh on Weed, Marcy's situation was temporarily mitigated.

In 1831 Marcy was elected to the United States Senate. He was not an orator, but his political experience, the breadth of his information, and the clearness and force with which he was able to express himself, soon caused him to be recognized as a worthy compeer of any of the members of that great body. He was appointed chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, and a member of the Committee on Finance. Unfortunately, however, a phrase which he used in debate gained great notoriety, and created in regard to his political views and action an erroneous impression which he afterwards strove to correct but never was able wholly to remove. This phrase was used in the animated debate on the rejection of Van Buren's nomination as Minister to England—an act savoring of political revenge and specially humiliating, since its victim had reached his post in London and was actively engaged in the discharge of his diplomatic duties. The justification chiefly alleged for it was the charge that Van Buren was identified with the "spoils system," to which the "Albany Regency," of which he was the head, was supposed to be peculiarly addicted. Of that celebrated confraternity, Marcy, as State Comptroller; Samuel L. Talcott, Attorney-General; Benjamin Knower, State Treasurer (whose daughter became Marcy's second wife); and Edwin Croswell, editor of the *Argus* and State Printer, constituted, says Thurlow Weed, "with Van Buren as their chief, . . . the nucleus"; and, speaking further of his old political antagonists, Weed continues: "After adding Silas Wright, Azariah C. Flagg, John A. Dix, James Porter, Thomas W. Olcott, and Charles E. Dudley to their number, I do not believe that a stronger political combination ever existed at any State capital, or even at the national capital. They were men of great ability, great industry, indomitable courage, and strict personal integrity.

Their influence and power for nearly twenty years was almost as potent in national as in State politics."

In defending his political associates, and particularly his friend and leader, Van Buren, against the assaults of the Whigs, Marcy, while denying that they were peculiarly open to reproach, declared that the politicians of New York boldly preached what they practiced, and saw nothing wrong in the rule that "to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy." The use of this catching phrase Marcy lived to repent; nor did he ever cease to repel the interpretation popularly placed upon it. I have among my papers a copy of a carefully prepared memorandum, in which he declares his dislike of the rule of proscription, of which he was himself an early victim, and refutes the charge that he was a "spoilsman" in that sense. Although it was his practice to appoint to office only persons of his own political faith, he affirms that, while he held the post of Comptroller and had at his disposal more patronage than any other official of the State, he steadily refused to discharge men from the public service because of their political views; and that even when he became, as Secretary of War, the center of partisan attacks growing out of the conduct of the war with Mexico, he retained in confidential positions near him men who were attached by political opinion and also by family connection to his political adversaries. In the Department of State he disturbed no man on account of his political convictions, and carefully preserved the organization of the Department intact.

In 1833, Marcy resigned his place in the United States Senate to assume the office of Governor of New York, to which he had just been elected. He held this office three terms, his majority at each biennial election successively expanding, until, in the autumn of 1838, he was defeated by William H. Seward. His fall was the result of financial conditions and of the unpopularity of the monetary policy of the national administration, at the head of which stood Martin Van Buren. Under pressure from Washington, Marcy reluctantly advocated and signed the law prohibiting the circulation of safety-fund bank notes under the denomination of five dollars. This measure proved to be most unpopular, the suppression of small notes resulting not in the increased use of gold and silver, but in the flooding of the commonwealth with currency from other States and from Canada of variant and uncertain value. The State administration being thus placed at a disadvantage and exposed to popular disfavor, its decline seems to have been somewhat accelerated by the revival of the story of the sartorial patch, of which effective use was made for the last time.

On June 16, 1840, Marcy was appointed by Van Buren as one of the commissioners under the convention with Mexico of April 11, 1839, for the adjustment of claims. The duties of this position occupied him for two years, but he was destined for still further honors.

In March, 1845, he became Secretary of War in the administration of James K. Polk. Like all the other members of the cabinet, he received from Polk a letter pledging him, in case he should become a candidate for the Presidency, to resign his place. After the lapse of little more than a year, the war with Mexico began. As has always been the case with the government of the United States, it was not prepared for the conflict, and the complex burden of enlisting and organizing a sufficient army was thrown on Marcy's hands. The ability and skill with which he performed this task have been universally attested. He was not, it is true, wholly exempt from the loose charges of mismanagement, of inefficiency, and even of sinister obstruction of our own commanding officers in the field, which were circulated against the administration in connection with the conduct of the war; but, fortunately, these charges were at length concentrated in certain unconsidered letters which General Scott addressed to him, while he was still Secretary of War. These charges and complaints, Marcy, by a letter of April 21, 1848, triumphantly answered. This great state paper was as famous in its day as was, in the preceding generation, John Quincy Adams' reply to Jonathan Russell in the celebrated Duplicate Letters; and for some years after Marcy's controversy with Scott, the letter of 1848 was cited as an example and a warning. It is, however, gratifying to narrate that when these sturdy controversialists subsequently met, Marcy extended his hand, which the gallant and high-souled Scott, harboring no resentments, cordially clasped.

Between 1849 and 1853, Marcy held no public office. It was the longest period in his adult life in which he was not saddled with some sort of official responsibilities. He spent his time pleasantly at Albany in social intercourse with his political enemies as well as with his political friends, and although he continued to be active in politics, he read much, chiefly in historical works. One of his chief diversions was whist, at which he almost daily contended with his old political antagonist, Thurlow Weed. His reading was, however, exceptionally extensive. When out of office, he was far from being a methodical man, and perhaps the nearest attempt he made at method was in his reading. He sometimes essayed to read regularly a certain number of pages a day, but he was too much interested in

politics and too fond of the society of his friends to adhere rigorously to such a plan.

In 1852, he figured as a leading candidate for the Democratic nomination for the Presidency. As has so often happened with favorite sons of New York, his chief danger lay in a factious opposition in his own State. He had the warm and cordial support of such men as John V. L. Pruyn and Erastus Corning; but, unhappily, Daniel S. Dickinson, who had a certain Southern support, particularly in the State of Virginia, could not rid himself of the hope that he might himself eventually obtain the coveted prize, if he only could succeed in blighting Marcy's chances. Before the convention met at Baltimore, an effort was made by some of Marcy's friends to effect an arrangement with Dickinson, under which the candidate having the strongest support outside of New York should have the support of the State delegation. Dickinson, according to Thurlow Weed, said in later years that if this proposition had come to him earlier, before his friends had fully launched his candidacy, he would have accepted it. It is probable that this later impression was not well founded. Certain it is, as appears by the journal of Mr. Pruyn, the other State delegations stood ready to nominate Marcy if only they could be assured that the New York delegates had agreed to treat their divisions as being at an end. This step, Dickinson, who was a delegate, refused to take. "He would not," said Mr. Pruyn, "surrender his personal animosities toward Governor Marcy." The sittings of the convention, which began on the 1st of June, were protracted till the 5th of the month, when, on the forty-ninth ballot, the convention with practical unanimity suddenly nominated Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire. Pierce's vote on the forty-eighth ballot was 55; Marcy's was 90, the highest of any aspirant. In the conditions then existing, the nomination was equivalent to an election, and Pierce was duly installed as President on March 4, 1853.

In Pierce's cabinet, Marcy was called to the place of Secretary of State, a post for which his experience in administrative positions, his wide reading and his unusually extensive information gave him important qualifications. His career as Secretary of State was a great one. While strong in controversy, he never pursued it for its own sake, but devoted himself to the accomplishment of valuable results. At the very outset, he declined a suggestion of his predecessor in office for the continuance of a debate with France and Great Britain upon a proposed tripartite arrangement in regard to Cuba.

One of his earlier remarkable achievements was the conclu-

sion of the Canadian reciprocity treaty of June 5, 1854. The negotiations, which were partly carried on at Berkeley Springs in West Virginia, were conducted on the part of Great Britain by Lord Elgin, who came to the United States as a special plenipotentiary. That the picturesque account of his lordship's clever attaché, Laurence Oliphant, of the signing of the treaty should be received with a grain of allowance is to be inferred from the fact that he speaks of Marcy as a general in the Mexican War and represents him as having been a noted duelist. The effects of the treaty were beneficial to both countries, and its termination at the close of the Civil War, on notice by the United States, was due to a combination of causes in which a feeling of resentment appears to have played an appreciable part. So long as the treaty lasted it provided an amicable working arrangement in regard to the fisheries, and if it had been permitted to continue in force, the statesmen of Canada of imperialistic tendencies would have found difficulties even greater than those they actually overcame in bringing about the formation of the Dominion.

Another measure which Marcy sought to carry through was the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. Almost fifty years elapsed before this conception of his far-reaching statesmanship was fulfilled.

An important subject with which he dealt in an intelligent and practical way was that of the extradition of fugitives from justice. Prior to his time the Department of State had declined to enter into extradition treaties with countries that refused to deliver up their own citizens or subjects. In many instances this refusal rested on ancient laws which were regarded as having a fundamental character. Marcy took a practical view of the matter. As Governor of New York he had learned how undesirable it was to make one country the refuge of criminals from another country. He therefore decided to accept, wherever it was necessary, a reciprocal exemption of citizens or subjects from surrender. On this working basis he concluded numerous treaties, and gave to the development of the system of extradition in the United States its most decided early impulse.

He also initiated the movement which resulted in the abolition of the Danish Sound dues—that is to say, the dues which had been charged by Denmark on commerce passing into and out of the Baltic Sea through the Straits of Elsinore. His action led to the calling of a European conference, which, although the United States did not take a direct part in it, devised a general arrangement for the capitalization and abolition of the dues. It fell to his successor in the Department of State

actually to sign the convention exempting American vessels from these burdensome exactions. But the draft was drawn and the work substantially completed before Marcy's retirement.

On all occasions Marcy took high ground as an advocate of the freedom of the seas and of the natural channels by which they are connected. He urged the free navigation of international streams, and the making of treaties to obtain it. When, towards the close of Pierce's administration, the United States was invited to adhere to the Declaration of Paris, he proposed, as the condition of adhesion, the exemption of private property at sea, except contraband of war, from capture, and believed that, if he could have remained at his task, he might have secured the general acceptance of the principle.

Three notable cases occurred during Marcy's term as Secretary of State which I group together because they each contain a predominant personal element. One of these was the dismissal of Sir John Crampton as British Minister at Washington. Some time after the outbreak of the Crimean War, rumors became rife that a system of enlistments in violation of the neutrality laws was carried on in the United States under the supervision of the British Minister and of certain British consuls. Precise proof of this fact was eventually disclosed in the trial at Philadelphia of a man named Hertz. The United States asked for Crampton's recall together with that of the implicated consuls. The British ministry procrastinated and objected until it became necessary for the United States to act for itself. This step was taken by Marcy not without pain and regret, for his personal relations with Crampton had been of the friendliest character. But, when brought to the point of action, he moved with firmness and resolution, sending to the Minister his passports and revoking the exequaturs of the consuls at New York, Philadelphia and Cincinnati.

Another celebrated case was that of Martin Koszta. This case is the source of a popular delusion which even high officials have occasionally shared. Koszta was a Hungarian political refugee who came to the United States about the time of Kossuth's visit. After residing in the United States upwards of a year and making a declaration of intention to become a citizen, he paid a visit to Turkey. While in that country, certain agents of the Austrian government conceived the idea of securing possession of his person under the guise of the system of extraterritoriality which prevailed to a limited extent in the Ottoman Empire. Proceeding, however, in an irregular manner, they caused Koszta, while walking on the quay in Smyrna, to be seized and thrown into the water, where

he was picked up by a boat's crew from the Austrian brig-of-war *Huszar*, in which he was presently confined. Immediately afterwards Captain Ingraham, of the U. S. sloop-of-war *St. Louis*, sailed into the harbor and learning that Koszta claimed American protection, instituted an inquiry; but having subsequently received notice of a design to remove the prisoner clandestinely, before the investigation could be completed, he demanded Koszta's release, with an intimation that, unless the demand was complied with by a certain hour, it would be enforced. Fortunately, an arrangement was then effected under which Koszta was delivered into the custody of the French consul-general, till the question should be adjusted between the two governments directly concerned. The Austrian government, strongly remonstrating, lodged a protest at Washington, in which it expressed confidence that the United States would disavow the conduct of its agents, call them to a severe account, and tender "a satisfaction proportionate to the magnitude of the outrage." To this protest Marcy replied in the celebrated state paper since known as the Koszta note, presenting a masterly review of the facts and the law, and expressing in conclusion the expectation that his Imperial Majesty would cause Koszta to be set at liberty. This note has been popularly supposed to have justified the protection extended to Koszta on the ground of his having made a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States. No supposition could be more completely unfounded. The declaration of intention was referred to by Marcy only as one of the proofs that Koszta had acquired a domicil in the United States. In reality, Koszta when seized was a protégé of the American consulate, a fact which, under the custom prevailing in Turkey and recognized by the Powers, entitled him to the protection of the United States without regard to his original nationality. This was the ground on which his protection was in the first instance exclusively justified. Subsequently, the ground of domicil was introduced as an independent source of national character, in view of the fact that he had, as Marcy contended, been by a decree of banishment deprived of his rights as an Austrian subject and had not yet acquired by naturalization the rights of a citizen of the United States. In making this argument Marcy probably had in mind, although he did not mention it, a peculiar case of similarly exceptional circumstances, which came before him as a commissioner under the treaty with Mexico of 1839. It is gratifying to relate that the Austrian government eventually assented to Koszta's return to the United States.

The third case in which an individual bore a highly conspic-

uous part was that of the Walker-Rivas government in Nicaragua, an organization created and dominated by William Walker, once euphemistically heralded as the "gray-eyed man of destiny." Walker, who was of Scotch antecedents, exhibited, in singular union with extraordinary determination, a grotesque perversion of the adventurous spirit which has so often characterized the children of that interesting land. A physician by profession, but a filibuster by occupation, he was fanatically devoted to the design of extending the domain of slavery. Landing in Nicaragua with a small band of recruits from the United States, he effected a junction with a disaffected revolutionist named Rivas, with whom he set up and operated a government. Of the manner in which this government was conducted, much favorable testimony has been adduced; but it aroused a feeling of universal horror and alarm in Central America, and was eventually overthrown through the patriotic sacrifices of Costa Rica, who made war upon it and brought it to an end. For a long while the Walker-Rivas government was not recognized by the United States, and its recognition was strenuously opposed by Marcy on the ground that the United States could not afford to expose itself to the imputation of countenancing hostile expeditions organized in its own territory against friendly Powers. Eventually, however, the President decided to recognize the government; and I may say it was only the insistence of the President and his appeal to personal considerations that induced Marcy to remain in the cabinet. On a third filibustering expedition to Central America in 1860, Walker was seized and put to death. His surrender in Nicaragua on May 1, 1857, was, as late as 1890, annually celebrated in the Costa Rican capital.

Marcy's state papers are distinguished by rare ability. In comprehensiveness of view, massive force of statement, strength of legal argumentation, and clearness and vigor of style, they stand unsurpassed in the records of the Department of State. Apart from what I had heard of him in my childhood, it was my own fascination with them, on my first service in that Department, that led me to be specially interested in his life. Of these papers, the Koszta note is no doubt the one most widely known, but there are others that, in my judgment, surpass it. If I were asked to name my favorite, I should not hesitate to designate the note to the French Minister, Count Sartiges, on the Greytown claims.

Greytown, a community lying outside the then generally acknowledged boundaries of Nicaragua, in what was known as the Mosquito Coast, claimed and sought to maintain an independent existence under the authority of the Mosquito

king, who was understood to enjoy the patronage of the British Government. As the result of a controversy with Nicaragua concerning limits, which involved the question of jurisdiction over Punta Arenas, property belonging to the Accessory Transit Company, an organization of American citizens holding a charter from Nicaragua, was on various occasions seized or destroyed at that point by the Greytown authorities, and for these acts damages were demanded. There was, however, another complaint which was supposed to affect the "dignity" of the United States. At that time the United States was represented in Central America by a Minister named Solon Borland, from Arkansas, a man of spirit who had served in the Mexican war. One day the Greytown authorities attempted to arrest the captain of an Accessory Transit steamer, then lying at Punta Arenas, when Mr. Borland happened to be aboard. The captain resisted, and, in the scrimmage that ensued, Mr. Borland seized a musket and gave to the captain successful support. Great excitement ensued at Greytown; and this excitement was presently fanned to a flame by the announcement that Mr. Borland intended to call upon the resident United States commercial agent in the evening. A suggestion from the latter that this visit be considerably omitted, Mr. Borland, his blood still up, scornfully rejected; and, while he was in the agent's house, a violent commotion in the street denoted the presence of a mob. Mr. Borland, nothing daunted, promptly appeared in the gallery and warned the tumultuous assemblage to disperse. But his oratory was suddenly checked by a blow in the face from a bottle, thrown by someone in the crowd, who, after draining from the flask the last inspiring drop, used it as a missile. For the redress of these accumulated grievances Captain Hollins, of the U. S. S. *Cyane*, was dispatched to Greytown. Lacking specific instructions as to procedure, he made upon the local community demands which it was either unwilling, or unable, or without adequate opportunity, to meet, and the time-limit having expired, first bombarded and then burned the town, utterly destroying it. This somewhat fierce and drastic punitive measure created a sensation throughout the civilized world. I have in my collections a pamphlet on the case, published in France, on the cover of which the action of the United States is typified by an arm uplifted in vengeance and bearing an incendiary torch.

At the time when Greytown was destroyed numerous foreigners were residing there, including some of British and some of French allegiance. Claims in behalf of the latter were unofficially presented to the United States by the French Government on the ground that the destruction of the place was

unlawful and unjustified. Marcy, in his response, maintained that, as the claimants had settled in Greytown, they must be regarded as having committed themselves to its protection, so that, for any injuries they had suffered, they must look for redress to that community, and not to the United States or to any other country with which the local government had happened to fall into difficulty. The argument was marshalled with such crushing force that Lord Palmerston announced in Parliament that Great Britain would not present the claims of her subjects to the United States. The French claims were abandoned. I have reason to believe that Marcy himself considered his note in this case to be on the whole the most finished of all his diplomatic papers.

Any review of Marcy's eventful career as Secretary of State would be palpably incomplete that failed to include his well known circular of June 1, 1853, in relation to diplomatic dress. While expressing, in this circular, the expectation that a diplomatic representative of the United States, on the occasion of his reception, would, as far as was consistent with a "just sense of his devotion to republican institutions," conform to the "customs of the country" wherein he resided and to the rules prescribed for officials of his rank, Marcy announced that the Department of State would "encourage" on the part of such representative "as far as practicable, without impairing his usefulness to his country, his appearance at court in the simple dress of an American citizen." He added:

Should there be cases where this cannot be done, owing to the character of the foreign government, without detriment to the public interest, the nearest approach to it compatible with the due performance of his duties is earnestly recommended.

This circular, which marks, so far as the diplomatic service of the United States is concerned, the crest of the great democratic movement that culminated in the middle of the past century, was explained as reflecting "the simplicity of our usages and the tone of feeling among our people." With such a certificate of origin, it produced, in the dovecot of those who aspired to further political honors at home, a flutter in which the latitude of action it allowed seemed to be quite overlooked. To its keen and clear-sighted author, whose sense of humor seldom flagged, this agitation must have furnished a certain amusement; but there can be no doubt that the circular expressed his own inmost feelings. With the men of his time and his type, uniting with a sense of responsibility and entire self-respect an unaffected, rugged simplicity, democracy was not merely a cult; it was a creed, a faith, in which were bound up humanity's best hopes and ideals.

We have seen that the object of our present devotions possessed extraordinary vigor of mind; that he was a statesman of grasp and of vision; and that he bore through life an unblemished reputation. It is evident that he was as the world goes an honest man. In reality, although not deficient in shrewdness, he was remarkably tenacious of principle and sincere; incapable of playing the part of a *poseur*, an apostle of cant. But, admitting all this to be so, did he measure up to the highest standard of integrity? Could it be said of him, as was said of another great public servant, "Statesman, yet friend to truth"? Was he free from that form of self-deception which, often facilitated by the emotions, deludes the promptings of justice and truth with the exalted phrases of patriotism and benevolence? Let him answer for himself.

During the administration of Pierce, the question of Cuba loomed large. Only a few years before, the United States had offered to purchase the island from Spain, but this offer had been indignantly repulsed. Subsequently, certain disputes arose, one of which grew out of the seizure of the *Black Warrior*, an American vessel, by the authorities at Havana. These controversies, combined with the desire for more slave territory, added much strength to the annexationist movement in the United States. Of this measure one of the leading advocates was Pierre Soulé, a native of Brittany in France, who, after settling in Louisiana, became a Senator from that State. Soulé was sent by Pierce as Minister to Spain. The inner history of his mission to Madrid has never been written; but, in the midst of a violent agitation in the United States for the annexation of Cuba, the singular step was taken of instructing Soulé, together with James Buchanan, then Minister at London, and John Y. Mason, Minister at Paris, to repair to some place in Europe and, after conference, to make a report to their Government on the Cuban question. They met in October, 1854, at Ostend, in Belgium, and duly formulated and submitted a report.

In this report, which is known as the "Ostend Manifesto," it was declared that "if Spain, deaf to the voice of her own interest, and actuated by a stubborn pride and false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States," the time would then have come for the United States to consider whether Cuba in the possession of Spain seriously endangered "our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union"; that, if this question should be answered in the affirmative, "then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power"; and that we should be "recreant to our duty—be unworthy of our gal-

lant forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and become a second St. Domingo."

When Marcy received this report his official comments upon it were as parsimonious as they were effective. In a dispatch to Soulé, he remarked that the language of some parts of the report might perhaps be so construed as to convey the inference that the United States was "determined to have the island," and would obtain it by other means, if efforts to purchase it should fail; while other parts of the report repelled this inference. On this he would, he said, only remark that while "the acquisition of Cuba by the United States would be pre-eminently advantageous in itself and of the highest importance as a precautionary measure of security," yet the failure to obtain it by cession "would not, without a material change in the condition of the island, involve imminent peril to the existence of our Government."

Such were his conclusions as formally expressed. Not long afterward, however, in the freedom of private correspondence, he gave full vent to the feelings by which those conclusions were inspired. In a confidential letter addressed to L. B. Shepard, a friend in New York, he said:

I have not time to say much, though I have much to say on the subject to which your letter of yesterday refers.

I am entirely opposed to getting up a war for the purpose of seizing Cuba; but if the conduct of Spain should be such as to justify a war, I should not hesitate to meet that state of things. The authorities of Cuba act unwisely, but not so much so as is represented. They are more alarmed than they need be in regard to the dangers from this country, though it cannot be said that the filibuster spirit and movements do not furnish just grounds of apprehension. They have a clear right to take measures for defense, but what those measures may be it is not easy to define. In exercising their own rights they are bound to respect the rights of other nations. This they have not done in all cases. That they have deliberately intended to commit wrongs against the United States I do not believe; but that they have done so I do not deny. The conduct of Spain and the Cuban authorities has been exaggerated and even misrepresented in some of our leading journals, particularly in the "Union." I cannot speak of the views of the conductors of the latter paper, for I have little or no intercourse with them. From what I have seen of it, I am not much surprised at the opinion that it is for war, right or wrong; but I venture to assure you that such is not the policy of the Administration. It does not want war, would avoid it, but would not shrink from it, if it becomes necessary in the defence of our just rights.

The robber doctrine I abhor. If carried out it would degrade us in our own estimation and disgrace us in the eyes of the civilized world. Should the Administration commit the fatal folly of acting upon it,

it could not hope to be sustained by the country, and would leave a tarnished name to all future times.

Cuba would be a very desirable possession, if it came to us in the right way, but we cannot afford to get it by robbery or theft.

On the confession thus made by her son, Brown University's recording angel will have occasion to shed no tears but those of joy and satisfaction.

On leaving the Department of State in March, 1857, Marcy contemplated a voyage to Europe in company with the late Hamilton Fish, afterward Secretary of State, who was then on the point of making a two years' sojourn on the Continent. Marcy and Fish had always been political antagonists, their correspondence having begun with Marcy's refusal, as Governor, to appoint Fish a commissioner of deeds for the City of New York; but they became warm personal friends. At the beginning of July, Marcy, who had been at Saratoga Springs, started towards New York. On the Fourth he stopped at Ballston Spa. For some time he had occasionally felt in the region of the heart a troublesome disturbance, which the exhausting effects of the warm weather seemed to aggravate. Feeling weary, he lay down on the bed, in his room at the hotel, with a copy of Bacon's *Essays* in his hand, and as he read he suddenly entered upon his last sleep. A servant, on entering the room some hours later, found him lying with the volume still in his hand, open at the place at which he had been reading. Himself a man of singular strength and wisdom, he spent his last moment on earth in communion with one whose words are the common treasure of mankind.

Sharing, as an honorary alumnus of Brown University, the pride she must feel in the distinguished son whose memory we revive today, I wish to present to her, as I now do, a memorial of him. Embracing photographic reproductions of three successive portraits representing him as Governor, as Secretary of War, and as Secretary of State, I trust that this memorial, while preserving for posterity his features, may move some of those who look upon it to study his career and emulate his example.

HENRY CLAY AND PAN AMERICANISM¹

MUCH has been heard in recent years concerning the relations between the United States and the independent countries to the South collectively designated as Latin America. These countries, twenty in number, occupy, as is well known, the vast region formerly ruled by Spain and by Portugal; but the Portuguese dominions, though greater in extent than the connected continental area of the United States, are comprised in what was for sixty-seven years the Empire, but is now the Republic, of Brazil. The other nineteen countries were once colonies or provinces of Spain. When we speak of Pan Americanism, we associate these countries of Spanish and Portuguese origin with the United States, and thus link together in our thoughts all the independent governments of America. Is this a mere operation of the fancy? Is Pan Americanism a reality or a dream? Is it, as is sometimes affirmed, an unnatural conception, altogether artificial and likely to perish; or is it a natural growth, capable of and perhaps occasionally needing artificial stimulation, but legitimately, inevitably springing from conditions, past and present, from which it derives and, if not unwisely tended, will continue to derive an ever increasing substance? To these inquiries it is the purpose of the present address in some measure to furnish an answer.

Just a hundred years have elapsed since Simon Bolivar, living in exile at Kingston in Jamaica, wrote his celebrated prophetic letter. Defeated and driven from his native Venezuela, condemned to struggle with extreme poverty in a foreign land, he could hardly have been censured if he had sounded a note of despair. There was indeed little in the appearances of the time to justify the supposition that the Spanish colonies would become independent. The original revolt did not, as is sometimes hastily assumed, aim at separation. On the contrary, levelled against the alien government set up in Spain by Napoleon Bonaparte, it was ostensibly a loyalist movement designed to support the authority of the son and legitimate successor of the

1. An address delivered before the Kentucky State Bar Association at Frankfort, Kentucky, on the evening of July 8, 1915. Reprinted from *The Columbia University Quarterly*, Vol. XVII, No. 4 (September, 1915); Spanish translation in *Conciliacion Internacional, Boletin 8 de la División panamericana*, 1916.

monarch whom Napoleon had forced to abdicate. Owing to various causes, among which was the obduracy of the regency at Cadiz, it was gradually transformed into a movement for independence; but, even as late as 1815, this object had not been generally avowed. At that date not a single colony had formally declared its independence of Spain herself; and there were perhaps comparatively few who grasped the fact that the former relations with the mother country could not be restored. It was only to the man of faith and of vision that the future was unrolled. Such a man was Simon Bolivar, the "Liberator." In the letter appropriately called "prophetic," he did not hesitate to declare:

The destiny of America is irrevocably fixed; the tie which united it to Spain is cut. . . . Because successes have been partial and fluctuating, we ought not to lose confidence in fortune. In some parts the supporters of independence triumph, while the tyrants obtain advantages in other places. And what is the result? Is not the New World vigorous, aroused and armed for its defence? We glance about us and see everywhere a light in the immense extent of this hemisphere.

While Bolivar thus chained his car to the star of independence, yet, being conscious of the uncertainties that overhung the future of the Spanish provinces in America, he did not seek to foretell the political principles which should prevail in them, or to speculate concerning the nature of the government or the governments which they would adopt. "I desire," he declared, "more than anything else, to see formed in America the greatest nation in the world, not so much by reason of extent and riches as by reason of liberty and glory." He did not, however, regard the union of the provinces under one government as practicable. Owing to their diversities of climate and of situation, the immense distances which separated them, and their characteristic and frequently conflicting interests, he conceived such a union to be impossible. Nevertheless, in his imagination he sought to foreshadow some measure by which harmony and concert between the various parts might be brought about. He dreamed that at some future day the Isthmus of Panama might be for the nascent nations of the West what the Corinthian Isthmus was for the Greeks. "Would to God," he exclaimed, "that some day we might enjoy the happiness of having there an august congress of representatives of the republics, kingdoms and empires of America to deal with the high interests of peace and of war, not only between the American nations but between them and the rest of the globe."

At the time when these words were written there was only one country in America whose independence was proclaimed,

acknowledged and established. This country was the United States. It stood then as the great beacon light to all peoples struggling for liberty and self-government. What was to be the attitude of the United States towards the struggling peoples to the south? Did the United States hold within its limits a man of broad and generous sympathies, a man of faith and of vision, who could look into the future and with hope and confidence predict for the provinces of Spain a destiny such as that which their own prophetic son had ventured to forecast?

There was just one man possessing in requisite combination these qualities and characteristics, and this was the bold, generous, high-souled idol of the adventurous West, vibrant with human sympathies and aspirations—Henry Clay of Kentucky. On July 9, 1816, a congress at Tucuman declared the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, of which Buenos Aires was the head, to be a free and independent nation. In February of the following year the Chilean revolutionists gained at Chacabuco a decisive victory which presaged a similar declaration. On December 6, 1817, Clay announced in the House of Representatives that he intended to move the recognition of Buenos Aires and probably of Chile. The national administration dispatched commissioners to inquire into conditions in South America; but on March 24, 1818, when an appropriation to compensate the commissioners was taken up, Clay sought to obtain an outfit and a salary for a minister “to the independent provinces” of the River Plate. This proposal he followed up on that and the succeeding day by a four hours’ speech in advocacy of the cause of the revolutionists.

This speech was in some respects the most remarkable of his entire career. At the outset he expressed regret at being obliged to differ with many of his friends; but he consoled himself with the reflection that, if he erred, he erred “on the side of the liberty and the happiness of a large portion of the human family.” He would not, he protested, give just cause of war to any power—not even to Spain herself. He believed that the policy of the United States should be one of strict and impartial neutrality; but this was not, he maintained, incompatible with recognition. The United States having consistently acted upon the *de facto* principle, he contended that the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata was an established government, deserving to rank among the nations. There being then in his view no valid ground of objection to its recognition, he avowed the conviction that there was no question in the foreign policy of the United States that had ever risen or ever could occur, “in the decision of which we had so much at stake.” Depicting this country as “the natural head of the American family,” he de-

clared that the question "concerned our politics, our commerce, our navigation."

As to the nature of the governments which the independent countries of Spanish America might maintain, Clay showed himself to be anything but a narrow, destructive propagandist. While regarding the inquiry as one "highly important in itself," he frankly admitted it to be "a question . . . for themselves." Anxious as he was that their governments should be "free," we had, he said, "no right to prescribe for them." They were, and ought to be, the sole judges for themselves. He was strongly inclined to believe that they would in most, if not all, parts of their country establish free governments. We were their great example. Of us they constantly spoke as brothers, having a similar origin. They adopted our principles, copied our institutions, and, in some instances, employed the very language and sentiments of our revolutionary papers. No matter, therefore, what forms they might adopt, he believed that their governments "would be animated by an American feeling and guided by an American policy. They would obey the laws of the system of the New World, of which they would compose a part, in contradistinction to that of Europe."

The allegation that the South Americans were "too ignorant and too superstitious to admit of the existence of free government," he denied. The eight-years' revolution had "already produced a powerful effect." "Education had been attended to, and genius developed." But, even if the fact were otherwise, it was, he asserted, "the doctrine of thrones that man was too ignorant to govern himself." He conceded that the South Americans had not gone so far as could be desired in the direction of religious toleration, but we should, he said, remember that "everything was progressive." Even granting that they were ignorant and incompetent for free government, this was due to the execrable colonial system, from which they should be freed.

In his broad sweep of the horizon, Clay did not lose sight of the possibilities of commercial development, whose importance was relatively enhanced by the restrictions then existing on the trade of the United States with the British colonies. It had been suggested that the United States might find in an independent Spanish America a great agricultural rival. This view he denounced as "narrow, selfish, and grovelling, as well as untrue." On the other hand, he held out the prospect, the realization of which the fatuity of later years has done all that was possible to defeat, that, when Great Britain should be at war, the United States would "engross almost the whole transportation of the Spanish American commerce." Nay, more; survey-

ing the future with yet greater comprehensiveness and unhesitatingly assuming that, in respect of "European wars," the several parts of independent America would "stand neutral," he deemed it to be of the utmost importance to them to adopt and observe "a liberal system of neutrality," which "all America" would be "interested in maintaining and enforcing."

On all these grounds Henry Clay pronounced the independence of Spanish America to be "an interest of primary consideration." His motion, however, to provide for a diplomatic mission to the River Plate was lost by a vote of 115 noes to 45 ayes. For nearly two years the agitation in Congress concerning South America rested. In the interval the effort of the United States to obtain from Spain the peaceful cession of the Floridas was in progress. But, before the attainment of this object was fully assured, our great protagonist of South American independence returned to his charge, and on May 10, 1820, submitted in the House a resolution declaring it to be expedient to provide by law for the sending of ministers to any of the governments of South America that had established and were maintaining their independence of Spain. In the eloquent speech with which he supported this proposal, he did not hesitate to examine the subject in all its phases. Even the question of slavery, which had persistently disturbed the debates of the session, he did not forbear to discuss. Adverting to an intimation that the people of South America were "unfit for freedom," he affirmed that they were in some particulars "in advance of us." In one particular they were indeed "greatly in advance of us"; this was, that "Granada, Venezuela, and Buenos Aires had all emancipated their slaves." He "rejoiced that circumstances were such as to permit them to do it." Nor had they, he said, neglected education. They had "fostered schools." Newspapers were numerous. He had, he affirmed, never seen "a question discussed with more ability than in a newspaper of Buenos Aires, whether a federative or consolidated form of government was best." Rising, then, to the height of his argument, he exclaimed:

It is in our power to create a system of which we shall be the centre, and in which all South America will act with us. In respect to commerce, we should be most benefited; . . . We should become the centre of a system which would constitute the rallying point of human wisdom against all the despotism of the Old World. . . . In spite of our coldness towards them, . . . [he] had no earthly doubt, if our government would take the lead and recognize them, that they would become yet more anxious to imitate our institutions, and to secure to themselves and to their posterity the same freedom which we enjoy.

The opinion of "the friends of freedom in Europe" was, he declared, that the policy of the United States had been "cold, heartless, and indifferent towards the greatest cause which could possibly engage our affections and enlist our feelings in its behalf." He would no longer justify this impression. He would break the "commercial and political fetters" by which the New World had so long been confined. "Let us," he exclaimed, "become real and true Americans, and place ourselves at the head of the American system."

Clay's resolution was carried by a vote of 80 to 75; but, although this showed great progress, the contest was not yet won. The resolution only expressed an opinion in favor of diplomatic representation, but did not actually provide for it. A year later, on February 9, 1821, a motion for a suitable appropriation was lost by only seven votes. On the following day, however, Clay renewed his agitation, by presenting a resolution that afforded the House an opportunity, first, to declare its interest in the success of the South American provinces in their struggles for liberty, and secondly, to pledge its "constitutional support to the President" whenever he should "deem it expedient to recognize the sovereignty and independence" of any of them. A motion to lay on the table was lost. The author of the resolution at length felt the flush of success. With an independence as characteristic as it is refreshing, he disdainfully repulsed a cautious suggestion of doubt as to approval at home with the declaration that, if his constituents did not share his sentiments, so help him God, he would not represent them. Both clauses of his resolution were carried,—the first, expressing interest in the cause, by a vote of 134 to 12; the second, pledging constitutional support to the President, by a vote of 87 to 68. A year later, the President having communicated to Congress his opinion that recognition should no longer be withheld, an appropriation was duly made. The triumph of the cause was complete.

Almost two years later came the famous pronouncements in President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, constituting what has since been known as the Monroe Doctrine, the meaning of which is not inaccurately interpreted in the popular phrase "America for the Americans." When these declarations were made, the danger of interference by the Allied Powers of Europe in the affairs of Spanish America had in reality passed away. But a great question still remained. Recognition had been accorded; but the character of the relations of the United States with the other independent countries of the hemisphere remained to be determined and defined.

In the consideration of this momentous question the figures

of Bolivar and Clay again rise to pre-eminence. In a letter written at Lima on December 7, 1824, Bolivar, then at the head of the Republic of Peru, suggested the holding of a conference of representatives of the independent governments of America at Panama. The object of the conference was declared to be "the establishment of certain fixed principles for securing the preservation of peace between the nations of America, and the concurrence of all those nations in defence of their own rights." Bolivar's invitation embraced Colombia, Mexico, Central America, Buenos Aires, Chile and Brazil. It did not include the United States. For this omission a sufficient reason may be found in the circumstance that the United States was not a party to the conflict then still in progress between Spain and her former colonies, but it has also been conjectured that the existence of African slavery in the United States was regarded by Bolivar as an obstacle to the free discussion of some of the matters of which the congress might be obliged to treat. However this may be, the first intimation that the presence of the United States was desired was made by the representatives of Colombia and Mexico in conversations with Clay, who had become Secretary of State. The President, John Quincy Adams, although he had warmly espoused the cause of the American nations as against any hostile projects of the Holy Alliance, felt obliged to proceed with caution, since the United States was maintaining in the Spanish-American conflict a neutral position; but there can be no doubt that Clay warmly urged that the invitation be accepted. As has been seen, the idea of a common interest arising from a similarity of political principles had taken a profound hold upon him. He was in reality the great champion of this conception. He was, therefore, naturally fascinated with the proposal that the United States should take part in the congress at Panama. His dream of a league of freedom seemed to be in process of fruition. The invitation to the congress was accepted.

The President appointed as plenipotentiaries of the United States two eminent men, Richard C. Anderson of Kentucky and John Sergeant of Pennsylvania. Their instructions, dated May 8, 1826, were drawn by Clay and were signed by him as Secretary of State. Covering a wide range, they disclose the broad and far-reaching views to which, in co-operation with the President, now a sturdy advocate of Pan Americanism, he sought to give effect. At the very threshold they declared that the President could not have declined the invitation to the congress "without subjecting the United States to the reproach of insensibility to the deepest concerns of the American hemisphere," and perhaps of a want of sincerity in regard to Mon-

roe's solemn declarations. Moreover, the assembling of a congress would, so the instructions declared, "form a new epoch in human affairs." Not only would the fact itself challenge the attention of the civilized world, but it was confidently hoped that the congress would "entitle itself to the affection and lasting gratitude of all America, by the wisdom and liberality of its principles" and by the establishment of a new guarantee for the great interests which would engage its deliberations. At the same time the fact was emphasized that the congress was to be regarded as a diplomatic body, without powers of ordinary legislation. It was not to be "an amphictyonic council, invested with power finally to decide controversies between the American states or to regulate in any respect their conduct," but was expected to afford opportunities for free and friendly conference and to facilitate the conclusion of treaties.

After these preliminary explanations, the instructions proceeded to point out that it was not the intention of the United States to change its "pacific and neutral policy." While, therefore, the congress probably would consider the future prosecution of the war with Spain by the existing belligerents, the delegates of the United States were not to enter into the discussion of that subject, but were to confine themselves strictly to subjects in which all the American nations, whether belligerent or neutral, might have an interest. One of these was the maintenance of peace, which was declared to be "the greatest want of America." In regard to European wars, confidence was expressed that the policy of all America would be the same, that of "peace and neutrality," which the United States had consistently labored to preserve. On this supposition the greatest importance was, said the instructions, attached to questions of maritime neutrality. The delegates were to bring forward "the proposition to abolish war against private property and non-combatants upon the ocean," as formerly proposed by Dr. Franklin; but, as this might not be readily adopted, they were authorized to propose that free ships should make free goods and that enemy ships should make enemy goods, both rules being considered to operate in favor of neutrality. The delegates were also to seek a definition of blockade, and were besides to deal with the subject of contraband, whose vital relation to the preservation of neutral trade is, it may be remarked, not always fully appreciated.

In regard to commercial intercourse, the instructions incorporated the most liberal views. The delegates of the United States were not to seek exclusive privileges, even as against the European powers. They were to observe the most-favored-nation principle, so that any favors in commerce or in naviga-

tion granted by an American nation to any foreign power should extend to every other American nation; and were to oppose the imposition of discriminating duties on importations or exportations on account of the flag. As for the Monroe declarations, the delegates of the United States, without committing the parties to the support of any particular boundaries or to a joint resistance in any future case, were desired to propose a joint declaration that each American state, acting for and binding only itself, would not allow a new European colony to be established within its territories. Another subject, closely related to commerce as well as to politics, was that of a canal to connect the Atlantic and the Pacific. Treating of this subject in a spirit of liberality, the instructions said:

What is to redound to the advantage of all America should be effected by common means and united exertions, and should not be left to the separate efforts of any one power. . . . If the work should ever be executed so as to admit of the passage of sea vessels from ocean to ocean, the benefits of it ought not to be exclusively appropriated to any one nation, but should be extended to all parts of the globe upon the payment of a just compensation or reasonable tolls.

In only one passage of this remarkable state paper did its author seem to labor. This was where he was obliged to discuss the troublesome question that so persistently marred the prospect in which his fancy loved to range. The congress might perhaps consider the question of Cuba and of Haiti. With regard to the latter, he expressed the opinion that the subject was not one that required concert of action between all American powers. The case of Cuba was more complex. The United States, it was said, would prefer the unaided establishment of Cuban independence, but was convinced that the island was incompetent to sustain self-government without assistance. An independence guaranteed by others powers, European or American, or both, would on the other hand involve difficulties almost insuperable. Likewise fraught with danger was the design which rumor ascribed to Colombia and to Mexico to conquer and annex the island. Such an attempt would, declared the instructions, change the whole character of the war and involve continual fears as to the future stability of conditions. The delegates of the United States were therefore authorized to state without reserve that their government, having too much at stake to see with indifference a war against Cuba prosecuted in a desolating manner, or one race employed against another probably with the most shocking excesses, would be constrained to employ all means necessary to defend

itself against the "contagion" of such near and dangerous examples.

Having thus dealt with the vexed question, the instructions passed to other topics. It was suggested that a joint declaration be made in favor of the free toleration of religious worship. If questions of boundary and other controverted matters among the new American powers should be presented, the delegates of the United States were to manifest a willingness to give their best counsel and advice, and, if it were desired, to serve as arbitrators. Finally, as to forms of government and the cause of free institutions, it was declared that the United States were not and never had been "animated by any spirit of propagandism." They preferred "to all other forms of government . . . their own confederacy"; but, allowing, as they did, "no foreign interference" either in the formation or in the conduct of their own government, they were "equally scrupulous in refraining from all interference in the original structure or subsequent interior movement of the governments of other independent nations."

The plans of the administration in regard to the assembly at Panama encountered in the Congress of the United States a determined opposition, largely due, as the records amply attest, to difficulties arising out of the question of slavery. So long was the departure of the plenipotentiaries of the United States delayed, that, when they appeared on the Isthmus of Panama, the congress had adjourned. For all practical purposes the congress seemed to be a failure. But we commit a grievous error if we assume that great thoughts perish when some measure designed to make them effective falls short of immediate success. The idea of the Panama Congress survived in various conferences held by the South American countries, but its fuller development was deferred till later years.

Meanwhile, the relations between the United States and the American countries of Spanish origin became such as to justify the belief that the conceptions of Clay lacked substantial foundation. The period succeeding the establishment by those countries of their independence was characterized by the disorders that attended their efforts to conduct stable governments. Revolutions constantly broke out, and dictators rose to power whose acts seemed to falsify the dreams patriots had cherished of liberty and fraternity. In 1846, the war between the United States and Mexico occurred. This conflict and the absorption of Mexican territory by which it was followed produced towards the United States, throughout all Spanish America, a feeling of distrust, the extent and depth of which have perhaps never been adequately appreciated in this country.

There was created a sense of insecurity, which was greatly intensified by the departure of numerous filibustering expeditions which set out from the United States for Mexico and Central America during the fifth decade of the last century; nor was this feeling of apprehension allayed by the recommendations made by the Executive to the Congress of the United States just prior to our Civil War for the occupation of northern Mexico. Concert of action for mutual protection against the United States was indeed seriously considered by the Spanish-American countries, a general dread having overspread them that they were drifting toward a position in which, if they would save their independence, they must accept toward the great colossus of the North, with the dominating tendencies of its governing race and its menacing doctrine of "manifest destiny," an attitude of open and avowed hostility. The ideals, the lofty purposes, the broad and generous sympathies of Henry Clay seemed for the time being to have perished. A new chapter in history was, however, about to be opened.

With the outbreak of the Civil War in the United States, the attitude of the government towards the countries to the South underwent an immediate and radical change. In this change the government's altered front towards the extension of slavery was a fundamental factor. But, beyond this, the people of the United States, who had been accustomed to point to the revolutions in Spanish America as proof of unfitness and incompetency for self-government, suddenly learned that no country was exempt from the possibility of internal disturbance. The language of the government also was completely transformed. Terms of kindness and respect took the place of epithets of opprobrium. In a word, the thoughts and aspirations that had animated the policies of Henry Clay began again to elevate and to dignify the utterances of statesmen.

One of the first tangible and substantial proofs of the radical change that had taken place was furnished by the Peace Conference at Washington, in 1870, which brought about the cessation of hostilities between Spain and the Republics on the west coast of South America. For five years a state of war had existed in that quarter. The United States sought by its good offices to terminate it. The conference met under the presidency of Hamilton Fish, who was then Secretary of State, and resulted in the conclusion of an agreement in the nature of a perpetual armistice, under which neither party was to commit any act of hostility against the other without three years' notice given through the Department of State of the United States.

Nine years later there broke out what is known as the War

of the Pacific, a war between Chile on the one side and Peru and Bolivia on the other. In March, 1881, while this lamentable conflict was still in progress, James G. Blaine became Secretary of State. His emulation of the example of Henry Clay may have been stimulated by the circumstance that he spent some of his earlier days in the great State with which Clay's fame is forever connected. That he sought to figure as the heir of Clay's political doctrines was a fact generally recognized. In regard to the policy of protection he was long known as the leading exponent of the "American system" of which Clay was called the father. Naturally, therefore, as Secretary of State, he sought to revive the ideal of an international American political system possessing traits and characteristics of its own.

In this spirit Mr. Blaine on November 29, 1881, issued to the independent governments of America in the name of the President an invitation to take part in a conference at Washington. This conference was to meet on November 24, 1882, "for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America." Its attention was to be "strictly confined to this one great object." In issuing this invitation, the United States, it was declared, did not assume the position of attempting to determine existing questions, and for this reason a day was set for the assembling of the conference so far in the future as to leave room for the hope that by the time named the war in the Pacific would be ended. It was further declared that the influence of the United States, so far as it might be potential, would be "exerted in the direction of conciliating whatever conflicting interests of blood, or government, or historical tradition may necessarily come together in response to a call embracing such vast and diverse elements."

Because of the continuance of the war in South America, the invitation thus extended was subsequently withdrawn, but the project of a conference survived. Discerning men sagaciously espoused it, with a mind not merely to save it but to make it more comprehensive. Among these I may mention without impropriety, because he was the most active, the most insistent, and the most effective of all, an eminent member of the House from Kentucky, now governor of the State which he has so long and so faithfully served in positions of high responsibility, the Honorable James B. McCreary. On May 28, 1888, largely as the result of his persistent efforts, a bill to authorize the calling of an International American Conference, having passed both houses, became a law without the President's approval. Verily, the soul of Henry Clay went marching on!

It was my good fortune to be present, as an official of the

Department of State, at the assembling of the first International American Conference on October 2, 1889. Its sessions covered nearly seven months, the final adjournment taking place on April 19, 1890. Its presiding officer, with a certain poetic justice, was Mr. Blaine, who had again become Secretary of State. Its labors covered a wide range, and were full of interest. Unfortunately, the contemporaneous action of the Congress of the United States in greatly increasing the rates of duty on imports discouraged the efforts of those who had hoped to bring about more liberal trade relations. The dramatic stroke by which Mr. Blaine at length secured the insertion in the new tariff of a clause looking to a limited reciprocity forms one of the best known incidents of the time.

It was once somewhat the fashion to decry the first International American Conference because only a few of its various professed objects were immediately accomplished. This short-sighted view was, however, chiefly propagated by those who were in the habit of decrying, on general adverse presumptions and without regard to the merits, all projects with which the president of the conference was prominently identified. Had nothing else been achieved, the resulting establishment of the international union of the American republics would alone have justified the meeting. But the conference was fruitful in many ways. The International American Conferences have in reality become a permanent feature of the life of the independent countries of America. In 1901-2, a second conference was held in Mexico; a third conference was held in 1906 at Rio de Janeiro; and a fourth, in 1910 at Buenos Aires. The fifth conference would have met in 1914 in Santiago, in Chile, but for the breaking out of the appalling conflict in Europe. The time was when Pan Americanism seemed to be most fitly emblemized by the orchid, a product wholly ornamental, having no roots in the ground and suggesting the thought of artificiality. But gradually this emblem has ceased to be appropriate; and in its place may we not now take as our symbol the monarch of the forest, the oak, rearing its branches high in the air but sending its roots deep into the ground, and drawing from both earth and sky all the elements of a vigorous and useful growth?

We have seen that in the dreams of Bolivar and Clay the idea of a solidarity of political interests was predominant. So long as this condition continued, relations were necessarily incomplete. Sympathy follows association, and association naturally follows the line of our activities. One thing was yet needed to complete the circle of our sympathies, and that was the union of material with political interests by means of a

more intimate commercial intercourse. To such a consummation there have heretofore been certain rigid obstacles. Our commercial relations with the countries of Central and South America have often been discussed as if trade could be brought about by a mere exertion of the will. Our manufacturers and merchants have been censured because they did not seek the trade of those countries. In reality, to say nothing of fiscal obstructions, the development of trade has been slow because conditions were not ripe for it. Not only has the United States, like other rapidly developing countries, been a great borrower, resorting to the same European reservoirs from which other American countries have been nourished, but its merchants and manufacturers have been preoccupied with their own rich and expanding home market, in which short credits and large profits exercised their inevitable fascination. These conditions have, however, been changing. The development of manufactures has created a need of foreign markets, while the gradual accumulation of free capital has prompted attention to opportunities abroad.

That the American nations are alive to the advantages of co-operation in supplying each other's material wants cannot be doubted. A demonstration, both original and striking, of progress in that direction is furnished by the Pan American Financial Conference, lately held in Washington under the presidency of the Secretary of the Treasury. That its convocation was a happy thought is shown by the earnest, practical character of its deliberations, and the plans wisely laid for future activity. May the work thus auspiciously begun go steadily and prosperously on!

In conclusion, I venture to advert to a phrase too frequently heard in public places—the dictum that “commerce is war.” Catching phrases are notoriously misleading, often proving upon examination to be essentially fallacious; but this particular phrase I desire to put under the ban of Henry Clay’s denunciation as “narrow, selfish, and grovelling.” Trade, it is true, usually involves competition; yet competition when fairly conducted is to be regarded only as the stimulus of energy. Commerce properly viewed is an exchange of benefits. A great American statesman, one of the ablest statesmen, I may say, of recent times, the late Baron Rio-Braco of Brazil, in a remarkable state paper, well observed that “arrangements in which neither of the interested parties loses, and still more those in which all gain, are always the best.” Commerce pursued in this spirit is unfriendly to no one. It is not unfriendly to Europe, or to any other part of the globe, but is, on the contrary, a fructifying influence, contributing to the prosperity

and contentment of all. In this benign sense it found a place in Clay's vision of a free, harmonious, united America, as the eventual abode of justice, peace and good-will.

ELIHU ROOT'S SERVICES TO THE NATION¹

I COME here neither to bury Caesar nor to praise him. Not only is the subject of the evening's discourse still with us, but he has given, during the past six months, manifestations of an energy and a continuing capacity for work which youth might envy. Indeed, may we not remind him that, if he should decide to imitate the example of Cato, he has yet ten years to wait before he can be re-entered as a freshman in the study of Greek? The time for a final reckoning of his achievements has not arrived, for we are justified in assuming that the sum total is still unattainable. On the other hand, to essay to recount his services in terms of eulogy would tend only to obscure them, just as the strong, bold outlines of a massive structure are sometimes marred by efforts at ornamentation.

Of Mr. Root's record as United States district attorney at New York, from 1883 to 1885, I shall not undertake to speak, but shall proceed at once to the consideration of his career after his entrance into the public service at Washington.

In the summer of 1899 a vacancy occurred in the office of Secretary of War, an office which had, as the result of the war with Spain, the consequent annexations of territory, the occupation of Cuba and the insurrection in the Philippines, become charged with duties unprecedentedly varied, complex and onerous. President McKinley caused it to be known that he desired the best man that could be found for the position. Members of both political parties united in designating Elihu Root as the person most likely to meet the necessities of the situation; and on August 1, 1899, he became the head of the War Department.

The new incumbent of that important post was too clear-sighted to cherish any illusions as to the seriousness of the task to which he had set his hand. Although our history had thoroughly discredited Jefferson's affirmation that peace was our passion, it had as conclusively shown that unpreparedness was our ruling predilection, and that popularity could scarcely be gained by running counter to the popular supposition, so signally confirmed by our brief conflict with Spain, that un-

1. Reprinted from the *Proceedings* of the Fifty-first Convocation of the University of the State of New York, Albany, N. Y., October 21, 22, 1915.

trained levies, provided they were American, were not only invincible but were more than a match for any foreign force that could be sent against them. Mr. Root, however, perceived an opening through which farsighted statesmanship might advance to the achievement of enduring reforms. Under the law as it then stood, the volunteer force which had lately enlisted in the national service was to be abandoned before July 1, 1901, and the regular force restored to its peace basis of 26,610. No matter how speedily the insurrection in the Philippines might be subdued, the existing conditions rendered necessary an increase of the regular army. If content to follow what had been the previous practice, Mr. Root might have dealt with this question as an isolated problem, but he preferred to employ it as the occasion for a general survey of the nation's predicament and needs, and the presentation of a comprehensive plan for the improvement of the organization of the army.

Such a plan he embodied in his annual report for 1899. This document, which appeared only four months after his induction into office, may be regarded as epoch-making. Setting out with two fundamental thoughts, (1) that the real object of maintaining an army is to provide for war, and (2) that the regular army in the United States probably would never be by itself sufficient to carry on a war, he proceeded to detail the requisites of adequate preparation, embracing the study of plans of action, implements and methods of tactical organizations and the establishment of depots, camps, fortifications and lines of communications; the preparation of materials of war; the proper selection of officers of the army; and the exercise and training of officers and men in large bodies, under conditions approaching as nearly as possible those to be anticipated in war.

For the accomplishment of these objects he recommended the founding of an army war college, the creation of a general staff, an improved system of appointments, and of promotions, and the establishment of such relations between regulars and volunteers that the combined force should constitute a homogeneous body. These proposals were set forth in ample detail, and were renewed in his report for 1900.

Gradually, under his skilful guidance and powerful urgency, his recommendations one by one bore fruit. An appropriation was obtained for the War College. By the act of February 2, 1901, provision was made for the reorganization of the army. Minimum and maximum numbers of enlisted men were established for the different organizations, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, so that the total number might be varied by the President according to the exigencies of the time from a minimum of

59,131 to a maximum of 100,000, without any change of commissioned officers or in the number of organizations. Various orders were issued for the purpose of carrying out the work of reorganization.

On November 27, 1901, the day on which his annual report for 1901 was signed, Mr. Root issued a memorandum for a general order on the subject of the instruction of officers. This memorandum outlined a complete system of instruction, including the creation of general and special schools for officers, and, above all, the establishment of the war college, which, besides exercising a general supervision over all the other schools, was to perform many of the duties of a general staff.

On January 21, 1903, a bill for the reorganization of the militia became a law. This bill, drawn on the lines laid down by Mr. Root, provided that the organization, armament and discipline of the organized militia, which embraces the national guard organizations, should be the same as that prescribed for the regular army; that it should have the same arms, ammunition and supplies; that it should be inspected by regular army officers and take part in joint maneuvers with the regular army. It also provided for the detail of officers of the regular army to give instruction and information at state encampments, and introduced examinations for the purpose of determining the fitness of members of the organized militia for the command of volunteer forces.

Less than a month later, on February 14, 1903, an act, also drawn precisely upon the lines laid down by the Secretary of War, was passed for the establishment of a general staff. It is the function of this corps, which is composed of officers detailed from the army at large, to prepare plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of the military forces in time of war; to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the army and its state of preparation for military operations; to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general officers and other superior commanders, and to act as their agents in informing and co-ordinating the action of all the different officers who are subject to the supervision of the chief of staff; and to perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be prescribed by the President.

The provisions of the general staff act were carried out by appropriate orders and regulations; and, as the creation of the general staff relieved the War College board of many of the duties originally assigned to it, new regulations were made for the War College.

The four capital measures here briefly described—the re-

organization of the army, the reorganization of the militia, the establishment of the War College, and the creation of the General Staff—constitute the coherent parts of a harmonious plan, fundamental in character. The army became a living organism; and for the first time in its history the United States may be said to have possessed the foundations of an efficient military system, wisely and sagaciously laid. Such an achievement would alone have sufficed to win for its author lasting fame.

But the thoughts of the Secretary of War were by no means wholly occupied with plans for military reform. The administration of distant countries and peoples was committed to his department. In his celebrated annual report for 1899, when discussing the government of Porto Rico, he declared it to be "our unquestioned duty to make the interests of the people over whom we assert sovereignty the first and controlling consideration in all legislation and administration which concerns them." Perhaps this proposition will in the abstract command our instant intellectual assent, but it has, as a practical rule, been by colonizing nations more honored in the breach than in the observance. Mr. Root steadfastly endeavored to enforce it; and it was his good fortune not only to preside over the substitution of civil for military government in the Philippines, but also to issue to General Wood, the successful administrator of the government of Cuba, the order for the evacuation of the island in conformity with the pledges we had publicly made.

When Mr. Root, on February 1, 1904, retired from the post of Secretary of War, he had reason to feel justified in returning to the practice of the profession to which his life had been chiefly devoted; for he had completed in the War Department a rounded service, comparable in its symmetry and its demonstration of organizing ability with that which another great citizen of the State of New York, Alexander Hamilton, had performed in the Treasury. But he was soon called to another sphere of action.

On July 1, 1905, Mr. Root became Secretary of State in the cabinet of President Roosevelt. His predecessor, John Hay, had attained great eminence, and he was not likely to gain reputation by easy contrasts; but he was not unfamiliar with foreign affairs, and, besides having participated in the discussion of international problems in cabinet, had, while Secretary of War, acted as a member of the tribunal by which the Alaskan boundary was determined.

On assuming the Secretaryship of State, Mr. Root at once threw himself with his accustomed vigor and thoroughness into the work of mastering the numerous and complicated questions with which he was called upon to deal. The previous

speaker this evening, Señor Calderon, the distinguished minister from Bolivia, has spoken of Mr. Root's tour of South America. This tour marks an epoch in the relations between the United States and the other independent countries of the western hemisphere; but, in view of what has already been said, I will not dwell upon it. I will venture only to mention two thoughts which it suggests. The first is that the United States is primarily an American power, and that, so far as its concerns are political, they relate to the American continent rather than to Europe or to Asia. The second thought is that the Monroe Doctrine, if properly interpreted, instead of being subversive of the independence of American states, should be regarded as but the guaranty of such independence. This view was enunciated by Mr. Root in his speech before the third International American Conference at Rio de Janeiro, with a lucidity, eloquence and force that thrilled our sister republics in this hemisphere; and the speech has not ceased to be remembered by them. On that occasion, he said:

We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights, or privileges, or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic. We wish to increase our prosperity, to expand our trade, to grow in wealth, in wisdom, and in spirit, but our conception of the true way to accomplish this is not to pull down others and profit by their ruin, but to help all friends to a common prosperity and a common growth, that we may all become greater and stronger together.

Within a few months, for the first time, the recognized possessors of every foot of soil upon the American continents can be and I hope will be represented with the acknowledged rights of equal sovereign states in the great World Congress at The Hague. This will be the world's formal and final acceptance of the declaration that no part of the American continents is to be deemed subject to colonization. Let us pledge ourselves to aid each other in the full performance of the duty to humanity which that accepted declaration implies; so that in time the weakest and most unfortunate of our republics may come to march with equal step by the side of the stronger and more fortunate. Let us help each other to show that for all the races of men the liberty for which we have fought and labored is the twin sister of justice and peace. Let us unite in creating and maintaining and making effective an all-American public opinion, whose power shall influence international conduct and prevent international wrong, and narrow the causes of war, and forever preserve our free lands from the burden of such arma-

ments as are massed behind the frontiers of Europe, and bring us ever nearer to the perfection of ordered liberty. So shall come security and prosperity, and production and trade, wealth, learning, the arts, and happiness for us all.

The sentiments of justice and good will which ring in these eloquent utterances permeated Mr. Root's entire work as Secretary of State. In the delicate and important negotiations with Japan, which he successfully conducted, he did not hesitate to avow his belief in the pacific desires and intentions of that great empire of the Far East. Profoundly understanding that the surest foundation of the world's peace is mutual respect, he sought to cultivate a spirit of reciprocal confidence. He tried not merely to allay irritation but to remove its causes. Above all, he endeavored, through arbitration and other amicable methods, to establish a reign of law among nations. With the same end in view, he staunchly supported the work of The Hague conferences.

Another trait by which Mr. Root's service in the Department of State is characterized is its organizing tendency. Just as in the War Department he had sought to substitute method and system for occasional measures, so in the Department of State he endeavored to lay the foundations on which future generations might build. This is particularly shown in his negotiations with our neighbor to the north, the Dominion of Canada. Within the space of less than a year, in 1908 and 1909, he concluded treaties for the more complete definition and demarcation of the international boundary; for the adoption of uniform and effective measures for the protection, preservation and propagation of food fishes in the waters contiguous to the two countries; for the conveyance through the one country of persons in lawful custody for trial or punishment in the other; for reciprocal rights in wrecking and salvage in waters contiguous to the boundary; and for the regulation of the use of boundary waters in such manner as to preserve their navigability while promoting industrial interests. The importance to the adjacent populations of the treaties relating to food fishes and the use of boundary waters it would be difficult to overestimate; but I am sorry to say that, by reason of the failure of the United States to adopt appropriate legislation, the convention for the preservation of food fishes has not yet been carried into effect, so that their destruction still proceeds at such a pace that even many of the destroyers have become alarmed for the future of their occupation. Mr. Root's last act as Secretary of State was the signing on January 27, 1909, of the treaty for the submission to The Hague Court of the century-old controversy between the United States and Great

Britain as to the north Atlantic fisheries; and with peculiar appropriateness he was sent as chief counsel to conduct that great litigation on the part of the United States. The ability and success with which he discharged this duty are still within the public memory.

On Mr. Root's services in the Senate it is unnecessary on this occasion to dwell. So far as they have related to international questions, he has stood for the same principles and methods that he employed as Secretary of State; and even where they have related to questions on which men divide as members of different parties, it is universally acknowledged that his arguments have been worthy of his reputation as a statesman, and have potently influenced the form and course of legislation.

The name of the guest of the evening has often been mentioned in connection with what is sometimes called a higher place than any he has as yet occupied. I deliberately refrain from saying "higher honors," because I conceive that honor consists not so much in the position one holds as in the manner in which he performs its duties. But, this much I desire to say: After a careful survey of Mr. Root's services to the nation, I am unable to detect in the record a single act or utterance suggestive of what is popularly termed a "bid" for any office. No trace is found there of rhetorical jugglery, nor of effort to steal away to the skies in a cloud of dubious phrases. On the contrary, order and lucidity mark every utterance, while intelligent purpose characterizes every act. The office is lost sight of in the man, and honor follows achievement. Of all titles to distinction, this is the highest and best.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND FUTURE TRADE RELATIONS¹

IN spite of the prevailing uncertainty as to the duration of the present conflict in Europe, the commercial world is anxiously looking forward to the time when normal trade relations will be restored and competition will again become general and active. It is an admitted principle of international law that, with the exception of engagements specially applica-

1. Address delivered at the International Trade Conference, Hotel Astor, New York, December 6-7-8, 1915, under the auspices of the National Association of Manufacturers in Co-operation with Banking and Transportation Interests of the United States.

ble to a state of hostilities, war abrogates all treaties between the belligerents of an executory nature, and in this category are embraced commercial agreements. It will therefore be necessary, when peace is re-established, for the countries now engaged in armed strife to take up without delay the question of the conditions and regulation of trade.

TREATY RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

With the exception of Russia, with whom the treaty of commerce and navigation of 1832 had lately been terminated because of what was termed the passport question, the United States at the outbreak of hostilities had commercial treaties with all the belligerents. As the United States has remained neutral, those treaties have not been disturbed; but it is by no means certain that they may not eventually have to be revised, or supplemented, in order to meet new arrangements between the countries now at war.

CHIEF OBJECT OF COMMERCIAL TREATIES

A detailed analysis of our commercial treaties is not possible within the limits of the present address.² Generally speaking, I may say that, apart from special agreements of reciprocity, their chief object has been the creation of equal conditions under which the American merchant and ship-owner might freely compete with his rivals. To this end it has been customary to provide, at the outset, for a reciprocal freedom of commerce between the territories of the contracting parties, so that the citizens of each party should have liberty to come with their ships and cargoes into all the ports and places of the other to which the ships or cargoes of any other foreign nation might be permitted to come, and on the same terms. In harmony with this general clause, it is usually also stipulated that no discriminating duties of any kind shall be levied, and that no higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importation into the one country of the products or manufactures of the other country than shall be payable on like articles of any other foreign country. The same stipulation is applied to export duties. Equality of navigation duties is also prescribed, whether they relate to tonnage, to light or harbor dues, to pilotage, to salvage, or to any other local charges; and it is further provided that this equality of duties shall exist without regard to the flag the vessel flies, whether it be a vessel of the country or a foreign vessel.

2. Such an analysis may be found in *Commercial Treaties of the United States*. A brief by Carman F. Randolph, of the New York Bar. Published by the National Foreign Trade Council, New York City.

DISCRIMINATION NOT PERMITTED

It may here be remarked that by a clause (J Subsection 7) of the existing Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, it was enacted that a discount of 5 per cent on all duties imposed by the act should be allowed on goods, wares and merchandise imported in registered vessels of the United States. The clause was, however, coupled with the proviso that it should not be so construed as to abrogate or impair or affect the provisions of any treaty of the United States; and as the Attorney-General subsequently held that the clause could not be enforced without violating the stipulations of existing treaties, the Treasury suspended the enforcement of the act, the interpretation and application of which are still the subject of litigation. The policy to which it was thus proposed to revert was practically universal a hundred years ago. In the third decade of the last century, largely as the result of the efforts of the United States, it was reciprocally abandoned in the belief that, as flag discriminations, if practiced by one nation, were necessarily enforced by others, the advantage gained on the homeward voyage was offset on the outward voyage by a corresponding loss.

THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE

Another stipulation usually found in the commercial treaties of the United States is that which is commonly known as the most-favored-nation clause. This clause is found in various forms. Usually it stipulates that if either contracting party shall grant to a third nation any favor in commerce or navigation, such favor shall immediately enure to the benefit of the other party, freely, if freely granted, or upon paying the same compensation, if conditionally granted.

The interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause is a question as to which the United States and the countries of Europe have long differed. According to the European interpretation, it covers reductions of duty under special agreements of commercial reciprocity; according to the United States' interpretation, it does not embrace such concessions. The view that such concessions, because they are reciprocal, cannot be regarded as "favors," was first enunciated in 1815, and has since been generally maintained by the United States. In at least one instance, however, the other contracting party has been able to show by the record of the negotiations that a particular clause was in fact intended to embrace reciprocal concessions. This was the case with the treaty with Switzerland of 1850. Immediately after the conclusion of the reciprocal agreement with France of May 30, 1898, under the provisions of the Dingley Act, Switzerland claimed for her imports into

the United States the same concessions as were granted to French imports, on the ground that the most-favored-nation clauses in the treaty of 1850 were, when entered into, expressly understood to have that effect. The United States, after examining the record, admitted the claim to be well founded, but at the same time gave notice of the termination of the clauses—an act that produced in Switzerland a feeling of strong dissatisfaction, the United States having always had the full benefit of the treaty in that country.

Another question of difference in regard to the most-favored-nation clause appeared in 1899, when the United States took the ground, in its relations with Germany, that the clause must be applied in each country uniformly, so that one of the contracting parties, even though it should apply the restrictive interpretation in its own territory, might demand the benefit of the liberal interpretation in the other country, if it prevailed there.

RECIPROCITY AGREEMENTS

This brings us to the consideration of the subject of special agreements of commercial reciprocity, designed to increase trade by mutual reductions of duty below the prevailing rates. The United States, soon after the Declaration of Independence, proclaimed its adhesion to the principle of reciprocity as a means of getting rid of commercial monopolies and discriminations, and securing liberty to trade. As has been pointed out, our earlier treaties had this end chiefly in view. Occasionally, as in the treaty with France of 1831, for the settlement of claims, special concessions of duty were made on certain articles of merchandise. In 1854, a treaty quite broad in its scope was made with Great Britain, under which, largely for the purpose of effecting an adjustment of the fisheries dispute, reciprocal reductions of duty as between the United States and Canada were made on many articles of merchandise. For causes which need not here be explained this treaty was terminated on notice in 1866. A proposal to renew it in a modified form was rejected by the Senate of the United States in 1873. In 1875 an extensive treaty of reciprocity, having also a political aspect, was made with the Hawaiian Islands.

RECIPROCITY AT THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN CONFERENCE

In 1888 the subject of commercial reciprocity was included in the programme proposed to the American nations for the First International American Conference. Up to that time, however, the advocates of protection in the United States had

generally looked with disfavor upon departures from the established schedule of duties, and the tariff bill of 1890, as formulated in the House and in the Senate, contained no clause looking to the making of reciprocal concessions. At this stage Mr. Blaine came to the front, and by a dramatic public appeal secured the insertion in the bill of a clause (Section 3), the avowed object of which was "to secure reciprocal trade." To this end, sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, raw and uncured, were put on the free list till January 1, 1892. But, after that date, they became subject to duty, whenever the President should by proclamation declare that, considering their free introduction into the United States, the country producing and exporting them imposed upon the agricultural or other products of the United States duties or exactions which he deemed to be "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable." (Act of October 1, 1890, commonly called the McKinley Act.)

Under this clause, agreements were concluded with Brazil (February 5, 1891); Spain, in relation to Cuba and Porto Rico (July 31, 1891); Dominican Republic (August 1, 1891); Salvador (December 31, 1891; December 27, 1892); Germany (February 1, 1892); Great Britain, in relation to British Guiana, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, the Leeward Islands, and the Windward Islands, except Grenada (February 1, 1892); Nicaragua, (March 12, 1892); Honduras (April 30, 1892); Guatemala (May 18, 1892), and Austria-Hungary (May 26, 1892).

On March 15, 1892, a proclamation was issued suspending the free entry of sugar and the other enumerated articles from Colombia, Haiti, and Venezuela. This action naturally gave rise to protests. Brazil alone, of the independent countries of South America, had entered into an arrangement; and Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela were not the only countries of South America that produced and exported the enumerated articles. With Colombia there took place a diplomatic controversy, in which that government pertinently cited certain provisions of its commercial treaty with the United States. These things may not, however, be regarded as necessary incidents of the carrying out of a plan of commercial reciprocity. In some cases, and notably in that of Cuba and Porto Rico, the arrangements resulted in an important increase of exchanges.

The agreements made under Section 3 of the McKinley Act fell with the repeal of that law by the general tariff act of August 27, 1894. It is understood that the termination of the arrangement as to Cuba materially contributed to the local industrial distress which hastened the revolutionary outbreak in February, 1895.

RECIPROCITY UNDER THE DINGLEY ACT

By Section 3 of the Dingley Act of July 24, 1897, two distinct provisions were made for reciprocal reductions of duty. By the first clause it was declared that, for the purpose of "equalizing" the trade of the United States with countries producing and exporting argols, or crude tartar, or wine lees, crude; brandies, or other spirits manufactured or distilled from grain or other materials; champagne and other sparkling wines; still wines, and vermouth; paintings and statuary, or any of those articles, the President was authorized to make certain concessions in duties in return for reciprocal concessions respecting the products and manufactures of the United States. By the second clause, the terms of the reciprocity clause of the McKinley Act were substantially reenacted, with a substituted list of articles, consisting of coffee, tea, and tonquin, tonqua, or tonka beans, and vanilla beans. Moreover, by Section 4 of the act, a basis was laid for the making of reciprocity arrangements by treaty, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate; while, by Section 5, the levy of countervailing duties on articles receiving a bounty in the country of export was authorized.

Under Section 3 of the Dingley Act, reciprocity arrangements were eventually made with France, Germany, Great Britain, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.

ALDRICH-PAYNE ACT: "MAXIMUM" AND "MINIMUM" TARIFFS

By the so-called Aldrich-Payne Act of August 5, 1909, a new feature was introduced. Provision was made (Section 4) for the termination of the commercial agreements concluded under Section 3 of the Dingley Act, the reciprocity treaty with Cuba, which was not based on that section, being expressly declared to remain unaffected, and there was introduced the principle of a *minimum tariff and a maximum tariff*. The minimum tariff consisted of the dutiable and free lists. The maximum tariff consisted of the rates prescribed by the act and in addition thereto 25 per cent. ad valorem, which was to be levied after March 31, 1910, except as to countries in which the President should have proclaimed that there were "no terms or restrictions, charges or exactions," and no bounties, export duty or prohibition, which "unduly discriminated" against the United States and its products, and that such products were accorded "reciprocal and equivalent" treatment. Provision was also made (Section 6) for the collection, on imports receiving an

export bounty, of a countervailing duty equal to the net amount of the bounty.

PRESENT STATUS OF RECIPROCITY

The plan embodied in the Act of August 5, 1909, was done away with by the general tariff act of October 3, 1913, which is now in force. By this act, a new provision was introduced (Section IV A), by which the President was authorized and empowered "to negotiate trade agreements with foreign nations wherein mutual concessions are made, looking toward freer trade relations and further reciprocal expansion of trade and commerce," with the proviso, however, that such agreements, before becoming operative, should be "submitted to the Congress of the United States for ratification or rejection."

In principle, the proposal to submit trade agreements to Congress rather than to the Senate, where legislative provision has not already been made for their administrative conclusion and enforcement, appears to be correct. But nothing has so far been accomplished under the clause in question. This circumstance may be ascribed, in the first place, to the fact that, as the effects of a new tariff act on the public revenues can never be certainly foretold, it was reasonable to observe for a time the results of its operation, and, in the second place, to the fact that ten months after the act was passed, the great war in Europe broke out with a consequent decline in the revenue from importations.

LACK OF SUCCESS OF RECIPROCITY WITH SOUTH AMERICA

There is, however, one subject to which I deem it important to advert, and that is the lack of success in concluding agreements of commercial reciprocity with the countries of South America. The agreement with Brazil, which was terminated by the Act of 1894, was not subsequently renewed, nor was any arrangement negotiated to take its place. In reality, it has been difficult for the countries of South America to conclude agreements in involving a reduction of import and export duties. Internal duties, even where they exist, are insufficient for the purposes of government, and the collection of duties at the custom house is essential to the public welfare. If the United States, with its large internal revenues, has not found it practicable lately to enter upon a campaign for the reciprocal reduction of customs duties, still less can it be expected that countries whose internal revenues are comparatively small will make haste to reduce or suspend such duties.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE BRITISH COLONIES

For a number of years there has been developing in the British Empire a system of preferences between the mother country and the colonies. This subject is not devoid of importance to the commercial world. During the first half century of its existence, the United States was obliged to contend with the system of colonial monopoly. This system has not been restored; but a system of preferential duties between the widely separated parts of great empires would necessarily render competition in trade more difficult. In 1911, as is well known, an attempt was made to reestablish relations of commercial reciprocity between the United States and Canada on the basis of independent but reciprocal legislation in each country. The plan was defeated; one of the causes of its failure being the fact that, partly as the result of certain incidents, it came to be regarded by our northern neighbors as a measure inimical to the growth of what is commonly called Canadian nationality.

ANTI-DUMPING LEGISLATION

It is also worthy of notice that there has sprung up in certain of the British dominions, that is to say, in Australia, Canada, and South Africa, a kind of legislation designed to prevent what is popularly termed "dumping." An enactment of this kind was made in Australia in 1906, as part of what was styled the Industries Preservation Act, a general law against monopoly and unfair competition. In the Canadian Customs Tariff of 1907 a clause (Section 6) was inserted, providing for the collection of a special duty not exceeding 15 per cent, ad valorem, called a dumping duty, on articles imported into Canada of a class or kind made or produced in that country, where the export or actual selling price to the Canadian importer is "less than the fair market value of the same article when sold for home consumption in the usual or ordinary course in the country whence exported to Canada at the time of its exportation to Canada." In 1914, the government of the Union of South Africa adopted a statute closely following the language of the Canadian act. By regulations put into force in Canada on September 1, 1914, the dumping duty is imposed in all cases where the fair market value, as above defined, exceeds the selling price to the importer in Canada by 5 per cent.³

A clause, modeled on the Canadian law and regulations, was included in the Underwood bill as it passed the House in 1913, but it was omitted by the Committee on Finance in the Senate.

3. For fuller details, see *Commerce Report*, No. 230, October 1, 1915, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of Commerce.

The war in Europe has so materially altered the usual conditions of competition in sugar production, that it is scarcely worth while at this moment to discuss the subject farther than to say that, when the great conflict is ended, the question of bounties probably will have to be considered again. This question was temporarily adjusted by the International Convention signed by Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden, at Brussels, March 5, 1902, by which it was agreed that, so long as the convention lasted, all bounties direct and indirect, on the production or exportation of sugar, should be abolished. In this stipulation there was assimilated to sugar the products thereof, such as confitures, chocolates, biscuits, condensed milk, and all other analogous products containing a notable proportion of artificially incorporated sugar. A permanent commission was established to supervise the execution of the provisions of the convention. By a protocol signed March 17, 1912, the convention was continued in force till August 31, 1918, but it has been shattered by the war. In this relation we may note the fact that, by the existing Tariff Act of October 3, 1913 (Section IV E), it is provided that, whenever any country or political division thereof shall pay, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant on the exportation of any article that is dutiable under the act, there shall be levied on such article, on its importation into the United States, even though it may have been changed by manufacture or otherwise, an additional duty equal to the net amount of such bounty. For the purpose of determining such net amount, the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to make all needful regulations.

SHIPPING AND SEAMEN

A question agitating the public mind at present is that of shipping and seamen, and particularly the effect upon our carrying trade of the so-called La Follette Act, or Seamen's Act, of March 4, 1915.

Since the breaking out of the war in Europe, freight rates have necessarily been high and space has often been difficult to obtain. This is due not only to the destruction of merchant ships by the belligerents, but also to the circumstance that many ships have been requisitioned by their governments for service as transports. The Government of the United States endeavored to meet the emergency in the first instance by the act of August 18, 1914, which, with a view to facilitate the admission of foreign-built ships to American registry, empowered the President to suspend the provisions of our navigation

laws, requiring all watch officers of American vessels in foreign trade to be citizens of the United States and prescribing certain conditions of survey, inspection and measurement. By an executive order dated September 4, 1914, the provision as to watch officers was suspended for seven years, except that a vacancy occurring after two years must be filled by a citizen of the United States, while the provision as to survey, inspection and measurement was suspended for two years. During the six months following the issuance of this order, 133 foreign-built vessels of 475,524 gross tons were admitted to American registry. The rate of accession has since declined; but it is proper to bear in mind that many of the vessels at first admitted, being the property of foreign corporations owned or controlled by American capital, would perhaps long previously have been transferred to American registry, had the navigation laws permitted it, and that the number of vessels for sale is limited.

SEAMEN'S ACT AND THE WAR

The Seamen's Act is not a product of the war. It had long been pending in Congress. But, as it materially modifies the conditions that existed after the passage of the act of August 18, 1914, and the promulgation of the executive order of the following month, and gives immediate effect to certain requirements of the International Convention for Safety at Sea in advance of their enforcement by competing nations, it has been strongly assailed. Apart from the provision of the act, which requires the carrying of a greater number of deck hands, rated as "able seamen," than the laws of other countries exact, the clauses chiefly attacked are Section 13, which requires 75 per cent of the crew *in each department* to be able to understand any order given by the officers, and Section 14, which contains certain requirements as to life-saving equipment and the manning of such equipment. Section 13 took effect as to American vessels on November 4, 1915, and is to take effect as to foreign vessels on March 4, 1916. By a circular of the Secretary of Commerce of September 18, 1915, the language requirement in Section 13 is construed to embrace only "necessary orders" given to the members of the crew in each department "in the course of the performance of their duties," and such orders as may be "normally" given to them "in the course of the usual performance of their regular duties." By another circular of the Secretary of Commerce, dated September 24, 1915, and based on opinions of the Attorney-General and the Commerce Department's Solicitor, it is stated that Section 14, while applying on and after November 4, 1915, to other American vessels, will not apply to vessels registered under the Act of

August 18, 1914, till September 4, 1916; that it will not apply at any time to foreign steamers carrying passengers to the United States; and that it will not apply to foreign steamers carrying passengers *from* the United States under the flags of countries whose inspection laws approximate those of the United States and that have entered into reciprocal relations with the United States. Such countries are said to be Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Canada, New South Wales, New Zealand, Japan, the Netherlands, and Norway.

GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF VESSELS

With a view to meet conditions produced by the war as well as by legislation, the formation of a corporation, or of corporations, controlled and financially backed by the government, for the purpose of purchasing or building ships, and running them, has been proposed. This proposal formed the subject of acute controversy during the last session of Congress, and is to be renewed in the present session, not only on commercial grounds, but in connection with the movement for the enlargement and increased preparedness of the navy.

Into the merits of this controversy it is not my purpose now to enter. It is, I believe, generally agreed that the multiplication of merchant vessels under the American flag is desirable. Nor do I understand it to be maintained that this great end can be secured except under a system that will in the long run enable ships to be profitably employed in transportation. Referring to this aspect of the pending proposal, with which he is so prominently identified, the Secretary of the Treasury, in his speech at Indianapolis, October 18, 1915, expressly declared: "We could prove the falsity of the claim that ships cannot be operated under the American flag at a profit." On this demonstration the permanency of any policy in regard to the merchant marine would no doubt largely depend.

TRADE WITH SOUTH AMERICA

In the public prints our commercial relations with the countries of Central and South America have occupied, during the past year, a large amount of space. Discussion has been rife; conferences have been held and movements organized to promote interest and activity in the subject. It is not my desire to seem to assume a critical attitude. Our mercantile community can hardly be expected to devote itself exclusively to one subject, nor can a great trade be built up in a day. Nevertheless, I venture to ask whether we have as yet shown a capacity fully to meet the situation in the countries to the south of us? Commercially speaking, those countries are in the dawn of their

development. Some are indeed far more advanced than others, but they are all, from the industrial point of view, comparatively new. They therefore need what all other developing countries need, what the United States has constantly needed and bountifully obtained, namely, money and credit. Unless we can furnish them with these absolute essentials, we shall lose the opportunity which present conditions offer, and at the end of the war their trade and finance will revert to former channels. European merchants and European bankers will again control the course of commerce, and the United States will be obliged to compete under conditions adverse to success. For these reasons, I would strongly and earnestly impress upon all persons interested in foreign commerce the importance of learning accurately the needs of the countries to the south as understood by their governments, some of which are large purchasers of various supplies, as well as by their bankers and merchants, and of endeavoring by all possible means to meet those needs without delay.

THE RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO NATIONAL LAW IN THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS¹

THE present address is not concerned with the question whether the law of nations or international law is to be placed in the same legal category as national or municipal law—a question I discussed elsewhere a year ago.² It relates simply to the attitude of the authorities, legislative, administrative and judicial, of the American countries toward international law and its enforcement. It may be superfluous to say that international law, in the sense in which the term is commonly understood, had its origin among the so-called Christian States of Europe. In consequence, all European States and all States inheriting European civilization are assumed to be bound by it. By Article VII, however, of the Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, Turkey was expressly admitted "to participate in the advantages of the public law and system of concert

1. Reprinted from the *Proceedings of the Second Pan American Scientific Congress, Washington, 1915-1916*, sec. VI (Washington, 1917), pp. 128-135; *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law* (1915), pp. 11-23.

2. "Law and Organization": Presidential address at the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, December, 1914. *The American Political Science Review*, February, 1915.

of Europe." With this act the classification of States that were subject and those that were not subject to international law as Christian and non-Christian ceased to be applicable, and its inapplicability became only the more pronounced with the acceptance of the system by Japan and other non-Christian countries.

In regard to the countries of America there never was any question as to their position or their obligation, since all of them, as they now exist, were of European origin, having been at one time or another the colonies of European powers. The first of them to become independent—the United States of America—acted from the outset upon the principle that it was subject to what was then generally known as the law of nations, but is now commonly called international law. Long prior to the formation of the Constitution of the United States, while the loose national association formed by the Articles of Confederation was still in existence, the so-called Federal Court of Appeals declared that "the municipal laws of a country can not change the law of nations so as to bind the subjects of another nation."³ In 1796, seven years after the establishment of the Government under the Constitution, Mr. Justice Wilson, sitting in the Supreme Court, declared that "when the United States declared their independence they were bound to receive the law of nations in its modern state of purity and refinement."⁴ By the Constitution itself international law was indeed expressly recognized. Such recognition is seen in the provision that Congress shall have power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high sea, "and offenses against the law of nations."⁵ Moreover, in order that the law of nations might be duly observed, it was provided that the judicial power of the United States should extend to all cases arising under treaties made under the authority of the United States, to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, to controversies to which the United States should be a party and to controversies between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens, or subjects, and that in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State should be a party, the Supreme Court should have original jurisdiction.⁶ Finally, it was declared that all treaties which had been or which should be made "under the authority of the United States," should be "the supreme law of the land," binding upon the judges in every

3. Case of the *Resolution*, 2 Dallas, 1, 4.

4. *Ware v. Hylton*, 3 Dallas, 199, 281.

5. Art. I, sec. 8, clause 10.

6. Art. III, sec. 2, clauses 1 and 2.

State, in spite of any clause to the contrary in its Constitution or laws.⁷

The fact having thus been avowed that the new nation called the United States of America was subject to the law of nations, it was only natural and logical that the courts should proceed upon the principle that international law was a part of the law of the land, and as such to be interpreted and applied in the causes coming before them. This was a principle of the English common law. In 1764 one of the most celebrated of English judges, Lord Mansfield, quoted the opinion of a great predecessor, Lord Talbot, to the effect "that the law of nations, in its full extent, was part of the law of England," and that it was to be "collected from the practice of different nations, and the authority of writers." The writers consulted, there being then no English writer of eminence on the subject, were Grotius, Barbeyrac, Bynkershoek, Wicquefort, and other continental publicists. Lord Mansfield also recalled Lord Hardwicke both as declaring an opinion to the same effect and as "denying that Lord Chief Justice Holt ever had any doubt as to the law of nations being part of the law of England."⁸ Upon the strength of these authorities, an eminent judge at Philadelphia, prior to the formation of the Constitution of the United States, sustained an indictment founded on the common law for an offense against the law of nations.⁹ In 1793 Thomas Jefferson, the first Secretary of State of the United States, declared that "the law of nations makes an integral part . . . of the laws of the land."¹⁰ In 1815 Chief Justice Marshall, in deciding a case before the Supreme Court, declined to accept the contention that the judicial tribunals should, on the ground of retaliation, apply to Spain a rule respecting captures different from that prescribed by the law of nations. Till Congress should pass a retaliatory act, he declared that the court was "bound by the law of nations, which is a part of the law of the land."¹¹ In consonance with this doctrine, the law of nations does not have to be proved to the court as a fact.¹²

On the authority of these official utterances, Sir Henry Maine was justified in declaring that the statesmen and jurists of the United States did not regard international law as having become binding on their country through any legislative act; that they looked upon it as an integral part of the conditions on which a State is originally received into the family of civi-

7. Art. VI, clause 2.

8. *Triquet v. Bath*, 3 Burrows, 1478.

9. *Respublica v. DeLongchamps*, 1 Dallas, 111.

10. *Wait, American State Papers*, I, 30.

11. *The Nereide*, 9 Cranch, 388, 423.

12. *The Scotia*, 14 Wallace, 170.

lized nations ; and that their view, being essentially the same as that entertained by the founders of the system, might be summed up by saying that the State which disclaimed the authority of international law places itself outside the circle of civilized nations.¹³

Apart from certain special and exceptional clauses, which, as found in a few of the national constitutions, have given rise to international controversy, and the terms and effect of which will be discussed farther on, it may be unhesitatingly affirmed that the principles above set forth prevail throughout the American Republics. In the spirit of those principles, the constitution of Argentina, following substantially the terms of that of the United States, declares that "treaties with foreign powers are the supreme law of the Nation, binding upon the provincial authorities, notwithstanding any contrary provision in the provincial constitutions or laws";¹⁴ that the Supreme Court of the Nation shall have jurisdiction of all cases involving foreign treaties or concerning ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls, and of all cases between a Province or its citizens and a foreign citizen or State; and that, in cases concerning foreign ambassadors, ministers, or consuls, or to which a Province shall be a party, the jurisdiction of the National Supreme Court shall be original and exclusive.¹⁵

The constitution of Brazil contains a significant clause, investing Congress with exclusive power to authorize the Government to declare war, "when arbitration has failed or can not take place."¹⁶ This recognition of the obligatory force of international law is altogether remarkable and commendable. By the same constitution, the Federal Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction of "disputes and claims between foreign nations and the union, or between foreign nations and the States."¹⁷ The jurisdiction of the federal judges and courts also embraces suits between foreign States and Brazilian citizens; actions instituted by foreigners, founded on contracts with the Federal Government or on conventions or treaties between the Union and other nations; questions relating to maritime law and the navigation of the ocean; and questions of international criminal or civil law.

The constitution of Colombia of 1863 expressly declared, "The law of nations forms part of the national legislation"; and although a similar clause is not found in the constitution of 1886, or in the amendments subsequently adopted, the authori-

13. Maine, *International Law*, pp. 37-38.

14. Part First, Sole chap., Art. 31.

15. Part Second, Title First, Section Third, chap. ii, Arts. 100 and 101.

16. Art. 34, clause 11.

17. Art. 59.

ties of the country are understood, in their treatment of neutrality and other questions, to have acknowledged the continuing force of the principle.

The constitution of the Dominican Republic of 1896, while investing the supreme court with jurisdiction of all civil and criminal cases against diplomatic functionaries "when permitted by the law of nations,"¹⁸ explicitly provided that "the law of nations is made a part of the law of the Republic."¹⁹ Although this last clause is not found in the Dominican constitution of 1908, there are other provisions in which the underlying principle is clearly recognized. Thus, in language similar to that employed by the Constitution of the United States, the Congress is empowered to grant letters of marque and reprisal, to regulate matters of prize, to define acts of piracy and offenses against the law of nations, and to affix the penalties.²⁰ Furthermore, the government is forbidden to declare war without having previously proposed arbitration; and in order that the application of this principle may be assured it is provided that there shall be introduced in all international treaties made by the Republic the clause: "All differences which may arise between the contracting parties must be submitted to arbitration before an appeal is made to war."²¹

The constitution of Honduras confers upon the supreme court jurisdiction of prize cases and cases of extradition, as well as of all other cases that are to be settled according to international law.²²

By the constitution of Uruguay the high court of justice has "original jurisdiction" of "crimes or offenses against the law of nations," of "questions growing out of treaties or negotiations with foreign powers," and of "cases in which ambassadors, ministers, and other foreign diplomatic agents are concerned."²³

These constitutional provisions merely acknowledge, either expressly or by implication, the obligatory force of international law in matters to which it is properly applicable. The same principle has often been consecrated in judicial and administrative decisions in the American countries. It is further exemplified in the proclamations, decrees, and circulars which they have been accustomed to issue in the enforcement of their neutrality, as may be seen in the collection of neutrality proclamations and decrees printed by the United States in 1898 and

18. Art. 69.

19. Art. 106.

20. Dominican constitution, 1908, Art. 29.

21. *Idem*, Art. 102.

22. Art. 107, par. 5.

23. Art. 96.

in the volume lately published by the eminent and learned Chilean authority, Dr. Alejandro Alvarez, on the neutrality of his country in the present European war.²⁴

In this relation I may mention a case, somewhat exceptional in its circumstances, of which erroneous versions have sometimes been given. I refer to the case of José Dolores Gamez in Nicaragua. Señor Gamez, a political refugee from that country, took passage early in 1885 on the Pacific mail steamer *Honduras* at San José, Guatemala, for Punta Arenas, in Costa Rica. When the steamer, in the regular course of her voyage between those ports, arrived at San Juan del Sur, in Nicaragua, the comandante of the port requested her commander, Captain McCrae, to deliver Gamez up, and on his refusal to do so declined to give him a clearance. Captain McCrae then sailed away without proper papers, and for this act was charged, before the criminal court of first instance at Rivas, under Article 177 of the Nicaraguan Penal Code, with the offense of "want of respect for the authorities," in having openly resisted or disobeyed them. Sentence was rendered on February 9, 1885. The court held (1) that the "open resistance or disobedience" to authority, which was essential to the crime in question, was not "clearly shown," because, while it was true that Captain McCrae did not comply with the command of the comandante, it was also true that the obligation to do so "did not exist," or at least was "doubtful," and still more so in the form in which the demand was made, since, although the ship was a merchant vessel and therefore, "according to the general principles of international law," subject to the local jurisdiction, this subjection, "according to those same principles," was not absolute; (2) that the fact that Señor Gamez took passage on the steamer "from one of the ports of the other Republics of Central America" rendered the obligation to deliver him up "still more doubtful," because, said the court, "when certain cases have arisen analogous to the one under consideration among nations more civilized than our own it has been alleged, as a reason to justify the delivery, that both the embarking of the passenger, as well as his delivery, must be made in national waters"; (3) that Señor Gamez, as appeared by the papers, was accused, not of common crimes, but of political offenses under a decree of September 9, 1884, and that it was "a doctrine universally accepted in the works of writers on international law" that, although merchant vessels were subject to the local jurisdiction as regarded persons accused of common crimes, they were "exempt from the jurisdiction" as regards persons accused of

24. *La Grande Guerre Européenne et la Neutralité du Chili* (Paris, A. Pedone, 1915).

political offenses, all of which relieved the captain from the obligation of making the delivery demanded of him. In support of these views the court cited Bello, *Principios de Derecho Internacional* (Paris, 1882), cap. iv, No. 8, pp. 72-73, and Calvo, *Derecho Internacional* (Paris, 1868), part 1, cap. v, sec. 200, pp. 316-317. It was accordingly adjudged that the charge of disrespect was not established; and this sentence was affirmed by the supreme court at Granada in 1892 without an additional statement of reasons. The case is interesting as showing how national legislation was interpreted and enforced in the light of what was understood by the court to be the rule of international law.²⁵

A question much discussed in the American countries is that of the nature and limits of diplomatic intervention, particularly in behalf of private aliens. This question has been discussed chiefly with reference to the attitude of individual Governments toward the employment by the alien's Government of the diplomatic processes recognized by international law.²⁶

In a few instances express provisions on the subject are found. In the national constitution of Guatemala it is provided that "foreigners shall not resort to diplomatic action except in case of a denial of justice," and that "final decisions adverse to the claimant shall not be understood as denials of justice." Substantially the same rule is found in the constitution of Honduras, which provides²⁷ that "foreigners shall not resort to diplomatic intervention except in case of manifest denial of justice, abnormal delays, or self-evident violation of the principles of international law," and that "the fact that a final decision is not favorable to the claimant shall not be construed as a denial of justice." Likewise, the constitution of Nicaragua declares that "foreigners shall not resort to diplomatic intervention." Except that the constitutions of Honduras and Nicaragua impose as a penalty for any violation of the inhibition the loss of the right to reside in the country, these provisions may be regarded as declaratory of an established principle of international law.

The subject of diplomatic intervention in behalf of private aliens was discussed in connection with the phrase "denial of justice," at the Third International American Conference at

25. A fuller statement of the case may be found in Moore, *Digest of International Law*, II, 868-870.

26. See, generally, Borchard, *Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, or the Law of International Claims*, and, particularly, chap. vii, pp. 836-860, on "Limitations Arising Out of Municipal Legislation of the Defendant State."

27. Art. 15.

Rio de Janeiro in 1906, on the occasion of the renewal of the treaty concluded at the Second International American Conference at Mexico in 1902, for the arbitration of pecuniary claims. This treaty required the high contracting parties to submit to arbitration "all claims for pecuniary loss or damage," presented by their respective citizens, which could not be "amicably adjusted through diplomatic channels," when the claims were important enough to justify the expense. In the report adopted at Rio de Janeiro, on the renewal of this treaty, it was assumed that the cases intended to be covered were those in which diplomatic intervention was justified, it being the sovereign right of each independent power to regulate by its laws and to judge by its tribunals the juridical acts consummated in its territory, "except in cases where, for special reasons, of which the law of nations takes account, the question is converted into one of an international character." This thought was most admirably elucidated by one of the delegates of Brazil, Dr. Gastao da Cunha, who, after expressing his concurrence in the view above stated, remarked that the phrase "denial of justice" should, subject to the above qualification, receive the most liberal construction, so as to embrace all cases where a State should fail to furnish the guaranties which it ought to assure to all individual rights. The failure of guarantees did not, he declared, "arise solely from the judicial acts of a State. It results," he continued, "also from the act or omission of other public authorities, legislative and administrative. When a State legislates in disregard of rights, or when, although they are recognized in its legislation, the administrative or judicial authorities fail to make them effective, in either of these cases the international responsibility of the State arises. In all those cases, inasmuch as it is understood that the laws and the authorities do not assure to the foreigner the necessary protection, there arises contempt for the human personality and disrespect for the sovereign personality of the other state, and, in consequence, a violation of duty of an international character, all of which constitutes for nations a denial of justice."

At the Fourth International American Conference, at Buenos Aires, it was proposed in committee to supplement the treaty of Mexico, not only with an unexceptionable provision obligating the arbitral tribunal to decide in accordance with the principles of international law, but also with a stipulation that, if a question should arise between the high contracting parties as to whether a case covered by international law and justifying diplomatic intervention had arisen, this difference should be submitted to the arbitral tribunal as a "previous" or prelimi-

nary question, the solution of which might or might not authorize the tribunal to take cognizance of the merits of the case. In support of this proposal, a passage was quoted from an official note of the Argentine plenipotentiaries to the representative of the Italian Government, as to the interpretation of the Argentine-Italian treaty of arbitration. This passage, by which it was declared that a foreign state was not obliged to accept the judgment of the local tribunals if it believed that they were not competent, or if they had decided contrary to the principles of international law, but that, as between civilized states, the territorial judges should be presumed to act justly, at least to the extent that diplomatic action should not be initiated till they had rendered their sentence, and then only when the sentence was contrary to international law, may be treated as a statement of a general principle. But it did not seem completely to support the proposal that the question of the right or propriety of diplomatic intervention might, if raised, be treated as a preliminary question to be determined apart from the merits of the case. One of the members of the committee, therefore, took the ground that it was not practicable to lay down in advance precise and unyielding formulas by which the question of a denial of justice might in every instance be determined, or to treat it as a preliminary question which might be decided apart from the merits of the case; that, in the multitude of cases that had, during the preceding one hundred and twenty years, been disposed of by international arbitration, the question of a denial of justice had arisen in many and in various forms that could not have been foreseen; that human intelligence could not forecast the forms in which it might arise again, but that in the future, as in the past, it would be disposed of by the amicable methods of diplomacy and arbitration, and in a spirit of mutual respect and conciliation. The other members of the committee declared that they accepted these declarations, since they considered that they were in no way inconsistent with what had been set forth in the report.

The question of the liability of a government for the acts of insurgents has often been treated as presenting a special phase of the right of diplomatic intervention under international law. Calvo, the great protagonist of the limitation of the right of intervention in such cases, declared that, to admit the principle of responsibility and indemnity "would be to create an exorbitant and pernicious privilege, essentially favorable to strong states and injurious to feebler nations, and to establish an unjustifiable inequality between nationals and foreigners."²⁸

28. *Droit International*, III, 1280.

Clauses designed to give effect to this view may be found in the constitution of Guatemala, which provides²⁹ that "neither Guatemalans nor foreigners shall in any case have the power to claim from the Government indemnification for damages arising out of injuries done to their persons or property by revolutionists"; in the constitution of Haiti, which provides³⁰ that no Haitian or foreigner shall be entitled to claim indemnity for "losses sustained by virtue of civil and political trouble," but that the injured party shall have the right to seek reparation by prosecuting the authors of the wrongs in the courts; in the constitution of Salvador, which contains a clause³¹ to the same effect, coupled, however, with the singular provision³² that no treaty or convention shall be made "which in any way restricts or affects the exercise of the right of insurrection"; and in the constitution of Venezuela, which declares³³ that no indemnity shall be claimed by any one for losses "not caused by lawful authorities acting in their public capacity," and forbids³⁴ any treaty to the contrary to be made.

The principle enunciated by Calvo was accepted by Wharton, in his *Digest of International Law*,³⁵ to the extent of declaring that "a sovereign is not ordinarily responsible to alien residents for injuries they receive on his territory . . . from insurgents whom he could not control"; and from this source it has passed, to the extent indicated, into various subsequent utterances of the Department of State of the United States. To the same extent it was adopted by the late Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, at Washington, which, moreover, took "judicial notice" of the fact that the Cuban insurrection of 1895 at once passed beyond the general control of the Spanish authorities, and therefore required claimants, in order to obtain an award, affirmatively to show that those authorities had in the particular instance the power actually to prevent the wrong, but refused or failed to exercise it. Beyond this, the assertion of exemption from liability has not been sanctioned, and probably would not be permitted in any case to be maintained.

There yet remains to be considered an effort that has been made to guard against diplomatic interposition in respect of claims growing out of alleged breaches of contract. In the con-

29. Art. 14.

30. Art. 185.

31. Art. 46.

32. Art. 68, par. 29.

33. Art. 17.

34. Art. 18.

35. II, 576, p. 223.

stitution of Ecuador of 1897 it was provided³⁶ that every contract of an alien with the Government or with a private Ecuadorean "shall carry with it implicitly the condition that all diplomatic claims are thereby waived"; but, by the subsequent amendatory act of June 13 of the same year, it was declared that this "shall not cover cases in which the enforcement of judicial decisions or of arbitral awards in favor of foreign contractors has been refused," the parties injured thereby having "the right to resort to diplomatic intervention, according to the principles of public law." By this amendment the attempted safeguard was materially modified; but the provisions of the act of June 13, 1897, are not included in the Ecuadorean constitution of 1906, which renews³⁷ the terms of Article 38 of the constitution of 1897.

It is chiefly in Venezuela, however, that the question has been put to a practical test. The successive constitutions of the country have made ample acknowledgment of the obligatory force of international law. By the constitution of 1904 the supreme federal court was invested with power to take cognizance of "civil or criminal prosecutions against diplomatic agents, in the cases allowed by the public law of nations," as well as to hear and determine prize cases.³⁸ The constitution further provided that in all international treaties a clause should be inserted to the effect that "all differences between the contracting parties shall be decided by arbitration without appeal to war."³⁹ The constitution also contained the explicit declaration that "the law of nations forms part of the laws of the country," but this was qualified by the further declaration that the provisions of the laws of nations "shall not be invoked when they are opposed to the constitution and the laws of the republic."⁴⁰

Interpreted in one sense, this qualification might be regarded as a denial of the obligatory force of international law, and as having been intended to assert the position that a country can fix the measure of its international obligations, not only by its constitution, but also by the laws which its legislature may from time to time prescribe. I am not, however, inclined to give to the qualification this sweeping interpretation which, if admitted, would destroy the foundations of international law. I am, on the contrary, disposed to interpret it in the following senses:

36. Art. 38.

37. Art. 23.

38. Art. 95, pars. 3 and 7.

39. Art. 120.

40. Art. 125.

1. Although it may not be so in all countries, yet it is no doubt the case in many countries, including the United States, that an act of the supreme legislative power violative of the law of nations will be enforced by the public authorities, judicial and administrative, the foreign government being left to assert its rights through the diplomatic channel. In this respect the clause of the Venezuelan constitution is not exceptional.

2. Apart from what is set forth in the preceding paragraph, it is probable that the clause in question was intended to give a special sanction, among other things, to Article 124, which declared that no contract of public interest entered into by the Federal Government or by any public authority should be assignable to any foreign government, and that in all contracts there should be included, and if omitted, should be considered as included, the following clause: "The doubts and controversies of any nature that may arise in regard to this contract, and which can not be amicably settled by the contracting parties, shall be decided by the competent tribunals of Venezuela, according to the Venezuelan laws, and shall not in any case be made a subject of international claims."

Provisions similar to those just quoted are included in the Venezuelan constitution of April 19, 1914, except Article 125, *supra*.⁴¹

Clauses such as this, when actually embodied in contracts, have on several occasions been discussed by international commissions, with results not entirely harmonious. In some cases they have been regarded merely as devices to curtail or exclude the right of diplomatic intervention, and as such have been pronounced invalid. In other cases they have been treated as effective, to the extent of making the attempt to obtain redress by local remedies absolutely prerequisite to the resort to international action. Only in one or two doubtful instances does the view seem to have been entertained that they should be permitted to exclude diplomatic interposition altogether.⁴²

On the whole, the principle has been well maintained that the limits of diplomatic action are to be finally determined, not by local regulations, but by the generally accepted rules of international law.

41. Art. 95, pars. 3 and 7, of the constitution of 1904, become Art. 98, pars. 3 and 7, of the constitution of 1914; Art. 124 of the constitution of 1904 is Art. 121 of the constitution of 1914. For Art. 120 of the constitution of 1904, *supra*, there is substituted, with the same number, in the constitution of 1914, the following: "In international treaties there shall be inserted the clause that 'All differences between the contracting parties, relative to the interpretation or execution of this treaty, shall be decided by arbitration.'"

42. Moore, *Digest of International Law*, VI, 301-308.

BOOK REVIEWS

OUTLINES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. *By CHARLES H. STOCKTON, Rear-Admiral, U.S.N., retired. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914. Pp. xvii, 616.*

Admiral Stockton presents in convenient form an intelligent and useful summary of the principles of international law. As he states in his preface, information upon questions affecting international relations "is not only valuable to our representatives at home and abroad, but to all intelligent citizens, especially as the general government is becoming closer in its relations with and dependence upon its citizen voters." With this view he has brought the subject down to date and presents his information in such form as to be available for the general reader as well as for the more serious student. His preface bears date October 1, 1914, and if it had been written a month later, it may be doubted whether he would have referred to the conventions and declarations of The Hague and of the London Naval Conference of 1909 as "amounting in fact to a partial codification of the laws and usages of war ashore and afloat." The Department of State, on the 19th of October, expressly declared that the Declaration of London, the ratifications of which were in fact never exchanged, was no longer to be accepted as a guide, and that the United States would in future rely upon the principles of international law. The fact is also well known that The Hague Conventions, so far as they relate to war, are by their very terms inapplicable as international compacts to the present conflict in Europe, one or more of the belligerents in each instance having failed to ratify them. Two years ago, in reviewing a work just then published on international law, I sounded a note of warning on this subject, particularly as regarded the Declaration of London.

Admiral Stockton, in his preface, says it has been declared by "good authority" that there have "arisen more vexed questions in international law during the first six weeks of this war than during the entire period of the Napoleonic Contests." It does not appear that the "good authority" furnished a detail of the novel questions thus referred to. Such a detail would be very useful and enlightening, especially to one who has witnessed the tendency in the present conflict to reproduce the

conditions and the questions which were so fully dealt with during the Napoleonic Wars.

Reprinted from the *Columbia Law Review*, XV (1915), 93-94.

BARTOLUS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS. *Translated into English by JOSEPH HENRY BEALE*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press; London, Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1914. Pp. 86, with two illustrations.

This well printed volume forms an admirable tribute to the memory of a great jurist, on the six hundredth anniversary of his birth. In this particular it is altogether to be commended. The translator in his preface modestly remarks that he "can urge as a qualification neither an adequate command of the Latin language, knowledge of medieval law, nor English style," but that "those better qualified have unfortunately neglected the work." It would therefore seem to be ungracious critically to examine a translation which is declared to have been "purposely . . . made freely, with the hope of making the work in that way clearer to American lawyers." Happening to open the volume at page 33, we note that Bartolus is interpreted as having affirmed that "always a statute allows and permits what it does not reasonably forbid, excepting those things in which a privilege is specially granted." The original text reads—"Aliquando enim statutum concedit et permittit id quod rationabili-ter non competit, nisi in his, in quibus specialiter privilegium est concessum." Probably we should come nearer to the author's meaning if he were translated as saying that a statute "sometimes allows and permits what does not reasonably correspond to it, unless in matters in which a privilege is specially granted."

In reality the text of Bartolus is hardly intelligible to American or other lawyers instructed under the Common Law, unless they happen to have made a special study of the state of jurisprudence in the time and place in which he wrote. Even the single passage above quoted is quite obscure unless we understand the senses in which he used the words "statutum" and "privilegium." A brief but illuminating discussion of the meaning of these terms may be found in Meili's International Civil and Commercial Law.

Reprinted from the *Columbia Law Review*, XV (1915), 473.

THE WORLD CRISIS AND ITS MEANING. *By FELIX ADLER.*
New York and London, D. Appleton & Company, 1915.
233 pp.

Dr. Adler makes a notable contribution to the discussion of the all-pervasive topic of the present European war, its meaning and consequences. He does not share either the hopes of those who think that the horrors of the conflict will cause war to be abandoned or the despair of those who see in the struggle the end of civilization. He sees clearly that, if war is to be done away with, the disease that causes it must be recognized and cured. Militarism is not the malady. Militarism, as he affirms, exists "wherever the preparation for war has become a regular business." It is only a symptom of the disease, not the disease itself. In this relation Dr. Adler points out the disproportionate amount of time spent upon preparation for war under modern conditions, as compared with the time required under earlier conditions. In earlier times, when the machinery of war was simple, preparation could be made quickly. In recent times, with the development of scientific methods, this cannot be done. The development of war preparedness is comparable with the development of industrial preparedness. "The machine gun is the counterpart of the machine loom." In this sense, nations have become the victims of science. How are they to shake themselves loose from the system?

Militarism can, as Dr. Adler contends, be broken only by an inner spiritual change—a new ideal of human brotherhood and a new conception of justice. The theories advocated by pacifists before the great war began have broken down. All these theories fell before the force of nationalism—the clash of types, each fighting for its supremacy in the belief that on its supremacy depends the existence of the mental pattern which it cherishes above all else. In this way the right to be different, recognition of which is essential to the peace of the world, is denied or altogether lost sight of. In this view the reviewer finds himself in entire harmony with Dr. Adler. There can be no doubt that the passion for uniformity is the mainspring of much of the world's destructive strife.

Dr. Adler does not overlook the fact that there exists a strong military party in the United States, working, as he says, for the most part secretly, but sometimes, as at present, much in evidence. Its members argue not only that war is desirable in itself as a means of preventing mankind from sinking into sloth and ease and materialism, but also that, even though peace were preferable, yet as a lasting and righteous peace has hitherto been unattainable, extensive preparations

for war must be made. As an antidote to these doctrines, Dr. Adler declares that we need new moral concepts. In the first place, there must be a clear recognition of the right to be different. Germany, exemplifying efficiency, discipline and a certain religious mysticism; England, exemplifying political liberty, qualified or accompanied by the idea of the social predominance and political influence of the masterful man; and the United States, exemplifying the idea of a republic built "on the uncommon fitness in the common man"—each of these types contains something by which the others may be enriched. In order that this may be done, there must be cultivated the spirit of good-will, so that the aversions provoked by mere differences may be overcome and the element of good in different things be discerned and preserved.

Another favorite idea of Dr. Adler's is that of an international congress, representing all classes, including laborers, manufacturers, men of commerce, agriculturalists and delegates of the universities. In this way, he thinks that something might be done to prevent the misuse of civilization for purely selfish advantages, such as are indicated by the phrases commercialism, industrialism and imperialism. Society must be reformed on ethical lines, and the reform must permeate all the relations of life. Society being the great organization, the chief industries should constitute minor organic groups, and in each industry, as in the steel industry, for instance, there should be an industrial parliament of the trade, in which each worker should have a vote. In order to bring about such a reform, each man should try (1) to take part in movements for social betterment, (2) to release the imprisoned mentality of workers, and (3) to labor towards organized democracy by introducing constitutionalism in industry as a bridge.

Reprinted from the *Political Science Quarterly*, XXX, No. 4 (1915), 693-695.

AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW¹

ONE of the most important events of the past two hundred years, and indeed one of the most important events of all time, was the advent of the United States of America into the family of nations. The principles on which our government was founded were not altogether new—they had been conceived and expounded by philosophers in other times and in other places; but for the first time, in this broad but sparsely settled country, there was an opportunity to put them to the practical test. The rights of man as expounded by philosophers here actually became the rights of individual men. The people of the United States were fortunate in having the foundations of their policy, national and international, laid by men of great intelligence and capacity. The men who were concerned in the formation of our Federal, or National, Government were equally concerned in the formulation of our foreign policy. But the name that deserves to be mentioned first, among those connected with the management of our foreign relations, is that of Benjamin Franklin. As a diplomatist he occupied the highest rank. His great knowledge of men, his liberal political and economic views, and his long and varied experience, to say nothing of his worldwide fame as a philosopher, all combine to render him a most useful representative abroad. Another name that figures largely in our early diplomatic annals is that of John Adams. Although of a very different type from Franklin, Adams was a man of quick and profound understanding and grasped with singular clearness the idea of American nationality. It was perhaps chiefly due to him that there was inserted in the treaty of peace with Great Britain of 1782-83 the important clause guaranteeing to British creditors, in spite of the confiscating laws of some of the States, the right to sue for and recover bona fide debts contracted before the Revolutionary War. The inability of the United States under the old Articles of Confederation to enforce this clause led to the insertion in the Constitution of the United States of the provision declaring treaties to be a part of the supreme law of the land.

1. Address before the Baltimore Alumni Club, Baltimore, Md. Reprinted from the *Columbia Alumni News*, VII, No. 24 (March 17, 1916).

THE PIONEER DIPLOMATS

Two other eminent characters conspicuously associated with our early diplomacy were Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams. These early diplomatists were remarkably open and direct in their methods. I would not, I think, describe them as "shirt-sleeve diplomatists"—a phrase more or less heard in recent times and perhaps designed as a cloak to disguise a sort of diplomacy that would fain be thought direct, in order that it may not be thought inept.

One of the first things our ancestors did when they embarked on the sea of independence was to send a commission abroad to negotiate with foreign powers. In so doing they merely acknowledged one of the primary conditions of national life—the maintenance of relations with other nations. Now and then proposals are made in Congress and in other places for the outright abolition of the diplomatic service, or for such a reduction of salaries as would produce the same result. I recall one instance where a motion was made in Congress to reduce the pay of our ambassadors at London, Paris, Berlin, and other European capitals to \$6,000 a year; and when objection was made that this would hardly defray their house rent, the enlightened member who made the motion vehemently declared that he had twenty-five men in his own district who would be glad to take their places at that salary—which no doubt was true.

Our forefathers were not subject to any such hallucination; and, when they sent a commission abroad, they fully understood that they were taking a serious step. In one particular, however, they apparently overrated the capacity of at least one of their diplomatic agents; for they specially enjoined upon the first of our representatives to go abroad, Silas Deane, the task of learning immediately the use of "Parisian French." It is not recorded that he ever carried out his instructions in this regard. The entire commission, as at first appointed, consisted of Franklin, Deane, and Jefferson, but, as Jefferson declined the post, there was substituted for him Arthur Lee.

For the use of the commission Congress adopted a plan of a treaty. This plan related chiefly to commerce, and was in its terms exceedingly liberal; but I do not intend to intimate that the liberality of its terms was wholly due to the philosophic conceptions of the statesmen who framed it. Our situation at the time was such that we necessarily advocated a large measure of freedom in matters of trade. Just emerging from a colonial condition, in which our commerce was confined chiefly to exchanges with the mother country, all kinds of commercial restrictions seemed odious to us. But the provisions of the plan

were not confined to ordinary matters of trade—they embraced stipulations for the protection of commerce in time of war, for the exemption of private property from belligerent action, and for the regulation of the subject of contraband.

THE DOCTRINE OF RECOGNITION

Taking up the particular contributions which the United States has made to international law, the first I will mention is that of the *Doctrine of Recognition*. After the revolution in France and the overturn of the government with which we had concluded the treaties of 1778 and 1788, the question arose in the cabinet of Washington as to whether we should recognize the revolutionary government. The monarchy had been overthrown and in its place there was set up a *de facto* government. Should this government be recognized? There were no precise precedents to guide our action. Fortunately, this question was dealt with by men of learning and of wide intelligence, and the credit for its wise solution belongs chiefly to Thomas Jefferson, who then happened to be Secretary of State and who signally displayed on this occasion his profound, philosophic grasp of fundamental principles. In formulating his opinion, Jefferson said :

When principles are well understood their application is less embarrassing. We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own government is founded, that every one may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will; and that it may transact its business with foreign nations through whatever organ it thinks proper—whether King, Convention, Assembly, Committee, President, or anything else it may choose. The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded.

The principle thus clearly enunciated by Jefferson has come to be generally accepted as one of the most important contributions made by the United States to international law.

THE DUTIES OF NEUTRALS

With the question of recognition there also arose that of neutrality—the question of the duties as well as that of the rights of neutrals. Fortunately again, the treatment of these questions fell into the hands of Thomas Jefferson, and I may say here that by reason of his far reaching solution of them, and of the question of recognition, I consider that he has left upon our foreign policy the deepest impression made by any of our statesmen. He did this, as I have indicated, by recurring to fundamental principles, which his broad intelligence and philosophic insight enabled him to understand and to apply.

In the order in which they were dealt with, the question of

neutral duties came first. Genêt, the new French minister, when he landed at Charleston, South Carolina, in the spring of 1793, proceeded at once to fit out and commission vessels to prey on British commerce. These vessels captured British ships, even in the waters of the United States. The British minister complained of these acts; and in response Jefferson, as Secretary of State, laid down certain rules of neutral duty which are acknowledged to form the basis of the system of neutrality even at the present day.

Jefferson admitted that it was the duty of the United States, in the enforcement of its sovereignty, to forbid the issuance of commissions in the United States to vessels intended to serve against foreign powers in time of war; that it was the duty of a neutral power to prevent enlistments within its territory, as well as the fitting out of vessels for either belligerent; and for any failure in these particulars he also admitted that the neutral government was obliged to make compensation. This was the first instance in the history of international law in which the failure to perform neutral duties was treated as a subject of pecuniary amends.

DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE ALABAMA CASE

The rules laid down by Jefferson were embodied by Congress in acts of 1794, 1817 and 1818, and have since been incorporated in the revised statutes of the United States and are still in force. An important development of them was made in the treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871, providing for the settlement of the *Alabama* claims. By the "three rules" of this treaty, a neutral government is obliged:

1. To use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping within its jurisdiction of any vessel, which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise, or to carry on war against a power with which it is at peace, and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above—such vessel having been specially adapted in whole or in part within such jurisdiction to warlike use.
2. Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operation against the other, or for the renewal or augmentation of military supplies, or arms, or the recruitment of men.
3. To exercise due diligence in its ports or waters, and as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violations of the foregoing obligations and duties.

The question of neutral rights also arose during the wars growing out of the French Revolution, but particularly after the breach of the peace of Amiens. From 1805 and on, neutral ships were ruthlessly swept from the ocean, and in 1812 we

actually went to war with Great Britain. Whether we should have taken this extreme step simply upon the abridgement of rights of trade is a question which no one today can answer with certainty. In the so-called "War Message" of Madison to Congress, the denial of the right to trade was blended with that of the impressment of seamen on board American vessels. Impressment involved a claim, when in the exercise of the belligerent right of visit and search, to take from the neutral vessel any person on board who might be "recognized" as a citizen of the country to which the vessel making the search belonged. I have sometimes seen it stated, and the statement has lately been made, that Great Britain's claim of impressment related to peace as well as to war. This is an error; the British government never claimed the right to impress seamen, except as an incident of the exercise of the belligerent right of search.

A question did, however, arise as to the existence of a right of visit and search for the suppression of the slave trade. In 1824 an effort was made to create such a right by assimilating the slave trade to piracy by law of nations. But this attempt ended in failure; and in 1858 the Senate of the United States resolved:

American vessels on high seas in time of peace bearing the American flag remain under the jurisdiction of the country to which they belong, and therefore, any visitation, molestation, or detention of such vessel by force, or by the exhibition of force, on the part of a foreign power is in derogation of the sovereignty of the United States.

This principle was subsequently accepted by Great Britain, and in time it came to be thoroughly established.

Straits and Canals

Connected with the principle of the freedom of the seas, is that of the navigation of narrow waters by which they are connected. The United States very early advocated their free navigation, and in 1855 took the lead in the movement which resulted in the abolition of the charges on vessels passing through the straits of Elsinore into and from the Baltic. Connected with this question is that of the navigation of canals connecting open seas. Such ways being artificial, the company or power constructing them is naturally entitled to compensation for their use; but the principle that they should be open to the navigation of all nations on equal terms was laid down by Henry Clay as Secretary of State, in 1826. A similar announcement was made by the Senate in 1835 and House of Representatives in 1839. It was also embodied in Article XXXV of the Treaty of 1846 with New Granada (Colombia), and in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

It may here be remarked that the principle of the exemption of foreign men-of-war from the jurisdiction of the local courts may be traced to the decision of Chief Justice Marshall, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the *Schooner Exchange*. The principle there laid down has been unanimously acquiesced in by nations.

NON-INTERVENTION

Another contribution of the United States to international law is that of the principle of *Non-Intervention*. Here again Jefferson performed a very important part in formulating the rule—the credit being divided between him and Washington. In 1793 the French minister, Genêt, acting for his government, proposed to the United States “a national agreement in which two great peoples shall suspend their commercial and political interests, and establish a mutual understanding to defend the empire of liberty wherever it can be embraced.” This proposal was not accepted. On the contrary the United States adopted the principle of non-intervention in political affairs of other nations. This principle is closely connected with the “Monroe Doctrine.” The Monroe Doctrine, as you all know, was formulated by John Quincy Adams. Recording in his diary his thoughts on the subject, he said :

Considering the South Americans as independent nations, they themselves and no other nation has the right to dispose of their condition. We have no right to dispose of them, alone or in conjunction with other nations; neither have any other nations the right of disposing of them without their consent.

This was but the reaffirmation of the time-honored American doctrine of non-intervention. There was, however, one occasion on which the United States seemed to be very near a radical departure from its principle of non-intervention. This was in the picturesque case of the Hungarian refugee, Kossuth. Looking at the matter calmly, it may seem to be incredible that a considerable number of persons in the United States advocated interference in the war between Austria and Hungary; but such is the fact. Kossuth came to the United States for the purpose of advocating such interference, and had at one time a great vogue. He was a remarkable character, a great orator, and a great popular agitator. His presence in the United States produced a great commotion, and for the time being many eminent statesmen seemed to lose their balance.

EARLY HYPHENATED AMERICANS

Another question with the development of which the United States is peculiarly connected is that of expatriation. For many

years immigration to the United States was small. It was not indeed until the early forties that it became large. It thereafter rapidly grew. As a result, the question often presented itself, whether the so-called inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness embraced the right to change one's home and allegiance at will. I think it is generally assumed that our government always maintained that an individual possessed this right, but this impression is erroneous. The first Secretary of State to advance this claim was James Buchanan in 1848. His successors as Secretary of State did not espouse the claim; but, when he became President, he promptly revived it. The doctrine of the Common Law was expressed in the phrase, "Once a Citizen, always a Citizen." Countries of Continental Europe usually did not permit a citizen or subject to expatriate himself until he had resided abroad ten years. The United States, however, undertook to naturalize aliens after a residence of five years. In 1868 Congress passed an act declaring the right of expatriation to be a natural and inherent right of all people, and any opinion contrary to this view to be inconsistent with the fundamental law of the land. But, when Congress remodeled the naturalization laws, it excluded therefrom the Chinese. This exclusion is obviously inconsistent with the declarations of 1868. The question of expatriation is a proper one for adjustment by treaty.

OUR USE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

Our popular speakers sometimes claim for the United States the origination of the process of international arbitration. Personally, having had occasion to go into the subject very fully, I am unable to support such a view. Arbitration is not a new thing. It was practiced by nations in the early ages. In a single century, in the Middle Ages, we find thirty-six cases of arbitration; but, after the Hundred Years' War, the resort to it almost ceased. It is true that very early in our national career, we adopted arbitration as a means of settling international disputes. The Jay Treaty with Great Britain, in 1794, provided for three important arbitrations; and during the next hundred years this example was followed in many instances. The greatest of our arbitrations, the greatest indeed of all arbitrations, both by reason of the importance of the questions submitted and of the distinct inclusion of the question of "national honor," is that which took place at Geneva, in 1872, for the settlement of the *Alabama* claims. Since that time two of the most important arbitrations that have taken place are those for the settlement of the Bering Sea Question, at Paris, in 1894, and that for the settlement of the Northeastern Fish-

eries Question, at The Hague, in 1910. On the whole, however, the United States has contributed little during the past twenty years to the advancement of the cause of international arbitration; and it is in reality now more difficult to secure the concurrence of the United States in the comprehensive submission of matters of importance to arbitration than it was forty years ago. In view of the loose and uninformed assertions we often hear to the contrary, this statement may seem to be surprising; but its accuracy is readily demonstrable.

THE FATHERS BELIEVED IN LAW

Such, in very brief outline, is the record of the contributions of the United States to international law; and I hope that the achievements of the next hundred years may be on the whole as creditable and honorable as those of the years that preceded. One reason why the early record is so remarkable is that American statesmen of that time were fully possessed of the idea of legality. Their minds were deeply imbued with it. They believed in law, as the true basis of justice and freedom. They believed in international law, as the great security of rational rights and interests; and so believing, they felt that they rendered the greatest possible service to the world in respecting the limitations of the law and in living up to its standards.

SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL LAW: ITS ORIGIN, OBLIGATION, AND FUTURE¹

I

OUTLINE

I. ORIGIN.—International law, like all other kinds of law, originated in the necessities of intercourse between human beings. Just as rules developed for the regulation of life within individual groups, so, as groups became permanent and were transformed into states, rules developed for the regulation of their intercourse with one another. The system thus gradually formed was not artificial in any sense other than that in which all legal systems are artificial. Regulation is just as essential to the relations between groups of men as it is to the relations between individual men.

1. April 15, 1916. Reprinted from the *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, LV, 1916.

In spite of the fact that it was formerly the fashion of writers to say that the law of nations, or international law, was altogether of modern origin, the recent researches of scholars have tended more and more to disclose the existence of well-defined rules for the regulation of international intercourse among the ancients. There existed, for example, among the Greeks and the Romans, a large body of customary law governing their intercourse with aliens and with alien states. Among the Greek states themselves, there was a large body of usages in accordance with which their relations were conducted. The judicial settlement of disputes between them, by means of arbitration, was carried to a very high point and was attended with a large measure of success. Within the past twenty years, much light has been thrown on this subject by the study of inscriptions, which has conclusively demonstrated as clear and precise an application of the judicial method to the settlement of disputes between the independent Greek states, as has been made to the settlement of disputes between nations in recent times.

These things I particularize for the purpose of emphasizing the point that all law, so called, whether national or international, grows out of the necessities of human intercourse. We commit a fundamental error in thinking of any system of law as an artificial creation.

II. OBLIGATION.—It was altogether in harmony with the view above expressed that Grotius and other so-called founders of the modern system of international law regarded its acceptance as a fundamental condition of the admission of a state to its benefits. By these writers the system was regarded as having had its origin among the Christian states of Europe, and non-Christian states were admitted to its benefits only to a limited extent. In course of time, this conception ceased to be sufficiently comprehensive. By the Treaty of Paris of 1856, Turkey was expressly declared to be admitted to the benefits of the public law and concert of Europe. Subsequently, certain states of the Far East, beginning with Japan, expressly assented to the system and were duly recognized as participants in it.

But, so far as obligation is concerned, it matters not whether the system was tacitly accepted or expressly adopted. In both cases, the obligation is the same.

It is necessary, however, to observe the distinction between obligation and enforcement—between the duty to observe a certain rule and the power to compel its observance. The failure to make this distinction constantly produces confusion. We know, as a matter of fact, that, in the attempts to enforce

municipal law, a failure of justice often takes place. The skill of an attorney or the bias of a juror may, and no doubt often does, result in the acquittal of a guilty defendant, and yet it does not occur to anyone to say that, because the defendant thus escaped the punishment which he should have been obliged to undergo, the duty of obedience to the law did not in his case exist. Such a suggestion we should regard as absurd. Nevertheless, we daily hear the allegation that there is no such thing as international law, because, forsooth, some nation has violated, or is said to have violated, an acknowledged rule. There is as little reason for the assertion in the one case as in the other.

III. THE FUTURE.—Since the great conflict in Europe began, the days have perhaps been rare on which the teacher or student of international law has not been greeted with the profound remark that there is no such thing as international law, or that international law has come to an end. As there are comparatively few persons who have deeply studied international law, it should not seem to be ungracious to say that such remarks betray a want of information, or at any rate of reflection. The rules of international law are by no means so indefinite or uncertain as they are often supposed to be, or as interested persons often seek to make them appear to be; nor is their observance by any means so casual as is sometimes imagined. It would be difficult to find in international law an example of uncertainty greater than that which attended the interpretation and enforcement of the so-called Sherman Anti-Trust Law, which, after twenty years of strenuous controversy, was left to be interpreted according to the "rule of reason." Nor is international law in ordinary times badly observed. It is, in fact, usually well enforced; and any differences in regard to its interpretation and enforcement are, except in matters of a political nature, commonly left to international tribunals for determination, in connection with individual claims.

The present misconception in regard to international law is largely due to the tacit but unfounded assumption that municipal law is well enforced in time of war. Precisely the contrary is the fact. There is indeed an ancient maxim of the common law, to the effect that in the midst of arms the laws are silent—*Inter arma silent leges*. This maxim was not a creation of the fancy, but was merely an expression of the results of experience. Law never has been and never will be found in a flourishing condition between firing lines. War itself means that the reign of law has been superseded by a contention by force. During war the ordinary law is constantly superseded by martial law, which has been defined as the "will of the com-

mander-in-chief"; and while this does not mean an unregulated will, or mere caprice, it does signify the supplanting of the system by which rights are ordinarily regulated and enforced. The fact is not today generally appreciated that the fundamental guarantees of personal liberty were set aside in the United States during the Civil War, and that the people lived under a military dictatorship. A benevolent dictatorship it may have been and no doubt generally was, but it was nevertheless a dictatorship. When, soon after the outbreak of the war, a citizen of the state of Maryland, which had not seceded from the Union, sought to avail himself of the writ of habeas corpus, the marshal of the court who sought to serve the writ was informed by the military officer who held the prisoner in custody that he took his orders not from the courts but from the War Department at Washington. The meaning of this was that the constitutional guarantees of personal liberty were suspended; and grave statesmen went so far as to announce that they approved the course of the administration just in proportion as it disregarded the law. There were many persons at the time who thought that the constitution of the United States had come to an end, just as many persons are now saying that international law has come to an end. The difficulty with such persons is that they look for law between firing lines, and regard a temporary phase as a permanent condition.

I do not hesitate to affirm that the violations of international law during the present conflict in Europe, fierce and wide extended as it is, have not exceeded, either in number or in importance, those that occurred during the wars growing out of the French Revolution and the succeeding Napoleonic Wars. In reality, many recent violations, which are commonly supposed to be new, have precise precedents or analogies in what took place in the former titanic struggle, in which there were extensions of the contraband list and interferences with commerce under pretences of blockade, just as there have been during the present great struggle. These things are done, not because of any uncertainty as to the law, but because the parties to the war, being engaged in a life and death contention by force, naturally think more of their own safety than of the interests of neutral nations.

Nor is there in these things any reason for discouragement as to the future of international law. As the ordinary rules of intercourse have in all previous conflicts been more or less disregarded, according to the exigency or the intensity of pressure, so it has been found that, when the incidents of the struggle came to be surveyed, there arose a general desire to extend the domain of law, to define its rules more clearly, and to take

measures for their more effectual enforcement. This was what happened after the Thirty Years' War. The same thing occurred after the close of the wars growing out of the Spanish Succession. It happened again after the close of the Napoleonic Wars; and a similar phenomenon distinguished the ending of the Crimean War. Many of the mournful lucubrations regarding violations of international law in the present war have, consciously or unconsciously, a partisan character, and are intended to further the interests of the one side or the other. We should be on our guard against such lamentations. They are by no means new in character; they are characteristic of all wars. All armed contests are characterized by charges and countercharges of violations of law, and such charges are partly false and partly true. There never took place, and never will take place, a contention by force in which the so-called rules of war were not violated. War itself means the killing and maiming of human beings, and, in the passions it excites and the fears it creates, excesses will inevitably be committed. It is in the nature of things that it should be so.

Judging, therefore, by the past, we are justified in looking forward to important developments in international law after the present great conflict shall have been ended. These developments will naturally take place along the ordinary lines of legal progress. In the first place, there will always be differences to be settled. This is a matter of primary importance, since it involves the avoidance of conflict and the preservation of peaceful conditions of legal growth. We may call this the judicial aspect, which has been dealt with chiefly through international arbitration.

But, in the second place, while law must be interpreted, it must also be progressive, and must keep pace with changes in conditions. The greater part of international law has been developed through usage, but, during the past hundred years, it has undergone a marked development through acts which were in their nature legislative. To what extent is it possible to enlarge and render more efficient the legislative method in the international sphere? Up to the present time, the chief obstacle has been the requirement of unanimity. Acts which seemed to be beneficent have been blocked because two or three powers, or perhaps one power, refused to assent to them.

In the third place, we have the administrative aspect of the system. Is it possible to develop anything in the nature of an international administration? We know that in certain matters, such as that of the posts and the telegraph, marked progress has been made in that direction. The great difficulty arises when we come to deal with things of a contentious nature. We

have heard a great deal of "international police." An examination of what has been said on the subject must be admitted often to betray an exceedingly slight comprehension of fundamental conditions. So far as the phrase "international police" implies the use of force, it involves the most serious of all problems with which the student of international affairs and the statesman can be confronted. The use of force effectively is a matter that readily assumes immense proportions; the use of force ineffectively may readily create a condition of anarchy.

Lastly, we are brought to the consideration of the question as to whether and to what extent it is possible, by means of organization, to secure the more effective development, interpretation and enforcement of international law. It is not a new question, but it is a very serious and difficult one. Europe has been trying for hundreds of years to find a solution of it, but has not yet succeeded. The mere association of nations, as they now exist, in an alliance or league, with a view to bring force to bear upon a recalcitrant nation as readily as it can be applied to a recalcitrant individual in a municipality, would of itself afford little assurance either of effectiveness or of permanency. The difficulties are too complex to be solved by any single agency.

THE PEACE PROBLEM¹

IT is inevitable that in times of stress and of trouble our usual sense of the relations of things should be impaired, if not wholly lost. The mind, burdened with the griefs as well as with the pressing problems of the moment, is disposed to think of the past only as a failure and to regard the temporary wreck of its hopes and aspirations as a finality. From the depressing clutch of a vision thus distorted, it is not unprofitable now and then to disengage ourselves. Sooner or later, normal conditions will return; and although certain changes, the durability of which the future alone can determine, may then have taken place, we shall find ourselves dealing, not with a new heaven and a new earth, but with the same terrestrial globe and the same firmament, and with problems

1. Address at the Twentieth Celebration of Founder's Day, Carnegie Institute, Pittsburgh, April 27, 1916; reprinted in the *Columbia University Quarterly*, June, 1916; *North American Review*, July, 1916; Washington, Government Printing Office, 1917.

which, because they inhere in human activities, are as old as man himself.

Of these problems none is more fundamental than that which I have chosen as the subject of the present address—the Peace Problem. It is fundamental because it involves life itself, the very existence of peoples and of states, and the preservation of those accumulated benefits of human thought, effort, and experience which, in their aggregate, we call civilization. And for the reason that the problem bears this character; for the reason that it touches all the springs of action and is as complex as human nature itself, I shall not undertake to offer to-day a new and ready solution of it. While the fakir, who sold pills that were said to be good for the earthquake, may have excited the applause and the patronage of his hearers, it is not related that he gained their permanent gratitude. In order that we may be sure of our remedy, or in order that we may at any rate avoid the dangers of a want of vigilance and of effort, it is necessary to know the nature of our malady and the precise forms of its manifestation. So, if we would find a remedy for war, we must understand its nature and symptoms. We must examine the conditions and impulses that produce it. To this preliminary but essential task I propose in the main to devote myself on the present occasion, in the hope that its performance may contribute to the intelligent direction of our aims as well as to the cure of illusions and the prevention of mistakes.

The past three hundred years, to say nothing of earlier times, have not been wanting in plans for the preservation of peace, some of which have proceeded from men of great eminence.

Sully, in his *Memoirs*, ascribes to Henry IV of France a "grand design" for the rearrangement of the states of Europe in such manner as to do away with jealousies and apprehensions regarding the balance of power. There were to be in all fifteen states, of which six—France, Denmark, Great Britain, Lombardy, Spain, and Sweden—were to be hereditary monarchies; five—the German Empire, Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, and the Papacy—were to be elective monarchies; and four—Venice, and three others established respectively in Italy, Switzerland, and the Belgic provinces—were to be republics. For the regulation of the relations of the independent states thus formed there was to be a general European council, modeled on the Amphictyonic, but to sit continuously and to consist of about seventy persons, of whom four were to be sent by each of the larger powers and two by each of the lesser. There were also to be local councils, from which

appeals might be taken to the general council, whose decrees were to be final. This project has often been described, not inappropriately, as a plan for the abasement of the House of Austria, and for this reason alone it could hardly be treated in its day as a practical measure.²

After more than a hundred years the scheme of federation was elaborated by the Abbé de St. Pierre, but with an animus less obviously partisan. The Christian sovereigns of Europe were to form a permanent union for the preservation of peace, and, after a certain number had entered, the rest were, if necessary, to be coerced into joining. Agreeing to be content with the territory they severally possessed or with what was to be allotted by a treaty, the members of the union were to establish through their representatives a Senate, which, besides codifying the laws of commerce, was to compose differences by mediation, or, if this failed, by arbitration. No sovereign was to take up arms, or commit hostilities, except against one who had been declared an enemy of the European society. Any sovereign taking up arms before the union had declared war, or refusing to execute a regulation of the union or a judgment of the Senate, was to be declared such an enemy, and the union was then to make war upon him until he should be disarmed or until the regulation or judgment should be executed, in addition to which he was to pay the cost of the war and to lose any territory taken from him before the close of hostilities. When the forces of the union were thus employed, each state was to furnish the same number of troops, but the expenses were to be paid by the more powerful sovereigns; nor was there, in time of peace, to be an inequality of forces, except that a powerful sovereign might, with the consent of the union, employ foreign troops for his garrisons, so as to prevent seditions. When the union declared war against a sovereign, a generalissimo was to be named by a majority vote. It was further proposed that the European union should endeavor to bring about the formation in Asia of a permanent society like that in Europe.

The well-known plan of William Penn, though far less elaborate than that of the Abbé de St. Pierre, which it antedates, lays much stress on the judicial function of the central body, and embraces the idea of the association of forces for the purpose of compelling the submission of disputes and the performance of judgments. Nor can it be denied that Penn

2. A comprehensive and highly philosophical discourse on the occasions and means of establishing a general peace and liberty of commerce by all the world may be found in *Le Nouveau Cynée* (Paris, 1623) by Emeric Crucé, a reprint of which, edited, with an English translation, by Thomas Willing Balch, Esq., was published in Philadelphia in 1909.

manifested a keen sense of the delicacy of the matter with which he was dealing when he proposed that the room in which the central body or diet was to meet should be round, and should have several avenues of entrance and of exit, in order that quarrels as to precedence might be avoided.

A century later two great philosophers, Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham, one German and the other English, who were destined to leave a deep impress upon the world's thought, applied themselves to the baffling problem on lines not identical but by no means divergent. They both recommended a limitation of armaments, but in the main relied upon the creation of a state of public right in the progressive development of which the desired consummation would be gradually attained. Bentham, with characteristic predilection for legal processes, particularly emphasized the importance of establishing a common judicature for the determination of international disputes, reasoning that, if such a tribunal existed, war would no longer follow from a difference of opinion, since the decision of the arbiters would "save the credit and the honor" of the contending parties. That this conception, which was by no means original with Bentham, is intrinsically valid, can hardly be questioned; for not only has it inspired all intelligent and successful efforts to promote international arbitration, but its soundness has been exemplified in the actual settlement and termination of many grave and important controversies.

While enough has been disclosed to justify the conclusion that recent proposals for the preservation of peace by means of leagues or alliances contain little that is new, a cursory examination of the records of the past will also show that their principle has often received a practical application. It was tried, with a considerable measure of success, in the Amphictyonic League among the states of ancient Greece. This league, whose objects were at first religious, then religious and political, and at last chiefly political, held, through its council, two meetings a year; and while the council did not perform the functions either of a national assembly or of a tribunal of arbitration, it acted as an order of consultation, through which its constituents were enabled to act in concert for the preservation of peace. With the exception of the fact that it was a permanent body and held stated meetings, its functions were not unlike those that have been performed by the international congresses which have from time to time been held in Europe during the past three hundred years. These conferences have indeed more frequently been held for the restoration than for the preservation of peace; but,

whether held before or after war, their chief object has been to establish a condition of things under which peace might be maintained. Especially has this been the case since the Congress of Westphalia, which finished its work in 1648. The international system established by this congress, in spite of the wars that supervened, reached its formal end only with the Peace of Amiens in 1802. It was eventually replaced with a new system, created at Paris and Vienna in 1814 and 1815, the dominant thought of which was the substitution of the principle of concert for that of the balance of power, on which, in spite of all efforts, the states of Europe have tended to range themselves and are now actually aligned.

In a work recently published, under the title of *The Confederation of Europe*, by Mr. W. A. Phillips, an eminent English historian, many interesting disclosures are made concerning the attempt, during and after the Napoleonic wars, to found, under the auspices of certain powers, what may be termed a league to enforce peace. The leader in this movement was the Emperor Alexander I of Russia, a deeply religious man with a tendency towards mysticism, who in his youth imbibed from his tutor, a Frenchman named Frédéric César de La Harpe, an exponent of the transcendental "philosophy of humanity," the ideas of liberty and equality of the French Revolution. In weighing the aspersions sometimes cast on Alexander's character and motives, it is well to bear in mind that the efforts to discredit his proposals were by no means always disinterested; that if, as the result of assassinations and other incidents, he eventually fell under reactionary influences, he only manifested a susceptibility from which no one is wholly exempt; and that, between malevolence and an obtrusive benevolence, the methods and results do not always enable us clearly to distinguish. Nor is it out of place to say that if, in the Holy Alliance and other acts which he promoted, he evidently regarded himself as a chosen instrument of God, he merely manifested a human tendency from which even elective rulers are not invariably exempt. Is it indeed strange that one who has, whether by birth or by the suffrages of his fellow-citizens, been elevated to a high station, should regard Providence as having had a hand in the work, and should think no worse of Providence or of himself on that account?

As early as 1804, Alexander, in secret instructions to his confidential agent in England, M. de Novosiltzoff, which were supplementary to those given to the Russian ambassador in London, proposed the "combination of the resources and forces of Russia and Great Britain," in order to constitute "a

vast mass of power," with a view "to fix the future peace of Europe on a solid and permanent basis." Europe was to be reorganized; governments representing the wishes of the people were to be established; everywhere public institutions were to be "founded on the sacred rights of humanity," and were to breathe "the same spirit of wisdom and benevolence." Of the operation of such institutions order would be the necessary consequence. Moreover, the parties to the treaty by which the relations of the European states were to be defined were "never to begin a war until after exhausting every means of mediation by a third power," and were also to adopt a code of international law which, if violated by any of the parties, would "bind the others to turn against the offender and make good the evil he has committed." Alexander even declared it to be desirable to arrive at an arrangement regarding Turkey "in conformity with the good of humanity and the precepts of sound policy"; and believing, as he said, that the peace of Europe could be preserved only "by means of a league formed under the auspices of Russia and England," powers which were interested in order and justice and would by their union be able to maintain it, he even ventured to suggest that, with a view to further the great design, the British government might "make some change in its maritime code," so as to conciliate the neutral powers and do away with their distrust of British preponderance at sea.

This suggestion was not warmly received. Indeed, the Russian ambassador in London reported that England, in order to prevent the Mediterranean from becoming, according to the current phrase, a "French lake," felt it indispensable to keep Malta, the retention of which had caused the renewal of the war with France, and considered any alteration of her maritime code to be "equally out of the question." The cherished project, however, was not abandoned by its author. On the contrary, it was later symbolized by the Holy Alliance, which in terms bound the contracting parties to observe in their conduct the precepts of the Christian religion; and it was essentially transfused into the Quadruple Alliance between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, signed November 20, 1815, which, in order to "consolidate the connections" which "so closely united the four sovereigns for the happiness of the world," bound them (Article VI) "to renew their meetings at fixed periods," either personally or by their ministers, for the purpose of "consulting upon their common interests," and of devising measures which should "be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations, and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe."

Pursuant to this scheme, Alexander on October 18, 1818, presented to his allies at the conference at Aix-la-Chapelle a confidential memorandum, in which he proposed that, while the Quadruple Alliance should be preserved, all the signatories of the Congress of Vienna treaty should make a declaration putting the rights of nations under a guarantee analogous to that which protected individuals. Metternich on behalf of Austria hailed the memorandum with "diplomatic unction." Prussia, apprehensive as to her new acquisitions on the Rhine, welcomed it. Great Britain opposed it, her spokesman, Lord Castlereagh, declaring that the blessings of perpetual peace would seem too dearly bought at the price of subjugating Europe to an international police, of which the armies of Russia would form the most powerful element, and that "a universal union, committed to common action under circumstances that could not be foreseen," so far from leading to disarmament, would leave the decisive vote to "the master of the biggest battalions." He avowed the belief that, until "a system of administering Europe by a general alliance of all its states" could be "reduced to a practical form, all notions of a general and unqualified guarantee must be abandoned." In the end the parties to the Quadruple Alliance signed a protocol, to which France was invited to adhere, by which they declared that the convention of October 9, 1818, regulating the execution of the treaty of peace of November 20, 1815, was regarded as "the accomplishment of the work of peace" and "the completion of the political system destined to secure its solidarity"; that their "intimate union," having "no other object than the maintenance of peace," the "guarantee" of the transactions on which it was founded, and "the strictest observance of the principles of the rights of nations," offered to Europe "the most sacred pledge of its future tranquillity"; and that they would constantly labor for "the repose of the world," solemnly acknowledging that their duties to God and their people peremptorily required them to give to the world "an example of justice, of concord, and of moderation."

The union thus described reached its high-water mark at the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, which acted, as Phillips remarks, "not only as a European representative body, but as a sort of European supreme court, which heard appeals and received petitions of all kinds from sovereigns and their subjects alike." Great Britain finally broke away when it was proposed to extend the activities of the union to the western hemisphere, where, as the Russian government remarked, the revolution in the Spanish colonies fixed the attention of "two

worlds" and involved the interests of the "universe" and "the future, perhaps, of all civilized peoples."

The idea of a European league to enforce peace readily expanded in its author's mind into a world association for the same purpose. Castlereagh's successor, George Canning, was even more critical of the world policy. Canning declared that not only had England's "dignity" been wounded, but that her "material interests" were threatened; that for "Europe" he would desire now and then to read "England"; and later he even congratulated himself that, with France "constitutionally hating England," things were "getting back to a wholesome state again, . . . every nation for itself and God for us all," and instructed the British ambassador at St. Petersburg to bid the Russian emperor "be quiet," as the "time for Areopagus and the like of that" had "gone by." In America the prevalent attitude toward the suggested interposition of the allied powers in the contest between Spain and her revolted colonies was unmistakably reflected in President Monroe's famous pronouncement.

I have set forth with some particularity the history of Alexander's project of union, not only because it occupies so large a place in the diplomacy of Europe during the first quarter of the last century, but also because it so clearly exemplifies, in its progress and its fate, the possible or probable obstacles with which the attempt to establish such a plan must reckon. The author's evident belief in it was its mainstay, but this naturally ceased to be effective when an ally felt that it no longer needed his support, or might promote its own interests even by antagonizing him. When the situation was thus reversed, the liberties of small states and the cause of peace and humanity were readily found outside the union rather than within it. In other words, the national interest was preferred to the common interest, and the national interest, as has often happened, was in no small part avowedly "material" or commercial.

We have seen that Castlereagh did not relish the prospect of the army of a strong military power, even when united with the armies of other powers, marching through the confederation for the purpose of enforcing peace. The Abbé de St. Pierre sought to avoid such an objection by proposing that the armies of great and small powers should be numerically the same; but, considering the question purely as one of physical resistance or attack, we cannot disregard the latent strength which territory, population, and resources themselves may assure. The great importance of this consideration is shown in the wars growing out of the French Revolution and

the ensuing Napoleonic Wars. Austria and Prussia, alarmed at the Revolution, began a war against France, but historians are generally agreed that they would have speedily retired from the contest had not Great Britain taken part in it. British statesmen seem to have thought that internal anarchy would compel France to succumb, but the belief in her weakness did not prevent them from forming against her a coalition which, before the end of 1793, embraced all the Christian powers of Europe, except Sweden, Denmark, Genoa, Venice, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, and Switzerland. Nevertheless, the war lasted, with one brief intermission, for more than twenty years, and when France emerged from it in 1815 she retained, with slight exceptions, her boundaries of 1790, furnishing to the world an example of the strength of a united people, and of the danger of underrating the power and resources of an adversary. The advocates of a "small international police" as an effective prevention of armed conflicts may find here material for reflection.

Lastly, it will be observed that Castlereagh objected to anything in the nature of an international administration of Europe. From the point of view of rendering predominant the power and prestige of his own government, his position was no doubt correct; but he seems also to have admitted that such an administration would be essential to the success of the scheme. It would indeed be important both materially and morally; materially, as a means of fusing the interests of all in a common interest; morally, as a means of creating a common allegiance. It is by the combination of these two measures—the substitution of concert for unlimited competition and the fostering of the sentiment of unity—that the great empires and federations of to-day in effect operate as peace agencies. This they do within themselves. But, as regards one another, what is their attitude? That of rivals who may lawfully prosecute their ambitions by all possible means. Internally, the destruction of life and property for gain is forbidden; externally, it may be commanded, and this upon the theory that a number of men can, by associating themselves in a political society, place themselves above any earthly authority.

It is in this attitude of mind, which is exemplified in the recognized law of conquest, that we find the crux of the peace problem. In a letter written in 1893, Alfred Nobel, founder of the Nobel Institute at Christiania, remarked that, if all states would with solidarity agree to turn against the first aggressor, wars would become impossible. So long, however, as states retain their present conception of their duties and functions in

their relations one with another, such "solidarity" of action can hardly be relied upon. Nor is the question who was the "first aggressor" so easy of determination that the parties to such an agreement would in the exercise of their independent individual judgments be likely to concur in their conclusions upon it. Ward, in his *Law of Nations*, narrates the case, in 1292, of two sailors, the one Norman, the other English, who quarreled in the port of Bayonne and began to fight with their fists. The Englishman, who is said to have been the weaker, stabbed the other with his knife, and the local magistrates having failed to take cognizance of the case, the Normans applied to their king, who told them to take their own revenge. They instantly put to sea, and, says Ward, "seizing the first English ship they could find, hung up several of the crew, and some dogs at the same time, at the masthead. The English," continues the chronicler, "retaliated without applying to their government, and things arose to that height of irregularity, that (with the same indifference on the part of their kings) the one nation made alliance with the Irish and Dutch; the other with the Flemings and Genoese. Two hundred Norman vessels scoured the English seas, and hanged all the seamen they could find. Their enemies in return fitted out a strong fleet, destroyed or took the greater part of the Normans, and giving no quarter, massacred them to the number of fifteen thousand men. The affair then became too big for private hands, and the governments interposing in form, it terminated in that unfortunate war which, by the loss of Guienne, entailed upon the two nations an endless train of hostilities till it was recovered."

Take two of our own wars of the past century. Madison, in his message to Congress in 1812, said that Great Britain was at war with the United States, while the United States were at peace with Great Britain. He therefore advised that the balance be adjusted, and Congress undertook to do it. But, as the result of disclosures, made ten years later, from French archives, it is now perfectly well known that Madison was mistaken in his supposed facts; and Albert Gallatin, who made the first partial discovery of the truth, declared that, if the reality had been known, the United States, it was to be assumed, never would have entered upon the course that resulted in the war. In 1846 Mexico treated the entrance of United States forces into certain territory, alleged by the United States to belong to Texas, as an act of war, and as such undertook to repel it by force. If one will examine the United States Statutes at Large, he will find there the solemn declaration of Congress, conforming to the official declaration of

President Polk, that war was begun by the act of Mexico. Congress therefore recognized the existence of a state of war, instead of declaring war; but there has always been a profound difference of opinion upon the question whether this view was justified.

Nearly twenty years elapsed after the outbreak of the war between France and Prussia, in 1870, before the circumstances immediately affecting the precipitation of the conflict were fully and certainly established.

To these examples many others might readily be added.

Another difficulty that would arise in the execution of a mere agreement among independent states, such as that above suggested, is the regulation of the right of self-defense. In speaking of this right, it is perhaps unnecessary to make allowance for a sensitiveness so extreme as that of the gentleman who, in modestly confessing that he had taken part in eighteen wars and fought twenty-seven duels, never failed to add—“but always, suh, in self-defense”! Nevertheless, the truth is that each party to a war usually regards itself as the victim of aggression, and that, while acts of aggression or of menace are seldom wholly confined to one side, it is necessary to act upon appearances. Nor should we forget that the parties to a dispute can scarcely survey their situation with the calmness and deliberation of a bystander who has nothing at stake. Thus, while the first actual shot in the battle of Navarino, the consequences of which proved to be so momentous, seems to have been fired by the Turks, English writers have candidly admitted that the Ottoman commander was not unjustified in believing that he was repelling an attack on the part of the allied fleet.

Finally, in spite of loose generalizations as to the annihilation of time and distance, the fact remains that the interests of independent states are many and varied, and that, dotted over the globe, there are points of vantage whose control, while supposed deeply to affect the welfare or security of certain states or groups of states, is, rationally speaking, of little or no concern to the rest of the world. In this way the interests of nations are necessarily divided. It was the recognition of this fact that enabled the European powers several years ago successfully to localize the wars between Turkey and the Balkan states and between the Balkan states themselves, thus avoiding the operation of the alliances that later dragged into the present conflagration certain powers which had no direct or individual interest in the quarrel out of which it grew. The first of these was that gallant nation, of which Sir Edward Grey, on August 3, 1914, declared that “no government and

no country" had "less desire to be involved in war" over a dispute between Austria and Serbia than "the government and country of France," but that they were involved in it because of their "alliance with Russia." The wisdom or justification of this particular alliance it is not my purpose to discuss, but I would commend its latest consequence to the consideration of persons of enlarged views or visionary tendency, who, in their passion for what they are pleased to call "world politics," would lightly throw away the freedom of a nation to determine its own fate.

In the formulation of plans for the preservation of peace, the complicated elements with which the present survey has dealt must all be taken into account. They can no more be neglected in the external than in the internal affairs of states. Mere alliances will not suffice. There must be organization of such character and extent as to gratify the desires, reconcile the ambitions, and settle the specific disputes of peoples, so that their attitude toward international order and internal order may be substantially the same.

In the cultivation of such an attitude no agency has been more useful than international arbitration, a process which has the sanction of antiquity, and, where passions would permit it to be employed, of success. It was practised between the independent Greek states with an intelligence and precision rarely surpassed. Under the influence of a united church, it was extensively applied during the Middle Ages. During the Thirty Years' War, while men, crazed by famine, waited upon the gallows and explored the cemetery, and, reduced to the stage of cannibalism, hunted down their fellows for food, it disappeared. Through the subsequent colonial and commercial wars it remained in eclipse. It revived toward the close of the eighteenth century, when Great Britain and the United States applied it not only to questions of boundary but also to disputes as to maritime right, such as have frequently occasioned wars. In its practical application it reached perhaps its highest point in the Geneva award, by which, in 1872, the claims growing out of the depredations of the *Alabama* and other Confederate cruisers fitted out in British ports were finally determined, although I would by no means fail to mention either the arbitral settlement of the Bering Sea dispute at Paris in 1893, or that of the century-old controversy as to the North Atlantic fisheries by the Permanent Court at The Hague in 1910.

The treaty or convention under which this court was established was signed at The Hague in 1899 and was renewed in 1907. As is generally known, it provides for commissions

of inquiry to ascertain facts, and for mediation, as well as for the judicial settlement of disputes by the permanent arbitral court; and while it does not declare arbitration to be obligatory in any particular case, it excepts nothing from the process, thus adopting Bentham's view that in the decision of arbiters the credit and honor of the disputants will be preserved. In this respect it radically differs from certain later treaties which stipulate that differences "of a legal nature, or relating to the interpretation of treaties," shall be referred to the Permanent Court at The Hague, provided they "do not affect the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the two contracting states, and do not concern the interests of third parties." The object of these treaties is said to have been to render resort to the court obligatory; but as their most important clause is that which specifies the exceptions, they recall the case of the officer who, on placing his troops in position, pointed out a way of retreat, which, when the enemy appeared, they promptly took. In reality, the article in effect declares that nothing of a serious nature need be arbitrated. In this respect, while it may not fall below the standard of some nations, it is far behind the actual practice of others which have, during the past hundred and twenty-five years, arbitrated numerous questions that may, in the sense in which language is usually employed, be said to affect the "independence," or the "vital interests," or the "honor" or the contracting parties. The questions submitted under Article VII of the Jay treaty were of this character. Seventy years later, when the United States first proposed to Great Britain the arbitration of the *Alabama* claims, Earl Russell declined the proposal, on the express ground that the complaints of the United States involved the "honor" of Her Majesty's Government, of which, according to the accepted phrase, he declared Her Majesty's Government to be the "sole guardian." The scope of the questions at issue had not been reduced, but had indeed been enlarged, when, in 1871, it was decided to submit the controversy to arbitration. What would indeed be thought of a code prefaced with the clause that its provisions should not be held to apply to any case which, in the opinion of either party, involved his "honor"? No doubt we should find that defendants would grow extremely sensitive on that score, but the peace and order of society would be likely to suffer.

With a view to remove the limitations imposed by the treaties above mentioned, and to set an example of confidence in amicable processes, there were concluded at Washington, on August 3, 1911, two remarkable agreements, commonly

known as the Taft-Knox treaties, between the United States on the one part, and France and Great Britain respectively on the other, by which an attempt was made to bring within the scope of arbitration all future differences involving a "claim of right" and "justiciable in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law or equity"; and in case of dispute as to whether a difference was of this nature, this question was to be referred to a Joint High Commission of Inquiry, whose vote in favor of arbitration was to be conclusive, if concurred in by all or all but one of the members. The United States Senate amended these treaties (1) by requiring the advice and consent of the Senate for any and every submission, (2) by taking from the Joint High Commission of Inquiry the power to decide that a difference was justiciable, and (3) by declaring that the treaties did not embrace any question affecting (a) the admission of aliens into the United States or to the educational institutions of the several States, (b) national or State boundaries, or State debts, (c) the Monroe Doctrine, or (d) "other purely governmental policy." The treaties were then abandoned.

The so-called peace pacts concluded by the United States with numerous powers during the past three years, although often criticized as treaties of unlimited arbitration, do not as a rule stipulate for arbitration at all, but merely provide for the submission of disputes to international commissions of inquiry for investigation and report within a year. Furthermore, the report, when made, is not binding, the contracting parties expressly reserving their liberty of action in regard to it. The thought underlying these treaties is (1) that they furnish an honorable means of suspending controversy; (2) that the suspension of controversy will have a tranquillizing effect; and (3) that the report of the commission of investigation probably will point the way to a fair and equitable settlement. Their practical application, however, to flagrant and continuing violations of substantial rights as to persons, property, jurisdiction, or commerce, might become difficult unless a *modus vivendi* could be arranged.

For the preservation of peace all devices, such as international conferences, arbitration, mediation, and good offices, are or may be useful, according to the circumstances of the case; but back of all this we must in the last analysis rely upon the cultivation of a mental attitude which will lead men to think first of amicable processes rather than of war when differences arise. To this end it will be necessary to rid the mind of exaggerated but old and generally prevalent notions as to

the functions and mission of the state, of superstitions as to "trial by battle," of the conceptions that underlie the law of conquest, and of the delusion that one's own motives are always higher, purer and more disinterested than those of other persons, to say nothing of the passion for uniformity that denies the right to be different.

In a letter written not long ago to the president of the American Jewish Committee, at New York, who, with a view to ameliorate the sufferings of his coreligionists in regions within the theatre of war, had invoked the exercise by the Sovereign Pontiff, at Rome, of his moral and spiritual authority, His Holiness declared not only that natural rights should be respected without regard to differences of religious faith, but that in the existing circumstances he felt more deeply than ever that all men should recollect "that they are brothers and that their salvation lies in the return to the law of love." In the midst of the mingled cries of agony and of hate that daily rend the air, this counsel of fraternity seems to be almost lost. But it will not perish, for the truth that it embodies is eternal. [*Great applause.*]

EDUCATIONAL CROSSCURRENTS¹

IT is seldom that the progress of a school is, in a brief space of time, attended with so many striking events as have lately marked the career of Delaware College. Indeed, but for the fact that each new act or benefaction, proceeding from some wise creative design, has, by distinctly increasing the capacity of the institution for future growth and usefulness, impressively enlarged the bounds of hope and of promise, epoch-making developments would have become almost a commonplace.

Nevertheless, a native Delawarean need not be classed among the patriarchs who recall a time when the influence of Delaware College upon the life of the State was practically negligible. Though nominally the head of the educational system of the commonwealth, it could hardly have discharged that function, even had its endowment been greater, since no such system in fact existed. Public schools, it is true, were not lacking. Though not so abundant as they are now, nor always efficiently conducted, they occasionally furnished an approach to the ideal of Plato, by reason of the presence of a teacher

1. Commencement address at Delaware College, June 14, 1916.

capable of transferring some vital thought to the mind of the pupil—a capacity which no certificate of professional training can alone assure. Teaching in those days was, in fact, a favorite means of livelihood with young men who aspired to careers of professional distinction, and fortunate were the pupils whose minds could catch the glow of youthful and honorable ambition of instructors of that type. But, while great excellence in teaching was thus now and then attained, there was, after all, no irreducible minimum of qualification. There was no necessary standard of performance; and the supervision essential to the maintenance of such a standard was altogether wanting. More than all there was no appointed ideal, no central source of instruction and information to which to look for inspiration and guidance.

This function Delaware College was destined eventually to perform; but it is significant that it was, as is well known, set on its career towards the fulfilment of this high destiny, with the aid of the national government. At the present juncture, when candidates for public favor claim for their rival plans of military preparedness specific and exclusive virtues, it is not ungrateful to turn to a measure of educational preparedness as to whose wisdom and beneficence there can be no difference of opinion. I refer to the act of Congress of July 2, 1862, commonly known by the name of its sagacious author, then a representative and later a senator from Vermont, as the "Morrill Act," by which large areas of public lands, in the proportion of 30,000 acres for each senator and representative in Congress, were granted to the several States, on condition that the proceeds of the sale of such lands should be invested and maintained by the State as a fund whose income should be "inviolably appropriated" to the support of at least one college where, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, there should be taught, together with military tactics, such branches of learning as were "related to agriculture and the mechanic arts," in order to promote "the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions of life." Although various acts of Congress have since increased the aid thus extended, till the amount now received by Delaware College from national sources is almost eighteen times as great as that derived from the first grant, these later contributions are to be regarded only as amplifications of the wise original design.

But it is during the past thirty years that the chief development of Delaware College has taken place; and of the results of that development, not the least important, down to a very recent day, was the demonstration to the State and to the pub-

lic of the fact that there existed here a great opportunity for educational effort. Three years ago, when, by amendment of its charter, the college became the exclusive charge of the State, and the State, conscious of its new and enlarged responsibilities, provided for the establishment of the affiliated "Women's College of Delaware," the demonstration may be said to have been complete. And then was witnessed that highly gratifying manifestation on the part of the alumni of whole-hearted loyalty, which, in securing an endowment for the administrative headship of the institution, proved to be but the precursor of the private munificence that has furnished the means for providing the institution with grounds and with buildings, and particularly with the hall of science whose corner-stone is to be laid today.

We continue therefore to stand with faces turned towards the future. For a steady-going people, not given to experimentation, the recent pace perhaps has been rapid, but not alarmingly so. Too often distrust of change springs from a settled dislike of all innovation, while slowness of growth may be merely a sign of weakness. The quick advance of Delaware College to a position among institutions of learning whose future is a matter of general interest and concern affords no ground for apprehension. On the contrary, it is full of wholesome significance; for it is the result of a co-ordination of spiritual and material forces in whose vital union an institution of learning finds the best assurance of enduring life and ever increasing usefulness. Nor, in affirming this to be the case, do I lose sight of the fact that a marked feature of the advance was the provision of equal educational opportunity for women. By this act of enlightened justice, as the result of which the Women's College was, to the lasting honor and credit of the State, opened a year ago, not only has the immediate constituency of the institution been enlarged but its appeal to the people of the commonwealth has been immeasurably strengthened. Well may Governor Miller congratulate himself upon the circumstance that it was his official privilege to give to this measure its final sanction.

As we are justified in feeling confident that, through the continued co-operation of the forces that have so far sustained the college and advanced its interests, the means of its future development will be assured, the question naturally arises as to what the course of that development should be. This question I shall endeavor to answer not as an expert in educational methods, whose importance I may be inclined to underrate, but as a student of life, seeking to discover in its various manifestations here and elsewhere, in the present and in the past,

the basal principles on which the training of men and women for the upbuilding of society should be conducted.

Speaking in this sense, I may at once say that I believe the great defect in educational activities in the United States during the past fifty years to have been the tendency towards superficiality, as exemplified in the excessive multiplication of the subjects professedly taught and in the encouragement given to immature and uninformed pupils to taste promiscuously but not too inquisitively the viands set before them. The process has not indeed been unlike that which has so greatly increased the risk of ptomaine poisoning in our restaurants. Not long ago, being at a seaside resort, I one day dropped into a road house. The resources of the place apparently were not great, but I was promptly furnished with the usual volume in which are listed all the articles of diet which the markets of the United States are supposedly annually to afford, together with all the beverages which the vineyards, distilleries and springs of the entire world are known to produce. Feeling somewhat discouraged, I asked the waiter why it was that his employer did not act upon the principle of preparing a few dishes of superior quality, which his patrons might order with confidence. My humble servitor at once vouchsafed an explanation which proved him to be a man of observation and a true philosopher. "Your idea, Sir," said he, "I believe to be right, but our trouble is this: most people don't appear to know what's good from what's bad, and if they ask for what you haven't got, they seem to be disappointed and you feel bad." Descending then to the discussion of details, I found that the establishment could furnish only one dish that was fresh and above suspicion.

Let us not flatter ourselves that this homely illustration of a wayfarer's experience cannot be duplicated in our educational life. Should any one be inclined to doubt it, let him consult the report on medical schools in the United States, prepared under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for the Advancement of Teaching, which is now engaged in a similar investigation of law schools. Institutions claiming, by virtue of their titular designation, the rank of universities, have not been guiltless of conferring degrees in subjects in which no adequate instruction was provided; and, while such things may to some extent be regarded as the effervescence of a period of feverish growth, they have exerted a baneful influence in fostering loose conceptions of public and private duty.

But, in making this statement, I desire to avoid the inference that I advocate a narrow and restricted curriculum. On

the contrary, I adopt, without amendment or qualification, the words of the Act of 1862, which, while exacting instruction in agriculture and the mechanic arts, expressly embraced in its purview other scientific as well as classical studies, to the end that the education of the people might be not only "practical" but also "liberal." We are accustomed to speak of "mind" and of "matter," and although we may be unable precisely to denote where the one ends and the other begins, yet we cannot be unconscious of the operation of the spiritual forces that create and fix our ideals and inspire our efforts to reach a higher plane of thought and of action. These forces, without whose elevating influence life, no matter how elaborate and ornate its trappings may be, tends to sink to the level of mere physical existence, it is the special function of liberal studies, among which I may particularly mention psychology and ethics, to explain, to stimulate and to direct. The importance of such studies therefore cannot be too strongly emphasized.

There are two forms of comparatively recent systematic educational activity to which I desire to advert, and these are extension teaching and the summer school. In both these forms of activity, in whose usefulness I ardently believe, Delaware College is now engaged. The specific benefit they offer is that, through their agency, increasing numbers of persons, thirsting for knowledge, are enabled to share the advantages afforded by established institutions of learning, with definite and progressive educational aims. In this way the power and influence of such institutions are vastly extended, and educational standards are gradually raised. I do not doubt that the people of the State feel a lively interest and a just pride in what Delaware College is accomplishing in these directions, and that they will accord to it, as the appointed centre of their educational system, their generous support in all its efforts to serve them.

Of the tendency towards superficiality, of which I have heretofore spoken, the tendency towards specialization is often mentioned as the antithesis; but it is by no means certain that the latter should be regarded as an antidote to the former. While specialization is no doubt essential to expertness, it cannot alone assure the highest efficiency. As specialization necessarily restricts the scope of one's studies, it tends to narrow the vision; and it should therefore be entered upon only after a general cultivation of the mental faculties, such as will enable the investigator both to form a just comparative estimate of the results of his own labors and to continue to derive light from other sources.

Such a preparation is altogether compatible with, and may indeed be said to be conditioned upon, the inculcation of those habits of patience, thoroughness and accuracy that beget sincerity, truthfulness and simplicity of character and make of men and women useful members of society. Fortunately, while these are the traits on which we must in the last analysis rely for the preservation of whatsoever is best in life and for all wholesome progress, they are as easily comprehended as they are important. Rhetoric may seek to embellish but cannot wholly obscure them. They are fundamental, and education fulfils one of its highest functions in their nurture and perpetuation.

But, beyond the fostering of these elementary virtues, it is of the utmost consequence to cultivate a spirit of toleration, in order that differences may not develop into unreasoning antagonisms and close the mind to considerations of justice and benevolence. For this purpose the study of history should be most useful; but, it must be admitted that history has too often been written on lines of interest and of prejudice. So clearly is this the case that I do not hesitate to say that even persistent impressions of the most important events have sometimes been little better than travesties. Till a comparatively recent time practically all that was taught in England and the United States concerning the French Revolution related to the aftermath called the Reign of Terror, for which foreign intervention was so largely responsible. Of the great epoch-making transformation that had previously taken place scarcely any explanation was vouchsafed. Defects such as these our scholars and instructors are now endeavoring to remedy; and it is gratifying to observe that there exists in our schools a disposition to present the history of each country from the point of view of its own people, so that their acts and motives may be fairly judged. It is most desirable that instruction on these lines should be liberally provided.

In conclusion, let me say just a word of a somewhat personal nature. It may, I believe, be truthfully affirmed that Delaware College is an institution whose professions have never run ahead of its performance. To the full limit of its capacity, its record has been characterized by quiet and substantial achievement. That this encomium may justly be bestowed upon it, is mainly due to the faithfulness of its faculty, who have given to its service the full measure of loyal and unselfish devotion. Labor of this kind has its own rewards, chief among which is the consciousness that one's own ideals and aspirations may by transfusion live on and grow in others; but it is also attended with sacrifices and with the relinquish-

ment of opportunities of which equal industry and intelligence exerted in other directions might secure the benefits. To no one, we may believe, has the increasing prosperity of their charge brought so much joy as to the instructors who have spent and to those who are now spending their days in demonstrating its value to the community. These are indeed its true representatives, the veritable embodiment of its life and its purposes; and, while their example in the past has been beyond all praise, I venture to say, upon the strength of what has lately been accomplished and of what is yet proposed, that at no time has there existed a stronger or more active spirit of public service than that which animates the President and Faculty today. Holding, as they do, the confidence of their constituency by the best of all titles, that of attested desert, may they receive in ever increasing measure the co-operation and encouragement of the commonwealth to whose welfare and upbuilding they so essentially and so abundantly contribute.

THE ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF A PLAN FOR THE SYSTEMATIC EXCHANGE OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS BETWEEN THE SEVERAL AMERICAN REPUBLICS¹

BY a resolution adopted on August 18, 1910, the Fourth International American Conference at Buenos Aires decided to recommend to the American Governments a plan for the interchange of professors and students.

As to professors, it was recommended that facilities should be granted to those sent from one university to another "for the holding of classes or the giving of lectures." Such classes or lectures, it was advised, should "treat chiefly of scientific matters of interest to America, or relating to the conditions of one or more of the American countries, especially that in which the professor is teaching." To this end, it was resolved that in each year the universities desiring the interchange should give notice to each other of the matters of which their professors could treat and of those which they desired to have treated. The remuneration of the professor was to be paid by the university which had appointed him, unless his services should

1. *Proceedings of the Second Pan American Scientific Congress, Washington, 1915-1916* (Washington, 1917), sec. IV, part 1, pp. 561-563.

have been expressly requested, in which case his compensation was to be paid by the university making the request. It was further resolved that the universities should determine annually the amount to be taken from their own funds or to be requested from their respective governments, for meeting the cost of carrying out the resolution. It was further declared to be desirable that the universities of America should attempt at a congress to provide for university extension and other means of American university co-operation.

As to students, it was resolved that the universities should create scholarships in favor of students of other countries of the continent, with or without reciprocity, and that each university in which such scholarships should have been created should appoint a committee to be charged with the care of the students to whom scholarships had been given, with a view to direct their studies and regulate the performance of their duties.

Such was the resolution. Its evident object was to make helpful suggestions toward the accomplishment of a design which, if we may judge by the usual discussions of it, is assumed to be as easy of fulfillment as it is no doubt benevolent in intention. The fact must, however, be admitted, that those discussions take little or no account either of experience or of the inherent difficulties of the subject.

Certainly the time has come, when, instead of making vague assumptions, we should examine the problem at close quarters and endeavor to understand it. In this spirit I will consider, first, the question of the exchange of professors.

When I speak of the exchange of professors, I of course refer to a systematic exchange, annually or at frequent or stated intervals, necessitating a regular and constant supply of properly equipped men. If the exchange is to be simply occasional, it would be idle now to discuss it, since it will take place only when special provision is made for it and on the terms then specified.

Dealing with the question as one of systematic exchange, I hazard nothing in saying that the results of such an exchange of professors, where it has actually been tried, have not by any means been uniform. While in some cases the results have been manifestly valuable, their value has in other cases been less appreciable. And this difference has been due not solely to differences in general teaching efficiency and linguistic equipment, but also to differences in the adaptation of the subject to the educational scheme and needs of the particular institution. In the last analysis, however, the conclusion perhaps can not be avoided that a main cause of the difference in results

has been the impossibility of obtaining a constant supply of persons possessing the requisite linguistic equipment, the absence of which may be a bar to effective instruction, while the effort to obtain it narrows the field of selection and may defeat the object of the exchange.

If I correctly apprehended it, the underlying purpose of the systematic exchange of professors is the interpretation, in a broad sense, of the history, institutions, and ideals of one people to another people, to the end that they may know each other better, and, profiting by each other's experience and achievements, learn to work together in sympathy and mutual understanding for the common good.

Such being the object to be attained, may we not ask, whether, in essaying to reach it by the mere exchange of professors, we are not proposing a means inadequate to the accomplishment of the end in view? And when I say "inadequate," I mean actually so; for, after all, the question is a practical one. With modern facilities of transportation, international travel has so increased that there is no civilized country in which the presence of a foreigner, though he be a professor, is an event so rare as to attract a throng even of university students. The fact is also to be borne in mind that university students have regular courses of study to pursue, that for the most part they are laboring toward specific results, and that their prescribed work to a great extent engrosses their thoughts and monopolizes their time and energies, so that instruction, if it is to be effectively given, must fit in with their plan of study and form a part of it. Otherwise their regular attendance upon lectures is hardly to be counted on.

The first and logical step in the scheme of interpretation would therefore appear to be to establish, in the university in which the work is to be undertaken, a chair devoted to the comprehensive exposition of the history, institutions and ideals of the people or group of peoples whose life it is proposed especially to explain. This chair should be permanently filled, by an incumbent who could speak the language of the people or group in question as well as that of the country in which the university is situated, and the work should form a part of the regular curriculum. In this way permanence of instruction would be assured, and if at any time an advantageous exchange could be arranged, a salary would be already provided for the temporary incumbent. Meanwhile, the exchange would be merely an incident of the work and not the controlling factor.

I have already adverted to the uncertainties of the exchange system, as usually discussed, due to the linguistic difficulties.

The effort to meet this important practical condition, while narrowing the field of selection, also makes the subject to be taught a matter of uncertainty. The subject which a person linguistically qualified might be able to offer might bear no relation whatever to the fundamental thought of the system; but even if it should have some such relation, it might be a subject not only adequately taught in the institution to which the exchange professor comes but taught in conformity with a plan of instruction with which he is unfamiliar. But there is still another difficulty and a very serious one. It may regularly happen that a professor who, by reason of his exceptional fitness and prestige is specially desired, may be engaged in important work which he cannot be fairly asked to abandon or suspend. Perhaps his personal situation may be such that he is unable to absent himself from his home. Indeed, do we transcend the bounds of admissible conjecture if we permit ourselves to suppose that by reason of a combination of circumstances the services he is at the moment rendering at home may be of greater value than any he could just then perform elsewhere?

In suggesting, as the first step in the effective solution of the problem, the establishment of special chairs, it may be unnecessary to remark that I have not overlooked the fact that in various universities more or less instruction is already given in the literature and the political and social institutions of foreign countries; but it is often given in detached courses and without the definite design of presenting a comprehensive survey and interpretation of the civilization of a particular people or group, which I take to be the main conception of the proposed exchange. The student-attendance which such a chair would command, would, as in all other cases, depend in an appreciable measure upon the efficiency of the incumbent, and, as has already been intimated, an additional attraction could now and then be offered in the person of an exchange professor, when an available one could be found.

As to the exchange of students little need be said on the present occasion. The recommendation made at the fourth International American conference does not seem to require extended additions or comment. There is, however, one point which it would be well to bear in mind, for further consideration, and that is the question of the age of the students to be exchanged. Not long ago in presenting this question to a number of foreign students of different nationalities, I was struck with the fact that they all seemed to concur in the opinion that it was undesirable to send youths away from home at such an

early age that, receiving their formative impressions abroad, they would return to their native land as strangers in a strange environment, with the result that they would be unable to work in harmony and co-operation with their own people and would even find their ability to make a living seriously impaired.

BOOK REVIEWS

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA. *Edited by R. G. MARSDEN.* Vol. I, A.D. 1205-1648. *Publications of the Navy Records Society*, Vol. XLIX. London, Navy Records Society, 1915. Pp. xl, 561.

The present volume makes an interesting addition to the materials in which the student may endeavor to trace the development of maritime law. The records reproduced in it go back as far as the year 1205, while the latest in date belongs to 1648. Of many of the earlier and some of the later documents the original text is Latin, though occasionally there is a French text; but in every such instance an English version is given, accompanied with the original. The transcription and the editing of the texts from the original records have required much labor, care, and expertness and the task appears to have been skillfully performed. The presswork is excellent. But, where only extracts from documents are given, the excerpts are sometimes insufficient to enable one to form a confident opinion as to the subject-matter, while in other cases the interpretations or summaries given in the introduction to the volume are open to question.

For example, it is stated (p. ix) that "before the end of the thirteenth century the supply of war material was being stopped by arrest or capture of the carrying ship," while "sometimes neutrals were politely requested not to do so." In support of the former statement, reference is made to page 21, where an English royal order of 1293 is given for the arrest of a number of Frisian and German ships that had put into English ports under stress of weather and were said to be laden with armor and other military supplies for the enemies of England in France, the arrest to be made in order that the cargoes might be unloaded and disposed of by the owners among the English people. It was also alleged that at least some of the cargoes were enemies' property. This allegation appears not to have been sustained, but the military character of some of the cargoes was unquestionable. There was no capture on the high seas, and there probably never was a time when a government would permit military supplies, when brought within its jurisdiction, to be carried on to its enemies. As to neutrals be-

ing "politely requested" not to supply war material, it will be found that the document cited (p. 64) conveyed a request of the King of England to the Count of Holland not to permit his subjects to furnish armed ships to the Scots, who were then (1336) in rebellion against the English king, or to persons professedly in league with them. This tends to illustrate the antiquity of the distinction between what is now called contraband and the fitting out of ships, which is analogous to the raising or setting on foot of a hostile expedition.

Again, it is stated (p. ix) that "where there was no order to the contrary, enemy goods in a friend's ship condemned the ship." The document cited (p. 66) is in reality a royal order issued in 1337 for the delivery of a Flemish ship as a gift to an English subject who had captured her while she was engaged in transporting "Scottish enemies," some of whom the captor slew in the act of making the capture. The language of the order indicates that the ship was regarded as forfeited to the crown "as a capture from our [Scottish] enemies aforesaid," in other words, as a transport in the enemy's service. Indeed it seems possible that the ship may have been actually owned by enemies (p. 67). The question whether a certain quantity of goods and chattels at the same time captured aboard the ship did not in the circumstances stated belong as of right to the captor was four years later decided adversely to the captor's claim; and as he had retained them, he was held liable for them or their value to the king (p. 69). The value of the royal order of 1346 (p. 75) as proof that a friend's ship, which had been carrying enemy goods, was in that case restored because condemnation in such cases "was soon found, for political reasons, to be inexpedient" (p. x), is impaired by the fact that the order was founded on a particular treaty stipulation. The bare decree of the Admiralty of 1612 (p. 384), directing that certain tobacco imported into England by a Spanish subject be delivered to the Spanish ambassador, does not of itself disclose with certainty the nature of the case. The same comment may be made upon the extract (p. 430) called a "sentence condemning to the captor, as good prize, a ship and corn cargo destined to the enemy." From what is given it would not be safe to infer that the court would have condemned a neutral ship with a cargo of corn destined to the enemy. If the ship, as may be inferred from her name, was English, the ground of condemnation would appear to have been an attempt to trade with the enemy. These examples, as well as others that might be adduced, lead to the conclusion that, valuable as the volume undoubtedly is, its value

to legal science might have been enhanced if space had been available for the fuller disclosure of essential facts.

The volume contains the commission issued in 1595 to Hawkins and Drake (p. 284). There are also interesting documents relating to the treatment of enemy goods as well as to reprisals, neutrality, contraband, visit and search, the *voyage de conserve*, impressment, and the Rule of the War of 1756.

Reprinted from *The American Historical Review*, XXI (1916), 582-583.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE: AN INTERPRETATION. *By ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, Ph.D., Litt.D., LL.D., Professor of the Science of Government in Harvard University. Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1916. Pp. vi, 403.*

The present volume deals with the Monroe Doctrine in a very comprehensive manner. The author regards it not as a "question of theory," but as one of fact. It is, as he affirms, "founded in the state of things in the western hemisphere"; but as the "conditions of the problem change from decade to decade," he admits that any doctrine "which is to endure in the midst of these changing conditions must undergo corresponding alterations." He thus recognizes the fact that the phrases of Monroe have undergone not a little distortion.

Indeed [he declares (p. 141)] both in its extent and intent, the Monroe Doctrine was not a term but a treatise; not a statement, but a literature; not an event but an historic development. The term Monroe Doctrine has at various times been set up as precluding every form of interference by European powers, from kidnapping a policeman to conquering an empire; and to every parcel of territory from the Pribyloff Islands to Tierra Del Fuego.

At the same time, he states that there is a "perpetual national policy which needs no authority from President Monroe" to make it valid, and that is "the daily common-sense recognition of the geographic and political fact that the United States of America is by fact and by right more interested in American affairs, both on the northern and southern continents, than any European power can possibly be." It is probable, however, that cartographers would not be unanimous in regarding the United States as having a paramount interest by reason of physical proximity to the more southern countries of South America, or admit that this can be proved even by "the formal statements of ten presidents and twenty secretaries of state." Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly true that the repeated assertion by the United States of a paramount political interest

in the fate of countries of the western hemisphere has resulted in or been attended by an assumption of geographical proximity which is as to some of them unfounded.

A careful examination of the volume has failed to disclose the omission of anything that the title may fairly be supposed to comprehend. It is indeed exceedingly full and suggestive; and there can be no doubt that the author comprehends and has clearly stated the striking developments and expansions of policy that have been associated with the name of Monroe rather than with anything that Monroe and his advisers ever said or dreamt of. The author, however, in his preface frankly states that some "errors" in the text may have escaped attention, and these he will no doubt desire to correct in a future edition. As to matters of opinion, authorities will necessarily differ. For instance, when the policy of our earlier presidents is spoken of as a doctrine of "isolation," there are some persons, among whom is the reviewer, who regard the term as wholly misleading. In reality, the word "isolation" is meant to denote the absence of political entanglements, conventional or otherwise. In any other sense, the United States was no more isolated in the first twenty-five years of its history than it is to-day.

The author points out (p. 78) the erroneous supposition that the desire to secure the West Indian trade was the controlling motive of Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams. Russia, however, did not make "a claim to the whole north Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea" (p. 88); she suggested that she might have made it, but stated that she preferred to assert only her "essential rights." Again (p. 103), we find the statement: "'The Argentine Nation,' as Buenos Aires came to be called, showed the greatest prosperity and the strongest sense of the money value of an orderly government, among all the Latin-American states." This statement relates to the period 1827-1844, which is largely covered by the reign of tyranny and disorder under the long and melancholy dictatorship of Rosas, to which no Argentine to-day likes to refer. The state of Buenos Aires once seceded from the Argentine nation, but never was supposed to be coextensive with it. The treaties between Great Britain and Spain of 1783 and 1786, far from requiring the English to give up (p. 117) their logwood-cutting "foothold," expressly confirmed it.

A popular impression no doubt prevailed and probably still prevails in the United States that the Hungarians, when they "rose against their masters . . . proclaimed a republic" (p. 121); but Dudley Mann, who was in Europe at the time, could scarcely have shared this impression, nor did he get nearer

"the scene" than Vienna. The release of Koszta was not demanded (p. 123) because he had lived in the United States two years and "filed his first papers." A singular injustice is done to Marcy in classing him (p. 134) with those who supported the "Ostend Manifesto" and sought to "browbeat" Spain into the sale of Cuba, or (p. 140) with those who pursued a "radical and aggressive" policy towards Central America; for he publicly punctured the "Manifesto," brought about Soule's resignation by frustrating his machinations at Madrid, and strongly opposed and resented the recognition of the Walker-Rivas government in Nicaragua. The controversy as to the Danish sound dues was adjusted by Marcy, not by Cass (p. 139), the United States accepting, in the treaty signed but not negotiated by Cass, the terms arranged by the European conference. Marcy's feeling toward the Declaration of Paris of 1856, far from being "muddled" (p. 139), proceeded from a perfectly clear conception of the problem. "Solana" Bay (p. 151) should be "Samana." The call for the Pan-American Conference in 1888 can hardly be treated as "one of the few indications that President Cleveland was interested in Latin America" (p. 189), his want of sympathy in this instance being pointedly attested by permitting the bill to become a law without his signature. Uruguay, instead of being unrepresented (p. 189), had a delegate in the conference from October 2, 1889, till February 10, 1890. Among the tangible results of the conference may be mentioned not only the Bureau of the American Republics (p. 190), but the Intercontinental Railway Commission, the record of whose surveys and other work, down to 1898, may be found in the general report, in seven volumes, made in that year, while the late A. J. Cassatt was president of the commission. Between 1859 and 1892 there were several occasions when "hostilities with a Latin-American neighbor" (p. 191) were threatened. The claims against Venezuela in 1903 were not submitted to the Hague Court (p. 231); only the question of preferential payment was so referred. So far as concerns order and stability, greater discrimination is due (p. 249) to the governments of Latin America. Calvo was an Argentine, not a Brazilian (pp. 245, 262). The "pacific blockade" (p. 277) of Venezuelan ports in 1903 was soon converted into a hostile blockade.

ANGLO-AMERICAN Isthmian DIPLOMACY, 1815-1915.

By MARY WILHELMINE WILLIAMS, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of History, Goucher College. Washington, American Historical Association; London, Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1916. Pp. ix, 392.

The excellence of the work done in this volume is attested by the fact that the Justin Winsor Prize in American History for 1914 was awarded to the author on account of it. It is indeed the most important exposition, historically speaking, of the subject to which it relates. For the first time, by reason of the use of manuscripts in the Public Record Office in London and the Department of State at Washington, but particularly of those in London, the actual course of the negotiation of the celebrated Clayton-Bulwer Treaty is disclosed. In one place (p. 102) the author speaks of Clayton as having been guilty of "indirection," and elsewhere represents him as having shown a want of what we may call steadiness in the conduct of the transaction. It is not implied, however, that he overreached his adversaries in the negotiations. All the proofs combine to show how ardent was his desire to make a treaty which should on the one hand be approved by the United States Senate, and which should on the other hand be the means of averting a collision with Great Britain. The latter motive seems indeed to have been the overruling one, and to such an extent was it influential that it produced results in phraseology that came near defeating Clayton's main object.

This circumstance and the train of events connected with it render appropriate certain comments which by no means affect the accuracy or thoroughness of the author's investigations but relate rather to historical perspective. On a certain occasion a public speaker, when asked to give reasons for his demand for a "big navy," replied that he "desired to be in the fashion." By analogy, we may say that there seems to be a certain historical "atmosphere" which is supposed to be essential to the discussion of the diplomacy of Pierce's administration, to say nothing of that of Buchanan. A certain depreciation should, it seems, characterize it: a suspicion of aggressiveness, especially in the interest of the "slave power," should always attend it; and to this should be added, for seasoning, just a dash of assumed demagoguery. On any other supposition, how are we to explain the fact that, while the language of Pierce's message of 1855 is admitted to have been temperate, there should be found, in the "determination not to yield on either the recruiting difficulty or the dispute over Central America," a "hostile note"? And how, on any other supposition, is the statement to be ex-

plained that the "compromise," effected under Buchanan in 1860, was "an unequal one, for Great Britain conceded the more"? For it must be borne in mind that the author rejects as an afterthought and unfounded Great Britain's claim that the restrictive clauses of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty were wholly prospective. Had this construction at the time been suspected, it is hardly conceivable that an American Secretary of State would have signed the treaty, or that a single vote could have been secured for it in the United States Senate. In explanation of the British claim, and of the British forward movements after the treaty was made, we may indeed in fairness take into account the enterprises of the filibusters, and the suspicions which they naturally served to engender; but this is far from justifying an imputation of unfriendliness either to Pierce and Marcy or to Buchanan and Cass. While it is true that Marcy was not easily intimidated, and was not inclined to yield clear rights under the stress of threats, he sincerely desired to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain on the basis of mutual respect. His disposition in this regard is clearly exemplified by the reciprocity treaty of 1854, which was largely his handiwork. As for Buchanan, who, for reasons generally understood, to a great extent personally conducted the diplomacy of his own administration, his desire to preserve the most cordial relations with Great Britain is amply attested. Ten years earlier, as Secretary of State, his reluctance to force the issue with that government in the Oregon controversy caused Polk to regard him as "timid." Of the essential friendliness of his attitude there can be no doubt.

In the author's preface, it is stated that chapter X, which embraces the latest phases of the tolls question and even advert's to what is called the "new Monroe Doctrine," covers a period too recent for satisfactory treatment. The facts are, however, pretty well known, and future investigations will not add anything that is requisite to a judgment upon the questions involved. But, should further disclosures be made, they can hardly justify stronger expressions than the author has used in condemnation of the diplomacy of the United States in the matter. We are indeed advised that the reply of Mr. Knox to the British protest was "evasive and in its arguments unsound," so that it did not have "the undivided support of the nation." The latter test we may reject as inconclusive, in view not only of the popular reception accorded to President Wilson's address to Congress of March 5, 1914, but also of the circumstance that Congress, in eventually granting a reluctant repeal of the exemption of coastwise vessels, reaffirmed the right of the United States in the premises. A more intelligent

understanding of the subject would, besides, have been assured if the author had pointed out the particulars in which Mr. Knox's note was "evasive" and "unsound." Had this been done, the fact should have appeared that the position of the British government was not what it seems to be supposed to have been. The British government did not in fact allege that it would have suffered any wrong if the tolls schedule had actually gone into operation and American coastwise vessels had been exempted from the payment of dues. The precise claim was that all vessels should be included in the aggregate tonnage on which the rate of tolls was computed; and this had in reality been done. The protest of the British government was based upon the circumstance that the language of the act of 1912 was broad enough to permit the government of the United States to omit its coastwise vessels from the computation of rates, in case it should at some future time see fit to do so. In other words, the protest was in effect a reservation made with reference to a future contingency. It is, therefore, not strange that the British government, after receiving Mr. Knox's reply, did not continue the correspondence.

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L'ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL CHEZ LES HELÈNES. *Par A. RAEDER. Publications de l'Institut Nobel Norvégien.* Tome I. Kristiania, H. Aschehoug & Company (W. Nygaard), 1912. 324 pp.

The author of this work in his introduction remarks that the more international arbitration is employed the more reason there is to hope that modern societies will find in it the means of practically solving the difficulties that arise between nations. At the present moment this hope seems to have been discredited. It is just now the fashion to speak of arbitration as an inadequate, ineffective process. In reality, however, the popular disrepute into which international arbitration has temporarily fallen is due not to dissatisfaction with the results but to the refusal or neglect to resort to it. Nations, like individuals, have the choice between trial by judges and "trial by battle"; and on the part of nations the freedom of choice is less restrained because no form of organization has as yet been found by which the physical force in a populous and highly developed country can be held in check as effectually as can that of the individual in a populous and organized community. But

the fact that nations in a particular instance go to war may indicate not that the dispute was incapable or even difficult of judicial or other amicable solution, but simply that one or both of the contestants preferred to take the chance of obtaining by force what justice could not concede. The difficulty was not in the nature of the question but in the disposition of the disputants.

Precisely the same phenomena are seen in the history of arbitration among the Greeks. They understood the theory of arbitration with perfect clearness, and they carried it practically to a high stage of development; but the fact that they used it successfully, and with more or less method, did not prevent them from casting it aside when popular passions moved them to do so. Mr. Raeder has industriously collected and systematically arranged all the cases of Hellenic arbitration which modern investigations have disclosed. The results are instructive. He gives eighty-one examples of arbitrations and agreements to arbitrate. Nor did the autonomous Greek states invariably refuse to extend the process to their relations with other countries.

It is only in recent years that the facts in regard to arbitration among the Greeks have come to light sufficiently to enable the student to treat the subject in a philosophical manner. This end has been attained by the study of inscriptions, which are the chief source of information on the subject. By this means the details of numerous arbitral decisions have been disclosed with such fulness as to show the procedure employed and the formalities observed. In bringing together and summarizing the results attained in this field of research, Mr. Raeder has performed a useful and helpful service.

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A CHINESE APPEAL TO CHRISTENDOM CONCERNING CHRISTIAN MISSIONS. *By LIN SHAO-YANG.* New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1911. Pp. iv, 321.

Under a Chinese pseudonym, an Englishman, named R. F. Johnston, long resident in China, presents in this volume the case against the religious proselytism of Christian missionaries in that country. Fundamentally there is, as he maintains, a want of mutual understanding. Europeans complain that the Chinese character is inscrutable; the Chinese, on the other hand, find much that is baffling and mysterious in western thought, character, and ideals. Particularly is this the case,

says the author, in regard to Christian missions and the activity of their propagandism in the Far East at a time when, in lands professedly Christian, the basal principles of the faith are subject to open and persistent attack by historical and scientific investigators. In this relation he remarks :

It seems strange to those of us who are familiar with the religious situation in Europe that, while unbelief is rapidly spreading among all classes of their own people, missionaries yet go forth in ever-increasing numbers to preach the gospel to the heathen. Do they propose to convert China and then wait for the Chinese to reconvert the West?

Pursuing the argument in this strain, the author expresses the belief that no form of western religion, not "consistent with itself and in harmony with modern thought," will find a permanent home on Chinese soil. Missionaries can, he contends, succeed in China only when they show by their conduct that western civilization at its best is "not necessarily aggressive and truculent in the material concerns of life, and not necessarily bigoted and hysterical in matters spiritual." He admits that missionaries are not all of the same type; that, while some of them may be described as "corybantic," others are decorous and considerate of the feelings of the people; that a large proportion of those now in China are engaged in educational and medical work, and that these are received with marks of friendship in a very large number of towns and districts.

In the course of his discussion, the author treats of monasticism in China, revivalist methods and emotional religion, the problem of evil, Christian demonology, hell and the damnation of heathen, prayer, faith and telepathy, science and prayer, Christian ethics and social prejudices, magic and word-spells, and churches, church-bells, and hymns. He compares and contrasts eastern and western civilization, and concludes with a critical examination of the effects of western education in China. What he specially dreads is the activity of reformers, Chinese or otherwise, who would create a bridgeless chasm between the Old China and the New. He believes the secret of Japan's success to lie in the fact that, in spite of her full acceptance of western teaching and example in politics and in science, she never cut wholly adrift from her social, moral and religious traditions and ideas. He would have the Chinese pursue the same course, so that, while progressing in material things, and learning to construct shipyards, battleships, mills, railways, telegraphs and aeroplanes, they may preserve their æsthetic, moral and religious qualities.

Soon after the present work was published, a question was

raised by a reviewer as to whether the book was entitled to any consideration, since the author's Chinese pseudonym was a disguise for a western writer. This issue the author and his publishers did not hesitate to meet by avowing his English nationality. In a letter in *The Spectator* of London, September 23, 1911, the author, still preserving his Chinese pseudonym, stated that he had traveled in sixteen out of eighteen provinces of China; that he had journeyed from Tibet in the west to Formosa and the Luchu Island in the east, and from Chosen in the north to Burma, Siam and French Indo-China in the south; that he had met all ranks of Chinese from imperial princes and viceroys to chair coolies and dung-gatherers; that he had been the guest of governors of provinces in their yamens and of Buddhist monks in their monasteries; and that, having thus studied the literature, character and intellectual tendencies of the people, their manners and their religious and social ideas and observances, he regarded himself as being qualified to interpret their views even under a Chinese pseudonym. The question thus raised, except so far as it might involve the author's qualifications as an expert, does not appear in the present instance to be vitally important. The perusal of only a few pages of the book convinced the present reviewer that the Chinese name was only a *nom de plume*, which, although it may have been designed to attract attention, was also intended to emphasize the claim that the view presented was essentially that of a Chinese person. No doubt shameless impostures are often put upon the market for the purpose of deceiving the public. Imaginary conversations are narrated; places never visited and persons never seen are described with an air and profession of familiarity. Frauds of this character, which are by no means confined to those who avoid the disclosure of their identity, should be unreservedly condemned. The present volume could be placed in such a category only if it were shown that the places and things described, the passages quoted and the authorities cited had been falsified. The employment by an author of a *nom de plume* suggestive of the point of view he maintains is by no means unprecedented, and, apart from other proofs of intent to mislead, will of itself hardly suffice for the condemnation of a work as false and spurious.

A GREAT PEACEMAKER: *The Diary of JAMES GALLATIN, Secretary to ALBERT GALLATIN, 1813-1827. With an introduction by VISCOUNT BRYCE.* New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915. Pp. xiii, 314.

The editor of this volume is Count Albert Gallatin, of London, England, a great-grandson of the "Great Peacemaker," Albert Gallatin. The impression, however, seems just now to prevail that the time has passed when a book can stand before the public on its own merits. Some well-known person must become sponsor for it by signing his name to an "introduction." Two "introductions" are in some instances evidently supposed to be better. This may happen even where the name of the author himself might be assumed sufficiently to avouch the merits of his performance. On the present occasion Viscount Bryce amiably conducts the performers to the footlights, and in the space of three pages gives us an intimation of what we are to see and hear. The ruling figure is, as he says, the diarist's "illustrious father," Albert Gallatin, "a singularly reserved and to strangers cold and even austere man, the product of generations of Calvinist ancestors, an aristocrat by sentiment, and though by conviction a stern republican, yet under no illusions as to the weak sides of democracy."

In reality, two formal lives of Albert Gallatin have been published in the United States, one of them being in the "American Statesmen Series," and to students of the earlier history of the United States there is no name better known than his. Although Viscount Bryce (perhaps regarding this as proceeding from the "weak sides of democracy") states that Albert Gallatin "did not in his own day receive from the general American public the credit which his disinterestedness as well as his abilities deserved," yet it must be confessed that he did not fare badly. The career of a man of alien birth, aristocratic descent and cold demeanor, who, while speaking the language of his adopted country with a pronounced foreign accent, served in the constitutional convention and repeatedly in the legislature of Pennsylvania, was elected to the Senate of the United States before he had reached the age of legal eligibility, sat repeatedly in the national House of Representatives, became secretary of the treasury at the age of forty and held the place for twelve years, discharged numerous first-class diplomatic missions abroad, and who, although he declined the post of secretary of state and still another cabinet position and withdrew from a nomination for the vice-presidency, was for thirty-five years almost continuously in public life, may more fitly be taken as proof of a certain democratic tenderness to-

ward aristocrats, where they are not too numerous and are fairly well behaved, than as an example of popular neglect. It is also stated that Gallatin's wife, the diarist's mother, whom Gallatin, before his marriage with her, described as "sensible, well-informed, good-natured," was "a typical New Englander of that time, altogether well-regulated, and so loyal to her Puritan piety" that she refused to attend court functions in Paris on Sunday. Although this statement may fairly be assumed to have passed muster with the lady's great-grandson, the editor, it is proper to remark that the writer of the introduction, with his intimate knowledge of the United States, could not, if he had been furnished with the facts, have spoken of her as a New-Englander and a Puritan, since her family belonged to Maryland and Virginia, her father being Commodore James Nicholson, commander of the famous frigate *Trumbull*, who was a native of Chestertown, Maryland. Two of her sisters married in Maryland, and yet another in Georgia.

The diary, as the title of the volume indicates, begins with Gallatin's peace mission to Europe in 1813, and follows him through the negotiation of the Treaty of Ghent, his first mission to England, his mission to France, and his second mission to England. On all these occasions he rendered services of the greatest value, his learning, depth of understanding, keen intelligence, and thorough mastery of every subject with which he dealt, to say nothing of his social accomplishments, giving him a position of singular pre-eminence; and it is needless to say that he came into contact with the leaders of the time in European politics and society, who pass in review in these pages.

On one occasion it appears that Gallatin lost some of his austerity. In 1821, while minister at Paris, he accidentally became acquainted with the secret Trianon decree of August 5, 1810, which, if it had not been kept from the public, would, as he believed, have prevented the United States from taking the ground which ultimately led to the War of 1812. His feelings on making the discovery were already known from a letter which he wrote to John Quincy Adams. But, says the diarist: "Never before have I seen my father so angry; he absolutely lost control of himself and used the strongest language." This incident, it may be remarked, is only one of the many illustrations which history affords, of the danger of assuming that contemporary diplomatic documents, put out by belligerent governments for purposes of attack or defense, furnish to neutrals a sufficient basis for final historical judgments. I say "to neutrals," for can it be supposed that belligerent governments, while themselves engaged in publishing what suits their

own purposes, will found their views on what is published by their adversaries?

We are informed by the editor that the text of the diary is offered to the public only "after weeding out large portions and suppressing anything that might offend." As the nature of the large portions weeded out is not disclosed, the effect of their excision on the historical value of the record remains an open question. In the suppression of what might offend, some discrimination would seem to have been practised. If certain passages that have been published are to be received as falling within the category of what is personally inoffensive, a few examples of matter regarded as offensive might have afforded diversion as well as illumination.

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THE FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO. *By T. Lothrop Stoddard.* Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914. Pp. xviii, 410.

This volume has a certain timeliness which its author could not have definitely foreseen. Narrating, as it does, the story of the achievement of the independence of San Domingo, it appeared on the eve of the occupation of Haiti by the United States forces in 1915. This last act perhaps serves to mark the culmination of a series of events that followed the dramatic session of the French Convention on February 3, 1794, when three deputies from San Domingo—a white, a mulatto, and a negro—were admitted to seats in it. The white delegate naturally attracted little notice, but, as the official record tells us, the "black features of Bellay and the yellow face of Mills" excited "long and repeated applause." The "aristocracy of the skin" was declared to be "at last doomed." The president of the convention, obedient to a motion that was "carried with loud applause," received the three deputies with the "fraternal kiss." A moment later, slavery, wherever it might exist in French territory, was abolished by acclamation. At this point attention was called to the fact that a "citizeness of color," who had regularly been present at the sittings, had fainted from joy, a fact that was ordered to be entered in the minutes as a "recognition of her civic virtues."

To those familiar with the history of Reconstruction in the United States, such scenes may suggest a difference in manners rather than in fundamental assumptions. In San Do-

mingo, the political, social and climatic conditions were all favorable to the success of such a revolution as actually took place. When, after the overthrow of French authority in the island, Napoleon sought to re-establish the French power, malaria and yellow fever came to the aid of the former slaves, now wrought into a frenzy by the attempt to restore them to a servile condition, and delayed the work of reconquest till the British blockade assured the victory of the blacks under Des-salines. In October, 1904, this energetic but remorseless leader, after having proclaimed the independence of the country under its Indian name of "Haiti," crowned himself as emperor; and in the following year, he completed his triumph by the massacre of the whites, of whom it was estimated that scarcely a score were left alive. As Dr. Stoddard observes: "The black State of Haiti had begun its troubled history."

At this point the volume closes. Its pages bear the marks of painstaking and intelligent research. The story of the revolution is told in ample detail. The impression is indeed sometimes given of an almost excessive anxiety lest some of the facts which the author had carefully gathered might not be duly set forth or might escape the reader's recollection. Perhaps a greater confidence in the reader's memory might have conducted to the continuity of the narrative and to the avoidance of occasional repetitions. But these are minor considerations as compared with the substantial merits of the contribution which the author has made to the history of a political and social upheaval, the results of which, although it seemed for a long while to have been almost forgotten, continue now and then to force themselves upon the attention of the world.

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OPINION ON THE LEGAL POSITION OF THE UNITED
STATES BRANCHES OF FOREIGN INSURANCE COM-
PANIES, THEIR LAWFUL CONTINUANCE IN BUSI-
NESS DURING WAR AND THE INTERESTS OF THEIR
POLICY HOLDERS¹

AS managers of the branch establishments which certain companies, incorporated abroad, have heretofore created and still maintain in the United States, for the purpose of carrying on, exclusively in this country, the business of insurance against loss by fire, marine and other hazards, you request my opinion as to the effect which the existence of a state of war between the United States and the country of original incorporation would have upon the continuance of your business and the interests of your policy holders.

It appears that the branches, of which you are the respective heads, were in each instance established in the United States in full compliance with the local law, and primarily with that of the State of New York; that your representative character, including your authority to bind the parent companies, is derived from powers of attorney which are expressly declared to continue in force even in case of war; that the trustees under the trust deeds, under which your funds in the United States are held, are, like yourselves, citizens and residents of the United States; that the branches in question are doing business in nearly all the States of the Union; that they are represented by about 8,000 agencies, many of which exclusively represent one of the branches named; that the number of your policy holders runs into the hundreds of thousands; that your funds are designed to be maintained exclusively for the protection of policy holders and creditors in the United States and are invested in conformity with the requirements of the local law; and that the branches are subject in all respects to the same supervision as American companies.

On this state of facts I beg leave to say that the answer to your inquiry is determined by the following well-settled principles.

1. The breaking out of war between two countries does not

1. Opinion given to the Committee, United States Branch Managers of Insurance Companies Incorporated Abroad. New York, March 22, 1917.

of itself terminate the legal capacity of citizens of the one country residing in the other to continue in the conduct of their business. On this point it suffices to cite the leading case of *Clark v. Morey* (1813),² in which objection was made to the maintenance of a suit by the plaintiff, on the ground that he was a British subject and an alien enemy. The opinion of the court was delivered by Chief Justice, afterwards Chancellor, Kent, who, after declaring it to be the established rule in England that "if the plaintiff came to England in time of peace, and remained there quietly, it amounted to a license, and that if he came over in time of war, and continued without disturbance, a license would be intended," declared that the plaintiff would be regarded as having permission to remain in the United States till ordered away, and said:

A lawful residence implies protection, and a capacity to sue and be sued. A contrary doctrine would be repugnant to sound policy, no less than to justice and humanity. . . . The right to sue, in such a case, rests on still broader ground than that of a mere municipal provision, for it has been frequently held that the law of nations is part of the common law. By the law of nations, an alien who comes to reside in a foreign country is entitled, so long as he conducts himself peaceably, to continue to reside here, under the public protection; and it requires the express will of the sovereign power to order him away. . . . And it has now become the sense and practice of nations, and may be regarded as the *public law of Europe*, . . . that the subjects of the enemy, (without confining the rule to merchants,) so long as they are permitted to remain in the country, are to be protected in their persons and property, and to be allowed to sue as well as to be sued.³ It is even held, that if they are ordered away, in consequence of the war, they are still entitled to leave a power of attorney, and to collect their debts by suit.⁴

The learned Chief Justice further adverted to the provisions of treaties, such as that between Great Britain and France of 1786, and that between the United States and Great Britain of 1794, expressly confirming to each other's citizens the privilege of remaining and continuing their business, notwithstanding war, so long as they behaved peaceably and committed no offence against the laws; and to the fact that such permission had frequently been announced in the very declaration of war.

Hall's statement⁵ that persons so remaining "are exonerated from the disabilities of enemies," and except as to intercourse with the enemy country, "are placed in the same position as

2. 10 Johns. (N.Y.), 69.

3. Bynk. Quaest. Jur. Pub. b.l., c.7, c.25, s 8.

4. Emérigon, *Traité des Assurances*, Tom. 1, 567.

5. *International Law* (6th ed.), p. 388.

other foreigners," has been sanctioned by recent judicial authority.⁶

It may be superfluous to remark that treaty stipulations expressly allowing to merchants a certain time after war for collecting and transporting their goods and merchandise are interpreted, not as limiting the privilege of residence, but as affirmatively assuring the continuance of the privilege for the term stated.

2. In harmony with the principle above mentioned is the further principle that the property of an alien enemy on land is not as such subject to seizure and confiscation. It was held by the Supreme Court of the United States during the War of 1812 that enemy property found on land could not be condemned without an act of Congress authorizing its seizure and confiscation.⁷ This decision was followed by the Supreme Court in cases arising out of the Civil War.⁸ The great principle underlying it was strictly observed by the United States during the War with Spain.

As was declared by Chief Justice Marshall, in a celebrated case:

It is very unusual, even in cases of conquest, for the conqueror to do more than to displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the country. The modern usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged if private property should be generally confiscated, and private rights annulled.⁹

On February 8, 1917, the Department of State at Washington issued the following notice:

It having been reported to him that there is anxiety in some quarters on the part of persons residing in this country who are the subjects of foreign states lest their bank deposits or other property should be seized in the event of war between the United States and a foreign nation, the President authorizes the statement that all such fears are entirely unfounded. The Government of the United States will in no circumstances take advantage of a state of war to take possession of property to which international understandings and the recognized law of the land give it no just claim or title. It will scrupulously respect all private rights alike of its own citizens and of the subjects of foreign states.

3. It has repeatedly been held in the United States, as well as in Great Britain, that belligerent or neutral character in

6. *Princess Thurn and Taxis v. Moffit*, 1915, 1 Ch. Div. 58, citing, also, *Wells v. Williams*, 1 Salk., 46.

7. 8 Cranch, 110.

8. *Conrad v. Waples*, 96 U. S., 279, 284.

9. *United States v. Percheman*, 7 Peters, 51, 86.

respect of business or commerce is determined not by political allegiance, but by domicil, which in commercial, as distinguished from civil, relations, signifies, not so much the place of one's permanent abode, as the place where the business or commerce has its seat and is carried on.¹⁰

One of the most eminent of recent authorities has set forth this distinction in the following terms:

The fundamental distinction between a civil and a commercial domicil is this: A civil domicil is such a permanent residence in a country as makes that country a person's home, and renders it, therefore, reasonable that his civil rights should in many instances be determined by the laws thereof. A commercial domicil, on the other hand, is such a residence in a country for the purposes of trading there as makes a person's trade or business contribute to or form part of the resources of such country, and renders it, therefore, reasonable that his hostile, friendly, or neutral character should be determined by reference to the character of such country.¹¹

The same principle has been forcibly stated by one of the judges in a comparatively recent case before the English Court of Appeal, as follows:

When considering questions arising with an alien enemy, it is not the nationality of a person, but his place of business during war that is important. . . . The subject of a State at war with this country, but who is carrying on business here or in a foreign neutral country, is not treated as an alien enemy; the validity of his contracts does not depend on his nationality, nor even on what is his real domicil, but on the place or places in which he carried on his business or businesses: *Wells v. Williams*, 1 Ld. Raym., 282; 1 Salk., 46. As observed by Sir William Scott in *The Yonge Klassina*, 5 Ch. Rob., 302-303, "a man may have mercantile concerns in two countries, and if he acts as a merchant of both he must be liable to be considered as a subject of both with regard to the transactions originating, respectively, in those countries."¹²

This statement above quoted from Lord Lindley's opinion has been adopted by the Court of King's Bench in a judgment rendered, during the present European war, in a case affecting the English branch of the Mannheim Insurance Company (incorporated in Germany), which had complied with the provisions of the Companies (Consolidation) Act of 1908. In this case the Court of King's Bench held that, except so far as the

10. 1 Kent Com., 75, and cases there cited.

11. Dicey, *Conflict of Laws* (2d ed.), 744, citing *The Danous*, 4 C. Rob., 255 (n); 1 Duer on Insurance, 494, 495, 520; 1 Kent (12th ed.), 75; *Tabbs v. Bendelack*, 4 Esp., 106, 108. See, also, Kent, *International Law* (Abdy ed. 1878), pp. 196-203.

12. Lord Lindley, in *Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines, Lim.*, L.R. (1902), A.C., 484, 505.

provisions of the Proclamation of October 8, 1914, expressly altered the situation, this branch was not in the situation of an alien enemy in respect of business transacted by it in England, Mr. Justice Bailhache, who read the judgment of the court, saying:

In the case of individuals and at common law the question whether a man is to be treated as an alien enemy for the purpose of his contracts, rights of suit, and the like, does not depend upon his nationality or even upon his true domicile, but upon whether he carries on business in this country or not. If he does, it is not illegal, even during war, to have business dealings with him in respect of the business which he carries on here. He is not in respect of that business divided by the war line, but has what is sometimes called a commercial domicile here. The same thing is true of companies, whose head-office is in Germany but which have a branch office here, in respect of business transactions with such branch office. The matter is discussed by Lord Lindley in *Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines*, (1902), A. C. at pp. 505, 506, and in the cases cited by him. In my judgment the defendant company did, upon the facts stated, so far carry on business through their underwriters here, as to prevent the application of the rules applicable to alien enemies from applying to business transacted with those underwriters, as this business in fact was.¹³

As an exposition of the law in England prior to certain enactments to which the present war has given rise, it is instructive to read, in the "Memorandum Concerning Aliens," issued by the British Treasury late in August, 1914, the following clause:

(3) If a firm with headquarters in hostile territory has a branch in neutral or British territory, trade with the branch is (apart from prohibitions in special cases) permissible, as long as the trade is *bona fide* with the branch, and no transaction with the head office is involved.¹⁴

So, by the Royal Proclamation of September 9, 1914, relating to Trading with the Enemy, it was declared that, "where an enemy has a branch locally situated in British" territory, "transactions by or with such branch shall not be treated as transactions by or with an enemy."¹⁵

4. But, it is evident that the branch establishments now in question have an American character far more precise and more permanent than that which is derived from an ordinary commercial domicil; that their local character and control are more definite and more substantial than that of the often shadowy "legal entity" which results, in the case of a foreign

13. *Ingle v. Mannheim Ins. Co.*, L.R. (1915), 1 K.B., 227.

14. *The Solicitors' Journal*, XXVIII (London, August 29, 1914), 795.

15. *Idem*, September 19, 1914.

corporation, from registration under the English Companies Act; and that they are to all intents and purposes domestic concerns.

This results from the legal requirements under which they are formed, supervised, and conducted, including the deposit of funds with trustees (citizens of the United States, approved by the Superintendent of Insurance) for the general benefit and security of policy holders and creditors in the United States, and the additional deposit with State authorities of prescribed funds also for the benefit of policy holders and (or) creditors in the particular State or in the United States, which funds cannot be released until all liabilities have been discharged. It may further be observed that by the law of New York, a foreign insurance company is not permitted to transact business unless it shall have deposited with the Insurance Department or with trustees \$500,000 invested in like manner as the capital of a similar domestic insurance corporation is required to be invested.

The status of branches such as those now under consideration was fully considered by the Court of Appeals of New York, more than forty years ago, in the case of a British insurance corporation, in which Chief Justice Church, delivering the opinion of the court, said:

The defendant sought and obtained the privilege of carrying on its business here under the regulations fixed by the statutes of this State. It established a permanent general agency, and conducted its business here as a distinct organization, and was permitted by law to do this in the same manner as domestic institutions. The business thus established and carried on in New York was designed to be confined to the United States and necessarily partook of the national character as a privileged business. Chancellor Kent, in his *Commentaries*, says: "The position is a clear one, that if a person goes into a foreign country and engages in trade there, he is by the law of nations to be considered a merchant of that country, and a subject for all civil purposes, whether that country be hostile or neutral."¹⁶ Nor is it invariably necessary that the residence be personal. While the general rule is that a principal transacting business in the ordinary way, through an agent, will not contract the character of a domiciled person, yet if the principal be trading not on the ordinary footing of a foreign trader, but as a privileged trader, such a privileged trade puts him on the same ground with their own subjects, and he would be considered as sufficiently invested with the national character by the residence of his agent.¹⁷

This contract was made in New York by authority of its laws. Although not stated in express terms that the premiums were to be

16. 1 Kent Com., 84.

17. *Idem.*

paid there, it is evident from the facts that the parties contemplated payment there, unless otherwise directed, for convenience of the assured, by the local board. The repayment of money borrowed was expressly provided to be made in New York, and the organization of a local board and the privileges granted by our laws, as well as the acts of the parties, including the notices above referred to, indicate that these contracts were to be made and performed there. It was essentially an independent American business, and would be treated as such, I have no doubt, if war existed between this Country and England.¹⁸

This case has since been followed in New York and elsewhere in the United States.¹⁹

It was no doubt in view of the law, as thus laid down, that former Superintendent of Insurance Hasbrouck, of New York, in a statement issued on the breaking out of the European war, said:

These branches (United States branches of foreign insurance companies) are to all intent and purposes American companies, amply protected by funds in the hands of American trustees and designed to protect American risks. Before a foreign company can do business in this country, a company must deposit sufficient funds to firmly establish the branch as an American company. The securities in which the company must invest are defined by a statute and are of such a character that they can be readily converted into cash in an emergency. The company must not only keep its deposit capital intact, but it must also be in possession of an adequate surplus and its American funds cannot be withdrawn as long as it has a risk upon its books.

And in conformity with the same view, the present Superintendent of Insurance, Mr. Phillips, published, on the occasion of the recent severance of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany, a statement concluding as follows:

These United States Branches are subject to the same supervision as American companies. Their funds in this country are designed to be maintained exclusively for the protection of policy holders and creditors in the United States, and investments are required to be of a character prescribed by statute for that purpose. In view of the fact that the figures quoted above show a material increase of net assets held by these United States branches since the beginning of the war, and a large increase of trustee funds, I feel warranted in stating, that, in my judgment, policy holders in these companies may have confidence in the protection which they furnish.

18. *Martine v. International Life Insurance Society* (1873), 53 N. Y., 339.

19. *Morgan v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co.* (1907), 189 N. Y., 447, and case there cited; *Matter of Wilcox* (1908), 123 Appellate Division, 86.

5. Even in ordinary cases, in which the person or company whose acts are in question does not hold a special or privileged position, contracts that do not involve intercourse between the countries at war are not forbidden or suspended.

Thus, where claimants of land in Pennsylvania, under contracts of purchase from the proprietaries (the Penns) before the Revolution, claimed an abatement of interest during war, it was decided:

A prohibition of all intercourse with an enemy, during the war, and the legal consequence resulting therefrom, as it respects debtors on either side, furnish a sound, if not in all instances, a just reason for the abatement of interest, until the return of peace. . . . But the rule can never apply in cases where the creditor, although a subject of the enemy, remains in the country of the debtor, or has a known agent there, authorized to receive the debt; because the payment to such creditor or his agent, could in no respect be construed into a violation of the duties imposed by a state of war, upon the debtor. The payment in such cases is not made to an enemy, and it is no objection, that the agent may possibly remit the money to his principal; if he should do so, the offence is imputable to him, and not to the person paying him the money.²⁰

While this case related to the receipt of payment of a debt, and the court specifically refers to that fact, the principle laid down is of wider application.

In a celebrated case arising during the Civil War, in which a citizen of Massachusetts, while residing in Mississippi, took a lease, in 1864, of a cotton plantation, the rent being payable partly in cash and partly in cotton, and some of the cotton was afterwards actually sent during the war to Massachusetts, it was contended that the lease was, by virtue of the non-intercourse act of 1861 and the President's proclamation thereunder, illegal and void. But the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in an opinion delivered by Judge Gray, later a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, unanimously held that the contract, since it was made between persons both at the time within the Confederate territory and to be performed there, was legal, and that, although the forwarding of the cotton to Massachusetts may have been unlawful, this could not affect the validity of the agreements contained in the lease, which neither involved nor contemplated the transmission of money or property or other communication between the belligerent territories. In setting forth the grounds of its decision, the court said:

The result is, that the law of nations, as judicially declared, prohibits all intercourse between citizens of the two belligerents which

20. *Conn v. Penn*, Peters C.C., 496, 524-525.

is inconsistent with the state of war between their countries; and that this includes any act of voluntary submission to the enemy or receiving his protection; as well as any act or contract which tends to increase his resources; and every kind of trading or commercial dealing or intercourse, whether by transmission of money or goods, or orders for the delivery of either, between the two countries, directly or indirectly, or through the intervention of third persons or partnerships, or by contracts in any form looking to or involving such transmission, or by insurance upon trade with or by the enemy. Beyond the principle of these cases the prohibition has not been carried by judicial decision. . . . At this age of the world, when all the tendencies of the law of nations are to exempt individuals and private contracts from injury or restraint in consequence of war between their governments, we are not disposed to declare such contracts unlawful as have not been heretofore adjudged to be inconsistent with a state of war.

The trading or transmission of property or money which is prohibited by international law is from or to one of the countries at war. An alien enemy residing in this country may contract and sue like a citizen.²¹ When a creditor, although a subject of the enemy, remains in the country of the debtor, or has a known agent there authorized to receive the amount of the debt, throughout the war, payment there to such creditor or his agent can in no respect be construed into a violation of the duties imposed by a state of war upon the debtor; it is not made to an enemy in contemplation of international or municipal law; and it is no objection that the agent may possibly remit the money to his principal in the enemy's country; if he should do so, the offence would be imputable to him, and not to the person paying him the money.²² The same reasons cover an agreement made in the enemy's territory to pay money there out of funds accruing there and not agreed to be transmitted from within our own territory; for, as was said by the supreme court of New York in the case last cited, "the rule is founded in public policy, which forbids, during the war, that money or other resources shall be transferred so as to aid or strengthen our enemies. The crime consists in exporting the money or property, or placing it in the power of the enemy."²³

The doctrines thus laid down have been adopted and repeatedly applied by the Supreme Court of the United States, and embody the American law on the subject.²⁴

Certain decisions in which life insurance contracts have been held to be suspended or abrogated by war have no application to the present case. The leading decision of this kind is that of

21. 2 Kent Com. 63.

22. *Conn v. Penn*, Peters C.C., 496; *Denniston v. Imbrie*, 3 Wash. C.C., 396; *Wurd v. Smith*, 7 Wallace, 447; *Buchanan v. Curry*, 10 Johns., 137.

23. *Kershaw v. Kelsey* (1868), 100 Mass., 561, 572, 573-574.

24. *Montgomery v. United States*, 15 Wallace, 395; *Briggs v. United States*, 143 U.S., 346; *Williams v. Paine*, 169 U.S., 55, 72-73.

Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U.S., 425, where a policy issued by a New York company on the life of a citizen of Virginia was held to be terminated; but in that case the premium was held to be payable in New York, and the company's agent in Virginia, who served as a channel for the transmission of receipts and premiums from one section to the other, declined, after the war broke out, to receive payment (1) because he had no receipt from the company, and (2) because, if he received the money, he apprehended that the Confederate government would seize and confiscate it. Soon afterwards he entered the Confederate Army and never resumed his agency; but the court, while holding that the performance of the contract, as it stood, would have involved intercourse between the hostile territories, cited *Conn v. Penn*, *supra*, as "the leading authority" in the United States on the continuance of agencies during war, and, after observing that the existence or continuance of an agency must not be presumed "contrary to the assent" of the parties, expressly declared:

We do not mean to say, that if the defendant had continued its authority to the agent to act in the receipt of premiums during the war, and he had done so, a payment or tender to him in lawful money of the United States would not have been valid; nor that a stipulation to continue such authority in case of war, made before its occurrence, would not have been a valid stipulation; nor that a policy of life insurance on which no premiums were to be paid, though suspended during the war, might not have revived after its close. We place our decision simply on the ground that the agency of Garland was terminated by the breaking out of the war, and that, although by the consent of the parties it might have been continued for the purpose of receiving payments of premiums during the war, there is no proof that such assent was given, either by the defendant or by Garland; but that, on the contrary, the proof is positive and uncontradicted, that Garland declined to act as agent.

In conformity with these views, various agencies existing between citizens of enemy countries under powers of attorney and otherwise have been held by the Supreme Court to continue during war. See, for example, *Briggs v. United States*, 143 U. S., 346, and *Williams v. Paine*, 169 U. S., 55.

The latter case related to a sale of land in Washington, D. C., during the Civil War, under a power of attorney given before the war to a citizen of Pennsylvania by the owner of the land, who afterwards went South and entered the Confederate service, and who was in that service when the land was sold. The court decided that the power was not revoked by the war, and therefore held the sale to be valid, although part of the purchase money was in fact subsequently sent across the lines into the Confederacy. Whether, said the court, an agency

was revoked by the fact of the breaking out of war, "depends upon the circumstances surrounding the case and the nature and character of the agency."²⁵

6. The law as set forth in the preceding part of this opinion is by no means peculiar to the United States.

On February 15, 1917, there appeared in the press a statement issued by the American Association of Commerce and Trade, in Berlin, saying: "No matter how the situation may develop, we believe that Americans in Germany, who conduct themselves properly and circumspectly, will have nothing to fear and will in no way be disturbed."

This statement is in conformity with German law, which, so far as regards civil relations, does not place alien enemies under special disabilities. Their legal rights are fully preserved, and it is lawful to contract with them, so long as intercourse with the enemy country is not involved.

Prior to the Ordinance of the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*), of September 4, 1914, which "was enacted by way of retaliation for the control [then lately] imposed by Great Britain over German banking and other institutions," no special measure was adopted in Germany, after the outbreak of the war for the supervision of foreign business undertakings in that country.²⁶

By that Ordinance, the central authorities of the different States of the Empire were authorized, so far as concerns establishments or branch establishments, domiciled in their jurisdiction, and which are under the direction or supervision of citizens of enemy countries, or whose production is destined in whole or in part to enemy nations, to name overseers who, while assuring the conservation of the right of property and other civil rights of the establishments or branch establishments, are to see to it that during the war the business is not carried on in a way prejudicial to German interests.

While the Ordinance forbids the transfer of money or valuable securities to the enemy nation, *it does not disturb the heads or the employees of the establishments or branches.*

The provisions of the Ordinance are expressly extended to insurance societies, with the direction that their supervision shall continue under the Department of Government which has heretofore supervised their business.²⁷

Further, it has been decided that, under German legislation, from the point of view of private law the citizens of an enemy state are to be protected in time of war just as in time of peace,

25. *Williams v. Paine*, 169 U.S., 55, 73-74.

26. *The Solicitors' Journal*, XXIX (London, October 31, 1914), 22-23.

27. *Journal du Droit International* (1915), pp. 77-78.

the Imperial Court, by a judgment rendered October 26, 1914, during the present war, holding:

The German law of nations does not admit the point of view of certain foreign codes, according to which war ought, from an economic point of view, to be prejudicial to the citizens of enemy States. It sets out, on the contrary, from the principle that war is made solely against the enemy State as such and its armies, and that the citizens of enemy States are, from the point of view of the civil law, assimilated to nationals in the same measure as they were before the war, in every matter save the exceptions prescribed by the law.

It has accordingly been held by the Imperial Court that citizens of enemy states retain the right to sue as well as to be sued in the German courts during the war.²⁸

7. For the reasons above explained, it is my opinion that your powers as managers would not be suspended, that the force of your policies would not be impaired, and that the continuance of your business, which has been conducted in full faith as to its permanency, would not be rendered unlawful by the fact of the existence of a state of war between the United States and the country of original incorporation.

JOHN HAY¹

IN order to define the limits of his task, Mr. Thayer at the outset declares that "this is a personal biography and not a political history," the reason being, as he declares, that "the time has not yet come when it would be proper to give the names of all witnesses and to cite by direct reference the official documents, as is required in a formal history." The phrase "official documents" is, we may assume, here intended to denote only documents that have not been published and are not as yet accessible to the historical investigator, since there could hardly be an objection to citing documents that have been made public. But in spite of the limits thus ostensibly set, Mr. Thayer has gone far beyond the revelation of personal traits, and has made averments of an historical character which, because they either exceed or are not in harmony with the public

28. *Idem*, pp. 785-791.

1. William Roscoe Thayer, *The Life and Letters of John Hay* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915). Two volumes: x, 456; 448 pp. Review reprinted from the *Political Science Quarterly*, XXXII, No. 1 (March, 1917), 119-125.

official record, can scarcely be held exempt from the usual and reasonable requirement of proof.

The statement, for example, that the "allies," Germany, Great Britain and Italy, "sent warships and established" a pacific blockade of Venezuelan ports on December 8, 1901; that "during the following year Secretary Hay tried to persuade the blockaders of the unwisdom of their action" and "urged arbitration"; that on December 8, 1902, Germany deeming that "her opportunity had now come," "she and Great Britain severed diplomatic relations with Venezuela, making it plain that the next steps would be the bombardment of towns and the occupation of territory," and that "here came a test of the Monroe Doctrine"—all these statements as to a series of public events, their order, significance and treatment, it would seem to be entirely proper to substantiate, since the version given is at variance with the authentic official record published by the United States and by other governments fourteen years ago.

The facts, as they appear of record, are that President Roosevelt, in his annual message of December 3, 1901, defined the Monroe Doctrine as "a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil," at the same time expressly affirming that the United States did "not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power"; that on December 11, 1901, the German ambassador at Washington, in a promemoria reviewing the German claims against Venezuela and the latter's refusal to admit diplomatic interposition in the matter, stated that, if Venezuela should persist in this refusal, the German government, after delivering an ultimatum, would have to consider as a measure of coercion the blockade of the more important Venezuelan ports and, if this did not suffice, their "temporary occupation" and the "levying of duties" therein, but especially declared "that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory"; that Mr. Hay, on December 16, 1901, quoting in his note President Roosevelt's definition of December 3, replied that the President, "appreciating the courtesy of the German government in making him acquainted" with the situation, but "not regarding himself as called upon to enter into the consideration of the claims in question," believed that "no measures" would be taken which were "not in accordance with the well-known purpose" of the

German Emperor, as set forth in the promemoria;² that no measure of coercion was taken till a year later, when Germany, Great Britain and Italy instituted a blockade of certain Venezuelan ports; that Great Britain gave an assurance, similar to that of Germany, regarding the permanent occupation of territory; that the powers concerned, long prior to any blockade, repeatedly asked for arbitration; that the blockade which was instituted only in December 1902, ended on February 14-15, 1903, after President Castro's abandonment of his previously persistent refusal to arbitrate; that, after the severance of relations between the blockading powers and Venezuela, the minister of the United States at Caracas, with the permission of his government and the assent of Venezuela, took charge of British and German interests in that country; that the Permanent Court at The Hague, in eventually deciding, in a suit to which the United States was a party, that the blockading powers had acquired a right to preferential payment of their claims, based its decision expressly upon the ground, among others, that the non-blockading powers, including the United States, had never, pending the employment of measures of coercion, protested against the assertion by the blockaders of a right to special securities; and that the court, in the course of its decision, particularly adverted to the fact that, prior to the blockade, the Venezuelan government "categorically refused to submit its dispute with Germany and Great Britain to arbitration, which was proposed several times, and especially by the note of the German government of July 16, 1901."³

Of the blockade and its ending, and of his own part in the transaction, President Roosevelt gave, in a speech at Chicago, April 2, 1903, the following account, which is in entire harmony with the record:

The concern of our government was of course not to interfere needlessly in any quarrel so far as it did not touch our interests or our honor, and not to take the attitude of protecting from coercion any power unless we were willing to espouse the quarrel of that power, but to keep an attitude of watchful vigilance and see that there was no infringement of the Monroe Doctrine, no acquirement of territorial rights by a European power at the expense of a weak sister republic—whether this acquisition might take the shape of an outright and avowed seizure of territory or of the exercise of control which would in effect be equivalent to such seizure.⁴ . . . Both powers assured us in explicit terms that there was not the slightest

2. *Foreign Relations*, 1901, pp. 192, 195.

3. *Idem*, 1904, p. 507.

4. President Roosevelt here read the interchanges with Germany and Great Britain, above mentioned.

intention on their part to violate the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and this assurance was kept with an honorable good faith which merits full acknowledgment on our part. At the same time, the existence of hostilities in a region so near our own borders was fraught with such possibilities of danger in the future that it was obviously no less our duty to ourselves than our duty to humanity to endeavor to put an end to that. Accordingly, by an offer of our good services in a spirit of frank friendliness to all the parties concerned, a spirit in which they quickly and cordially responded, we secured a resumption of peace—the contending parties agreeing that the matters which they could not settle among themselves should be referred to The Hague Tribunal for settlement.⁵

It may be further pointed out that, pending the blockade, Mr. Hay, on February 17, 1903, quoting President Roosevelt's definition of the Monroe Doctrine in the annual message of December 3, 1901, expressly declined to commit the United States to the Drago declaration "that the public debt cannot occasion armed intervention nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power."

These are facts of public record which cannot be effaced or altered.

No doubt the present work is entertaining. It is full of spirit and vivacity, is light of touch, often suggests a dash of waywardness, and is characterized by a strong play of personal feeling, indulged freely and without restraint. Moreover, in spite of the neglect of "official documents," the author may fairly claim to have done copious justice to the tendency to mental effervescence which his interesting subject, even when holding high official station, was wont to indulge, in familiar conversation and in writings which, though strictly personal and confidential, were "racy and fresh with idiomatic graces." But, whether the measure thus given of the man is adequate, and whether it will redound to Hay's fame as a statesman to create the impression that personal attachments and antipathies, extravagantly and often humorously expressed in the privacy of intimate correspondence, really animated his policies and controlled his public conduct, are questions which those who knew Hay and were attached to him may not be ready to answer offhand in the affirmative. Transactions in which Germany was concerned were not the only ones with which Hay dealt. The Hay-Pauncefote treaty, relating to the inter-oceanic canal, is one in the negotiation of which Germany was not concerned, and the attacks upon it did not come distinctively from German and Irish sources. And yet, how stands the matter upon the present page? The fact is well known that the

5. *Addresses and Presidential Messages of Theodore Roosevelt, 1902-1904.* pp. 117-120.

treaty encountered opposition in the Senate, where it was materially amended. The questions involved were questions concerning which men may legitimately differ; but, as an indication of Hay's attitude, we are furnished with a personal letter to our ambassador in London, in which a "curious state of things" is said to exist among the senatorial "kickers," of whom two are "howling lunatics," another is divorcing his wife, two are fighting for their re-election, another has *delirium tremens*, another has broken his ribs, and another has the grippe, while yet another has gone to New York on "private business."⁶ No wonder, such being his apparent frame of mind, that Hay, according to another selected revelation, should have fancied that the United States was "compelled to refuse the assistance of the greatest power in the world (Great Britain), *in carrying out our own policy*, because all Irishmen are Democrats and some Germans are fools."⁷ Nevertheless, the final verdict rendered by Mr. Thayer reads thus: "We can see, however, that they [Hay's 'kickers,' 'lunatics,' ineptites, etc.] were wiser than he." In view of this adverse judgment, a serious exposition, somewhere, of the terms of the treaty and of the principle on which it was founded, would not have been out of place.

Nor are Hay's unfavorable expressions here disclosed in regard to foreign powers by any means confined to one power. Great Britain almost alone escapes. France "is Russia's harlot —to her own grievous damage."⁸ A memorandum handed in by the Russian ambassador, "like everything from that country has a false bottom."⁹ As a supposed revelation of the real thoughts and feelings of one very recently entrusted with the conduct of American foreign policy, these phrases, though not taken from "official documents," must be highly interesting, and may be highly illuminating to the governments concerned. Perhaps no harm can now come to the United States from the publication of the view that the American public was "idiotic" in "snivelling over" the "bravery" of the Boers, or of the hope that England would "make quick work of Uncle Paul," even though Mr. Thayer vouchsafes an intimation that the Boer's "baffling resistance to enormously superior British forces was not properly admired by the Secretary."¹⁰

As to Hay's policy regarding China, we are left in some doubt. In one place, his quick assumption that the powers had

6. II, 225-226.

7. II, 235.

8. II, 234.

9. II, 235.

10. II, 221, 232, 231.

agreed to what they had not accepted is lauded as "one of the most adroit strokes of modern diplomacy";¹¹ but is later called "a magnificent bluff."¹² And it is admitted that neither the phrase "open door" nor the principle it denotes originated in the United States. There are indeed certain phases of Hay's treatment of the Chinese question that are perhaps more entitled to consideration, as affecting his character and reputation, than the fragile assumption above mentioned, the effect of which was not so pronounced or so durable as is sometimes supposed.

As Hay received his appointment as ambassador to England and as secretary of state from President McKinley, the latter necessarily figures to some extent in the present work; but Mr. Thayer's allusions to him are uniformly depreciatory and unfavorable. Freely admitting, as we must do, that McKinley, hailing from the new country called Ohio, west of the Alleghanies, may never have acquired that "Parisian culture" which a French journal declined in 1889 to accord to Buffalo Bill's Indians, and that he may never have assumed, by reason of residence in London, that air of superiority which enabled Henry James, in alluding to the friendly throng that welcomed Hay at Southampton, most intelligently and profoundly to inquire as to the impression made upon his mind by "these insects creeping about and saying things to you," we may still be unable to accept as satisfactory a characterization of McKinley as a "politician" lacking "intellectual force," who, knowing the "potency of words," had the art of "throwing a moral gloss over policies which were dubious, if not actually immoral, . . . with a sort of self-deceiving sincerity," and who exhibited in his conduct the showmanlike instincts of Barnum.¹³ Testing this judgment by the record, we venture little in saying that the finest thing in the present volumes is McKinley's letter of March 13, 1900, returning the resignation which Hay, hurt and weary, placed in his hands when the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported the canal treaty adversely. Generously assuming entire responsibility for the treaty, and declaring that he would himself "cheerfully bear whatever criticism or condemnation may come," McKinley declared: "We must bear the atmosphere of the hour. . . . Conscious of high purpose and honorable effort, we cannot yield our posts however the storm may rage." This was not written for the public eye. It was simply in keeping with what Hay had found to be McKinley's general attitude on foreign questions—a desire to do

11. II, 243.

12. II, 247.

13. II, 136-137, 139, 141.

that which was best for the country, "without regard to its effect upon himself" and his political fortunes.¹⁴

It seems hardly material, in discussing a life of John Hay, to notice the author's statement that the Republican national platform of 1896, "thanks to the efforts of some eastern delegates, declared in favor of a gold standard."¹⁵ In reality there is substantial testimony that the committee on resolutions held that position by a majority of 38 to 13, while of the sub-committee to draft the platform all the western members but one were in favor of a gold declaration.

Nor is McKinley alone in being the subject of depreciatory comment. In spite of the fact that Hay is quoted as speaking of the Canadian claim in the Alaskan boundary dispute as "ridiculous and preposterous,"¹⁶ it is intimated that the selection as British arbitrator of Lord Alverstone, who decided against the claim, "may not have been fortuitous,"¹⁷ and this is followed up with the statement that the British government, being apprehensive as to what President Roosevelt might do, chose "Lord Alverstone, who, as it turned out, supported the American claim."¹⁸ This insinuation is not new, but it was denounced by Lord Alverstone as false when it first appeared; and this denunciation he afterwards repeated in his autobiography, in which he affirms that he acted "purely in a judicial capacity" and that he was influenced by nothing but a sense of duty to his position.¹⁹ Lord Alverstone obviously is entitled to the benefit of the fact that he made this direct disclaimer.

After the advent of President Roosevelt, Hay is more than once made to appear as succumbing to the more "vigorous" views of his new chief; and it is represented that, in the Alaskan boundary matter, President Roosevelt thought his attitude "indecisive, if not actually timid."²⁰ On this occasion no writing of Hay's is cited, nor indeed is any authority adduced. The case is the same with the statement (p. 286) that at a certain point in the Venezuelan matter, "the direction of American policy passed from Secretary Hay to President Roosevelt." If it be true that Hay was unequal to emergencies, it is no part of his biographer's duty to conceal the fact; but, of statements repeatedly implying that such a defect existed, one may justly expect to find, especially in a "personal" biography, some substantiation.

14. Hay to Choate, August 18, 1899, II, 219-220.

15. II, 149.

16. II, 205.

17. II, 208.

18. II, 210-211.

19. *Recollections of Bar and Bench*, pp. 240-241.

20. II, 208.

While, to the pseudo-intelligent and superficial reader, the titillant quality of much of the matter embraced in the present volumes may be highly satisfying, it is probable that the eventual estimate of Hay as a man and a statesman will be determined by readers of another type and caliber. In the light of this probability, one can scarcely avoid the inquiry whether Hay would have regarded his ebullient private utterances as an accurate reflex of his personality and capacity, and whether the student of his career should so regard them. If he looked upon them as the eventual public embodiment of his inner thoughts and feelings, then, being himself a highly sensitive man, he may justly share the consequences with those (sometimes very old friends) to whom he did not seek to mitigate the sting, and, so far as his public conduct is concerned, may stand or fall by the deliberate self-revelation of his own foibles and limitations. The writer of the present review, although he cannot claim to have had with Mr. Hay a long and close acquaintance, happened to be thrown with him at certain junctures when he was under much stress, as in the summer of 1900; and the impression then formed of him, of his character, both public and personal, and of what he did and tried to do, was more serious and more favorable than the present account, in which some important transactions are scarcely noticed, would justify.

ADDRESS AT SEMI-CENTENNIAL (1865-1915)

ANNIVERSARY DINNER OF THE NATION

IT is now nearly sixty-four years since the founder of *The Nation*, Edwin Lawrence Godkin, who was then proceeding, as correspondent of the London *Daily News*, to the seat of impending war in the Orient, called, on the voyage from Marseilles to Constantinople, at Smyrna in Asiatic Turkey. Ordinarily, there would be nothing in such a visit specially to impress the recollection; but at that particular juncture the port, whose tranquillity usually is disturbed only by the wordy altercations of rival boatmen, was still reverberating with the echoes of an incident which attracted world-wide attention. Of this incident the name of the central figure, the Hungarian refugee, Martin Koszta, survives in association

1. April 19, 1917. Reprinted from *The Nation*, CIV (April 26, 1917), 502-504.

with certain legal misconceptions, the correction of which has been rendered difficult by popular contentment with the belief that the representatives of the United States, in rescuing from injury one whom they believed to be entitled to protection, gave in those distant waters a gratifying manifestation of the national power. In witnessing the local effects of this demonstration, the youthful Godkin no doubt received his most vivid early impression of the exuberance of spirit and pervasiveness of the American democracy.

The United States had then reached the summit of the second stage of its political development. The impressive lessons furnished by the War of Independence, and by the years that immediately succeeded it, of the necessity of a definite and effective central authority, produced the Federalist movement, which resulted in the formation of the Constitution of the United States. After this unique consummation, Federalism, as if exhausted by its prescient but unrequited toil, rapidly declined; and the great democratic movement, of which the revolution was itself a premonition, was soon in full swing. In due time the effects of this movement were everywhere manifest, in foreign as well as in domestic affairs. While the franchise was broadened and political institutions were popularized at home, sympathy was exhibited with revolutionary movements both in South America and in other quarters of the globe. During the Greek struggle for independence, a political philosopher in the western part of the State of New York declared that he could furnish to the cause "five hundred men six feet high with sinewy arms and case-hardened constitutions, bold spirits and daring adventurers, who would travel upon a bushel of corn and a gallon of whiskey per man from the extreme part of the world to Constantinople"; while, if the Holy Alliance should actually take sides with Spain against her former American colonies, his "backwoodsmen" would "spring with the activity of squirrels" to their assistance. Less than two years before the name of Martin Koszta became famous, the visit of Kossuth to the United States caused an agitation which led thoughtful men to doubt whether rules of policy, handed down from the Fathers and regarded as axiomatic, would prove to be an effective barrier against sudden tides of popular emotion; nor were they consoled by the reflection that the popular impressions, from which the excitement sprang, were in many respects unfounded. These were indeed the budding days when the diplomatic representatives of the United States were expected to exhibit "American feeling"; when it was first enjoined upon them, as a mark of devotion to Republican institutions, to appear at foreign courts "in the

simple dress of an American citizen"—an injunction which, even if it occasioned perplexity, left ample scope to individual tastes and reminiscences.

As a new and rapidly developing country in which democracy and self-government found a larger opportunity than had ever before existed, the United States presented to young, aspiring, zealous minds in all parts of the world an attraction which can scarcely be exaggerated. It is true that a wave of democratic sentiment had also swept over Europe, but it seemed to be in danger of spending its force in its encounter with established institutions. In America, there was a broad and open field, and there existed a widespread and generous expectation that democracy would in its unobstructed development work out results altogether benevolent.

The founder of *The Nation* was one among thousands who came to the United States in the sixth decade of the last century, as he himself declared, "with high and fond ideals." Nor were his expectations dashed by the civil strife which soon afterwards ensued. Although his experience in the Crimea had taught him to feel an abhorrence of war, the fact that the conflict in the United States resulted in the abolition of slavery invested it in the minds of many with an elevation of purpose which served to mitigate its horrors and to justify its sacrifices. But it had also become apparent that government, even under the most democratic conditions, was not exempt from the operation of malevolent influences; that there were not wanting those who would seek to make use of enhanced governmental powers for the furtherance of individual interests and ambitions, political, social, and financial; and that strenuous efforts would be necessary to resist the tendency towards a mere materialistic imperialism. While important problems had been solved, others had been created, not the least of which was a certain disorganization, marked by the propensity which the exercise of arbitrary power, incident to a state of war, had stimulated, to attain results without too close attention to the legality or the morality of the means.

It was an appreciation of these elements of weakness and of danger in political and social conditions, and of the importance of establishing in journalism a high educational standard and influence, that inspired the founding of *The Nation*. It was felt that there should be an organ of opinion characterized in its utterances by breadth and deliberation, an organ which should identify itself with causes, and which should give its support to parties primarily as representatives of those causes. In this conception there was logically embraced the principle

of independence in politics and of freedom from party fealty and control. And with these things there was to be combined the highest type of literary excellence.

This programme enlisted the co-operation of a number of men of exceptional intelligence and cultivation, among whom it is only just to single out, for special mention, the editor for many years of the literary department of *The Nation*, Wendell Phillips Garrison. It also powerfully appealed to the hopes and imagination of young men, encouraging them to enter public life rather with a view to improve political conditions than to turn them to personal advantage.

To enumerate the subjects with the discussion of which *The Nation* came to be identified would merely be to enumerate the principal questions that have occupied the public mind during the past half century. Of the causes which it earliest espoused, perhaps its founder would have given the post of honor to the reform of the civil service. Certainly this was to a great extent the product of his initiative and his fostering care. Regarded as something European rather than American, it at first excited little interest, and was flippantly assigned to the category of things visionary or futile. Little by little, however, it was forced upon the public attention. With a zeal that never flagged, and a wealth of intellectual resource seldom witnessed, the contest was carried on for twenty years till at length the principle of merit was incorporated in legislative and administrative measures, national and State; and, in spite of all reverses, and of many untoward incidents, the application of the principle has been extended with the support of public sentiment.

Next to the reform of the civil service, we may mention, as a cause with which *The Nation* is specially identified, the struggle for the maintenance of sound principles of finance. Great wars, if they last long enough, give rise to an inflation of the currency. With taxes necessarily inadequate to meet current demands, credit is at length strained to the point at which the aid of the printing press is invoked. Such came to be the situation in the United States during the Civil War; and after the war a large public debt, heavy taxes, financial panics, and industrial uncertainties produced their usual crop of shifty and short-sighted proposals. From first to last *The Nation* advocated a sound and stable currency based on actual values, and no journalistic influence was more active and efficient than that which it contributed to the triumph of that cause.

The founder of *The Nation* once remarked that he was

"brought up in the Mill-Grote school of radicals." He therefore naturally espoused the cause of tariff reform, with the abolition of duties distinctively protective as his goal. If, in the advocacy of this cause, the success of *The Nation* has been less striking than in the cases previously mentioned, this circumstance may be ascribed to the fact that, while free traders and tariff reformers are accustomed to consider the eventual political and social effects of the protective system as the chief point at issue, the general public is more directly affected by what seem to be the immediate pecuniary results. On the other hand, in the case of causes in which the moral issue can be more readily presented, such as ballot reform and improved municipal government, the advances that have been achieved have been most notable.

It may be said of *The Nation*, as was said of the achievements of an earlier time, that the past at least is secure. But in the history of peoples occasions arise when, to use the phrase of Burke, they seem to stand on the verge of great mutations. After the war with Spain, the superficial remark was often heard that the United States had become a "World Power." In reality the advent of the United States into the family of nations was one of the most important events in history; yet it is no doubt true that in many minds the position of a "World Power" is associated with the tenure of distant possessions and a participation in political and commercial alliances. In the main the United States has avoided entanglements of a political character; but in recent days the very fundamentals of our previous policy have been brought into discussion, and a momentous step has lately been taken that will involve momentous decisions hereafter.

Down to a comparatively recent time the policy of the United States was governed by certain cardinal principles which were regarded as practically immutable. Of these the first and foremost was that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, and particularly of abstention from all participation in the political arrangements of Europe. John Adams records in his diary that on a certain occasion Richard Oswald, who represented Great Britain in the peace negotiations with the United States in 1782, remarked: "You are afraid of being made the tool of the Powers of Europe." "Indeed I am," said Adams. "What Powers?" asked Oswald. "All of them," responded Adams. Adams further declared that the Powers of Europe would be continually manœuvring "to work us into their real or imaginary balance of power," since we might "very often, if not always, be able to turn the scale"; but that he thought "it ought to be our rule not to meddle," and that

the European Powers ought not to desire or even permit us to interfere if they could help it.

Of the policy of non-intervention, the system of neutrality was a logical derivative, as was also the recognition of governments as existing entities, and not as legitimate, or illegitimate, or as lawful or unlawful, under the local constitution. The Monroe Doctrine itself was but the correlative of the principle of non-intervention. "Our first and fundamental maxim," said Jefferson, should be "never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with *cis-Atlantic* affairs."

By preserving these principles, it was believed that the United States would best contribute to the preservation of peace, abroad as well as at home. But from time to time the public attitude changes, perhaps not deliberately, but suddenly, as the result of events which appeal to the imagination or stir the emotions.

In days not remote proposals have been made the real significance of which is perhaps scarcely appreciated by most of their supporters. Leagues and alliances of all kinds are in the air, and are often discussed with an easy and ready confidence suggestive of the supposition that facts can be created by phrases and that to speak of enforcing peace is equivalent to its permanent preservation. No doubt there are some who comprehend what the commitment to engagements of this character would involve. That such a plan may not to some extent or in some form be adopted, no one can safely predict. But, however this may be, there is one truth which we should not fail to bear in mind, and that is that no league ever was formed for the attainment of certain objects by force which was not sooner or later required to face the stern reality of armed conflict in the pursuit of that design. In such circumstances nothing is so likely to invite disaster as the neglect of rational and necessary precautions. Even apart from what has lately taken place, it must be admitted that, so far as the United States is concerned, the course of developments during the past twenty years has not been such as to justify expectations of continued and increasing tranquillity. Even in the matter of international arbitration, the boasts of recent progress, of which so much has been heard, will not bear the test of scrutiny; for it is demonstrable that, for very definite reasons, it is more difficult to secure the arbitrations of questions by the United States today than it was a hundred years ago. This is only one of the many facts that should impress upon us the lesson that, unless recent tendencies are to change and recent proposals are to come to naught, military and naval preparations must be car-

ried out not fitfully, but systematically and permanently, on a larger and more general scale than has ever been attempted heretofore.

The faith of the American people in their future is justified by the record of the past; but the day never will come when the country will not need for its guidance and safety not only the combined wisdom, intelligence, and foresight of all its component parts, but also that spirit of patriotic devotion which, while fruitful of sacrifice for the common good, numbers among its manifestations that uncompromising integrity in the discussion of public questions which the late Wayne MacVeagh had in mind when he declared that the founder of *The Nation* had for many years been "beyond all question the best force by far in American politics."

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION¹

THE subject on which I am to speak is by no means new. For that reason I suppose it ought to be regarded as very uninteresting.

I may at once say that I am not acquainted with, and hardly feel capable of formulating, any special device which will certainly assure the preservation of peace among nations.

There are certain methods of settling international disputes, which are known as amicable methods, as distinguished from inamicable and forcible methods. The amicable methods are negotiation, mediation and good offices, which I mention together, and arbitration.

Negotiation is simply the ordinary method of diplomacy.

Mediation stands midway between negotiation and arbitration, and in connection with it I mentioned good offices. We speak of good offices where some third power or powers come between disputants, listen to their complaints, and make suggestions and tender advice.

Mediation is the formal exercise of good offices. Sometimes a tribunal is organized which proceeds with much formality, but, whatever the procedure may be, mediation results in a

1. An address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 1917. Reprinted from the *Proceedings of the Academy*, VII (July, 1917), 213-220; the *World Court* (October, 1917), pp. 493-498.

recommendation which the parties to the dispute are at liberty to reject.

The third method, that of arbitration, represents the judicial process of settling international disputes. When I say the judicial process, I am not at all unconscious of the fact that we hear a great deal in these days of the "judicial settlement" of international disputes, as if it were something entirely novel. It is said that heretofore we have had arbitration, but that arbitration has failed, and that now we are to have the "judicial settlement" of international disputes.

Such statements illustrate the propensity to accept phrases rather than to search for facts. I fancy that the number of those who have had occasion actually to read the decisions of international boards of arbitration is small. There may indeed be members of the bar who read the decisions of judges for mere pleasure. But, after all, I fancy that we do most of our reading of judicial opinions professionally, more or less under the stress of professional necessity.

Now, it has fallen to my lot, in the pursuit of my professional work, to have read practically all the decisions that have ever been rendered by international tribunals, and there are some thousands of them. In fact, I was once so unkind, perhaps I might almost say so cruel, as to inflict them upon my fellow-men by incorporating them in some six large volumes, which should have been printed in twelve instead of six, because the present volumes are too large for the reader's convenience. When, therefore, I venture, very diffidently, to make a statement in regard to the proceedings of international tribunals, I feel that I know the ground on which I stand; and I venture to assert that the decisions of those international tribunals are characterized by about as much consistency, by about as close an application of principles of law, and by perhaps as marked a tendency on the part of one tribunal to quote the authority of tribunals that preceded it, as you will find in the proceedings of our ordinary judicial tribunals. One cannot study these records without being deeply impressed with that fact, and without discovering how lacking in foundation is the supposition that when we talk of the "judicial settlement" of international disputes we are presenting some new device or new method.

I have said that a tribunal of arbitration decides. Its proceedings result in the rendering of a judgment which is binding upon the contracting parties. It therefore can be employed where, in many cases, mediation would be ineffective. On the other hand, mediation may be employed in cases which the disputants would be unwilling to submit to a definitive

judgment. If I had the time in which to do it, I could point out numerous instances in which the judgments of tribunals of arbitration have been accepted by the parties and loyally carried out, although they imposed terms which it is inconceivable that the parties would have accepted upon the mere recommendation of a board of mediators. In other words, if there had been any loophole of escape, the parties would have availed themselves of it, but having agreed to submit the matter to judgment, and to abide by the award, they have done so, loyally and completely.

There is another misconception that I should be glad to correct, and that is that there has been great uncertainty in the enforcement of the judgments of tribunals of arbitration. Again I venture to affirm, upon the basis of actual information, that the awards of international boards of arbitration have been very generally accepted and carried into effect. I do not think I am mistaken when I say that if there has been a tendency during the last few years to question the accuracy and the binding effect of such awards, it has been due chiefly to the unfortunate supposition that no judgment should ever be regarded as final till it has been the subject of review on appeal. Lawyers are too much in the habit of thinking of judicial process as a series of appeals, till they finally get up to a tribunal beyond which nothing can be imagined. But, I venture to repeat that the cases have been few, very few indeed, in which the awards of international tribunals have not been accepted and loyally carried out.

I have said that international arbitration is not a new thing; and I will now go a step further and affirm that the judicial process which it has exemplified is one of which we must avail ourselves in dealing with all human affairs. Within the state it is inconceivable that we should be able to get on for a week or even for a day, with any approach to a condition of tranquillity, if we were to abolish the judicial process. We use negotiation, and we use mediation, all the while, in our private affairs as well as in our public affairs, but cases daily arise in which it is necessary to obtain an authoritative decision, and then we invoke the judicial process. We may therefore accept it as absolutely certain, that, no matter what kind of a league, or alliance, or other contrivance may be set up in international affairs, we shall be obliged to invoke the process of arbitration, in the judicial sense.

Several years ago a scholar named Raeder published, under the auspices of the Nobel Institute, a very interesting work entitled *International Arbitration among the Greeks*. I have very often seen the statement that, while the Greeks practised

what they called arbitration, it was not real arbitration, but something else. But, as a matter of fact, the Greeks had as clear, as intelligent, as precise a conception of the process of international arbitration, in the judicial sense, as exists today, as may be seen by an actual examination of the awards rendered by the tribunals employed by them for the determination of disputes between the different states.

Later, when the Roman Empire came into existence, with its conceptions of conquest and domination, there was little room for international arbitration; but, after the decline and fall of the Empire, the states that succeeded it employed the process on an extensive scale, especially under the influence of the Church. As a result, however, of the wars, somewhat miscalled "religious," of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—I say somewhat miscalled religious, because questions of property, politics and dominion were decidedly interwoven with questions of faith—international arbitration, being an amicable process, practically disappeared.

During the eighteenth century thoughts of arbitration began to revive; and, after the close of the Napoleonic Wars, when the world was worn out with fighting, nations not only talked a great deal about arbitration, but actually employed it on a very large scale, by the adoption of general claims conventions for the settlement of all outstanding questions. Under these conventions or treaties—the words being here interchangeable—all disputes that had arisen since a certain date were submitted, without exception, to the decision of arbitrators.

During the hundred years that followed the formation of the Constitution, the United States made numerous treaties of that kind; and I should say that the high-water mark of international arbitration, that is, of its actual application, was reached in the case of the award on the *Alabama* claims by the tribunal at Geneva in 1872. This was so, not only because of the nature and magnitude of the questions submitted, but also because, when the United States first proposed arbitration, the British government declined it, on the ground that the questions at issue involved the "honor" of Her Majesty's Government, of which, speaking in the approved phrase, it was declared that Her Majesty's Government was "the sole guardian." Of course every man and every nation is the "sole guardian" of his or its own "honor"—whatever that may be.

But, after thinking the matter over for six or eight years, eminent British statesmen came to the conclusion that perhaps a basis might be found on which this very grave dispute might be submitted to impartial and learned men, wise men, for

judicial decision; and in the end there was made the great Treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871, by which it was provided that the claims generically known as the Alabama claims should be submitted to an arbitral tribunal, which was to sit at Geneva. As I look on my right, I have great pleasure in recognizing an eminent diplomatist, who is also a friend, whose government, that of Brazil, was called upon to appoint one of the five members of that exalted tribunal.

The proceedings resulted in the award of \$15,500,000 to the United States. This is one of the cases I had in mind when I said that arbitration might be used to obtain a settlement which mediation could not effect. For, if the tribunal had been one of mediation, and its members, being thus limited to the exercise of advisory powers, had only recommended the payment of the sum above mentioned, we may believe that the recommendation would have been rejected. We had not then entered the period of "trust" organization, when such sums seem trivial. On the contrary, the draft for the payment of the award was the largest that had ever been drawn, and it is hardly conceivable that, with the feeling then existing over some of the questions covered by the award, a mediatorial recommendation of the payment of \$15,500,000 would have been entertained for a moment.

After the close of the sessions of the Geneva Tribunal, there sprang up a world-wide agitation for the establishment of some general method by which disputes between nations might be referred to arbitration. The success of the Tribunal in peacefully disposing of differences of the gravest character between two great nations caused peoples to feel a certain confidence in the process; and the agitation to which the Geneva Arbitration gave rise may fairly be regarded as having directly contributed to the adoption of The Hague Convention of 1899, establishing what is called the Permanent Court at The Hague.

Great things were hoped for from the establishment of that court. But it was followed by a movement which was so conducted that its results were, as I am compelled to believe, altogether unfortunate. The Hague Convention of 1899, while it did not make arbitration obligatory upon the contracting parties, excepted nothing from the process. Consequently, it did not suggest to the contracting parties pretexts for avoiding arbitration if they should be disinclined to adopt it. It is related of a certain general, who pointed out to his troops a way by which they might escape, that, when the enemy appeared, they promptly took it. The Hague Convention of 1899 did not obstruct the highway with signposts pointing to avenues of

escape, even if it did not profess to compel the traveler to follow the main road. But, there were those who thought we must have something in form obligatory, and in the end what they did was this: They made a so-called obligatory treaty which was very widely adopted afterward, because nobody could see any reason for not adopting it, especially if he did not want to arbitrate; a treaty by which it was provided that questions of a "judicial order," or relating to the interpretation of treaties, should be submitted to arbitration, provided they did not affect the "vital interests," the "independence," or the "honor" of the contracting powers, or "concern the interests of third powers."

Evidently, the substance of this treaty or convention is in the exceptions. Just what the fancied obligation embraces I have never been able to detect, even after a somewhat microscopic examination. Remember, the sweeping provisos above quoted are limitations not upon the general obligation to arbitrate; they are limitations upon the agreement to submit only questions of a "judicial order"; and they then proceed to declare that even as to questions of a judicial order arbitration may properly be excluded. What, then, have we left?

Nor is this all. If we are to make any progress in the world, we must set up some sort of standard or ideal. Perhaps we may say that after all there are such things as general principles to which it is important to adhere, because, if we abandon them, we are left without any means of reckoning, and are reduced to a mere shifty opportunism. The Hague Convention of 1899, although not in terms obligatory, did not in effect declare that the contracting parties need not arbitrate any question which they regarded as serious or important. The so-called "obligatory" treaties, in expressly authorizing and justifying the contracting parties in excluding any question which they might be inclined, on grounds of interest or of feeling, to exclude, even though it should be of a "judicial order," discredited international arbitration as a practical measure and placed it among unreal things, which only visionaries would pursue. This lowering of the standards was not warranted by the facts.

I have but one more word to say. In discussing and estimating methods or devices, whether arbitral or otherwise, for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, we must never lose sight of human nature. There exists on the part of men in masses a tendency to endeavor to attain their ends by violence. We observe this tendency all through human history; and, bearing it in mind, and remembering that human dispositions change very slowly, we must watch our own thoughts and inclinations as well as those of other people. That great

interpreter of the human heart, Robert Burns, admonishes us to keep an eye on our own defects, lest we become "o'er proud." Each people thinks itself not only peaceful, but much more peaceful than any other people. It is a matter of common knowledge that no nation in its own estimation ever wants to fight; it is always some other nation, perhaps even a very small and helpless one, that wants to go to war. The United States, we are constantly told, has always longed to arbitrate everything; and this, in spite of the fact that George Bancroft supposed he was stating the truth, when, in opening the case of the United States in the arbitration of the San Juan Water Boundary, he said:

Six times the United States had received the offer of arbitration on their northwestern boundary, and six times had refused to refer a point where the importance was so great and the right so clear.

And when at last the question was submitted to the German Emperor as arbitrator, we insisted upon and obtained a restricted submission, such as we had previously endeavored to secure. I mention this incident merely as an illustration of the truth of the poet's admonition, that, lest we become unduly self-satisfied, we should keep an eye upon ourselves as well as upon other people.

THE WORK OF THE PAN AMERICAN FINANCIAL CONFERENCE¹

BY the diplomatic and consular appropriation act, approved March 4, 1915, the President of the United States was authorized to invite the Governments of Central and South America to be represented by their ministers of finance and some of their leading bankers at a conference with the Secretary of the Treasury at Washington, with a view to establish "closer and more satisfactory financial relations" between their countries and the United States. Authority was also conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury to invite representative bankers of the United States to take part in the conference.

The invitation to the conference was accepted by eighteen

1. An address before the New York State Bankers' Association, at its annual meeting for 1917, at Lake Placid, N. Y. Reprinted from the *Bulletin of the Pan American Union*, XL, August, 1917; *The Economic World* (September 22, 1917); Spanish translation in the *Boletín de la Unión panamericana*, XLV (October, 1917).

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Governments—namely: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The conference met in Washington on Monday, May 24, 1915, and adjourned on the following Saturday. It was called the Pan American Financial Conference, and was attended not only by the foreign official delegates but also by the members of the diplomatic corps from Central and South America, by the Secretary of State of the United States and other members of the Cabinet, by the chairmen of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Senate and House, by the Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury, by the members of the Federal Reserve Board and officers of the Federal Reserve Banks, by members of the Federal Trade Commission, and by representative bankers and business men from all parts of the United States. It was presided over by the Hon. W. G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury.

The immediate occasion of the assembly was the derangement of commerce and finance by the great European War, the effects of which were acutely felt not only in the dislocation of exchanges between Europe and America, but also in the relations between the American countries themselves, which, although their interdependence had been greatly increased, found it necessary to make numerous readjustments. In these circumstances it was only natural, it was indeed inevitable, that the work of the conference should assume a wide scope and reveal the need of continued and systematic effort for the improvement of commercial and financial relations between the American countries.

The original program of the conference embraced the monetary and banking situation, the financing of public improvements and private enterprises, the extension of inter-American markets, and the improvement of transportation facilities, including postal exchanges, money orders, and the parcels post. For the purpose of considering these questions the members of the conference were assigned to group committees, such a committee being created for each country. In this way the full and free presentation of the needs and desires of each country was duly assured. An examination of the reports of these committees shows that, next to transportation, the subjects that attracted most attention were improved banking facilities and the extension of credits.

The reports of the group committees were referred to a general committee on uniformity of laws relating to trade and commerce, which was charged with the duty of reporting upon the subjects with which the conference should deal and the

organization necessary to carry the resolutions of the conference into effect. The report of this committee was unanimously adopted by the conference. It included, in the order here given, seven subjects: (1) The establishment of a gold standard of value; (2) bills of exchange, commercial paper, and bills of lading; (3) uniform (a) classification of merchandise, (b) customs regulations, (c) consular certificates and invoices, (d) port charges; (4) uniform regulations for commercial travelers; (5) further legislation concerning trademarks, patents, and copyrights; (6) the establishment of a uniform low rate of postage and of charges for money orders and parcels post; and (7) the extension of the process of arbitration for the adjustment of commercial disputes. Because of variances of view as to methods and measures and the complications of local legislation, the subject of marine transportation was not for the moment placed upon the program.

For the purpose of carrying its resolutions into effect the conference recommended the establishment of an International High Commission, to be composed of not more than nine members, resident in each country, to be appointed by the Minister of Finance of such country, these local bodies, composed of jurists, financiers, and technical administrators, constituting the national sections of the International High Commission. This recommendation was promptly carried into effect in the countries concerned; and by the act of Congress of February 7, 1916, the United States section was endowed with a specific legislative status.

The International High Commission, which, besides carrying on its work locally through the various sections, had conducted its work internationally by exchange of correspondence, held its first general meeting at Buenos Aires, from April 3 to April 12, 1916. The program of the meeting included, in addition to those acted upon by the Washington Conference, six different subjects—(a) international agreements on uniform labor legislation; (b) uniformity of regulations concerning the classification and analysis of petroleum and other mineral fuels with reference to national policy on the development of natural resources; (c) the betterment of transportation facilities between the American countries; (d) banking facilities, extension of credit, financing public and private enterprises, and the stabilization of international exchange; (e) telegraph facilities and rates and the use of wireless telegraphy for commercial purposes; (f) uniform legislation as to conditional sales and chattel mortgages.

The International High Commission, at its meeting in Buenos Aires, besides dealing with questions of finance and

administration, constituted a central executive council for the purpose of systematizing and co-ordinating its work, carrying out its recommendations, and preparing the programs of future meetings. This council consists of three members—a president, vice-president, and a secretary-general. These three places are occupied by the chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary of the national section of the country chosen for the time being as headquarters of the International High Commission. On motion of a member from Argentina, Washington was unanimously designated as the headquarters of the Commission till the next meeting, and the chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary of the United States section thus became the constituent members of the central executive council.

The central executive council, on entering upon its labors, decided that the best plan of procedure would be, while pressing the work of the conference as a whole, to select certain subjects for more immediate, definite treatment. With this view, it selected five subjects—(1) the establishment of an international gold clearance fund; (2) an international agreement to facilitate the work of commercial travelers; (3) legislation concerning negotiable instruments (including The Hague rules on bills of exchange), checks, and bills of lading, and warehouse receipts; (4) the arbitration of commercial disputes; (5) the ratification of the conventions adopted by the Fourth International American Conference at Buenos Aires in 1910 on trade-marks, copyrights, and patents.

In pursuance of this plan the central executive council has formulated drafts of treaties concerning commercial travelers and the establishment of an international gold clearance fund, and these drafts have been submitted through the Department of State of the United States to the governments concerned.

In presenting these projects it has been the design of the central executive council to suggest to the various sections of the International High Commission measures which appear to be susceptible of a ready solution. The subject of commercial travelers is one of general and increasing importance. In nearly all the countries of Central and South America such travelers pay a tax, but only in a few countries is this a national tax. Generally the tax is imposed by the States and occasionally even by the municipalities. Onerous as this system may seem, it is part of a concept of taxation, which, as the result of tradition or of local conditions, extensively prevails, under which charges are imposed upon professional classes and other groups, rather than upon the income-producing capacity of individuals regardless of business or profession.

What the council has ventured to suggest is the federalization of the taxes on commercial travelers, together with the facilitation of their operations through custom house and other fiscal machinery.

To this end the treaty draft provides for the issue of a national license, to run for a fixed period, and to be paid for with one fee, which the National Government may, if it so wishes, divide among the local governments surrendering this source of revenue. But, in order to obtain such license, the applicant must produce a certificate from his home government attesting his bona fide character as a commercial traveler; and he must also bring with him a certificate from a home customs authority setting forth the number and character of his samples, so that he may be permitted to give bond to pay duties upon them in case he should sell any portion of them or should fail to re-export them before the expiration of his traveler's license. In addition the council has submitted a protocol embodying administrative details, and has drawn up forms of documents which may be used by the Department of Commerce and by the customs authorities of the United States under the treaty.

The establishment of an international gold clearance fund formed the subject of a memorandum submitted by the delegates of the United States section at the meeting of the International High Commission at Buenos Aires in April, 1916. The scarcity of transportation facilities and the dangers created by belligerent operations had then rendered the shipment of gold extremely hazardous and often impossible. During the preceding year the Federal Reserve Board had evolved a system of settling debts among the twelve Federal Reserve Banks by means of a gold settlement fund, whereby, through the device of one bank ear-marking gold for another, a safe legal transfer of ownership was substituted for the physical transfer of the gold. It was conceived that a plan might be evolved for similar settlements between nations.

Such a plan is embodied in the draft treaty above mentioned, which provides that all deposits of gold, made within the jurisdiction of any of the high contracting parties for the purpose of paying debts incurred in the jurisdiction of another, in the course of private commercial and financial transactions, shall be treated by their governments as constituting an international fund, to be used for the sole purpose of effecting exchange. To this end they are to agree never to appropriate any part of it, but on the contrary, each within its own jurisdiction, to guarantee it, in war as well as in peace, against seizure by any public authority as well as against impairment through

any political action or change whatsoever. They are further to agree to act as trustees of the fund, and for this purpose to designate, each within its own jurisdiction, a bank to hold any part of the fund there existing, as joint custodian with such person or persons or such institution as they may concur in appointing for that purpose, such joint custodians to hold the moneys so entrusted to them, subject to the order of the creditors for whom it is held.

Under this plan, if, for instance, exchanges between Buenos Aires and New York were such that gold would have to be shipped to New York, the amount would be placed with the designated depositary bank at Buenos Aires in the international clearance fund, while the New York depositary bank, duly advised by cable, would place at the disposal of the Buenos Aires bank the same amount against which exchange on New York might be sold. The gold in Buenos Aires would be kept under the joint custody of the Argentine bank and such additional trustees acting for the international clearance fund as might be designated with the approval of the New York bank, the latter having, however, the right at any time to stipulate that the gold be shipped. Therefore the Buenos Aires bank, in selling exchange on New York, would have to provide for a margin sufficient to assure the shipping cost, the insurance, remelting and other incidental expenses which might arise in case actual shipment became necessary. Should the gold, however, remain at Buenos Aires until the tide would turn so that the transaction would be reversed, that is to say, until the moneys paid back to the New York bank would release the gold at Buenos Aires, then the shipping and other expenses would have been saved and would become the profit of the respective banks, to be apportioned between them by direct negotiation.

If the same gold coins were used by both depositary banks, the transactions in the international gold clearance fund would be very simple. But gold of different fineness and denominations would be deposited in these two banks, to say nothing of banks of other countries of South America where the deposits in the international clearance fund would include widely differing types of gold coins. The freest play of the proposed system could be expected only when gold coins interchangeable between various countries were in fairly common use in all countries participating in the arrangement. As a first step in this direction, the International High Commission at its meeting of April, 1916, adopted a uniform money of account to be used in all statistical publications and in the calculations of the international gold clearance fund, the unit of this money

of account being a gold coin 0.900 fine and 0.33437 grammes in weight. This unit, which it is proposed to call the American franc, is exactly one-fifth of a United States gold dollar, and is very close to the normal monetary unit of the South American countries, so that it was hoped that it might readily be adopted as the actual monetary standard, contributing to the development of trade relations by facilitating settlements between the various countries. For these reasons, the proposed unit forms part of the plan incorporated in the draft-treaty for an international gold clearance fund.

I will not detain you with a narration of what has been done by the International High Commission and its central executive council during the past twelve months to secure uniform legislation on negotiable instruments, bills of lading, and warehouse receipts, to extend the arbitration of commercial disputes and to secure further ratifications of the conventions of 1910 relating to trade-marks, copyrights, and patents. In the past thirty years great progress has been slowly but surely made both in Europe and in America in the direction of bringing about greater uniformity in commercial law and in methods of fiscal administration. As to negotiable instruments, we need only mention the important conferences at The Hague in 1910 and 1912, resulting in uniform rules on bills of exchange which have been incorporated into the legislation of several of the participating States. In 1890 a congress was held at Berne for the purpose of standardizing governmental regulations for the handling of freight at international frontiers. The consultations held at the international exposition at Paris in 1889 on the subject of statistics culminated in the statistical conference at Brussels in 1913, at which an international convention was agreed to and signed for the establishment of an international statistical bureau at that place. I scarcely need mention in the presence of this body the historic conferences which have been held in Europe for the purpose of adjusting international monetary conditions, or to the international unions dealing with posts, telegraphs, patents, and copyrights.

Similar efforts have been made in this hemisphere, especially during the past thirty years. I need only cite as examples the International American Conferences, the Pan American Scientific Congresses, and the Pan American Sanitary Conferences. The Pan American Financial Conference was not intended to supersede the activities of any of these bodies; for, while it has had occasion to further the adoption of some of the measures with which they were connected, it has found a broad and ample field of its own.

In one respect it possesses a distinct advantage, and that is in its capacity for continuous work. It is an ordinary defect of international conferences that, when the final session is held, they cease to exist, so that their work falls wholly into other hands. The Pan American Financial Conference, through the constitution of the International High Commission, and the creation by the latter of the central executive council, has established an organization by which the great task of securing desirable uniformity in legislation and in administration, among the American nations, may be prosecuted vigorously and without interruption.

Any one interested in securing more detailed information may obtain it by addressing the Secretary-General of the International High Commission, Treasury Department, Washington, D. C.

BOOK REVIEWS

BREACHES OF ANGLO-AMERICAN TREATIES: A STUDY IN HISTORY AND DIPLOMACY. *By JOHN BIGELOW, Major U. S. A., retired.* New York, Sturgis & Walton Company, 1917. Pp. xi, 248. \$1.50.

The preface to this volume is dated at New York, January 23, 1917. It therefore antedates not only the present war between the United States and Germany but also the rupture of their diplomatic relations; and the body of the text must have been written long before. A perusal of the work indeed fully confirms the accuracy of the statement that it "was not written to form or influence public opinion as to any phase or feature of the present world war." On the contrary, the author's main purpose seems to have been to investigate the foundations of charges of bad faith made in England against the United States, within the past five years, in terms which seemed to him possibly to savor of exaggeration. In particular he mentions the assertion of the *Saturday Review* that "American politicians" would not be "bound by any feeling of honor or respect for treaties if it would pay to violate them," and that it was too much to expect "to find President Taft acting like a gentleman"; the intimation of the *Morning Post* that Americans are disposed "to lower the value of their written word in such a way as to make negotiations with other powers difficult or impossible"; and the statement of Sir Harry Johnston that treaties with the United States are "not really worth the labor their negotiation entails or the paper they are written on." These polite admonitions seem not so much to have annoyed the author as to have piqued his curiosity, impelling him dutifully to make the more or less detailed studies the results of which, as he sums them up, are not unfavorable to his own country.

The investigation begins with the controversies relating to the execution of the treaty of peace of 1782-83. The author finds that there were violations on both sides, but the principal breach he conceives to be the refusal of Great Britain to withdraw her forces from the United States. The reason assigned for this refusal was the failure of the United States to make immediately effective, as to private debts due to British merchants, the stipulation that creditors on either side should

meet "with no lawful impediment" to the recovery of debts previously contracted. But, as the treaty contained no provision for the holding of territory as a guaranty for the performance of its stipulations, the author accepts as well founded Franklin's opinion that the evacuation was in reality delayed in the hope that some change in the European situation or some "disunion" among the late colonies might afford an opportunity for recovering dominion over them and securing their future dependence.

An examination of the disputes arising out of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty occupies nearly two-thirds of the volume. In this way their relative importance is perhaps unduly enhanced. The author affirms that Clayton was "willing to accept war" if this were necessary to secure an interoceanic railway or canal, although he would not go so far to secure "a purely American one." Probably it would have been more nearly correct to say that Clayton would have accepted war to prevent the construction of a canal under exclusive British control. It may be doubted that an American Secretary of State would then have been permitted to hold any other position. Of Clayton's desire to avoid a rupture there is abundant proof. The very fact that he was willing to sign a treaty by which the so-called Mosquito protectorate was permitted to stand even as (to use his own phrase) a "nominis umbra," sufficiently attests his anxiety for a friendly arrangement. In this relation the author scarcely grasps the importance of the incident of the bombardment of Greytown, which he says "left the general situation unchanged." In truth, although the instructions given to Captain Hollins did not specify the measures by which he was to obtain redress, and although the report of his summary and somewhat ruthless course came more or less as a surprise, there can be no doubt as to what the entire proceeding signified in the mind of Pierce's steady and sagacious Secretary of State, from the moment when it was determined to deal directly with the Greytown authorities down to the prompt assumption of full responsibility for what Hollins did. The incident probably did more than anything else to bring about the treaty of Managua of 1860.

As so much space is given to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, it would have been appropriate if the author had also examined the canal tolls question under the terms of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, especially as the imputations that prompted his investigations were inspired by that controversy. He correctly states that, although the question has been temporarily disposed of, it has not been settled in principle. In these circumstances an examination of its merits would not have been out

of place, and might have served to remove superficial impressions which have widely prevailed.

The author, in his consideration of treaty-making, adverts to the supposition that negotiators have often used obscure or dubious phrases in order to create a basis for future claims. To some extent that device has no doubt been employed; but it has not been practised so extensively as negotiators would have us believe. The imputation is flattering to vanity. But obscurity or dubiety often result much more from anxiety to reach an amicable agreement than from a conscious effort to overreach an opponent. This appears to have been the case with the Oregon Treaty and the resulting San Juan water boundary dispute, with which the author has not dealt, as well as with certain clauses in the treaty of Washington of 1871.

Reprinted from *The American Historical Review*, XXIII (1917), 194-196.

LA GRANDE GUERRE EUROPÉENNE ET LA NEUTRALITE DU CHILI. *By ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ, former Counsellor to the Ministry for Foreign affairs of Chili, etc.* Paris, A. Pedone, 1915. 315 pp.

As is indicated by the title, the second part of the present volume, whose author has long occupied an eminent position among specialists in international relations, is devoted to an exposition of the questions of neutrality in the discussion of which his own country, Chile, had during the first year of the pending conflict been particularly concerned. In the first part, questions of neutrality also form an important element, but the survey takes a much wider range, and embraces a consideration of the fundamental causes of the war, a comparison of the European and American political systems, and a series of suggestions as to how armed conflicts are to be avoided in the future. In contrasting the European and American systems, the learned author, continuing to employ the nomenclature with which his name is somewhat distinctively associated, speaks of a "European International Law" and an "American International Law." In these phrases the term "international law" evidently is used in a special and limited sense, since, in its ordinary and general sense, "international law" is neither European nor American. What is really meant is that there is an international system in Europe different from that which exists in America, and that each system has certain rules of its own which are not appropriate and therefore are not common to the other.

The extent to which it may be desirable or may be possible to reform the world after the present great European conflict is over, is a question concerning which opinions naturally vary. In some cases this variance seems to be at least partly due to different attitudes as to the effect of violations of international law. On the one hand, it is assumed that the obligatory character of international law is not destroyed by the actual disregard of its rules by belligerents, while on the other hand there seems to be a tendency to act upon the supposition that when rules are violated they cease to exist, so that, after the war is ended, it will be necessary to make international law over again. The latter view has no doubt obtained a certain currency because of the general assumption that the rules of international law have been more extensively violated or disregarded by belligerents in the present conflict than in the previous great European wars. This assumption may readily be shown to be largely or wholly unfounded. No doubt new conditions may call for the application of new rules, but even in this respect, as Lord Stowell once judicially and judiciously observed, the change may consist in the adaptation of an old principle rather than in the invention of a new one. It has therefore generally been found that after great conflicts what was required was the re-establishment rather than the creation of law. For the performance of this task of the future the learned author offers numerous suggestions which can scarcely be examined within the limits of a book review. One line of development which he proposes is that neutrals shall be permitted by means of commissions acting in the various belligerent countries to take a more direct and more active part than they have heretofore done in observing military operations in countries at war and acting upon alleged violations of the laws of war.

The work as a whole merits careful consideration, both by reason of its intrinsic interest and of the author's position as a publicist.

Reprinted from *The American Journal of International Law*, XI (1917), 230-231.

THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL. *By ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE.*

Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916.
Two vols.: pp. xxvi, 506; xviii, 620.

Impressed with the fact that a vague and shadowy austerity characterizes and measures the general conception of John Marshall, Mr. Beveridge has undertaken to give a full por-

trayal of the character, career and human personality of the great Chief Justice. "No man in our history," he says, "was more intensely human than John Marshall, and few had careers so full of movement and color." This statement is amply substantiated in a narrative which, beginning with whatever is ascertainable concerning the origin and early days of its subject, follows him step by step through his career as frontiersman, soldier of the Revolution, and lawyer; member of the Virginia legislature and council of state, and later of the Virginia convention on the ratification of the Federal Constitution; envoy to France; member of the national House of Representatives, and finally chief justice of the United States.

John Marshall, as his present biographer observes, "was never out of the simple, crude environment of the near frontier for longer than one brief space of a few months until his twentieth year." For education, he was in childhood dependent on such instruction as his parents could give him. Books were few; but his father, apparently with a view to make his eldest son, John, a lawyer, became one of the original subscribers for the American edition of Blackstone's *Commentaries*. At one time Marshall was sent to a primitive "academy" in Westmoreland County kept by the Reverend Archibald Campbell, uncle of the poet Campbell, but his attendance lasted only a few months. When the Revolution broke, he immediately took up arms. He passed through the terrible winter at Valley Forge, and remained in actual service till 1779, bearing his full share of hardships, battle and danger. In this service, in providing for which the local authorities showed so deplorable an inefficiency, "we find," says Mr. Beveridge, "the fountainhead of John Marshall's national thinking." When he formally resigned his commission in the army in 1781, he had already been admitted to the bar. As a preparation for the legal career he had attended law lectures by George Wythe, at William and Mary College, for a period of perhaps six weeks. Jefferson, his kinsman, and later his great political antagonist, signed, as governor of Virginia, his license to practise law.

January 3, 1783, Marshall married, and settled in Richmond for the practice of his profession. Mr. Beveridge presents the record of his professional, domestic, and social life, so far as it can be gathered, and it may be said that he has collected it with great care and minuteness. A vivid light is thrown upon the social and economic conditions and the modes and manners of the times. In the midst of it all, Marshall uniformly appears as the simple, unaffected, good-tempered, well-balanced, self-reliant man who inspired confidence by the quality of his per-

formance rather than by the apparent assumption of authority or of superiority. Probably his utter neglect of appearances and the entire absence of an air of self-importance may to some extent account for his failure to reach the masses more effectively than he did. But by sheer ability he profoundly impressed himself upon courts and assemblies, and he powerfully contributed to the ratification of the national Constitution by the Virginia convention. So clear, pronounced and influential was his advocacy of the need of an efficient national government that he became the leader of the Virginia Federalists. To the measures of the administration of Washington he gave unyielding support that was of inestimable value in the first trying years of national unification.

Of his mission to France, in conjunction with Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and Elbridge Gerry, the biographer gives a full and comprehensive narration. The story has often been told, but perhaps never better told. That it rekindles the embers of past political controversies cannot be denied, nor will Mr. Beveridge's comments upon the course of Jefferson be accepted by the latter's adherents without reservation. But as to the patriotism and uprightness of Marshall's own conduct there can be no question.

Soon after his return from France, Marshall, after a lively campaign and riotous polling, was elected a member of the national House of Representatives, where he distinguished himself, especially by his great defense of the action of President Adams in the extradition case of Jonathan Robbins—a speech to which has often been ascribed his appointment to the post of chief justice. But, before he reached the latter station, he held for a time the post of secretary of state of the United States. His nomination to the bench was made on January 20, 1801. It is said to have been wholly unexpected; and although it was confirmed by the Senate without opposition, he continued to discharge the functions of secretary of state till the close of John Adams's administration..

With Marshall's appointment as chief justice, the present volumes end; but the author states it to be his purpose to write the final part as soon as the nature of the task permits. The preliminary part has been done on an ample scale, and with a thoroughness of investigation and clearness and power of exposition that merit the highest commendation. At last we are justified in the expectation of possessing a worthy biographical memorial of one of the greatest judicial magistrates of all time.

THE SECRET MEMOIRS OF COUNT TADASU HAYASHI,
G. C. V. O. *Edited by A. M. POOLEY.* New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915. Pp. v, 331.

The word "secret" in the title of the present volume perhaps does not require special comment, since any effect it may have in attracting readers is not to be deprecated. Judging by the methods often employed to excite general interest, one might be justified in thinking that what the public wishes is not so much to be informed as to be scandalized. If therefore a seasoning of what Mr. Pooley calls "pleasing indiscretions" may serve to induce the reader to receive, even reluctantly, a little actual information, or, as a member of a rural schoolboard once remarked, to "get a little education into him," not only is no harm done but even some good may have been accomplished.

It seems that Count Hayashi intended to write a history of Japanese diplomacy from 1871, when he first became connected with it, down to his retirement from the Japanese foreign office on the fall of the Saionji ministry in 1908, and that perhaps with a view to the performance of this task, he made notes or memoranda constituting what is here spoken of as his "diary," although there is nothing to indicate that he kept a systematic contemporaneous record such as is appropriately denoted by that term. He apparently wrote certain chapters dealing with the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which he negotiated and signed on the part of Japan, and with his own career in the foreign office, and blocked out chapters on the question of immigration in the United States and certain other topics. He was also a contributor to the columns of the Japanese press, and particularly to the *Jiji Shimpo*, whose proprietor was his friend. The present volume is composed of materials obtained from all these sources. Nothing seems to have been farther from the Count's thoughts than the desire or the intention to keep any of these things secret farther than might be necessary to avoid interference with their publication. His chief anxiety evidently was to establish his claim to recognition as the real author of the alliance with England, and, by way of further assurance, incidentally to show that the Marquis Ito not only had no share in the origination of that measure but was inclined to look for support in other directions. Some of his disclosures as to the attitude held at that time by England as well as by Japan toward Germany and toward the question of inviting the latter to adhere to the treaty, derive an additional interest and weight from the circumstance that the terms in which they were recorded were necessarily uninfluenced by the

present armed conflict. In the end it appears that Lord Lansdowne endeavored to postpone even the notification to Germany of the conclusion of the alliance; and Count Hayashi afterwards heard that the desire for such postponement was due to "some wish expressed by King Edward" (page 194). The effort was, however, too late, as Japan, acting upon a previous understanding with Lord Lansdowne, had informally advised the German minister at Tokio that the treaty had been signed.

Count Hayashi impressively remarks (p. 204) that "in international relations faith is the most essential element"; and it is possible that his observation, on the same page, regarding the importance of maintaining the confidence reposed in a country by "friendly" powers, was not consciously intended to limit the application of that remark. However this may be, the editor, Mr. Pooley, declares that it was "one of the ironies of fate" that the count, after making the alliance, should have been "the Foreign Minister who had to demonstrate to the world how easily the pledges of maintaining the integrity and sovereignty of China could be evaded, and what a vacuous shibboleth the doctrine of the Open Door really was." Mr. Pooley evidently speaks with some feeling on this question. Moreover, he may have failed to ponder the discrepancy which often exists between the ambitious high-sounding phrases in which a policy or a measure is proclaimed, and the action afterwards taken under the ordinary and inevitable human limitations of time, space and interest.

In a chapter on the Russo-Japanese convention of 1907, Count Hayashi remarks that, although the Japanese public is rather cool and indeed almost indifferent toward foreign affairs, yet, when attention is forced in that direction, the public at once "seems to get intoxicated, as though drunk with alcohol, and behaves as if it were not able to discriminate." Perhaps the Count, if appropriately interrogated, would have admitted that such manifestations were not monopolized by his countrymen.

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THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE METHODS OF ITS ENFORCEMENT AS AFFECTING THE POLICE POWERS OF THE STATES. *By CHARLES H. BURR. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society.* Lancaster, Pa., New Era Printing Company, 1912. Pp. 269-422.

NATIONAL SUPREMACY: TREATY POWER V. STATE POWER. *By EDWARD S. CORWIN.* New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1913. Pp. viii, 321.

LIMITATIONS OF THE TREATY-MAKING POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. *By HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER.* Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1915. Pp. xxi, 444.

The monograph by Mr. Burr is one of nine essays submitted to the American Philosophical Society for the Henry M. Phillips Prize for the best dissertation on the subject mentioned in the title. Its meritorious character is presumptively attested by the circumstance that it secured the award. A careful examination shows that its excellence is intrinsic as well as comparative. In reality it constitutes a distinct and material contribution to the exposition of the nature and extent of a power than which none more far-reaching or more important is confided to the national government. The author's clear and precise preliminary statement is followed by a full and analytical discussion of the federal cases, and especially of those which have been determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. In performing this task Mr. Burr displays an intelligent discrimination, the lack of which often causes writers to flounder about among inconsistent dicta in apparent unconsciousness of the fact that the dicta are inconsistent and that the inconsistency, proceeding from radically different conceptions of the nature and powers of the government of the United States, is such as to render appropriate the rejection of one or the other view rather than an attempt to reconcile them.

The view maintained by Mr. Burr, as the result of his investigations, is that the treaty-making power is, within the lines drawn by international usage, practically unlimited. To the suggestion that a treaty stipulation cannot control the exercise of state police powers, his answer is that, "without qualification of any kind whatsoever and without limitation by any possible definition of the treaty-making power, a treaty provision as the embodied manifestation of the federal will is supreme over any and all state enactments made in the exer-

cise of the police power." This opinion he maintains upon the strength of the purposes and beliefs of the framers of the Constitution, and on contemporary interpretations of that instrument by the Supreme Court, especially while Marshall was chief justice, as well as upon the decisions of that tribunal since the Civil War.

The committee of the American Philosophical Society, in making its award, stated that it had "found very great difficulty" in deciding between Mr. Burr's essay and one written by Mr. Edward S. Corwin, whose present volume apparently preserves the results of his effort. Mr. Corwin's conclusions are in harmony with those of Mr. Burr. He maintains (1) that the treaty-making power is not constitutionally restricted by the police powers of the states, and (2) that no real peril lurks in this view. Not only, as he points out, did the framers of the Constitution repeatedly refuse to insert a clause to safeguard the internal police of the states against the operation of federal power, but they specifically recognized that the treaty-making power might deal with subjects reserved to the states. Such was the view early taken by the courts, and it has been confirmed by subsequent practice. That it involves no real danger is, as he contends, shown by the circumstance that the Senate, without whose approval a treaty cannot be ratified, is so constituted as to represent in a special sense state interests, as well as by other considerations of a legal and practical nature.

Mr. Tucker approaches the subject from a different point of view. Considering what he deems to be "limitations on the treaty-making power," he concludes that a treaty "cannot take away or impair the fundamental rights and liberties of the people, secured to them in the Constitution itself, or in any Amendment thereof"; that it cannot bind the government to do "what is expressly or impliedly forbidden in the Constitution"; that it "cannot change the form of the government of the United States"; that, where the protection or control of personal or property rights is by the Constitution confided to a state, the latter cannot be ousted of its jurisdiction "by having the same transferred to the treaty-making power"; and that "the treaty power cannot confer greater rights upon foreigners than are accorded citizens of the United States under the Constitution."

In the main it may be said that these so-called "limitations," in the broad and general terms in which they are expressed, involve in a proper sense not so much the question of restrictions upon the treaty-making power as that of its proper scope. Probably no one would contend that any power given under the Constitution for a certain purpose, though unlimited

as to the appropriate subject-matter, could be equally employed for any other purpose. Should the courts, being invested with all the judicial power of the federal government, undertake to pass statutes, or should the president, in the exercise of his executive functions, assume to render judicial decisions, or should the Congress, as the national legislature, engage in diplomatic correspondence, we should think of these acts as mere usurpations rather than as stretches of power. The conceptions are quite distinct.

Of his proposition that treaties "cannot confer greater rights upon foreigners than are accorded to citizens of the United States under the Constitution," Mr. Tucker remarks that it "would seem to be self-evident from the very nature and object of governments, and therefore needs no discussion." It may, however, be observed that the enunciation of "rights" as "self-evident" is often found to be strangely at variance with actual legal conditions. The word "rights" is itself a term that requires definition and specification. Certain it is that there is no country in which the position of aliens does not to some extent differ from that of citizens, and if in the term "rights" we embrace privileges and exemptions, there is no country in which rights are not accorded and secured to aliens by treaty in matters in which natives enjoy none. On the other hand, the alien may in other particulars enjoy less "rights" than the citizen. The simple truth is that the two categories are different, and that neither can be controlled by sweeping inferences from the position or condition of the other.

But, to come to questions of a tangible and concrete nature, there is one subject on which Mr. Tucker seeks to propound a view essentially opposed to that maintained by the two previous writers, namely, as to matters falling within the police powers and "reserved" powers of the states. He would exclude such matters from treaty regulation; and in this relation he largely relies upon a partly new version or interpretation of *Ware v. Hylton* (3 Dallas, 199), decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1796. Much as I should personally be inclined to concur in any view set forth by Mr. Tucker, I find myself wholly unable to accept this novel version, nor has it, in my opinion, the importance ascribed to it. During the Revolution, Virginia, like some other states, adopted legislation for the sequestration or confiscation of debts due to British subjects prior to the war, whereby payment into the state treasury was declared to be a bar to any future suit by the creditor for the recovery of the money. By article iv of the treaty of peace with Great Britain of 1782-83, an attempt was made

to nullify such acts, by agreeing that creditors on either side should meet with "no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money of all *bona fide* debts" theretofore contracted. It was in order to give effect, among other things, to this very stipulation that the Constitution was made (Article VI, clause 2) expressly to declare that "all treaties made or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land," and that the judges "in every state" should be "bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." Language could not be plainer, nor could the intent, as demonstrated by the historical record, be clearer, that the state statutes were in this matter to give way to and fall before the treaty. Mr. Tucker, however, essays to question the judicial assertion of the supremacy of the treaty in *Ware v. Hylton*, by arguing that, as some of the justices thought that the Virginia law did not finally "confiscate" debts, the treaty was not held to override the statutory bar because there was no such bar to be overridden!

In answer to this suggestion, it perhaps might suffice to point out that, as it was the avowed object of the treaty to remove any and every "lawful impediment," without regard to the form, the question of "confiscation" (save on the theory of Mr. Justice Wilson, hereafter noticed) was in effect immaterial; but we will examine the judicial record.

There were five judges in the court, Iredell, Chase, Paterson, Cushing and Wilson. Iredell, as the reporter states, did not take part in the decision, though he read the opinion he had delivered in the court below. Chase, as Mr. Tucker concedes, squarely held that the treaty was superior to the Virginia law and annulled it. And so did the three remaining judges; for, when we examine their opinions, we find that the effect which Mr. Tucker attaches to the word "confiscate" is altogether illusory. Regarding the "confiscation" of private debts as "disreputable," the judges sought, while holding that the treaty removed the bar of the statutes, to find in the language of those enactments evidence that the state did not intend a permanent deprivation and thus to console the unfortunate debtor-defendant with the hope that the state might eventually step in and pay the judgment rendered against him. Justice Wilson did indeed incline to the view that Virginia had exceeded her power, arguing that the power to confiscate debts due to aliens belonged exclusively to the "nation"; but he hastened to add that, even if she had that power, "the treaty annuls the confiscation." Paterson said: "The Fourth Article . . . removes all lawful impediments, repeals the legislative act of Virginia

. . . and with regard to the creditor annuls everything done under it." Cushing said he should "not question the right of a state to confiscate debts"; he thought, however, that an intent was expressed in the Virginia act of 1777 not to "confiscate" (using the word in the sense of permanency), unless Great Britain should set the example. But, he continued, if payment under the act was "to be considered as a discharge, or a bar, so long as the act had force," was there

a power, by the treaty . . . entirely to remove this law, and this bar, out of the creditor's way? This power [he declared] seems not to have been contended against by the defendant's counsel: and, indeed, it cannot be denied; the treaty having been sanctioned, in all its parts, by the Constitution of the United States, as the supreme law of the land.

He further affirmed that "the plain and obvious meaning" of the treaty was "to nullify, *ab initio*, all laws, or the impediments of any law, as far as they might have been designed to impair, or impede, the creditor's right, or remedy, against his original debtor"; and that it must also "annihilate all [state] tender laws, making anything a tender, but sterling money."

In the face of these clear and decisive pronouncements, on which the judgment of the court was founded, we are at liberty to believe that the understanding of *Ware v. Hylton* entertained by the bench and the bar for a hundred and twenty years remains unshaken. But, even were the fact otherwise, we should not be justified in holding that a plain provision of the Constitution may be nullified by the discovery that some case that was supposed to have given judicial effect to it had been erroneously interpreted.

There is a method of interpreting the Constitution which may be denominated the *apprehensive*. It is fertile in doubts, and treats of powers as subjects of abuse rather than as national necessities or sources of advantage. Approaching the treaty-making power in this spirit, writers too often forget that, in proportion as they would curtail, thwart, and hamper the operation of the ample clause of the Constitution in this country, in the same measure must citizens of the United States be put at a disadvantage in foreign countries, reciprocity being essential to successful negotiation. One of the primary objects of treaty making is the regulation of the rights of aliens. The first treaties made by the United States exercised this power. That it was a valid exercise of power was not doubted.

A HISTORY OF THE WESTERN BOUNDARY OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE, 1819-1841. *By* THOMAS MAITLAND MARSHALL. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1914. Pp. xiii, 266.

This is a painstaking monograph on a subject not heretofore dealt with in a comprehensive way. Other writers have discussed certain aspects of it, but for the most part they have done so only incidentally and without considering it in its wider relations. Even in the present volume, no attempt is made to explore the documentary material relating to the boundary during the Spanish-French régime. The narrative is confined to questions which primarily involve the United States.

At the outset the author sets forth the history of the purchase of Louisiana by the United States. On certain points his views differ somewhat from those of Henry Adams, particularly as to the precise time when Napoleon decided to sell Louisiana, but in the main he accepts Adams' version of the transaction. The cession placed Spain in a very difficult position, and, jealous as she naturally was of the expansion of the United States, she inevitably sought to restrict the limits of the ceded territory. That she took Wilkinson into her pay while he was on the western frontier is not surprising. Mr. Marshall dissents from the view that the claim of the United States to Texas was given up in order to secure the Floridas. He believes that the acquisition of the Floridas was practically assured early in 1818, and that Texas was exchanged, not for the Floridas, but for the Spanish claims to Oregon.

Mr. Marshall traces at much length, chiefly through the congressional debates and public documents, the course of the negotiations between the United States and Mexico for the settlement of the boundary between the former and Texas. He inclines to the opinion that the toleration by President Jackson and his secretary of state of the devious course of Anthony Butler, even though they did not accept his repeated proposals to attempt the bribery of Mexican officials, went farther and lasted longer than was compatible with a sincere desire and intention to deal fairly with Mexico in regard to the acquisition of Texas and if possible a part of California by the United States. After the recognition of the independence of Texas by the United States, negotiations were naturally entered upon for the settlement of the boundary between that country and the Louisiana territory by means of a new treaty. Ere long a treaty was signed by which the Sabine was named as the boundary, while provision was made for the

actual running of the line by commissioners appointed on either side. The joint commission met at New Orleans on August 7, 1839. Their proceedings were scarcely harmonious, but their controversies have for the most part little importance today. In time they prosecuted their surveys to Red River; with the annexation of Texas to the United States, the western boundary of Louisiana ceased to be an international line.

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OUTLINE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. *By ARNOLD BENNETT HALL.* Chicago, La Salle Extension University, 1915. Pp. v, 255.

The author states in his preface that this volume is intended as a brief, non-technical statement of the underlying principles of international law; that it is written, not for the specialist, but solely for the general student and reader who is interested in the world problems of today. The text, consisting of 131 sections, occupies only two-fifths of the volume. The rest is devoted to a classified bibliography and to reprints of some of the Hague conventions, and of the Declaration of London. The author undoubtedly states his propositions with clearness and force; but the demands of condensation sometimes result in the omission of essential elements, while occasionally he relies on authorities that seem to have misled him. No judgment was rendered against the United States in the case of the Texas Bonds (p. 12). The decision of the umpire is readily accessible, but not in the work cited. The definition of piracy taken from another writer (p. 38) is manifestly too broad; nor is the distinction noted between piracy by law of nations and piracy by municipal statute. The right to appropriate fisheries on the high seas disappeared long before the Bering Sea dispute (p. 38), in which the pretensions of the United States in that regard were found to be based upon erroneous assumptions and to have no foundation whatever. The statement of the case of Martin Koszta, taken in connection with the title of the section (p. 42), might create the impression that more effect was sought to be ascribed to the declaration of intention than was actually claimed for it. A third state would undoubtedly be justified in disregarding a claim based on domicile as against a claim based on citizenship, either naturalized or native. In Koszta's case there are two capital points to be noticed: (1) that he had, as the United States contended, actually lost his Austrian allegiance by a

decree of that government; and (2) that the sole original ground of the claim of the United States to protect him was the fact that he was an American *protégé*, a ground which was never abandoned. The author apparently has relied upon the fragmentary and misleading statement of the case in Wharton's *International Law Digest*.

In saying that a diplomatic agent "can never . . . be tried or punished by the local authorities" (p. 45), the author probably did not intend to imply that this cannot be done if his government consents to it. The obligation of a foreign man-of-war to respect the local police regulations (p. 48) extends equally to the rules of neutrality, the observance of which the local government may compel. Consular jurisdiction usually depends, not upon the fact that a foreigner is "a party" to the suit (p. 49), but upon the fact that the defendant is a foreigner.

Not four classes of public ministers were created by the Congress of Vienna (p. 52), but only three; a fourth class (the third in the present schedule) was added by the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Nor is it likely that inquiries at Washington, for instance, would fully substantiate the assertion that the classification is "of little importance except for ceremonial purposes." In regard to the dismissal or recall of ministers, the case of Catacazy (p. 55) was complicated by certain circumstances, and especially by the visit of the Grand Duke Alexis, which render it valueless as a precedent.

The sections on treaties (65-73) might be slightly amplified to advantage; for instance, it is of the utmost importance that the elementary reader should know that the interpretation given by the United States to the most-favored-nation clause (p. 63) is not generally accepted by other nations. Even our own most-favored-nation clauses are by no means confined to privileges "gratuitously" granted. It is true that the United States, Spain and Mexico did not at the time adhere to the Declaration of Paris of 1856 (p. 90), but Spain at length gave her adhesion on June 18, 1908.

The section on blockade and contraband might be rendered more precise if amplified in certain particulars. This is very important at the present moment when highly metaphorical uses of the word "blockade" are current. Nor can the importance of the subject of contraband, and the confinement of claims under that title to proper limits, be overestimated. There can be no doubt that if it be left to belligerents alone to determine these questions, there is scarcely any rule established for the protection of neutral trade that is worth the paper on which it is written.

As to the Hague conventions relating to war, it is to be observed that they contain a clause which renders them inapplicable to conflicts in which not all the parties are adherents. The Declaration of London never acquired international force by the exchange of ratifications, Great Britain having declined to adopt the legislation necessary to give effect to it on the part of that government. Some of the provisions of the Declaration are indeed open to serious difference of opinion, the questions covered being substantially controversial.

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AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. *By* CARL RUSSELL FISH. New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1915. Pp. xi, 541.

The present volume, whose author is professor of history in Wisconsin University, appears in the "American Historical Series," edited by Charles H. Haskins, professor of history at Harvard. The style of the work is lively, with a tendency to broad generalizations. "Mr. Dooley," by apt quotation, figures (p. 371) as an authority upon the quality and performances of our diplomatists. The reader, thus wafted along and entertained, finds it irksome to linger, even though his eye may chance to fall upon statements that seem to lack verification.

By the "Family Alliance" (p. 18) the author, as the date shows, intended to refer to the treaty designated in the original text and universally known as the "Family Compact" (Spanish text, "Pacto de Familia," French, "Pacte de Famille"). It is stated that by this treaty "either country might, if engaged in a defensive war, call for the assistance of the other," but that "in such case it must make good any losses which the succoring party should sustain." In reality, the contracting parties agreed (Art. i) that they would "consider as their common enemy every power who shall become such to either of the two Crowns"; that (Art. xi) succors must be sent by the one upon the request of the other "for any offensive or defensive enterprise"; and that (Art. xiv) "in no case shall the said ships or troops be at the expense of the power to whom they are sent." There was, however, one limitation which the author does not notice—namely, that France should not demand the assistance of Spain, "unless some maritime powers should take part in the war, or unless France should be invaded." It was perfectly understood that the chief object of the Compact was resistance to England.

The author states (p. 21) that at the time of the American Revolution international law was "so far from being the formal and inclusive system which it is today that it was not beyond the comprehension of amateurs." In fact, some of the profoundest treatises on international law—treatises as much beyond the comprehension of the amateur as Coke on Littleton or Fearne on Contingent Remainders—antedate the American Revolution. We are also told (p. 22) that our early diplomats took "the lead in a new departure in international law—the science of international arbitration"; but the process was much employed even among the Greeks, to say nothing of the scores of cases in the five centuries preceding the birth of the United States. John Adams, we are informed (p. 48), succeeded in incorporating into the Treaty of Peace of 1782-83 "a recognition of American rights to fish on the 'Banks,' and sufficient inshore privileges to make fishing profitable." In reality, his great triumph was in obtaining the "liberty" of an absolutely joint participation in the inshore fisheries. On the same page it is stated that the American commissioners "readily agreed to an article that creditors on either side should meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery" of debts previously contracted; but, in fact, Franklin and Jay entertained grave doubts as to their power to agree to annul state laws, and the matter was settled only by a dramatic utterance of Adams in the presence of the British commissioners. It is stated (p. 50) that the Treaty of Peace "gave us a territory, not indeed logical and satisfactory, but ample for present needs." The immense territorial concessions obtained by the American commissioners were one of the marvels of the age.

It is represented (p. 104) that Gouverneur Morris, while minister to France, "on the whole maintained a commendable impartiality." Those who are not startled by this statement may do well to read Trescot's delightful volume on the diplomacy of the administrations of Washington and Adams. The name is Trescot, not "Trescott," as it is repeatedly spelled in the present volume (p. 386, 387, 401). We also find "Cockrane" (p. 206) for Cochrane, "Baron de Tuhl," (p. 209) for Baron de Tuyl, and the word "mondel" (page 474) for mondial. Such errors might perhaps be ascribed to dictation or to oversight in proof-reading, but this would not account for the application of the title "Dominica" (p. 327), the name of a British island in the West Indies, to Santo Domingo.

It is said (p. 110) that England had as the result of her experience "devised" a variety of practices, one of which was that enemies' goods at sea might be seized or confiscated even when carried in neutral ships. This was, however, the common

law of the sea, and long antedated the establishment of Great Britain's maritime power.

The Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 is said (p. 235) to have "revived and expanded the extradition article of the Jay Treaty, which had expired with the War of 1812." In reality, that article was never "revived," nor did it expire with the War of 1812. It expired, as did all other articles of the Jay Treaty, except numbers 1-10, and number 12, in 1808, by the express limitation of Article XXVIII.

The Marcy-Elgin Treaty of 1854 is described as having harmonized the growing difficulties of the "Newfoundland fisheries" by "submitting some points to arbitration, and by securing to us certain desired privileges, in return for which the Canadians were given the right to import their fish into the United States free of duty." Nothing was submitted to arbitration except the delimitation of certain reserved fisheries. But the capital fact of the treaty is that with this exception it temporarily restored to the American fishermen the great inshore liberty which the War of 1812 interrupted and the Convention of 1818 for the most part gave up. On the other hand, the commercial schedule, which was reciprocal, embraced not only "fish of all kinds," but in general the products of the farm, the forest and the mine. Moreover—and this is also a point of interest to students of constitutional law—the treaty conceded to British subjects the inshore fishing privileges of the eastern coasts and shores of the United States as far south as the Chesapeake Bay, with the reciprocal reservation of the salmon and shad fisheries and fisheries in rivers and the mouths of rivers. It may further be observed that the treaty, while dealing with the Atlantic coast fisheries, thus expressly provided that either the British Parliament, or the Newfoundland Provincial Parliament, or the Congress of the United States, might omit Newfoundland from its operation.

It is said (p. 288) that "we took a new step in our diplomatic relations . . . when in 1854 we joined in an international act concerning the treatment of those wounded in war." There was no international act of that kind of 1854; but if the statement was intended to refer to the Geneva Convention of 1864, it is necessary to point out that the United States did not accede to that convention till 1882.

The author does me the honor to cite, on page 289, my volume on *American Diplomacy* (pp. 168-199) as authority for the statement that prior to our naturalization treaties, countries other than the United States "all asserted the principle of indefeasible allegiance, while we asserted the right of individual choice of nationality." The volume cited shows, at the place in-

dicated, the contrary. The author so states (p. 289) the Koszta case as to convey the impression that the United States undertook to protect Koszta because he "had declared his intention of becoming an American citizen." This is a popular supposition which Marcy most sedulously endeavored to correct.

In connection with the subject of trans-isthmian traffic, it is stated (p. 291) that the first step in the formulation of the policy of the United States "was a treaty with New Granada or Colombia in 1844," but that "this arrangement was unsatisfactory and another treaty was drawn up in 1846." There was no treaty of 1844.

It is represented (p. 305) that when Seward on April 1, 1861, proposed "the development of quarrels with Great Britain and France as a means of restoring unity at home"; "Lincoln made no comment"! In reality, far more important than Seward's amazing counsel of desperation, was Lincoln's famous rebuke, which forever fixed Seward's relation to his chief. In submitting his proposal, Seward somewhat brusquely intimated that a definite foreign policy must be adopted, that the President must either "do it himself" or "devolve it on some member of his cabinet," and that, once adopted, "debates on it must end." Lincoln, without permitting a day to elapse, quietly but promptly answered: "I remark that if this must be done, I must do it"; and as to any points subsequently arising, he significantly observed that he wished, and supposed he was "entitled to have" the "advice" of "all the cabinet."

The statement (p. 324) that from Monroe's message in 1823 down to our Civil War there was "no controlling intervention by European powers in American affairs," overlooks the joint intervention of Great Britain and France between Buenos Aires and Montevideo in 1845. Perhaps certain other matters, such as the Mosquito protectorate, are not considered by the author as falling within the phrase "controlling intervention," although contemporary statesmen were inclined so to regard them.

Of the British members of the Joint High Commission by which the Treaty of May 8, 1871, was formulated, it is said (p. 345) that "the chairman was Earl de Grey, and with him were Viscount Goderich, president of the privy council" etc. But, if Viscount Goderich was present, so also were the Earl of Ripon and Baron Grantham, neither of whom the author mentions. In fact all three were titles belonging to Earl de Grey, who nevertheless acted in a single individual capacity. The name of another British member is given as Montague Bernard, but perhaps few have observed that Bernard's first name was spelled "Mountague." Charles Francis Adams is said to

have been president of the Geneva tribunal, but the president was Count Sclopis, the arbitrator from Italy. The American case is said to have been presented by "William Evarts, M. R. Waite, B. R. Curtis, and Caleb Cushing." It was presented by the American agent, J. C. Bancroft Davis. William M. Evarts and Messrs. Waite and Cushing were of counsel. B. R. Curtis was not connected with the tribunal.

The United States, by a separate treaty with Hanover of November 6, 1861, did accept a plan formulated by other powers for the abolition of certain tolls on the navigation of the River Elbe; and a similar treaty was made with Belgium in 1863 for the redemption of certain tolls on the navigation of the Scheldt. But it is misleading to speak (p. 351-353) of the United States as having in any way co-operated in "opening the Elbe" or "opening the Scheldt," which were internationalized and opened to the navigation of all nations by the Vienna Congress treaty of 1814.

Lord Salisbury's announcement on May 16, 1888, that the fur-seal negotiations had been suspended on the request of Canada is represented (p. 378) as a "counter stroke" to the United States' rejection of "the northeastern fishery treaty on May 7." The treaty failed to receive the approval of the Senate only at the end of August; the supposed rejection was the adverse report of a majority of the Committee on Foreign Relations. It is represented (p. 378) that in March 1889 Congress, largely through Blaine's influence, asserted that Bering Sea was under the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Fortunately no such step was taken, a declaration to that effect, inadvertently adopted in the House, having been rejected by the Senate. It is stated that in the fur-seal arbitration "the American case was presented by Edward J. Phelps, Frederic Coudert and Henry Cabot Lodge." The case was presented by the United States agent, J. W. Foster. Henry Cabot Lodge was in no way connected with the tribunal. At the head of American counsel was the late James C. Carter.

It is stated (p. 388) that, in the first International American Conference "nothing could be done on the subject of arbitration." In reality the transaction on which Mr. Blaine, the president of the conference, chiefly congratulated himself was the adoption of the comprehensive plan of international arbitration, in which he took a direct personal part. This plan, which stands first among the acts of the Conference, was not afterwards ratified, but this is true of many other acts of the International American Conferences. It is said (p. 451) that a Pan-American Conference was held in Mexico in 1901, and that such conferences have since been held every five years,

the third—the second of the “new series”—at Rio de Janeiro in 1906, and the next at Santiago of Chile in 1911. There has been no “new series.” The fourth conference was held at Buenos Aires in 1910, four years after the conference at Rio de Janeiro. None has as yet been held in Chile.

It is stated (p. 474) that the peace “conference” at The Hague devised “a model treaty known as the mondell [*sic*], or world treaty,” which “provided that all differences of a legal nature as well as those relating to the interpretation of treaties . . . and which did not affect vital interests, independence or honor, should be referred to the Hague Court.” The terms quoted are those of the Anglo-French treaty of 1903, which was subsequently widely followed by other powers. The great treaty of The Hague was far more comprehensive and of a radically different nature.

When we are told (p. 8) that “great figures like Franklin, John Quincy Adams, and Hay stand out by their achievements [in diplomacy] more conspicuously than do any of our legislators and than all but a few of our administrators,” one cannot avoid the reflection that in the formation of judgments as to the relative standing of public men, time is always an important and often a remorseless factor. Franklin is the only statesman whose name appears on all our four great fundamental acts—the Declaration of Independence, the Alliance with France, the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, and the Constitution of the United States. If we say that John Quincy Adams signed the Treaty of Ghent, obtained the cession of the Floridas, and formulated the Monroe Doctrine, we have only begun to recapitulate his pre-eminent services. In assigning to Mr. Hay not only co-equal rank with these men but a conspicuousness above all American legislators, proofs, not here recapitulated, will be requisite.

We are told (p. 304) that from 1861 till Hay became secretary of state in 1898, “the only members of any administration” who had had “direct experience in foreign affairs” were “Carl Schurz under Hayes, and Levi P. Morton and J. W. Foster under Harrison.” If the vice president is to be reckoned as a “member” of the “administration”—an assumption rather hazardous—then it is true that Mr. Morton had been minister to France. That Mr. Schurz spent a few months as minister at Madrid is a fact, but hardly a significant one. But what is to be said of William M. Evarts, secretary of state from 1877 to 1881, who had discharged an important special mission abroad, had argued great international cases, was counsel at Geneva in 1872, and sometimes aided his friend Seward in difficult foreign matters? Moreover, Marshall Jewell in 1874

resigned the Russian mission to become postmaster general; Horace Maynard, postmaster general from 1880 to 1881, had been minister to Turkey; Wayne Mac Veagh, who became attorney general in 1881, had served from 1870 to 1871 as minister at the same court; Charles Emory Smith, who became postmaster general eight months before Hay became secretary of state, was minister to Russia from 1889 to 1892. Possibly "there were others."

As contrasted with the sudden apotheosis of Hay, it is curious to read the brief dismissal of Hamilton Fish. "A less aggressive man than Seward, serving under a more interfering president than either Lincoln or Johnson," we are told that, although Fish was "trained, skilled, dignified and wise," he "achieved less" than Seward "and deserved no particular fame for originality." Such a statement immediately and necessarily calls up one of the great landmarks of world-history in the nineteenth century, the Treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871, and its comprehensive, far-reaching settlement of questions, the adjustment of which was rendered more difficult and more conjectural by the futile and unadvised conventions which furnished a sort of anti-climax to the close of Seward's career as secretary of state. In this celebrated instrument may be found the famous "three rules," which the British government certainly professed to regard as savoring of originality, together with provisions for the settlement of Civil War claims, of fisheries questions, of the San Juan water-boundary dispute, and of the claims generically known as the *Alabama* claims. The Geneva tribunal, by which the award on these claims was rendered, still furnishes the high-water mark of international arbitration. Of this treaty it is on all hands confessed that Hamilton Fish was to a great extent the author and finisher. The long and complicated negotiations which preceded its conclusion he inspired and conducted. Other distinctive achievements might readily be specified. Moreover, the public records show that there has been no secretary of state whose utterances and decisions have been cited by his successors more frequently or with greater respect and approval than his.

Although the reviewer has by no means enumerated all the exceptionable statements he has noticed in the parts of the volume which he has examined, yet he is prepared to believe that the author has done himself an injustice, which may be ascribed partly to writing under pressure on a subject with which he was not intimately acquainted, and partly to the unguarded indulgence of a verbal facility which too often impels its possessor to generalize upon mere impressions. At the present moment such things are not uncommon. On the contrary,

so widely do they prevail, even in quarters where we should least expect to find them, that we can only conclude that the insistent pressure of the insatiate popular and journalistic demand for something, for anything "up to date" or "timely," has temporarily unsettled our standards. Let us beware of this tendency, lest we cease to value and even to respect the patient and laborious methods by which alone scholarship can discharge its obligations in the garnering and dissemination of the truth.

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THE PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY¹

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INTRODUCTION

THE present work incorporates substantially the entire text, with few alterations or amendments, of the volume published by the author in 1905 under the title *American Diplomacy: Its Spirit and Achievements*. The narrative in that volume, however, embraces few incidents that occurred later than 1903. The years that have since elapsed have been marked by important events, some of which are destined to be highly influential in shaping the future course of the foreign policy of the United States. The present work brings the history of that policy down to date.

The object of the author in the preparation of the original work, as well as in its revision, has been to set forth and explain the fundamental principles by which the diplomacy of the United States has been governed. Domestic policy and foreign policy are seldom wholly diverse, and foreign policy is in the main profoundly influenced by local interests and ideals. Consequently, just as the internal development of each nation presents some distinctive phase or phases, so we may expect its foreign policy to bear distinctive marks by which it can be identified.

The United States after its advent into the family of nations promptly satisfied that expectation. In grave and critical conjunctures its foreign policy became identified with certain definite principles, enunciated by the founders of the government, by whom its course was then guided. The promulgation of those principles formed an epoch in international relations; and as they were conceived to be congenial with the spirit of American institutions, and were found to be beneficent in their operation, they were afterwards preserved and developed with remarkable consistency and intelligence of purpose. Down to a comparatively recent time they were regarded as practically immutable.

Of these principles the first and foremost was that of "non-intervention." This term was used inclusively in a twofold sense. It embraced, in the first place, non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. In this sense, while betokening the revolutionary origin of the government of the United States, it was also intended reciprocally to concede to other nations the right to determine their form of government and

otherwise to manage their domestic concerns, each for itself and in its own way. In the second place, it embraced non-participation in the political arrangements between other governments, and above all strict abstention from any part in the political arrangements of Europe.

Of the principle of non-intervention the system of neutrality was a logical derivative, as was also the recognition of governments as existing entities, and not as legitimate or illegitimate, or as lawful or unlawful, under the local constitution. The Monroe Doctrine itself was but the correlative of the principle of non-participation in European affairs. "Our first and fundamental maxim," said Jefferson, should be "never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with *cis-Atlantic* affairs." By preserving these principles, it was believed that the United States would best contribute to the preservation of peace, abroad as well as at home, and to the spread of liberty throughout the world.

While the text of the present volume is not made up of a continuous recital of events in chronological order, yet that order is followed in the development of each principle; and all the essential or important incidents in the diplomacy of the United States are given. This method has commended itself to the author as a means of communicating to the reader and to the student something more than a dry detail of names, dates, and places. For the most part it is believed that the study of the past yields little beyond a certain familiarity with those elements, which are in themselves of little value. The element of real value is the motives, the thoughts and purposes by which events are inspired.

While an attempt is made in the text to describe and explain transactions with sufficient fullness to enable the reader readily to grasp their significance, there are added, at the end of each chapter, citations of sources in which the study of the subjects treated can be further pursued.

In view of the importance attached to the relations of the United States with the other countries of this hemisphere, a special chapter has been added to the present work, on the subject of Pan Americanism. The idea of Pan Americanism is obviously derived from the conception that there is such a thing as an American system; that this system is based upon distinctive interests which the American countries have in common; and that it is independent of and different from the European system. To the extent to which Europe should become implicated in American politics, or to which American countries should become implicated in European politics, this distinction

would necessarily be broken down, and the foundations of the American system would be impaired; and to the extent to which the foundations of the American system were impaired, Pan Americanism would lose its vitality and the Monroe Doctrine its accustomed and tangible meaning. I say this on the supposition that the Monroe Doctrine is, both geographically and politically, American, its object being to safeguard the Western Hemisphere against territorial and political control by non-American powers. Of this limited application I would adduce as proof not so much the fact that the Monroe Doctrine, although conceived in terms of colonial emancipation, has not prevented the United States and other American governments from forcibly extending their territorial limits at one another's expense, as the fact that it has been regarded by the United States as justifying the latter's recent enforcement in Nicaragua, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and elsewhere, of precisely such measures of supervision and control as it is understood to forbid non-American powers to adopt in American countries. Indeed, it has even been maintained that the United States was required so to act for the reason that non-American powers were precluded from seeking the redress of grievances or the amelioration of conditions by such means. Still less has the Monroe Doctrine been assumed to affect the non-American relations of non-American powers, or to touch the relations of independent states generally. Such spheres can be penetrated only with other doctrines, on each of which should be bestowed an appropriate title. Although the poet tells us that the rose by any other name would smell as sweet, he does not assure us that any flower, if called a rose, would become one.

Before proceeding to the body of the work, it may be convenient to say something as to the mechanism of American diplomacy and the organs through which it has been conducted.

Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the executive as well as the legislative power of the United States resided in the Congress. On December 29, 1775, the Continental Congress appointed a committee of five, called the Committee of Secret Correspondence for the purpose of communicating with the friends of the colonies in other parts of the world. This committee was superseded, on April 17, 1777, by the Committee for Foreign Affairs. The committee plan proved to be altogether inefficient. Partly because of the irregular attendance of members upon Congress, it was difficult to get the members of the committee together. In order to remedy the defect, there was created, on January 10, 1781, the Department of Foreign Affairs, to be presided over by a Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The first person to fill this office was Robert R. Livingston, of

New York, who was elected to it on August 10, 1781. He entered upon his duties October 20, 1781, and served till June 4, 1783. He was succeeded by John Jay, who assumed charge of the office on September 21, 1784. By the act of Congress of July 27, 1789, under the Constitution, the Department of Foreign Affairs was reorganized and expanded, while by the act of September 15, 1789, its name was changed to the Department of State and the title of the head became Secretary of State. Jay, although he had been appointed Chief Justice of the United States, remained in charge of foreign affairs, under his commission as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, till March 22, 1790, when Jefferson entered upon his duties as Secretary of State.

A list is given below of the Presidents and Secretaries of State. It will be observed that there are frequent gaps between the terms of service of the Secretaries of State. These gaps were filled by the *ad interim* designation of some one, perhaps a member of the cabinet, or the chief clerk of the Department of State, or later an assistant secretary, or the counselor, to perform the duties of the office.

The Presidents and their Secretaries of State follow in order of date:

PRESIDENTS	SECRETARIES OF STATE
George Washington, April 30, 1789, to March 3, 1797.	Thomas Jefferson, commissioned Sept. 26, 1789; entered on duties March 22, 1790; served till Dec. 31, 1793.
John Adams, March 4, 1797, to March 3, 1801.	Edmund Randolph, Jan. 2, 1794, to Aug. 20, 1795.
Thomas Jefferson, March 4, 1801, to March 3, 1809.	Timothy Pickering, Dec. 10, 1795—
James Madison, March 4, 1809, to March 3, 1817.	Timothy Pickering (continued) to May 12, 1800.
James Monroe, March 4, 1817, to March 3, 1825.	John Marshall, May 13, 1800, to March 4, 1801.
John Quincy Adams, March 4, 1825, to March 3, 1829.	James Madison, March 5, 1801, to March 3, 1809.
	Robert Smith, March 6, 1809, to April 1, 1811.
	James Monroe, April 2, 1811, to March 3, 1817.
	John Quincy Adams, commissioned March 5, 1817; entered on duties Sept. 22, 1817; served to March 3, 1825.
	Henry Clay, March 7, 1825, to March 3, 1829.

PRESIDENTS

PRESIDENTS	SECRETARIES OF STATE
Andrew Jackson, March 4, 1829, to March 3, 1837.	Martin Van Buren, March 6, 1829, to May 23, 1831.
Martin Van Buren, March 4, 1837, to March 3, 1841.	Edward Livingston, May 24, 1831, to May 29, 1833.
William Henry Harrison, Mch. 4, 1841, to April 4, 1841.	Louis McLane, May 29, 1833, to June 30, 1834.
John Tyler, April 6, 1841, to March 3, 1845.	John Forsyth, June 27, 1834— John Forsyth (continued) to March 3, 1841.
James K. Polk, March 4, 1845, to March 3, 1849.	Daniel Webster, March 5, 1841— Daniel Webster (continued) to May 8, 1843.
Zaehary Taylor, March 5, 1849, to July 9, 1850.	Abel P. Upshur, July 24, 1843, to Feb. 28, 1844.
Millard Fillmore, July 10, 1850, to March 3, 1853.	John C. Calhoun, March 6, 1844, to March 10, 1845.
Franklin Pierce, March 4, 1853, to March 3, 1857.	James Buehanan, commissioned March 6, 1845; entered on duties March 10, 1845; served to March 7, 1849.
James Buehanan, March 4, 1857, to March 3, 1861.	John M. Clayton, March 7, 1849— John M. Clayton (eontinued) to July 22, 1850.
Abraham Lincoln, March 4, 1861, to April 15, 1865.	Daniel Webster, July 22, 1850, to October 24, 1852.
Andrew Johnson, April 15, 1865, to March 3, 1869.	Edward Everett, Nov. 6, 1852, to March 3, 1853.
Ulysses S. Grant, March 4, 1869, to March 3, 1877.	William L. Marcy, March 7, 1853, to March 6, 1857.
Rutherford B. Hayes, March 5, 1877, to March 3, 1881.	Lewis Cass, March 6, 1857, to Dec. 14, 1860.
James A. Garfield, March 4, 1881, to Sept. 19, 1881.	Jeremiah S. Black, Dec. 17, 1860, to March 6, 1861.
	William H. Seward, March 5, 1861—
	William H. Seward (continued) to March 4, 1869.
	Elihu B. Washburne, March 5, 1869, to March 16, 1869.
	Hamilton Fish, commissioned March 11, 1869; entered on duties March 17, 1869; served to March 12, 1877.
	William M. Evarts, March 12, 1877, to March 7, 1881.
	James G. Blaine, commissioned March 5, 1881; entered on duties March 7, 1881—

PRESIDENTS

SECRETARIES OF STATE

Chester A. Arthur, Sept 20, 1881, to March 3, 1885.	James G. Blaine (continued) to Dec. 19, 1881.
Grover Cleveland, March 4, 1885, to March 3, 1889.	Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, commissioned Dec. 12, 1881; entered on duties Dec. 19, 1881; served to March 6, 1885.
Benjamin Harrison, March 4, 1889, to March 3, 1893.	Thomas F. Bayard, March 6, 1885, to March 6, 1889.
Grover Cleveland, March 4, 1893, to March 3, 1897.	James G. Blaine, March 5, 1889, to June 4, 1892.
William McKinley, March 4, 1897, to Sept. 14, 1901.	John W. Foster, June 29, 1892, to Feb. 23, 1893.
Theodore Roosevelt, Sept. 14, 1901, to March 3, 1909.	Walter Q. Gresham, March 6, 1893, to May 28, 1895.
William H. Taft, March 4, 1909, to March 3, 1913.	Richard Olney, June 8, 1895, to March 5, 1897;
Woodrow Wilson, March 4, 1913—	John Sherman, March 5, 1897, to April 27, 1898.
	William R. Day, April 26, 1898, to Sept. 16, 1898.
	John Hay, Sept. 20, 1898—
	John Hay (continued) to July 1, 1905.
	Elihu Root, July 7, 1905, to Jan. 27, 1909.
	Robert Bacon, Jan. 27, 1909, to March 5, 1909.
	Philander C. Knox, March 5, 1909, to March 5, 1913.
	William Jennings Bryan, March 5, 1913, to June 9, 1915.
	Robert Lansing, June 24, 1915— (Mr. Lansing, who was promoted from the post of counselor, had an <i>ad interim</i> designation as Secretary of State from June 9 to June 23.)

THE PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

I

THE BEGINNINGS

WE hazard nothing in saying that not only the most important event of the past two hundred years, but one of the most important events of all time, was the advent of the United States into the family of nations. Its profound significance was not then unfelt, but in the nature of things its far-reaching effects could not be foreseen. Even now, as we survey the momentous changes of the last few years, we seem to stand only on the threshold of American history, as if its domain were the future rather than the past. But, if we would understand the diplomacy of the United States, the principles by which it has in the main been guided, and the distinctive influence which it has heretofore exerted, we must recur to the work of the original builders. Many nations have come and gone, and have left little impress upon the life of humanity. The Declaration of American Independence, however, bore upon its face the marks of distinction, and presaged the development of a theory and a policy which must be worked out in opposition to the ideas that then dominated the civilized world. Of this theory and policy the key-note was freedom; freedom of the individual, in order that he might work out his destiny in his own way; freedom in government, in order that the human faculties might have free course; freedom in commerce, in order that the resources of the earth might be developed and rendered fruitful in the increase of human wealth, contentment, and happiness.

When our ancestors embarked on the sea of independence, they were hemmed in by a system of monopolies. It was to the effects of this system that the American revolt against British authority was primarily due; and of the monopolies under which they chafed, the most galling was the commercial. It is an inevitable result of the vital connection between bodily wants and human happiness that political evils should seem to be more or less speculative so long as they do not prevent the individual from obtaining an abundance of the things that are essential to his physical comfort. This truth the system of com-

mercial monopoly brutally disregarded. From the discovery of America and of the passage to the Eastern seas, colonies were held by the European nations only for purposes of selfish exploitation. Originally handed over to companies which possessed the exclusive right to trade with them, the principle of monopoly, even after the power of the companies was broken, was still retained. Although the English colonies were somewhat more favored than those of other nations, yet the British system, like that of the other European powers, was based upon the principle of exclusion. Foreign ships were forbidden to trade with the colonies, and many of the most important commodities could be exported only to the mother-country. British merchants likewise enjoyed the exclusive privilege of supplying the colonies with such goods as they needed from Europe. This system was rendered yet more insupportable to the American colonists by reason of the substantial liberty which they had been accustomed to exercise in matters of local government. Under what Burke described as a policy of "wise and salutary neglect," they had to a great extent been permitted to follow in such matters their own bent. But this habit of independence, practised by men in whom vigor and enterprise had been developed by life in a new world, far from reconciling them to their lot, served but to accentuate the incompatibility of commercial slavery with political freedom. The time was sure to come when colonies could no longer be treated merely as markets and prizes of war. The American revolt was the signal of its appearance.

But there was yet another cause. The American revolt was not inspired solely by opposition to the system of commercial monopoly. The system of colonial monopoly may in a sense be said to have been but the emanation of the system of monopoly in government. In 1776 Europe for the most part was under the sway of arbitrary governments. Great mutations were, however, impending in the world's political and moral order. The principles of a new philosophy were at work. With the usual human tendency to ascribe prosperity and adversity alike to the acts of government, the conviction had come to prevail that all the ills from which society suffered were ultimately to be traced to the principle of the divine right of kings, on which existing governments so generally rested. Therefore, in place of the principle of the divine right of kings, there was proclaimed the principle of the natural rights of man; and in America this principle found a congenial and unpreoccupied soil and an opportunity to grow. The theories of philosophers became in America the practice of statesmen. The rights of man became the rights of individual men. Hence, our fore-

fathers in their Declaration of Independence at the outset declared "these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and that "to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

When the United States declared their independence they at once undertook to fulfil one of the necessary conditions of national life by endeavoring to enter into diplomatic relations with other powers. Indeed, even before that event, steps were taken towards the establishment of such relations. On March 3, 1776, the Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Continental Congress instructed Silas Deane, of Connecticut, to proceed to France in the character of a secret agent,¹ and if possible to ascertain whether, if the colonies should be forced to form themselves into an independent state, France would probably acknowledge them as such and enter into a treaty or alliance with them for commerce or defence, or both, and if so on what conditions. These instructions were signed by Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Harrison, John Dickinson, Robert Morris, and John Jay.

Deane's mission was by no means fruitless; but, after the Declaration of Independence, measures of a more formal kind were taken. On September 17, 1776, Congress took into consideration the subject of treaties with foreign nations, and adopted a plan of a treaty of commerce to be proposed to the King of France. Comprehensive in scope and far-reaching in its aims, this remarkable state paper stands as a monument to the broad and sagacious views of the men who framed it and gave it their sanction. Many of its provisions have found their way, often in identical terms, into the subsequent treaties of the United States; while, in its proposals for the abolition of

1. Deane, who was for some time after his arrival in France to be "engaged in the business of providing goods for the Indian trade," was to preserve the character of a merchant, it being assumed that the French court would not like it to be known that an agent of the colonies was in the country. But, with a letter furnished by Franklin, he was promptly to gain an introduction to "a set of acquaintance, all friends to the Americans," by conversing with whom it was supposed that he would have "a good opportunity of acquiring Parisian French." Meanwhile, through one of them who understood English, he was to seek an immediate audience of M. de Vergennes, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom, after exhibiting his "letter of credence," he was in the first instance to make application for a supply of arms and ammunition. In so doing he was to represent the opportunity that might ensue for the development of a large and profitable commerce. (Wharton, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution*, II, 78.)

discriminating duties that favored the native in matters of commerce and navigation, it levelled a blow at the exclusive system then prevailing, and anticipated by forty years the first successful effort to incorporate into a treaty the principle of equality and freedom on which those proposals were based. On the other hand, as if with prophetic instinct, care was taken that the expansion of the United States in the western hemisphere should not be hampered. The new government, in turning to France for aid, did not labor under misconceptions. It little detracts from our obligations to France, for support afforded us in the hour of peril and need, to say that that support was not and could not have been given by the French monarchy out of sympathy with the principles announced by the American revolutionists. No matter what incipient tendencies may have existed among the French people, there could be on the part of the French government no such sentiment. In one point, however, the French government and the French people were in feeling completely united, and that was the determination if possible to undo the results of the Seven Years' War, as embodied in the peace of Paris of 1763. Under that peace France had given to Great Britain both Canada and the Island of Cape Breton, and had practically withdrawn her flag from the Western Hemisphere. To retrieve these losses was the passionate desire of every patriotic Frenchman; and it was believed by the better-informed among our statesmen that France would overlook the act of revolt and embrace the opportunity to deal a blow at her victorious rival. Nevertheless, in the plan of a treaty to be proposed to France it was expressly declared that the Most Christian King should never invade nor attempt to possess himself of any of the countries on the continent of North America, either to the north or to the south of the United States, nor of any islands lying near that continent, except such as he might take from Great Britain in the West Indies. With this exception, the sole and perpetual possession of the countries and islands belonging to the British crown was reserved to the United States.

When this plan was adopted, Franklin, Deane, and Jefferson were chosen as commissioners to lay it before the French government; but Jefferson declined the post, and Arthur Lee, who was already in Europe, was appointed in his stead. On December 4, 1776, Franklin, weak from the effects of a tedious voyage, touched the coast of Brittany. He had just reached the Psalmist's first limit of age, and was no stranger to suffering; but, serene in the faith that sustained him in trials yet to come, he entered upon that career which was to add to his earlier re-

nown and shed upon his borrowed years the lustre of great achievements. As soon as his health was sufficiently re-established, he hastened to Paris, where he met his colleagues in the mission; and on December 23 they jointly addressed to the Count Vergennes, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, the first formal diplomatic communication made on behalf of the United States to a foreign power.

The plan of a commercial treaty which the commissioners were instructed to submit proved to be unacceptable to France; nor was this strange. The French government, while maintaining a show of neutrality, had indeed opened its treasury and its military stores to the Americans, under the guise of commercial dealings carried on through the dramatist, Beaumarchais, in the supposititious name of a Spanish firm. Nevertheless, France was still in a state of peace, her commerce unvexed by war, while America was invaded by a hostile army and her independence was yet to be established. She was free at any moment to become reconciled to England, and such a reconciliation was not deemed improbable either in England or in France. Even in America there were not wanting those who expected it. But the course of events swept the two countries rapidly along. The American commissioners, soon after they met in France, were authorized to abandon the purely commercial basis of negotiation and to propose both to France and to Spain a political connection—to the former, in return for her aid, the conquest of the West Indies; and to the latter, the subjugation of Portugal. These new instructions disclosed on the part of the United States a conviction of the necessity of foreign aid of a more direct and extensive kind than could possibly be rendered within the limits of neutrality. While the French government was still hesitating, there came the news of the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga. The report reached France early in December, 1777. The signal success of the American arms was the turning-point in the negotiations. The American commissioners at once assumed a bolder front. They formally proposed a treaty of alliance, and insisted on knowing the intentions of the French court. The answer of France came on December 17. On that day the American commissioners were informed, by order of the King, that his Majesty had determined to acknowledge the independence of the United States and to make with them a treaty. The negotiations then rapidly proceeded; and on February 6, 1778, there were signed two treaties, one of commerce and the other of alliance. The commercial treaty was the one first signed, and it thus became the first treaty concluded between the United States and a foreign

power. The treaty of alliance was signed immediately afterwards. The table on which these acts were performed is still preserved in the French Foreign Office.

In the treaty of commerce, the original views of the United States as to the opening of the colonial trade and the abolition of discriminating duties were by no means carried out; but the terms actually obtained embodied the most-favored-nation principle, and were as liberal as could reasonably have been expected. The treaty of alliance was, however, of a totally different nature, and established between the two countries an intimate association in respect of their foreign affairs. No one doubted that the conclusion of the alliance meant war between France and Great Britain. France's recognition of the independence of the United States was on all sides understood to be an act of intervention, which the British government would resent and oppose; for, while the United States had declared their independence, they were still in the midst of the struggle actually to secure it. This fact was acknowledged in the treaty itself. Its "essential and direct end" was avowed to be "to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty and independence, absolute and unlimited, of the United States, as well in matters of government as of commerce"; and it was agreed that, if war between France and Great Britain should ensue, the King of France and the United States would make it a common cause and aid each other mutually with their good offices, their counsels, and their forces. The American idea as to territorial expansion was, however, preserved. The United States, in the event of seizing the remaining British possessions in North America or the Bermuda Islands, were to be permitted to bring them into the confederacy or to hold them as dependencies. The King of France renounced them forever, reserving only the right to capture and hold any British islands in or near the Gulf of Mexico. In addition to these engagements, the United States guaranteed to France the latter's existing possessions in America as well as any which she might acquire by the future treaty of peace, while France guaranteed to the United States their independence as well as any dominions which they might obtain from Great Britain in North America or the Bermuda Islands during the war. In conclusion, the contracting parties agreed to invite or admit other powers who had received injuries from England to make common cause with them. This stipulation particularly referred to Spain, France's intimate ally.

The French alliance was beyond all comparison the most important diplomatic event of the American Revolution. It secured to the United States, at a critical moment, the ines-

timable support of a power which at one time controlled the destinies of Europe and which was still the principal power on the Continent. Only one other treaty was obtained by the United States prior to the peace with Great Britain, and that was the convention of amity and commerce, signed by John Adams, with representatives of their "High Mightinesses, the States-General of the United Netherlands," at The Hague, on October 8, 1782; but the Netherlands were then also at war with Great Britain, and their recognition, though most timely and helpful, was not of vital import. The failure, however, to make other treaties was not due to any lack of effort. Agents were accredited by the Continental Congress to various courts in Europe. John Jay and William Carmichael were sent to Spain; Ralph Izard was appointed to Tuscany; William Lee was directed to test the disposition of Vienna; Arthur Lee was authorized to sound various courts, including that of Prussia; Francis Dana was bidden to knock at the door of Russia; Henry Laurens was commissioned to the Netherlands. The fortunes and misfortunes of some of these agents form a curious chapter.

There exists a popular tendency to overrate the delights and to underrate the hardships of the diplomatic life; but, however much opinions may differ on this point, there can be no doubt that the office of an American diplomatist in the days of the Revolution was no holiday pastime. If he was not already in Europe, his journey to his post was beset with perils graver than those of the elements. In the eyes of British law, American revolutionists were simply "rebels," the reprobation of whose conduct was likely to be proportioned to their prominence and activity; and the seas were scoured by British cruisers, the dreaded embodiment of England's maritime supremacy. Deane went abroad secretly before independence was declared; but when his presence in France became known, the British government asked that he be seized and delivered up into its custody. Franklin sailed for France on a small vessel of war belonging to Congress, called the *Reprisal*. On the way over she took two prizes, and more than once, descrying a suspicious sail, cleared for action. Had she been captured by the British, Franklin would have had an opportunity to test the truth of his remark to his associates in Congress, that they must "either hang together or hang separately." Not long after bearing Franklin to France, the *Reprisal* went down with her gallant commander, Captain Wickes, off the banks of Newfoundland. John Adams, on his first journey, took passage on an American vessel; on his second, he embarked in the French frigate *Sensible*, and landed at Ferrol, in Spain. Jay committed

his fate to the American man-of-war *Confederacy*, and, like Adams and Franklin, reached his destination. Less fortunate was Henry Laurens.

Laurens was elected minister to the Netherlands in October, 1779, but, owing to the vigilance of the British watch of the American coasts, did not sail till August, 1780, when he took passage on a small packet-boat called the *Mercury*, under the convoy of the sloop-of-war *Saratoga*. When off the banks of Newfoundland, the *Mercury*, then abandoned by her convoy, was chased and seized by the British cruiser *Vestal*. During the pursuit, Laurens's papers were hastily put into a bag, with "a reasonable weight of iron shot," and thrown overboard. The weight, however, was not sufficient to sink them, and they fell into the hands of the captors, by whom they were "hooked up" and delivered to the British government. Laurens himself was imprisoned in the Tower of London. Never did consequences more momentous flow from a confused effort to supply the want of previous precautions. Among the papers there was a tentative plan of a commercial treaty between the United States and the Netherlands, which William Lee had, on September 4, 1778, agreed upon with Van Berckel, Grand Pensionary of Amsterdam, who had been authorized by the burgomasters to treat. Obviously this act was in no wise binding upon the States-General, and Van Berckel had formally declared that the treaty was not to be concluded till the independence of the United States should be recognized by the English. But trouble had long been brewing between the English and the Dutch; and the British minister at The Hague was instructed to demand the disavowal of the treaty, and the punishment of Van Berckel and his "accomplices" as "disturbers of the public peace and violators of the law of nations." This demand the Dutch declined to grant; and on December 20, 1780, the British government proclaimed general reprisals.

While the persons of our representatives were safe from seizure upon the Continent, they obtained no substantial recognition outside of France and the Netherlands. In 1777 Arthur Lee was stopped by the Spanish government when on his way to Madrid. Jay and William Carmichael were afterwards allowed to reside there, but only as private individuals. In the early days of the Revolution, Spain had given some pecuniary aid at the solicitation of France. That Congress expected to obtain from her further assistance may be inferred from the circumstances that Jay had scarcely left the United States when bills were drawn upon him to a large amount. But, with the exception of an insignificant sum, insufficient to enable him to meet these bills, which Franklin had ultimately to take up,

Jay obtained no aid and made no progress. With regard to the Mississippi, Spain demanded an exclusive navigation; but, in spite of the fact that Congress, against Jay's warning that such a course would render a future war with Spain unavoidable, eventually offered in return for an alliance to concede this demand from 31° of north latitude southward, his mission failed. Spain ultimately went to war against Great Britain, but for her own purposes. With a presentiment not unnatural, she to the end regretted the independence of the United States. In a prophetic paper submitted to the Spanish King, after peace was re-established, Count d'Aranda, who was Spanish ambassador at Paris during the American Revolution, said: "The independence of the English colonies has been recognized. It is for me a subject of grief and fear. France has but few possessions in America, but she was bound to consider that Spain, her most intimate ally, had many, and that she now stands exposed to terrible reverses. From the beginning, France has acted against her true interests in encouraging and supporting this independence, and so I have often declared to the ministers of that nation."

While the attitude of Spain towards the Revolution was affected by considerations of her particular interests, it was to a great extent shared by most of the powers of Europe. William Lee went to Vienna, but was not received there. Dana resided for two years at St. Petersburg as a private individual, and obtained nothing beyond one informal interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Izard was dissuaded by the minister of Tuscany, at Paris, from attempting to visit that country, and ended his diplomatic career in unhappy discontent at the French capital. But the greatest misfortune of all was that which befell Arthur Lee at the Prussian capital.

Diplomacy, in the course of time, had lost much of its idle pomp and ceremony, but had gained little in scrupulousness and delicacy. Bribery was still one of its most formidable weapons; but in its treatment of Lee it also employed methods the burglarious grossness of which was mollified only by the histrionic air that pervaded the whole transaction. Great concern was felt by England as to the possible course of Prussia; and when, early in May, 1777, the British government received, through one of its ubiquitous agencies, a report that Lee and Carmichael were about to proceed from Paris to Berlin, the Earl of Suffolk directed Hugh Elliot, the British minister at the latter capital, to "give every proper attention to their conduct, and the impression which it may make." His lordship added, with that completeness and accuracy of information which characterized all his communiations, that Carmichael

had "the best abilities," but that Lee was more immediately in the commission of Congress. At the end of May, his lordship wrote that a Mr. Sayre, and not Carmichael, would accompany Lee to Berlin; and Sayre he described as "a man of desperate private fortune, but with the disposition rather than the talents to be mischievous." Sayre was in fact one of those adventurers with whom Lee, through bad judgment, permitted himself often to be associated, with unhappy results. Meanwhile, before Elliot could have received his lordship's second letter, all diplomatic Berlin was agog over the arrival of Lee and a "Mr. Stephens," such being the patronymic under which Sayre, whose Christian name was Stephen, then travelled, while he assumed the character of a banker. Elliot, however, was not deceived; and, with the ardent desire of a young man of twenty-four to show his mettle, he set about his task with diligence and enthusiasm. His suspicions were soon inflamed by learning that Lee had had a private interview with Count Schulenburg and was in correspondence with him, and that Herr Zegelin, formerly Prussian minister at Constantinople, who was supposed to be much employed by Frederick the Great in confidential negotiations, had come to Berlin "unexpectedly," and taken lodgings not only in the same inn with Lee and Sayre, but even on the same floor. Nor was Elliot reassured when Count Schulenburg, on a certain occasion, turned the conversation to the "report" of the arrival of the "Americans," for the purpose of saying that he knew nothing of it; nor when, still later, he admitted that they had proposed to sell some tobacco at a low price, but declared that the King was "entirely ignorant of their being at all connected with the rebels in America." Elliot, however, had determined to get authentic information at first hand. Through a German servant in his employ, he "gained," as he expressed it, the co-operation of the servants at the inn and of the landlord's wife. By this means he learned that Lee kept his papers, including a journal of each day's transactions, in a portfolio which was usually laid away in a bureau. He therefore had false keys made, both to the door of the chamber and the bureau; and having learned that on a certain day Lee and Sayre were going into the country, where they usually stayed till eleven at night, he sent his German servant to bring away the papers. When the servant reached the inn, some strangers had just arrived, and as he could not enter the door without being seen, he got into Lee's room through a window. He returned with the portfolio about four o'clock. Elliot was at dinner, duly provided with four guests, "who were all enjoined to the most sacred secrecy, and set to copying instantly," while he himself went about to pay

visits and show himself. He was still thus engaged when, calling about eight o'clock at the inn on pretence of seeing a fellow-countryman, Lord Russborough, he found that Lee and Sayre had just arrived. He then assumed the most difficult part of his task. Knowing that the papers had not been returned, he, in company with Russborough, joined Lee and Sayre and endeavored to amuse them with conversation, which he did for nearly two hours, without any introductions, or any disclosure of names, but merely as one who had happened to meet persons speaking the same language. At ten o'clock, however, Lee retired, saying that he must go to his room and write. Soon afterwards Elliot heard a "violent clamor" in the house of a "robbery" and "loss of papers." He then drove home, and, finding most of the papers copied, disguised himself and took them to the mistress of the house, who, being in the plot, told the story that they were left at the door by some one who announced their return through the keyhole and then ran off. Lee appealed to the police, and an inquiry was promptly set on foot. It soon led to the German servant. Elliot, who was not unprepared for this contingency, immediately sent him out of the country, and made to the Prussian government, as well as to his own, an official explanation of the incident. According to this version, the affair was altogether an accident, due to his own imprudence in saying in the presence of an over-officious servant, that he would give a large sum of money to see Mr. Lee's papers; but, as soon as the "unwarrantable action" of the servant was discovered, the papers were returned. This account naturally found little credence, although diplomatic opinion of the merits of the transaction was said to be much "divided." But the knowledge of the fact that the British government had obtained copies of Lee's papers put an end to the attempt privately to negotiate with the Prussian government, and frustrated the plans for obtaining supplies from Prussian ports.

In the narration of the course of our Revolutionary diplomacy, there yet remains to be mentioned one name, that of Charles William Frederick Dumas. To the people of the United States it is to-day practically unknown; but I do not hesitate to affirm that, with the exception of Adams, Franklin, and Jay, he rendered to the American cause in Europe services more important than did any other man. A native of Switzerland, though he spent most of his life in the Netherlands; a man "of deep learning, versed in the ancient classics, and skilled in several modern languages"; the author and translator of a large number of works, some of which related to America, and the editor of an edition of Vattel, with a preface and copious notes—he felt at the very beginning the inspiration of the Ameri-

can cause, and from thenceforth dedicated his all to its advancement. When the first report of the Revolution was heard in Europe, he began to employ his pen in its support. Besides publishing and circulating an explanation of its causes, he translated and spread abroad the proceedings of the Continental Congress. Towards the end of 1775, his services were solicited by Franklin, in the name of the Committee of Secret Correspondence, as an agent of the American colonies in the Netherlands. He accepted the commission with the promise of "a hearty good-will and an untiring zeal," adding: "This promise on my part is in fact an oath of allegiance, which I spontaneously take to Congress." Never was oath more faithfully kept. His voluminous reports to Congress, some of which have been published, attest his constant activity. He journeyed from city to city, and from state to state, in the Low Countries, as the apostle of American independence. He lent his aid to Adams as secretary and translator, and later acted as *chargé d'affaires*, exchanging in that capacity for the United States the ratifications of the treaty which Adams had concluded with the Dutch government. And if, when the treaty was made, it represented not merely a perception of material interests, but the sentiment of fraternity commemorated in the medals of the time, the fact was in no small measure due to the untiring devotion of this neglected advocate of the American cause, to whom some memorial should yet be raised in recognition of his zeal, his sacrifices, and his deserts.

We have seen that in diplomacy, in spite of its supposed precautions, chance often plays an important part. So it happened in the case of the negotiations between England and America for peace. In the winter of 1781-82, a friend and neighbor of Franklin's, Madame Brillon, met at Nice a number of the English gentry. Among these was Lord Cholmondeley, who promised while on his return to England to call upon Franklin and drink tea with him at Passy. On March 21, 1782, Franklin received a note from his lordship, who, in the interview that followed, offered to bear a note to Lord Shelburne, who, as he assured Franklin, felt for him a high regard. Franklin accepted the suggestion and wrote a brief letter, in which he expressed a wish that a "general peace" might be brought about, though he betrayed no hope that it would soon take place. But at this moment the political situation in England was somewhat tumultuous. The American war was becoming more and more unpopular; and on March 20th Lord North resigned. In this emergency George III sent for Lord Shelburne. Shelburne advised that Lord Rockingham be called to the head of the cabinet, and declared the recognition of American

independence to be indispensable. Rockingham was made Prime-Minister, and Shelburne became Secretary for Home and Colonial Affairs. The Foreign Office was given to Charles James Fox. Franklin's letter to Shelburne was written without knowledge of the significant change then taking place in the British ministry. Soon afterwards news came of Shelburne's entrance into the cabinet; but Franklin thought no more of his letter till the second week in April, when a neighbor appeared and introduced a Mr. Oswald, who after some conversation handed Franklin two letters, one from Shelburne and the other from Henry Laurens. The letter from Shelburne, besides commending Oswald as an honest and capable man, expressed his lordship's desire to retain between himself and Franklin the same simplicity and good faith which had subsisted between them in transactions of less importance.

Although Fox had always been regarded with affection in America as a friend of the colonists, it was fortunate that the negotiations fell into the hands of Shelburne. Associated in his earlier career with men of reactionary tendencies, he afterwards became an eminent representative of the liberal economic school of which Adam Smith was the founder. As often happens, this change in his position gave rise to suspicions as to his sincerity. Lacking the vehemence which characterized Fox, and which gives even to the most flexible conduct the air of passionate sincerity, Shelburne was a man of high intellectual power, who followed the dictates of reason rather than the impulses of feeling. No better evidence could be adduced of the sincerity of his desire to treat on the most liberal basis than his choice of Richard Oswald as a negotiator. Ingenuous and impulsive, in the end the British cabinet was obliged to send an assistant to withdraw some of his concessions. On the part of the United States, authority to negotiate for peace had been given to Adams, Franklin, Jay, and Laurens. Jay arrived in Paris late in June, 1782, and for a time thereafter, owing to the illness of Franklin, the negotiations fell chiefly into his hands. But on July 6th Franklin presented to Oswald certain propositions, three of which were put forward as necessary, and two as advisable. The former were (1) the acknowledgement of independence, (2) a settlement of the boundaries, and (3) freedom of fishing; the advisable stipulations were (1) free commercial intercourse and (2) the cession of the province of Canada to the United States, partly in payment of war claims and partly to create a fund for the compensation of loyalists whose property had been seized and confiscated. The negotiations continued substantially on these lines till Adams, fresh from his triumphs in the Netherlands, joined his asso-

ciates in the commission. He arrived in Paris, October 26, 1782. The British government had then conceded (1) independence, (2) a settlement of the boundaries, (3) the restriction of Canada to its ancient limits, and (4) freedom of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland and elsewhere. There still remained open the question (1) of the right to dry fish on the British coasts, (2) the payment of debts due to British subjects prior to the war, and (3) the compensation of the loyalists. To the last measure Franklin was unalterably opposed, and whenever it was pressed brought up his proposition for the cession of Canada. Adams was equally insistent upon the right of drying and curing fish on the British coasts. The question as to the payment of debts grew out of the acts of sequestration passed by certain States during the Revolution for the purpose of causing debts due to British creditors to be paid into the public treasuries. The lawfulness of this transaction became a subject of controversy in the peace negotiations, especially in connection with the claims of the loyalists for compensation for their confiscated estates. Franklin and Jay, though they deprecated the policy of confiscating private debts, hesitated on the ground of a want of authority in the existing national government to override the acts of the States. But, by one of those dramatic strokes of which he was a master, John Adams, when he arrived on the scene, ended the discussion by suddenly declaring, in the presence of the British plenipotentiaries, that he "had no notion of cheating anybody"; and that, while he was opposed to compensating the loyalists, he would agree to a stipulation to enable the British creditors to sue for the recovery of their debts. Such a stipulation was inserted in the treaty. It is remarkable not only as the embodiment of an enlightened policy, but also as the strongest assertion in the acts of that time of the power and authority of the national government. The final concession as to the fisheries was also granted upon the demand of Adams, who declared that he would not sign a treaty on any other terms. Before the close of the negotiations, Henry Laurens arrived in Paris; and there, on November 30th, he joined his three colleagues in signing, with Richard Oswald, the provisional articles of peace. It has often been said that of all the treaties Great Britain ever made, this was the one by which she gave the most and took the least. It brought, however, upon Shelburne and his associates the censure of the House of Commons, and caused the downfall of his ministry.

The articles were signed by the American commissioners without consultation with the French government. In taking this course, the commissioners acted in opposition to their in-

structions. Their action was due to suspicions first entertained by Jay, but in which Adams, who besides was little disposed to defer to Vergennes, participated. Franklin, although he does not appear to have shared the feelings of his colleagues, determined to act with them. The question whether they were justified has given rise to controversies perhaps more voluminous than important. Every source of information has been diligently explored in order to ascertain whether the suspicions of Jay were, in fact, well or ill founded. This test does not, however, seem to be necessarily conclusive. In law, the justification of an act often depends not so much upon the actual as upon the apparent reality of the danger. The principal ground of Jay's distrust was a secret mission to England of Rayneval, an *attaché* of the French Foreign Office, and an especial representative of Vergennes. Jay suspected that Rayneval had been sent to London to learn from Shelburne the views of the American commissioners, and to assure him of the support of France if he should reject their claims to the fisheries and the Mississippi. The disclosure in recent years of Rayneval's reports to Vergennes has shown that his mission had other objects, though it is no doubt also true that the government of France, mindful of its own historic contentions, as well as of the interests of its other ally, Spain, regarded the claims of the Americans as excessive and was indisposed to support them. But whether the conduct of the American commissioners was or was not justifiable, it aroused the indignation of the French government.

You are about to hold out [wrote Vergennes to Franklin] a certain hope of peace to America without even informing yourself of the state of negotiations on our part. You are wise and discreet, sir; you perfectly understand what is due to propriety; you have all your life performed your duties. I pray you to consider how you propose to fulfil those which are due to the King. I am not desirous of enlarging these reflections. I recommend them to your own integrity.

No paper that Franklin ever wrote displays his marvellous skill to more advantage than his reply to these reproaches. While, protesting that nothing had been agreed in the preliminaries contrary to the interests of France, he admitted that the American commissioners had "been guilty of neglecting a point of *bienséance*." But as this was not, he declared, from want of respect to the King, whom they all loved and honored, he hoped that it would be excused, and that "the great work, which has hitherto been so happily conducted, is so nearly brought to perfection, and is so glorious to his reign, will not be ruined by a single indiscretion of ours." And then he adds this adroit suggestion: "*The English, I just now learn, flatter*

themselves they have already divided us. I hope this little misunderstanding will therefore be kept a secret, and that they will find themselves totally mistaken."

When the provisional articles of peace were signed, the American commissioners hoped subsequently to be able to conclude a commercial arrangement. This hope proved to be delusive. On September 3, 1783, the provisional articles were formally converted into a definitive peace. The old system, embodied in the Navigation Act, England even yet was not ready to abandon. It still dominated Europe, and confined the New World outside of the United States. Years of strife were to ensue before it was to fall to pieces; and in the course of the conflict the United States was to stand as the exponent and defender of neutral rights and commercial freedom.

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II

THE SYSTEM OF NEUTRALITY

BETWEEN 1776, when independence was proclaimed, and 1789, when the government under the Constitution was inaugurated, the United States entered into fourteen treaties—six with France, three with Great Britain,

two with the Netherlands, and one each with Sweden, Prussia, and Morocco ; but a majority of all were negotiated and signed in France, at Paris or at Versailles. Eight were subscribed, on the part of the United States, by two or more plenipotentiaries ; and among their names we find, either alone or in association, that of Franklin, ten times ; the name of Adams, seven times ; that of Jefferson, three times ; and that of Jay, twice. These early treaties covered a wide range of subjects, embracing not only war and peace, and, as did those with France, political alliance, but also commercial intercourse and the rights of consuls. Among their various stipulations, we find provisions for liberty of conscience, and for the removal of the disability of aliens in respect of their property and their business. Stipulations for the mitigation of the evils of war are numerous. A fixed time is allowed, in the unfortunate event of hostilities, for the sale or withdrawal of goods ; provision is made for the humane treatment of prisoners of war ; the exercise of visit and search at sea is regulated and restrained ; the acceptance by a citizen of the one country of a privateering commission from the enemy of the other is assimilated to piracy ; and an effort is made to limit the scope of belligerent captures at sea. But, prior to the establishment of the Constitution, it was easier for the United States to make treaties than to enforce them. In spite of the engagement of the treaty of peace, that his Britannic Majesty should with "all convenient speed" withdraw his "armies, garrisons and fleets" from the United States, important posts within the northern frontier continued to be occupied by the British forces ; and when the government of the United States protested, the British government pointed to the refusal of the State courts to respect the treaty pledge that British creditors should meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of their confiscated debts. For similar reasons, the act of the United States in sending John Adams, soon after the peace, as minister to the court of St. James, remained unreciprocated.

The termination of the period of divergence and of incapacity for uniform action among the several States came none too soon. Perils were close at hand, the disruptive impulses of which the old confederation could not have withstood. They were even to test the efficacy of the new Constitution. In 1789, when that instrument was put into operation, France was in the first throes of the great revolution which was eventually to involve all Europe in a struggle of unprecedented magnitude and severity. What attitude was the United States to hold towards this impending conflict ? Even apart from the treaties with France of 1778, the question was fraught with grave pos-

sibilities. For generations, Europe had been a vast battle-ground, on which had been fought out the contests not only for political but also for commercial supremacy. Of the end of these contests, there appeared to be no sign ; nor, in spite of their long continuance, had the rights and duties of non-participant or neutral nations been clearly and comprehensively defined. Indeed, so intricate were the ramifications of the European system that, when discords arose, it seemed to afford little room for neutrality. The situation of the United States was essentially different. Physically remote from the Old World, its political interests also were detached from those of Europe. Except as it might be drawn into disputes affecting the fate of existing colonies or the formation of new ones in America, it was not likely to become embroiled in European wars. Not only, therefore, did it enjoy the opportunity to be neutral, but its permanent interest appeared to be that of neutrality ; and the importance of preserving this interest was greatly enhanced by the necessity of commercial and industrial development. The new nation, though born, was yet to demonstrate to a world somewhat sceptical and not altogether friendly its right and its power to live and to grow. It was easy to foresee that its enterprise would penetrate to the farthest corners of the globe, and that its commerce, overspreading the seas, would be exposed to hazards and vexations of which the most uncertain and potentially the most disastrous were those arising from the exorbitant pretensions of belligerents. To resist these pretensions would fall to the lot of a neutral power ; and upon the results of this resistance would depend the right to be independent in reality as well as in name, and to enjoy the incidents of independence.

In circumstances such as these it is not strange that Washington and his advisers watched with anxiety the progress of the French Revolution, as, growing in intensity and in violence, it encountered, first, the agitated disapprobation, and then the frantic opposition of other powers. It was not till 1793, when England entered into the conflict, that the war, by assuming a distinctively maritime form, raised a question as to the obligations of the United States under the treaties with France ; but, long prior to that event, popular feeling in America was deeply stirred. Although the treaties of 1778 were made with Louis XVI, yet in the sounds of the French Revolution the American people discerned a reverberation of their own immortal declaration. From Boston to Savannah, there were manifestations of the liveliest sympathy and enthusiasm. To set bounds to this tendency, obviously would require the exercise of unusual prudence and firmness on the part of those intrusted with the af-

fairs of government. America had fought for freedom, but her statesmen were not mere doctrinaires. Their aims were practical. They understood that the peaceful demonstration of the beneficence of their principles, in producing order, prosperity, and contentment at home, was likely to accomplish far more for the cause of liberty than an armed propagandism, which perchance might ultimately degenerate into military despotism. It was therefore important to avoid premature commitments. To a perception of this fact is no doubt to be ascribed the appointment by Washington, on January 12, 1792, of Gouverneur Morris as minister to France. In his own country Morris had been a supporter of the Revolution, a member of the Continental Congress, assistant to Robert Morris in the management of the public finances, and a member of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. From the beginning, however, he had exhibited a distrust of the revolution in France. He instinctively recoiled from the excesses that were committed when his forebodings came to be fulfilled. Before he became minister of the United States, he offered his counsel to Louis XVI, in a sense directly antagonistic to the Revolution; and he afterwards sought to effect that monarch's escape. Such a man could not be acceptable to the revolutionary leaders; but he at any rate possessed an intimate knowledge of the conditions and tendencies of the time, and was not likely to commit his government to extravagant policies.

Early in 1793 a new minister was appointed by France to the United States. His name was Edmond C. Genêt. Of Morris he was in many respects the precise antithesis; for, while by no means destitute of experience, he was a turbulent champion of the new order of things. According to his own account, he was placed at the age of twelve years in the French Foreign Office, where, under the direction of his father, he translated into French a number of American political writings. After spending seven years at the head of a bureau at Versailles, under the direction of Vergennes, he passed one year at London, two years at Vienna, one at Berlin, and five in Russia. At St. Petersburg, however, he fell into difficulties. Because of some of his representations, which were pitched too high in the revolutionary scale, the Empress Catherine requested his recall, and, when it was refused, dismissed him. In reporting his departure for the United States, Morris observed that "the pompousness of this embassy could not but excite the attention of England." What it was that called forth this remark does not appear; but, whatever it may have been, there can be no doubt that Genêt set out on his mission gurgling with the fermentation of the new wine of the Revolution; and he had

scarcely left France when Morris reported that the Executive Council had sent out by him three hundred blank commissions for privateers, to be distributed among such persons as might be willing to fit out vessels in the United States to prey on British commerce.

On April 18, 1793, before this report was received, Washington submitted to the various members of his cabinet a series of questions touching the relations between the United States and France. These questions were, first, whether a proclamation of neutrality should issue; second, whether a minister from the republic of France should be received; third, whether, if received, he should be received unconditionally or with qualifications; fourth, whether the treaties previously made with France were to be considered as still in force. At a meeting of the cabinet, on April 19th, it was determined, with the concurrence of all the members, that a proclamation of neutrality should issue, and that the minister from the French Republic should be received. On the third question, Hamilton, who was Secretary of the Treasury, was supported by Knox, the Secretary of War, in the opinion that the reception should be qualified, while Washington, Jefferson, his Secretary of State, and Randolph, the Attorney-General, inclined to the opposite view; but the third and fourth questions were postponed for further consideration. In a subsequent written opinion Hamilton argued that the reception of Genêt should be qualified by an express reservation of the question whether the treaties were not to be deemed temporarily and provisionally suspended by reason of the radical change in conditions since they were formed. He also thought the war plainly offensive on the part of France, while the alliance was defensive. On the other hand, Jefferson maintained that the treaties were not "between the United States and Louis Capet, but between the two nations of America and France," and that "the nations remaining in existence, though both of them have since changed their forms of government, the treaties are not annulled by these changes." He also contended that the reception of a minister had nothing to do with this question.

On April 22, 1793, Washington issued his famous proclamation of neutrality. On April 8th, just two weeks before, Genêt had arrived at Charleston, South Carolina; but the news of his presence there reached Philadelphia through the public press only on the day on which the proclamation was published. At Charleston he lost no time in fitting-out and commissioning privateers; and, after having got a number ready for sea, he proceeded to the seat of the national government by land. On the way he incited the people to hostility against Great Britain,

and received such demonstrations of sympathy as to strengthen his confidence in the success of the course on which he had entered.

The posture of affairs between the United States and France was complicated and difficult. By the treaty of commerce of 1778, the ships of war and privateers of the one country were entitled to enter the ports of the other with their prizes, without being subjected to any examination as to their lawfulness, while cruisers of the enemy were in like circumstances to be excluded, unless in case of stress of weather. By the treaty of alliance, the United States, as has been seen, had guaranteed to France her possessions in America. For the moment, however, the situation was much simplified by reason of the fact that the French Republic did not ask of the United States the execution of the territorial guarantee. This may be accounted for by either of two reasons. The general arming of the whole population and the exhaustive devotion of the resources of the country to military purposes had caused a scarcity in France both of money and of provisions. The United States, as a neutral, formed a source of supply of both. An intimation to this effect was made by the French government to Morris not long before the issuance of Washington's proclamation of neutrality; and the same idea was strongly expressed in a report of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in June, 1793, in which it was said that the United States became "more and more the granary of France and her colonies." But there may have been yet another reason. It is not improbable that the National Assembly, while balancing the advantages of American neutrality against those of the treaty of alliance, doubted whether the guarantee was precisely applicable to the conditions then existing. This doubt is suggested by the original instructions to Genêt, which, although they were given before the conflict with England began, were written in contemplation of hostilities with that country as well as with Spain; and in these instructions, which looked to the formation of a new commercial and political connection with the United States, adapted to the conditions which the French Revolution had produced, Genêt was directed to bring about "a national agreement, in which two great peoples shall suspend their commercial and political interests, and establish a mutual understanding to defend the empire of liberty, wherever it can be embraced."

When Genêt arrived in Philadelphia, an unqualified reception was promptly accorded him. In presenting his letters of credence, he stated that his government knew that "under present circumstances" they had a right to call upon the United

States for the guarantee of their islands, but declared that they did not desire it; in a subsequent communication, he proposed that the two peoples should, "by a true family compact, establish a commercial and political system" on a "liberal and fraternal basis." The administration, however, was indisposed to quixotic enterprises. On the contrary, it was soon fully occupied with its efforts to vindicate its proclamation of neutrality, which was constantly violated by the fitting-out of privateers, the condemnation of prizes by French consuls sitting as courts of admiralty, and even by the capture of vessels within the jurisdiction of the United States. These proceedings, in which he was himself directly implicated, Genêt defended as being in conformity not only with the treaties between the two countries, but also with the principles of neutrality. When Jefferson cited the utterances of writers on the law of nations, Genêt repelled them as "diplomatic subtleties" and as "aphorisms of Vattel and others." He especially insisted that, by the treaty of commerce of 1778, the authorities of the United States were precluded from interfering in any manner with the prizes brought into their ports by the French privateers. The United States, on the other hand, denied that the contracting parties, in agreeing that prizes should not be subject to examination as to their lawfulness, deprived themselves of the right to prevent the capture and condemnation of vessels in violation of their own neutrality and sovereignty.

In the correspondence to which these differences gave rise, Jefferson, always perspicacious in his deductions from fundamental principles, expounded with remarkable clearness and power the nature and scope of neutral duty. Its foundations he discovered in two simple conceptions—the exclusive sovereignty of the nation within its own territory and the obligation of impartiality towards belligerents. As it was "the *right* of every nation to prohibit acts of sovereignty from being exercised by any other within its limits," so it was, he declared, "the *duty* of a neutral nation to prohibit such as would injure one of the warring powers." Hence, "no succor should be given to either, unless stipulated by treaty, in men, arms, or anything else, directly serving for war." The raising of troops and the granting of military commissions were, besides, sovereign rights, which, as they pertained exclusively to the nation itself, could not be exercised within its territory by a foreign power, without its consent; and if the United States had "a right to refuse permission to arm vessels and raise men" within its ports and territories, it was "bound by the laws of neutrality to exercise that right, and to prohibit such armaments and enlistments."

Such, briefly summarized, was the theory of neutral duty formulated by Jefferson. But the administration did not stop with the enunciation of doctrines. It endowed them with vitality. Acknowledging the obligation of the government to make indemnity for any losses resulting from its previous failure to cause its neutrality to be respected, it adopted efficacious measures to prevent the future fitting-out of privateers in the ports of the United States, to exclude from asylum therein any that had been so equipped, and to cause the restitution of any prizes brought by them within the national jurisdiction. To insure the enforcement of these rules, instructions were issued by Hamilton to the collectors of customs; and on June 5, 1794, there was passed the first Neutrality Act, which forbade within the United States the acceptance and exercise of commissions, the enlistment of men, the fitting-out and arming of vessels, and the setting on foot of military expeditions, in the service of any prince or state with which the government was at peace. In due season compensation was made to British subjects for the injuries inflicted by French privateers in violation of American neutrality.

The policy of the United States in 1793 [says the late W. E. Hall, one of the most eminent of English publicists] constitutes an epoch in the development of the usages of neutrality. There can be no doubt that it was intended and believed to give effect to the obligations then incumbent on neutrals. But it represented by far the most advanced existing opinions as to what those obligations were; and in some points it even went further than authoritative custom has up to the present day advanced. In the main, however, it is identical with the standard of conduct which is now adopted by the community of nations.

Against the course of the administration Genêt did not cease to protest; and, while he was himself its first victim, his misfortunes may serve as a warning to foreign ministers who may be disposed to reckon upon popular support in opposing the government to which they are accredited. There was indeed in his case much to mislead a judgment which, no matter how honest it may have been, was not well balanced. To the superficial observer it might have seemed that there were in the United States few Americans; that the population was almost wholly composed of partisans of France and partisans of Great Britain, the former constituting a vast majority; and that the administration, which was daily assailed with a virulence that knew neither restraint nor decency, might safely be flouted and defied. But when, convinced that the proclamation of neutrality would be faithfully enforced, Genêt denounced the government for the "cowardly abandonment" of its friends,

and, besides expressing contempt for the opinions of the President, persisted in questioning his authority, Morris was instructed to ask for his recall. The French government not only granted the request, but expressed disapprobation of Genêt's "criminal proceedings"; and his successor, M. Fauchet, demanded his delivery-up for punishment. This the United States refused "upon reasons of law and magnanimity." Genêt maintained, and with much reason, that he had acted in conformity with his instructions, which in reality contemplated the organization of hostile enterprises in the United States against Spain as well as against Great Britain. Nevertheless, he did not return to France, but settled in the United States, where he married the daughter of an eminent American statesman and spent the remainder of his days. It is only just to say that he has been the subject of much unmerited obloquy. In circumstances exceptionally trying, his conduct was ill-advised, but not malevolent. William Cullen Bryant, speaking in 1870, said that he remembered Genêt very vividly, as he appeared forty-five years before, when he came occasionally to the city of New York.

He was [said Bryant] a tall man, with a reddish wig and a full, round voice, speaking English in a sort of oratorical manner, like a man making a speech, but very well for a Frenchman. He was a dreamer in some respects, and, I remember, had a plan for navigating the air in balloons. A pamphlet of his was published a little before the time I knew him, entitled "Aërial Navigation," illustrated by an engraving of a balloon shaped like a fish, propelled by sails and guided by a rudder, in which he maintained that man could navigate the air as well as he could navigate the ocean in a ship.

The authorities of the French Republic took advantage of the request for Genêt's recall to ask for Morris's withdrawal. Under the circumstances, this act of reciprocity was ungrudgingly conceded. Morris was succeeded in France by James Monroe.

The Neutrality Act of 1794, though originally limited in duration, was afterwards extended, and was then continued in force indefinitely. In order to meet conditions arising out of the war of the Spanish colonies in America for independence, an additional act was passed in 1817; but this, together with all prior legislation on the subject, was superseded by the comprehensive statute of April 20, 1818, the provisions of which are now embodied in the Revised Statutes of the United States. A similar act was passed by the British Parliament in the following year; laws and regulations were from time to time adopted by other governments; and the duties of neutrality became a fixed and determinate part of international law. The

severest test of the system, as the ultimate standard of national obligation and responsibility, was made in the case of the claims of the United States against Great Britain generically known as the "*Alabama Claims*," growing out of the depredations of the *Alabama* and other Confederate cruisers fitted out in British ports during the American civil war. The government of the United States, in demanding indemnities for these depredations, could point to the precedent of 1793; but in the case of the *Alabama* claims the amounts involved were enormous, and the British government besides denied that it had been guilty of any neglect. By the treaty of Washington, of May 8, 1871, the question was submitted to arbitration at Geneva. The treaty declared that a neutral government was bound to use "due diligence" in the performance of its duties. The tribunal found that there had been negligence on the part of the British authorities in respect of three of the cruisers—the *Alabama*, the *Florida*, and the *Shenandoah* after she left Melbourne—and awarded the United States \$15,500,000. For the depredations of the French privateers in 1793 the United States paid to the subjects of Great Britain \$143,428.11. The amount was relatively small, but its payment, on considerations of international obligation and good faith, established a principle incalculably important, and, like the seed received into good ground, brought forth a hundredfold, and even more.

It is perhaps not generally known that the *Alabama*, in spite of the omission of the English customs authorities to seize her, might in the end have been detained but for an act of wifely devotion. On the 22d and 24th of July, 1862, evidence directly inculpating the vessel was communicated by the American legation in London to the British Foreign Office. On the 23d and 26th of July the papers were referred to the law officers of the crown, and, as the law officers had no permanent office, were sent as usual to the senior officer, who was then Sir John Dorney Harding, Queen's Advocate, his associates being Sir William Atherton, Attorney-General, and Sir Roundell Palmer, afterwards Lord Selborne, Solicitor-General. Unfortunately, Sir John Harding had just then fallen a victim to an acute mental disorder, which proved to be fatal, but which his wife, in the hope that it would soon pass away, had kept a secret. Upon the decision to be rendered by the law officers there hung, perchance, the issues of peace and war and the fate of nations; but the papers lay unexamined at Sir John's residence apparently till the 28th of July, when the Foreign Office, growing anxious at the delay, but ignorant of its cause, took steps to recover them and placed them in the hands of Sir William Atherton. On the evening of the same day, Sir William, per-

ceiving the gravity of the situation, which the papers disclosed, called Sir Roundell Palmer into consultation upon them in the Earl Marshal's room in the House of Lords. They at once agreed that the vessel must be seized. An opinion to that effect was delivered to Earl Russell on the morning of the 29th of July; but during the night of the 28th, the *Alabama*, as if conscious of what was impending, left the docks in which she had been lying. At ten o'clock on the morning of the 29th she put to sea. The order of the Foreign Office to detain her reached Liverpool in the afternoon.

The government of the United States, in 1793, had barely entered upon the performance of the duties of neutrality when it was swept into the vortex of the great struggle, which was to last almost unbroken for more than twenty years, for the maintenance of neutral rights. In this momentous contest there was involved the ever-recurrent question, which will continue in some form to arise as long as wars are waged, as to how far neutral powers are required to subordinate the interests of their commerce to the hostile interests of belligerents. That powers at peace were entitled to trade with powers at war was not denied, but the rule was subject to exceptions. It was admitted that a belligerent might cut off all trade with the enemy's ports by blockading them, and might also prohibit the carriage of contraband to the enemy. For entering or attempting to enter a blockaded port, the penalty was confiscation of vessel and cargo, while the carriage of contraband entailed the loss of the prohibited articles and the freight, if nothing more. There was, however, no precise and general agreement either as to what constituted a blockade, or as to what articles were to be considered as contraband. If blockades could be legally established merely by decrees on paper, without the application of force, or if the list of contraband could be sufficiently extended, it is obvious that the right of neutrals to trade with belligerents could be reduced to the shadow of a tantalizing supposition. Grotius, often called the father of international law, had divided articles, with reference to the question of contraband, into three classes: First, articles that were directly useful in war, as arms; second, those that were useless in war; and third, those that could be "used both in war and in peace, as money, provisions, ships, and articles of naval equipment." Concerning the first and second classes there was no dispute, except as to the possible inclusion or exclusion of some particular article; but as to the third class there had been a long and heated controversy, especially respecting provisions.

There was also a question as to whether the goods of an

enemy might be seized on board a neutral ship. It was conceded that a belligerent power might capture vessels belonging to subjects of the enemy, as well as other private property of the enemy at sea; but for many years an effort had been in progress to introduce the rule, denoted by the phrase "free ships free goods," that the merchandise of an enemy should, unless contraband of war, be exempt from seizure when transported by a neutral vessel. In 1780, the Empress Catherine of Russia issued a famous declaration concerning neutral rights. Since the days when Peter the Great, barbarian, statesman, and seer, diversified his studies in shipbuilding by riding through Evelyn's hedges in a wheelbarrow and pulling the teeth of his own retinue, Russia had aspired to become a maritime power. The declaration of the Empress Catherine afforded a striking manifestation of that ambition. Affirming the right of neutrals to trade with the powers at war, it sought to limit the scope of contraband, declared that blockades must be maintained by a force sufficient to render access to the blockaded port dangerous, and adopted the rule of free ships free goods. On this manifesto there was based an alliance of neutral powers, called the Armed Neutrality, the formation of which was one of the most notable events of the wars growing out of the American Revolution; and although the alliance was not effectively maintained, the principles which it consecrated possessed vitality, and were destined to survive an ordeal yet more severe than any to which they had ever been subjected.

By a decree of the National Convention of France, of May 9, 1793, the commanders of French ships of war and privateers were authorized to seize merchant vessels laden with provisions bound to an enemy's port, or with merchandise belonging to an enemy. This decree was defended on the ground of a scarcity of provisions in France, but it ran counter to the views of the United States concerning the freedom of trade as well as to treaty stipulations. Morris remonstrated against it, and intimated that it would be followed with eagerness by France's maritime enemies. His prognostication proved to be correct. By an order in council of June 8, 1793, the commanders of British cruisers were authorized to seize all vessels laden with grain, flour, or meal, bound either to a port in France or to a port occupied by the French arms. It is true that, by the terms of both these measures, the provisions, if neutral-owned, were to be paid for; but the compensation promised was far less than the cargo would have brought at the port of destination. Moreover, the order in council was followed, as was also the decree, by other measures yet more vexatious.

Out of these perilous complications Washington sought to

find a way by negotiation. John Jay, then Chief-Judge of the United States, was sent to London, where, on November 19, 1794, he concluded a treaty under which an aggregate amount of perhaps more than eleven million dollars was eventually obtained from the British government on account of maritime captures. The treaty, however, gave great umbrage to France, not only because it granted privileges of asylum to British ships of war and recognized the right to capture enemies' goods in neutral vessels, but also because it definitely fixed the position of the United States as a neutral. The resentment of the French government was soon made manifest by measures which prefigured the Berlin and Milan decrees of Napoleon. By a decree of the Executive Directory of July 2, 1796, which laid the foundation of a new series, it was announced that the cruisers of France would treat neutral vessels, as to searches, captures, and confiscation, in the same manner as their governments should suffer the English to treat them. The French government also recalled its minister from the United States and reduced the grade of the mission. Monroe, too, was recalled, and in his place was sent Charles Cotesworth Pinckney.

When, in December, 1796, Pinckney arrived in Paris, the Directory refused either to receive him or to permit him to stay at the capital as a private alien; and he retired to Amsterdam to await developments. Desirous, however, of trying all possible means of conciliation, President John Adams, while recommending to Congress the consideration of effectual measures of defence, joined Elbridge Gerry and John Marshall with Pinckney in a special mission. The three envoys arrived in Paris October 4, 1797. Four days later they were unofficially received by Talleyrand, who was then Minister of Foreign Affairs; but he subsequently intimated that they could not have a public audience of the Directory till their negotiations were concluded. Meanwhile, they were waited upon by three men who came sometimes singly and sometimes together, and who professed to represent Talleyrand and the Directory. These persons are known in the correspondence as X, Y, and Z. Their approach was prepared by W, who called on Pinckney and vouched for X as a gentleman of credit and reputation, in whom great reliance might be placed. On the evening of the same day X called, and, professing to speak for Talleyrand, suggested confidentially a plan of conciliation. He represented that certain passages in President Adams's recent speech to Congress, at which two members of the Directory were exceedingly irritated, would need to be softened; that a sum of money, to be at the disposal of Talleyrand, would be required as a *douceur* for the ministry, except Merlin, the Minister of Jus-

tice, who was already making enough from the condemnation of vessels; and that a loan to the government would also be insisted on. X stated, however, that he communicated with Talleyrand not directly, but through another gentleman, in whom Talleyrand had great confidence. This gentleman proved to be Y, who afterwards called with X upon the American plenipotentiaries and presented the propositions in writing. Y also dilated upon the resentment produced by the President's speech, but declared that, after the plenipotentiaries had afforded satisfaction on that point, they must pay money, "a great deal of money." In so saying he referred to the subject of a loan. Concerning the *douceur* little was said, it being understood that it was required for the officers of government, and therefore needed no further explanation. An impression perhaps widely prevails that at this point Pinckney exclaimed, "Millions for defence, but not a cent for tribute," and broke off the negotiations. The story is a pretty one, but is inaccurate. The sentiment in question, which resembles a phrase used by Jefferson, when Secretary of State, in his correspondence with the Barbary powers, was pronounced as a toast at a public dinner given to Marshall, at Philadelphia, on his return from France. In reality, the American plenipotentiaries, although they repulsed the solicitations of personal venality with the reply, "No, no, not a sixpence," offered to consult their government with regard to a loan, if the Directory would suspend its measures against American commerce. This the Directory refused to do. Negotiations were ended; the treaties between the two countries were abrogated by the United States; and there succeeded the state of limited war which prevailed from 1798 till 1800.

The respite which commerce enjoyed from belligerent deprivations after the Peace of Amiens was of brief duration, and the renewal of war, in 1803, was ere long followed by measures which retain in the history of belligerent pretensions an unhappy pre-eminence. The "rule of the War of 1756," by which Great Britain had assumed to forbid neutrals to engage during war in a trade from which they were excluded in time of peace, was enforced by the British admiralty courts with new stringency under cover of the doctrine of continuous voyages. Moreover, the British government in 1806, in retaliation for a decree of Prussia, which was issued under Napoleonic compulsion, excluding British trade from that country, declared the mouths of the Ems, the Weser, the Elbe, and the Trave to be in a state of blockade. On November 21, 1806, Napoleon fulminated from the imperial camp at Berlin a decree declaring the British Islands to be in a state of blockade and prohibiting all

commerce and correspondence with them. Great Britain replied by an order in council of January 6, 1807, forbidding neutral vessels to trade between ports in the control of France or her allies; and by still another order, November 11, 1807, she forbade such vessels to trade with the ports of France and her allies, or even with any port in Europe from which the British flag was excluded, without a clearance obtained in a British port. Napoleon's answer was the Milan decree of December 17, 1807, by which it was declared that every vessel that had submitted to search by an English ship, or consented to a voyage to England, or paid any tax to the English government, as well as every vessel that should sail to or from a port in Great Britain or her possessions, or in any country occupied by British troops, should be deemed good prize. These measures, with their bald assertions of paper blockades and sweeping denials of the rights of neutrality, the United States, as practically the only remaining neutral, met with protests, with embargoes, with non-intercourse, and finally, in the case of Great Britain, which was aggravated by the question of impressment, to which President Madison gave so much prominence in his war message, with hostile resistance, while from France a considerable indemnity was afterwards obtained by treaty. The pretensions against which the United States contended are no longer justified on legal grounds. Since the Declaration of Paris of 1856, it has been universally admitted that a blockade, in order to be valid, must be effective. The right of neutrals to trade with belligerents is acknowledged, subject only to the law of contraband and of blockade.

There is one radical limitation to belligerent activities, which, although often urged, has not yet been adopted. This is the inhibition of the capture of private property at sea. Strongly advocated by Franklin, it was introduced into the first treaty between the United States and Prussia, in the signature of which he was associated with Adams and Jefferson. John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, William L. Marcy, and Hamilton Fish are among the great Secretaries of State who have given the principle their support. President McKinley, in his annual message of December 5, 1898, suggested to Congress that the Executive be authorized to correspond with the governments of the principal maritime powers of the world with a view to incorporate it into the permanent law of civilized nations. This recommendation was cordially renewed by President Roosevelt in his annual message of December 7, 1903, in which the exemption, except as to contraband of war, was advocated not only as a matter of "humanity and morals," but

also as a measure altogether compatible with the practical conduct of war at sea.

The American delegates to the first Peace Conference at The Hague, in 1899, although the subject was not on the program, were authorized "to propose to the conference the principle of extending to strictly private property at sea the immunity from destruction or capture by belligerent powers which such property already enjoys on land, as worthy of being incorporated in the permanent law of civilized nations." The delegation accordingly submitted a proposition to "exempt from capture or seizure on the high seas, or elsewhere," by armed vessels or by military forces, all private property except (1) contraband of war and (2) vessels and cargoes attempting to enter a blockaded port. The conference, regarding this as a proposal to declare "the inviolability of private property in naval warfare," took no action beyond the expression of a wish (*vœu*) that the subject might be "referred to a subsequent conference for consideration."

On April 28, 1904, the Congress of the United States adopted a resolution expressing the opinion that it was desirable that the President should endeavor to bring about an understanding among the principal maritime powers for the incorporation into "the permanent law of civilized nations" of "the principle of the exemption of all private property at sea, not contraband of war, from capture or destruction by belligerents." This resolution was quoted in Mr. Hay's circular of October 21, 1904, suggesting the calling of the Second Hague Conference, and also in the instructions given on May 31, 1907, to the delegates of the United States to that conference, who were authorized to advocate the proposition submitted by the American delegation at the first conference. In conformity with these instructions, the proposal was duly presented and pressed, but without success. Mr. Scott, the technical delegate of the United States, in his narration of the work of the conference, states that the failure

was due solely to the fact that large maritime powers such as Great Britain, Japan, and Russia, and in a lesser degree France, were unwilling to renounce the right of capture of private property, either as a means of preventing a resort to arms or of shortening the war by bringing the enemy to terms.

Still another, and a somewhat curious, phase of the subject is dealt with in the report of the delegation of the United States. Among the measures formulated by the conference and signed by a number of the delegations, but not by that of the United States, is a convention regulating the transforma-

tion of vessels of commerce into vessels of war. The report states that the delegation of the United States would, perhaps, have signed this convention had not the conference regarded it as a "corollary" of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, which undertook to abolish the practice of privateering, and as a guarantee against a return to that practice. The delegation, in a formal statement to the conference, pointed out that the United States had never adhered to the Declaration of Paris or renounced the right to resort to privateering, but, in conformity with instructions, offered to vote for the abolition of the practice, in case the conference "should establish the inviolability of private property on the seas," subject, of course, to the law of contraband and of blockade. The report of the delegation intimates, however, that the government of the United States is under a disability to agree by treaty to the abolition of privateering, because the Constitution confers upon Congress the power, which has repeatedly been exercised, to "grant letters of marque and reprisal," that is to say, privateering commissions. If this be so, it is not clear why the disability does not preclude an abandonment of the thing authorized to be done. Letters of marque and reprisal never were regarded as being, like trinkets and ornaments, an end in themselves. They are merely the appropriate documentary evidence of authority to carry on war in a certain way. But the particular method of warfare to which they relate is neither more sacred nor more constitutional than any other method contained in the grant of war powers to Congress, which clearly embrace the capture of private property at sea. On the contrary, to agree generally to forego such capture would involve a far greater relinquishment of power than would the renunciation of a particular method of capture.

In reality, the suggested constitutional difficulty seems to lack substance. To say nothing of the fact that the regulation of methods of warfare would appear to be peculiarly within the treaty-making power, the principle of interpretation on which the doubt is suggested appears to be radically unsound and to belong in the category of notions which tend to bring constitutional law into disrepute. That the United States cannot internationally agree to forego the exercise of any power which the Constitution has conferred on Congress, or other department of government, is a supposition contradicted by every exercise of the treaty-making power since the government came into existence. When we reflect upon the number and extent of the powers conferred upon the national government, and upon their distribution and the methods prescribed for their exercise, it is obvious that the attempt to act upon such a supposi-

tion would exclude the United States from any part in the progress of the world through the amelioration of law and practice by international action.

Immediately on the outbreak of war in Europe, in August, 1914, the President of the United States issued the normal proclamation of neutrality; but controversial questions soon arose concerning the rights as well as the duties of neutrals. The safety of ships was imperiled by the placing of mines in the open seas, each belligerent charging its adversaries with the first overt act. As early as August, 1914, the British authorities gave warning of danger from mines in the North Sea, and on November 2d the British Admiralty, alleging that the Germans had scattered mines there indiscriminately, issued a notice declaring that the entire North Sea must be considered a "military area," within which merchant shipping would be exposed to danger from mines as well as from war-ships searching for suspicious craft. Sailing directions were given for ships wishing to trade with Norway, the Baltic, Denmark, and Holland.

The age-long dispute as to contraband was revived, particularly as to foodstuffs, which fall in the "conditional" category of things not subject to capture unless intended for the consumption of military or naval forces. An attempt to deal comprehensively with this subject was made in the Declaration of London (1909), and, although the declaration had not been ratified, the United States proposed that the belligerents should individually adopt it. Austria-Hungary and Germany substantially assented on condition of reciprocity. Great Britain conditioned her assent upon certain modifications judged "indispensable to the efficient conduct" of her naval operations. The United States on October 22, 1914, withdrew its proposal, declaring that it would rely on "the existing rules of international law" and its treaties.

Apparently with a view to make a test case, a ship called the *Wilhelmina* was, early in 1915, loaded in the United States with foodstuffs for Germany. On her way she was seized by the British authorities, and her cargo sent to a prize court. On February 4th the German government, while denouncing Great Britain's conduct of commercial warfare as illegal, announced that, just as England had declared the North Sea to be a "military area" Germany would, in retaliation, treat the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the entire English Channel, as a "war zone," wherein, after February 18th, every enemy merchant-ship would be destroyed, and even neutral ships would be exposed to danger because of the misuse of neutral flags which the British government was said to have

ordered. February 10th the United States replied that if German vessels of war, assuming a misuse of the American flag, should "destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens," the United States would view the act "as an indefensible violation of neutral rights," for which it would hold the German government "to a strict accountability"; and an assurance was requested "that American citizens and their vessels" would not be molested "otherwise than by visit and search." On the same day the United States, referring to the report that the captain of the British steamship *Lusitania*, acting under governmental orders, had lately raised the American flag in order to evade German submarines, requested the British government to endeavor to restrain British vessels from so doing in the sea area defined in the German declaration. The German government, in reply, justified its decree on the ground that, as Germany, "with the toleration, tacit, or protesting," of neutrals, was illegally cut off from all oversea supplies, it was her right to use all means at her disposal to prevent supplies, particularly of war materials, from reaching Great Britain and her allies, but admitted that the measure adopted for this purpose would involve danger, even to neutral vessels, and expressed the hope that the United States would forestall all trouble by bringing about the observance of the Declaration of London.

Subsequently, the United States proposed to the British and German governments the following provisional arrangement: Both were to agree strictly to limit the use of mines, to refrain from employing submarines against merchant-vessels except for visit and search, and to restrain such vessels from misusing neutral flags, while, if Germany agreed that imported food-stuffs should be consigned to agencies to be designated by the United States for distribution solely to retail dealers licensed to sell them only to non-combatants, Great Britain was not to interfere with their transportation. The German government, on March 1st, accepted with certain reservations; but, on the same day, the British ambassador at Washington, affirming that the German war-zone decree substituted "indiscriminate destruction for regulated capture," gave notice that the British and French governments, having in contemplation "retaliatory measures," would "hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin." This purpose was amplified in the British order in council of March 11, 1915, designed "to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany." The word "blockade," which means the real cutting off, by a sufficient force, as to all or part of an enemy's coasts, of in-

gress or egress by vessels of all nations, is not found in this order. It was used by Sir Edward Grey in an explanatory memorandum, in which he spoke of "the measures of blockade" authorized by the order; described its "object" as being "to establish a blockade to prevent vessels from carrying goods for or coming from Germany"; and stated that Great Britain and her allies would not impose the penalty of blockade, which is confiscation of ship and cargo, but would "restrict their claim to the stopping of cargoes destined for or coming from Germany." The interruption of commerce would, he said, be carried out by "controlling by a cordon of cruisers all passage to and from Germany," without sacrifice of neutral ships or non-combatant lives. The disposition made of the cargoes would be governed by the circumstances.

May 7, 1915, the *Lusitania* was torpedoed and sunk off the Irish coast, without warning, by a German submarine. Before her departure from New York the German ambassador published in the press a warning to passengers not to sail on her. Over a hundred American citizens lost their lives. The United States on May 13th demanded a disavowal of the act, reparation for the injuries inflicted, and immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of such an event. The note in which these demands were presented spoke of "the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative"; adverted to the "surprising irregularity" of the warning published by the German ambassador; and remarked that the Imperial German government would not expect the United States "to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

Answering on May 28th, the German government, while expressing sorrow for the loss of Americans, contended that the *Lusitania* was in effect built as an auxiliary cruiser and was armed, that she had aboard Canadian troops and a quantity of ammunition whose explosion hastened her sinking, that American lives were sought to be used as a protection for war materials, and that British vessels had secret instructions to ram submarines. Before the reply of the United States was made, Mr. Bryan resigned as Secretary of State, explaining his action upon the ground of his belief that the position which the government was assuming would lead to a conflict. He was succeeded by Mr. Robert Lansing, who had held the post of counsellor for the Department of State. The reply of the United

States to the German note bears date of June 9th. It did not repeat the intimation, made in the note of May 18th, that submarines could not lawfully be used as commerce-destroyers, but, while remarking that "nothing but actual forcible resistance or continued efforts to escape by flight when ordered to stop for the purpose of visit" had ever been held to forfeit the lives of the passengers and crew of a merchantman, maintained that only "actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for so much as putting the lives of those on board the ship in jeopardy"; denied that the *Lusitania* was armed; and declared that the United States could not admit that the proclamation of a war zone might be made to operate as "an abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchantships of belligerent nationality." Germany (July 8th) offered to instruct her submarines to permit the safe passage of American passenger-steamers, at the same time expressing the hope that the United States would guarantee that they did not carry contraband, and proposed to include in the offer neutral steamers, and if necessary four enemy steamers, all under the American flag. The United States (July 21st), attacks on other vessels having meanwhile taken place, declined this offer, expressed the expectation that the German government would no longer delay disavowal of the act of its naval commander and reparation for the American lives lost, and said that the repetition of such acts would be regarded as "deliberately unfriendly."

September 1, 1915, the German ambassador gave the following assurance: "Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance." This was, he said, decided upon before the sinking of the *Arabic*, which the German government afterwards (October 5th) disavowed, with expressions of regret and a promise of indemnity for the American lives lost.

Negotiations subsequently took place for the settlement of the case of the *Lusitania*, but they were interrupted by a new controversy as to the position of enemy merchantmen "armed for defense," which the German government, claiming that they were under instructions to act offensively, gave notice would be attacked without warning. In an "informal and confidential letter" sent to the ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia, and the minister of Belgium, on January 18th, and to the ambassador of Japan on January 24,

1916, Mr. Lansing proposed an arrangement to the effect that merchant-vessels should be prohibited from carrying any armament, while submarines should be required to adhere strictly to the rules of international law in regard to visit and search and the safety of passengers and crews. The letter stated, in conclusion, that the United States was "impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant-vessel carrying armament of any sort, in view of the character of submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of undersea craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent government," and that the United States was "seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly."

The substance of this letter, the text of which was not officially published till the following August, appeared in the press, without explanation, about the middle of February, 1916. The proposal which it conveyed was formally declined by Great Britain on the 23d of March. Meanwhile, a movement took place in Congress to pass a resolution warning citizens of the United States against traveling on armed enemy merchantmen. This movement, which assumed formidable proportions, was publicly opposed by President Wilson. It eventually failed; and a memorandum "prepared during March, 1916," "by direction of the President," on the status of armed merchantmen, was made public by the Department of State, under date of the 25th of that month, as a statement of the government's attitude on the subject. This memorandum, while reasserting the right of neutrals to travel on armed belligerent merchantmen, declared that the determination by a belligerent war-ship of the "war-like character" of such an enemy vessel "must rest in no case upon presumption, but upon conclusive evidence"; that, "in the absence of conclusive evidence," the belligerent must "act on the presumption that an armed merchantman is of peaceful character," even though the armament were such as a neutral government, in performing its neutral duties, might "presume to be intended for aggression." The explanation given of this distinction was that the belligerent war-ship "can on the high seas test by actual experience the purpose of an armament on an enemy merchant-vessel, and so determine by direct evidence the *status* of the vessel."

The entire submarine controversy was brought to a head by the torpedoing by a German submarine, in the English Channel, March 24, 1916, of the French steamship *Sussex*, an unarmed vessel having on board more than three hundred passengers, about eighty of whom, including some citizens of the United States, were killed or injured. In the course of

previous discussions offers of Germany to arbitrate various phases of the controversy had been declined. On a review of the case of the *Sussex* and other cases, the United States, on April 18th, instructed the American ambassador at Berlin to deliver to the German government a note, which was in the nature of an ultimatum. This note, after remarking that it had become "painfully evident" that the position originally taken by the United States was "inevitable," namely, that the use of submarines as commerce destroyers was incompatible with the "principles of humanity," the "rights of neutrals," and the "immunities of non-combatants," declared that, if it was "still the purpose" of the German government to prosecute "relentless and indiscriminate" submarine warfare against "vessels of commerce," the United States was at last forced to the conclusion that there was but one course to pursue; and that, unless that government should "immediately declare and effect an abandonment" of its "present methods" of submarine warfare against both "passenger" and "freight-carrying" vessels, the United States could "have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."

The German government, answering on May 4th, stated that orders had been issued to its naval forces that, "in accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant-vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance." The note added, however, that neutrals could not expect Germany, forced to fight for her existence, to restrict, in their interest, the use of an effective weapon, if her enemy was "permitted to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating the rules of international law"; that, the United States having repeatedly declared its determination to restore the principle of the freedom of the seas from whatever quarter it had been violated, the German government did not doubt that the United States would at once "demand and insist" that the British government "forthwith observe the rules of international law universally recognized before the war," as laid down in notes of the United States to that government of December 26, 1914, and November 5, 1915; and that, in case the steps taken by the United States to attain that object should not result in the observance of the laws of humanity by all belligerent nations, "the German government would then be facing a new situation, in which it must reserve itself complete liberty of decision."

Responding, on May 8th, Mr. Lansing said that the United

States, in "accepting" the German government's "declaration of its abandonment" of the policy which had so seriously menaced the good relations between the two countries, would "rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy" of that government, and would take it for granted that the latter did "not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy" was "in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations" between the United States and any other belligerent government, although "certain passages" "might appear to be susceptible of that construction"; but that, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the United States must notify the Imperial government that it could

not for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants.

To this counter notification, or reservation, the German government did not reply.

As has been seen, the German note of May 4, 1916, specified certain notes which the United States addressed to Great Britain on December 26, 1914, and November 5, 1915. In the former, which related to the seizure and detention of vessels laden with American goods destined to neutral ports in Europe, the United States said it was reluctantly forced to conclude that the policy pursued by the British government in such matters exceeded the manifest necessities of a belligerent and constituted restrictions upon the rights of American citizens on the high seas which were "not justified by the rules of international law or required under the principle of self-preservation," and that, if such things continued, they might "arouse a feeling contrary to that which has so long existed between the American and British peoples." Sir Edward Grey, in reply (January 7, 1915), pointed to the increase of American trade with neutral countries, and stated that the British government were desirous "not to interfere with the normal importation and use by the neutral countries of goods from the United States." The note of November 5, 1915, dealt at great length with the operation of the order in council of the 11th of the preceding March, and, after adverting to the fact that trade was carried on openly by sea between the Scandinavian countries and Germany, declared that the methods sought to be employed to obtain and use evidence of enemy destination of cargoes bound for neutral ports and to impose a contraband character upon such cargoes were "without justification";

that the "blockade," upon which such methods were founded, was "ineffective, illegal, and indefensible";¹ that the judicial procedure offered as a means of reparation for an international injury was inherently defective for the purpose; that in many cases jurisdiction was "asserted in violation of the law of nations"; and that the United States could not submit to "the curtailment of its neutral rights" by measures which, being "admittedly retaliatory, and therefore illegal, in conception and in nature," were "intended to punish the enemies of Great Britain for alleged illegalities on their part."

As to the essential illegality of retaliatory measures, the British government, in its reply (April 24, 1916), took issue with the United States, maintaining that if one belligerent "is allowed to make an attack upon the other regardless of neutral rights, his opponent must be allowed similar latitude in prosecuting the struggle," and that in such case the latter should not be "limited to the adoption of measures precisely identical with those of his opponent." On this point all the belligerents appeared to be in accord.

Discussions also took place between the United States and Great Britain as to other infractions or curtailments of neutral rights or privileges. By the record it appears that the order in council of March 11, 1915, above mentioned, may be regarded as constituting the centre of the system, enforced by various methods, including not only the seizure and detention of vessels and cargoes, but also embargoes, detention and search of mails, the blacklisting of firms in neutral countries, the withholdment of cargo space from non-assenting neutral shippers, and the denial of hospitalities in British ports to non-assenting neutral vessels, for the commercial and financial isolation of the Central Powers, and especially of Germany. Through all these controversies the British government constantly emphasized the distinction between acts affecting "life" and those affecting "property." By the Revenue Act of September 8, 1916, however, the Congress of the United States placed

1. In the argument of the case of the *Hakan*, before Sir Samuel Evans, President of the English Prize Court, as reported in *Lloyd's List*, June 9, 1916, there occurred between the bench and the bar the following colloquy:

"Mr. Balloch was proceeding to refer to the blockade, when—

"The President interrupted to say that what was called a blockade was not a blockade at all, except for journalistic and political purposes.

"Mr. Balloch: I notice that Mr. Balfour yesterday spoke of it as a blockade, so that I am sinning in very good company.

"The President: I do not know what Mr. Balfour said yesterday, but I remember reading a very informing article in which he pointed out that the restrictions we were imposing were very much less onerous than would be the case in an actual blockade."

in the hands of the President the power to adopt and enforce countervailing commercial measures. Specifically, when there was reasonable ground to believe that any country was by "laws, regulations, or practices . . . contrary to the law and practice of nations," restricting the importation of United States products, he was empowered to prohibit or restrict the importation of similar or other products of such country into the United States. He was likewise empowered to detain any vessel, American or foreign, which, "on account of the laws, regulations, or practices of a belligerent," was giving undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any person or traffic in the United States, or subjecting any person or traffic in the United States, or American citizens in neutral countries, to any undue or unreasonable discrimination in regard to the reception, delivery, or transportation of freight or passengers. And finally, to any belligerent failing to accord to American ships or citizens the commercial facilities which its vessels and citizens enjoyed in the United States, or equal privileges or facilities of trade with vessels of other nationality than its own, he was empowered to deny similar privileges or facilities.

The German government assured the United States, January 7, 1916, that its submarines in the Mediterranean had from the beginning had "orders to conduct cruiser warfare against enemy merchant-vessels only in accordance with general principles of international law," and in particular to exclude retaliatory measures such as were applicable to the war zone around the British Isles. In the case of the grain-laden American vessel *William P. Frye*, which was sunk, after taking off the crew, by a German auxiliary cruiser, the German government, besides agreeing to make indemnity in accordance with the treaties between the two countries, states (August 19, 1915) that it had issued orders forbidding American merchantmen carrying conditional contraband to be destroyed, and that, if a vessel carrying absolute contraband were to be destroyed by a submarine, the persons aboard would not be ordered to the life-boats except where the weather conditions and the nearness of the coast afforded absolute certainty that they would reach the nearest port.

On September 8, 1915, the United States instructed its ambassador at Vienna to inform the government of Austria-Hungary that its ambassador at Washington, Dr. Dumba, was no longer acceptable. This action was based on an intercepted letter addressed by Dr. Dumba to his government, and entrusted by him to a newspaper correspondent for conveyance to Europe, which outlined a plan to instigate strikes in American manufacturing plants engaged in producing munitions of

war. The question of the right of neutral individuals to manufacture and sell arms and munitions of war had formed the subject of an extended correspondence between the two governments.² The question of the use of submarines was also discussed between them in the case of the Italian steamer *Ancona*, whose sinking, by an Austrian submarine, resulted in the loss of American lives. It was alleged that the steamer attempted to escape; but, as it appeared that she was torpedoed after her engines were stopped and when passengers were still on board, the United States demanded a disavowal of the act, the punishment of the responsible officer, and indemnity for its citizens who were killed or injured. The Imperial and Royal government, while reserving for future discussion "the difficult questions of international law in connection with submarine warfare," substantially assented (December 29, 1915) to the view "that hostile private ships, in so far as they do not flee or offer resistance, may not be destroyed without the persons on board having been placed in safety," and, while stating that the officer at fault had been punished for exceeding his instructions, agreed to pay an indemnity. New demands were made (June 21, 1916) upon the Imperial-Royal government for apology and indemnity for an attack made by an Austrian submarine on the American tank-steamer *Petrolite*, but in this case the discussion drifted towards questions of fact.

On December 12, 1916, the Central Powers suggested the meeting, on neutral ground, of delegates of the warring states, for an exchange of views on the subject of peace. Six days later (December 18) the diplomatic representatives of the United States in all the belligerent countries were instructed to present to the governments to which they were accredited a "suggestion" which it was said that the President had "long had it in mind to offer." This was that the belligerent nations should make such an avowal of their views as to the conclusion of the war and the arrangement of a "guaranty against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future," as would render it possible "frankly to compare them." The objects of statesmen on both sides, as set forth in general terms to their own people and to the world, were, it was observed, "virtually the same," embracing security for the rights of small states, the prevention of "rival leagues to preserve

2. As to the law of contraband, see Moore, *Digest of International Law*, VII, 656 et seq.; Kleen, *De la Contrebande de Guerre*. Italy, in her notification, August 28, 1916, of a state of war with Germany, seems to have failed to discriminate between "supplies of arms" and "instruments of war, terrestrial and maritime."

an uncertain balance of power amidst multiplying suspicions," and "the formation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world." In the measures to be taken "to secure the future peace of the world" the people and government of the United States were, it was declared, "as vitally and as directly interested" as the governments then at war; and they stood "ready, and even eager," to "coöperate in the accomplishment" of those ends, when the war was over, "with every influence and resource at their command." The President, therefore, it was said, felt "altogether justified in suggesting an immediate opportunity for a comparison of views as to the terms which must precede those ultimate arrangements for the peace of the world"; in other words, an avowal, by the authoritative spokesmen on either side, of the precise objects the attainment of which would bring the war to an end.

To this public invitation the governments addressed publicly responded in variant senses. The Central Powers, December 26, 1916, replied that a direct exchange of views appeared to be the most suitable way of attaining the desired result, and in this relation referred to their proposal of the 12th of the month.

The Allies, in a joint note of January 10, 1917, after protesting "in the most friendly but in the most specific manner against the assimilation established in the American note between the two groups of belligerents," and denouncing the "aggressive designs" and war practices of the Central Powers, answered that, while the objects of the Allies in the war would not be made known in detail prior to the hour of negotiation, yet the world understood that those objects included "the restoration of Belgium, of Servia, and of Montenegro," with the "indemnities" due them; the "evacuation of the invaded territories of France, of Russia, and of Roumania, with just reparation"; the "reorganization of Europe guaranteed by a stable régime," with respect for nationalities and liberty of economic development; the "restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations"; the "liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Roumanians, and of Tcheco-Slovaques from foreign domination"; the "enfranchisement of populations" subject to the Turks, and the "expulsion" of the Ottoman Empire from Europe. While it was intimated that the Allies also wished "to liberate Europe from the brutal covetousness of Prussian militarism," yet the design "to encompass the extermination of the German peoples and their political disappearance" was specifically disclaimed.

The views thus set forth were supplemented on the part of

Great Britain by Mr. Balfour, secretary for foreign affairs, in a dispatch addressed to Sir Cecil Spring Rice, British ambassador at Washington, on January 13, 1917, in which three conditions of a durable peace were declared to be, "that existing causes of international unrest should be, as far as possible, removed or weakened," that "the aggressive aims and the unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers should fall into disrepute among their own peoples," and that "behind international law and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities some form of international sanction should be devised which would give pause to the hardest aggressor." These conditions, said Mr. Balfour, might be "difficult of fulfilment"; but they were believed to be "in general harmony with the President's ideas"; and the Allies were confident that none of them could be satisfied unless a peace could be secured on the lines indicated, so far as concerned Europe, in the joint note.

On January 10, 1917, the day on which the allied note was dated, a new order in council was issued by which the terms "enemy destination" and "enemy origin," as used in the order in council of March 11, 1915, prohibiting all trade and intercourse with Germany, were declared to apply to all goods "destined for or originating in any enemy country," and the term "enemy property" to goods belonging to "any person domiciled in any enemy country." The new order was expressly made applicable to goods previously discharged at a British or allied port. On January 24th the Foreign Office gave notice that an additional area in the North Sea adjacent to the Dutch and Danish coasts, except territorial waters, would be "rendered dangerous to all shipping by operations against the enemy" and "should therefore be avoided."

On January 22, 1917, President Wilson delivered to the Senate an address in which he undertook to state the "conditions" under which the people of the United States would "feel free" to render to mankind a "service" which, he said, they could "not in honor withhold" and which they did "not wish to withhold"; a "service," he declared, "nothing less than this, to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world." The "conditions," as he detailed them, embraced "a peace without victory," an "equality of rights among organized nations," the acceptance of the principle that "governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed" (to be exemplified, for instance, by "a united, independent, and autonomous Poland"), the assurance to "every great people now struggling towards a full development

of its resources and its powers" of "a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea," and the preservation of the "freedom of the seas."

Copies of this address were transmitted to the representatives of the powers. On January 31, 1917, the German ambassador at Washington, in acknowledging its receipt, stated that, while its "main tendencies" corresponded largely "to the desires and principles professed by Germany," yet, as her enemies had, in their economic conference at Paris, manifested an intention not to treat her as an equal even after peace was restored, and, besides rejecting her recent overture for a discussion of terms of peace, had, on pretence of following the principle of nationality, disclosed their real aim in the war to be "to dismember and dishonor Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria"; and as Great Britain had for two and a half years been using her naval power in a "criminal attempt to force Germany into submission by starvation," there had been created a "new situation" which forced Germany to "new decisions." These were embodied in two memoranda, which gave notice that, after February 1, 1917, all ships, including those of neutrals, found navigating within a defined zone around Great Britain, France, and Italy, and in the eastern Mediterranean, would be sunk. A limited reservation was made as to neutral ships in or on their way to ports in the "blockaded zones" on the 1st of February; and it was stated that one American passenger-steamer a week, in each direction, might sail undisturbed to and from Falmouth, in England, such steamers to be distinguished by certain marks and to sail by a designated route, the United States guaranteeing that they carried no articles included in the German contraband list.

A communication of similar tenor and bearing the same date was handed by the Imperial-Royal Foreign Office to the American ambassador at Vienna.

February 3, 1917, Mr. Lansing, referring to the correspondence exchanged in the case of the *Sussex*, announced to the German ambassador, by direction of the President, that all diplomatic relations between the United States and the German Empire were severed.

On the same day the President, in an address to Congress, officially informed that body of the step thus taken. Notwithstanding the unexpected and sudden renunciation by the German authorities of their previous assurance regarding the conduct of submarine warfare, he refused, he said, to believe that they intended to do in fact what they had given warning that they would feel at liberty to do, and only "actual overt acts" on their part could make him believe it. But he added

that, if American ships and American lives should in fact be thus sacrificed, he should take the liberty of coming again before Congress for authority to use any means that might be necessary "for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas." He could, he said, do nothing less; and he took it for granted that "all neutral governments will take the same course."

On February 11th the Swiss minister at Washington, to whom the care of German interests had been committed, presented a memorandum, stating that the German government was "willing to negotiate, formally or informally, with the United States, provided that the commercial blockade against England will not be broken thereby." Mr. Lansing, in the name of the President, replied that the United States would discuss any questions which the German government might propose, but only if the latter would first withdraw its proclamation of January 31st, and renew the assurances given on May 4, 1916, as to submarine warfare.

February 12th the Mexican embassy at Washington presented, by direction of President Carranza, a proposal, to the United States and to "all the other neutral governments," that the warring powers be invited to terminate the conflict either by direct negotiation or through the good offices or friendly mediation of all the countries which should jointly extend the invitation. It was further proposed that if within a reasonable time peace should not by this means be restored, the neutral countries should "take the necessary measures to reduce the conflagration to its narrowest limit by refusing any kind of implements to the belligerents and suspending commercial relations" with them until the conflagration should have been "smothered." The United States, in subsequently declining this proposal, referred to the extent to which one group of the belligerents had carried on on the high seas a warfare "involving the destruction of American ships and the lives of American citizens," and to the fact that the United States had "unearthed a plot laid by the government dominating the Central Powers to embroil not only the government and people of Mexico, but also the government and people of Japan in war with the United States." This statement referred to an intercepted dispatch to the German minister in Mexico, by which he was directed, in case the United States should cease to be neutral, to offer Mexico, as the price of her co-operation with Germany, the recovery of the territories which she lost to the United States in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, and to seek an alliance with Japan.

Meanwhile the general situation at sea had not improved. On January 24, 1917, the British Foreign Office had given notice of a new area in the North Sea, adjacent to the Dutch and Danish coasts, which would be "rendered dangerous to all shipping by operations against the enemy" and which "should therefore be avoided." The reason assigned for this measure was "the unrestricted warfare carried on by Germany at sea by means of mines and submarines." On the 13th of February a new notice was substituted, extending the area; and further enlargements have since been made by notices of March 21st and April 6th.

Moreover, by a proclamation of February 16th, the British government, referring to the German memorandum as to blockaded zones, announced that, in addition to the restrictions previously imposed on commerce with the enemy, by the order of March 11, 1915, and other measures, the rule would thenceforth be enforced that any vessel sailing to or from a neutral port which afforded means of access to the enemy territory, without calling at a port in British or allied territory, should, until the contrary was established, be deemed to be carrying goods with an enemy destination or of enemy origin, and should be brought in for examination and, if necessary, for adjudication before the prize court. It was further declared that the infraction of this rule would subject the vessel to capture and condemnation; and that goods found to be of "enemy origin" or of "enemy destination" should be liable to the same penalty.

To the intelligent reader these measures will not fail to recall the retaliatory orders and decrees of the wars growing out of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars.

On February 14, 1917, the American ambassador at Vienna was instructed to call the attention of the Imperial-Royal government to the sinking in the Mediterranean, presumably by submarines of Austria-Hungary, of a number of vessels having Americans aboard. Two British vessels particularly were mentioned as having been torpedoed without warning. The instructions recalled the assurance given in the case of the *Ancona*, and, while remarking that this pledge had been modified "to a greater or less extent" not only by the communication of January 31, 1917, but also by a declaration of February 10, 1916, to the effect that "all merchant-vessels armed with cannon, for whatever purpose, by this very fact lose the character of peaceable vessels," asked that the government definitely state its attitude. The answer of the Imperial-Royal government was made on the 2d of March. After discussing at length the questions involved, and declaring the opinion that

the arming of merchant-vessels, though only for defence against the exercise of the right of capture, was "not founded on modern international law," the answer stated that Austro-Hungarian men-of-war had instructions "even in case of encountering armed enemy merchant-vessels to be mindful of issuing a warning and of saving the persons on board, if this should be possible under the existing circumstances." That the two British steamers, mentioned by the United States, were sunk by Austro-Hungarian submarines was denied. The answer further stated that while the notice of January 31, 1917, was essentially a warning that no merchant-ship might navigate the sea zones therein defined, yet the Austro-Hungarian men-of-war were "instructed to warn merchant-vessels when possible even when encountered in these zones as well as to provide for the safety of crews and passengers." The Imperial-Royal government, said the answer, was "unable to accept a responsibility for the possible loss of human life which, nevertheless, may result from the destruction of armed ships or ships encountered in the closed zones"; but attention was called to the circumstance that Austro-Hungarian submarines were "operating only in the Adriatic and in the Mediterranean," so that prejudice to American interests by their operations was "hardly to be feared." In conclusion, the note explicitly declared that the assurance given in the case of the *Ancona* and renewed in that of the *Persia* had "neither been withdrawn nor restricted" by the declarations of February 10, 1916, and January 31, 1917.

On February 26th, the term of the existing Congress being then about to expire, the President again addressed that body. He stated that the commerce of other neutral nations was, in common with that of the United States, "suffering severely," but perhaps not very much more severely than before. "We have," said the President, "asked the coöperation of the other neutral governments to prevent these depredations, but so far none of them has thought it wise to join us in any common course of action." The President further stated that, although two American vessels had been sunk, the circumstances did not clearly indicate an altered method in the German submarine warfare, and that the situation since the 3d of February had not substantially changed, except for the tying up of American shipping in port because of the unwillingness of ship-owners to risk their vessels at sea without insurance or adequate protection, and the resulting congestion of commerce which was growing rapidly more and more serious every day. This might in itself, he remarked, in effect accomplish what the new German submarine order was meant to accomplish,

but he could only say that the "overt act" which he had ventured to hope the German commanders would avoid had not occurred. But there had, he said, been certain additional indications and expressions of purpose on the part of the German press and the German authorities which increased the impression that the course of the German submarine commanders had been characterized by an unexpected discretion and restraint rather than by any restriction placed upon them by their instructions. The situation, therefore, was fraught with the gravest possibilities and dangers, and as the session of Congress was about to expire, he desired to obtain "full and immediate assurance" of the authority which he might at any moment need to exercise. The form in which action might become necessary could not be foreseen, but he asked to be authorized to supply American merchant-ships with defensive arms, should that become necessary, and with the means of using them, and to employ "any other instrumentalities or methods that may be necessary and adequate to protect our ships and our people in their legitimate and peaceful pursuits on the seas." Along with these powers, he asked for a sufficient credit to provide adequate means of protection, including insurance against present war risks.

The term of the Congress having come to a close without legislative action on this request, the Department of State on the 12th of March informed the members of the Diplomatic Corps in Washington that, as the Imperial German government had on January 31, 1917, announced that all ships, neutral included, encountered "within certain zones of the high seas, would be sunk without any precautions being taken for the safety of the persons on board, and without the exercise of visit and search," the government of the United States had "determined to place upon all American merchant-vessels sailing through the barred areas an armed guard for the protection of the vessels and the lives of the persons on board."

"Overt acts" having occurred, the President, on the 2d of April, again addressed Congress, which he had called in extra session. Vessels of every kind without regard to flag, character, cargo, destination, or errand had, he said, been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board; the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents, and even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to Belgium, though provided with safe conduct, had been sunk. The present German submarine warfare against commerce was, he declared, "a warfare against mankind," "a war against all nations"—the "challenge" was "to all mankind." Each nation must decide for itself how it

would meet the challenge. There was, he said, but "one choice" that could be made; and he advised that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German government "to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States," and that immediate steps be taken "not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defence, but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the government of the German Empire to terms and end the war." This would, he said, "involve the utmost practicable co-operation and action with the governments now at war with Germany, and, as incident to that, the extension" to them "of the most liberal financial credits, in order that our resources" might, "so far as possible, be added to theirs." It would "involve the organization and mobilization of all the material resources of the country," the "immediate full equipment of the navy," and the immediate addition to the armed forces of the United States of at least five hundred thousand men, to "be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service." The object of the United States should be "to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action" as would "henceforth ensure the observance of those principles." The United States was, President Wilson further declared, "at the beginning of an age" in which it would be "insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done" should "be observed among nations and their governments" that were "observed among the individual citizens of civilized states." A steadfast concert for peace could never be maintained except by "a partnership of democratic nations." Events had shown that "the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend"; that it had meant to stir up enemies against the United States at its very doors was shown by the intercepted note to the German minister at the City of Mexico. The United States, the President affirmed, was about to accept the gage of battle with this "natural foe to liberty" and should, if necessary, "spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power." "The world," said the President, "must be made safe for democracy." The United States had no "selfish ends to serve," no desire for "conquest" or for "dominion," but was the champion of the "rights of mankind."

On April 6, 1917, the President approved a joint resolution of Congress, announcing that the "state of war between the United States and the Imperial German government" which

had been "thrust upon the United States" was "formally declared."

Two days later (April 8th) the *chargé d'affaires* of the United States at Vienna was notified that, as the United States had declared the existence of a state of war with the Imperial German government, Austria-Hungary, as the ally of the German Empire, had decided to break off diplomatic relations with his government. At the same time passports were placed at his disposal for the departure of himself and the other members of the embassy. The ambassador of the United States, Mr. Penfield, had previously withdrawn from the Austrian capital.

Within a few days after President Wilson's war message to Congress the government of Brazil severed diplomatic relations with Germany because of the torpedoing of the Brazilian steamer *Paraná* off Cherbourg. When, subsequently, the Brazilian vessel *Tijuca* also was torpedoed the decree of neutrality not long previously issued respecting the war between the United States and Germany was revoked, and an American squadron, then on its way to South America, was thus relieved in advance from the observance of neutral restrictions in Brazilian waters. The decree of neutrality as between the Allies in Europe and Germany was not then withdrawn, but German merchantmen lying in Brazilian ports were placed under the Brazilian flag and incorporated into the national merchant marine. While the contrast between Brazil's attitude towards the Allies in Europe and her attitude towards the United States exemplified anew the traditional friendship and sympathy between the two American countries, of which there have been in the course of years so many striking manifestations,³ yet it is also true that Brazil had, in common with other

3. In notifying the United States of his government's revocation of the decree of neutrality, the Brazilian Ambassador at Washington, June 4, 1917, wrote as follows:

"MR SECRETARY OF STATE,—The President of the Republic has just instructed me to inform your Excellency's Government that he has approved the law which revokes Brazil's neutrality in the war between the United States of America and the German Empire. The Republic thus recognized the fact that one of the belligerents is a constituent portion of the American continent and that we are bound to that belligerent by traditional friendship and the same sentiment in the defense of the vital interest of America and the accepted principles of law.

"Brazil ever was and is now free from war-like ambitions, and while it always refrained from showing any partiality in the European conflict, it could no longer stand unconcerned when the struggle involved the United States, actuated by no interest whatever but solely for the sake of international judicial order, and when Germany included us and the other neutral powers in the most violent acts of war.

"While the comparative lack of reciprocity on the part of the American republics divested until now the Monroe Doctrine of its true char-

South American countries, felt the effects of various restrictive measures of the European Allies, such as the blacklist and embargoes. As regards the latter, it may be observed that the British list of prohibited articles contains certain Brazilian agricultural exports, including the great national product—coffee. While this prohibition is maintained for the purpose of assuring the use of all cargo space for foodstuffs of prime necessity, such measures are of necessity more or less judged in each country by their local effects. On June 28, 1917, however, the President of Brazil issued a decree revoking the prior neutrality decrees as between Germany, on the one hand, and Russia, France, Belgium, Great Britain, Japan, and Portugal, on the other.

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acter, by permitting of an interpretation based on the prerogatives of their sovereignty, the present events which brought Brazil even now to the side of the United States at a critical moment in the history of the world, are still imparting to our foreign policy a practical shape of continental solidarity, a policy, however, that was also that of the former régime whenever any of the other sister friendly nations of the American continent was concerned. The Republic strictly observed our political and diplomatic traditions and remained true to the liberal principles in which the nation was nurtured.

"Thus understanding our duty and Brazil taking the position to which its antecedents and the conscience of a free people pointed, whatever fate the morrow may have in store for us, we shall conserve the Constitution which governs us and which has not yet been surpassed in the guaranties due to the rights, lives, and property of foreigners.

"In bringing the above-stated resolution to your Excellency's knowledge, I beg you to be pleased to convey to your Government the sentiments of unalterable friendship of the Brazilian people and Government.

"I avail myself of the opportunity to reiterate to your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

"DOMICIO DA GAMA."

Official Bulletin, Washington, June 22, 1917.

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III

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

IN maintaining the right of neutrals freely to navigate the ocean in pursuit of innocent commerce, the early statesmen of America, while sustaining a predominant national interest, gave their support to a cause from the eventual triumph of which the whole world was to derive an incalculable benefit. But it was not in time of war alone that commerce was exposed to attacks at sea. Although the exorbitant pretensions of the sixteenth century, by which the navigation even of the Atlantic and the Pacific was assumed to be susceptible of engrossment, had, before the end of the eighteenth, fallen into desuetude, much remained to be accomplished before the exhibition of an acknowledged national flag would assure to the peaceful mariner an unmolested passage. Ere this great end could be attained, it was necessary that various exaggerated claims of dominion over adjacent seas should be denied and overcome, that the "right of search" should be resisted and abandoned, and that piracy should be extirpated.

In placing the danger from "water thieves" before the peril of "waters, winds, and rocks," Shylock described a condition of things that long survived his own times. At the close of the eighteenth century, a merchantman built for long voyages still differed little in armament from a man-of-war. Whether it rounded the Horn or the Cape of Good Hope, it was exposed to the depredations of ferocious and well-armed marauders, and if it passed through the Straits of Gibraltar it was forced to encounter maritime blackmail in its most systematic and most authoritative form. On the African coast of the Mediterranean lay the Barbary powers—the empire of Morocco, and the regencies of Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers—which had for generations subsisted by depredations on commerce. In this

way they had won the opprobrious title of "piratical states," but they wore it with a pampered and supercilious dignity. Even in the exchange of courtesies they exhibited a haughty parsimony, exacting from the foreign man-of-war the generous requital of a barrel of powder for every gun with which they returned its salute. They had every reason to know that their power was understood and dreaded. In their navies might be found the products of the ship-building skill of England, France, Spain, and Venice. In war, civilized powers did not always scruple to make use of their aid. Their mode of life was diplomatically recognized, and to some extent connived at. It was regulated by a simple formula. While disdaining the part of common pirates, such as plundered vessels indiscriminately, they professed themselves at war with all who refused to pay them tribute; and they took good care to make their friendship expensive. Peace with Algiers, in 1786, was reported to have cost Spain upward of three millions of dollars, while the annual presents of Great Britain to the four states were valued at nearly three hundred thousand.

At the outbreak of the Revolution it was estimated that one-sixth of the wheat and flour exported from the United States, and one-fourth of their dried and pickled fish, and a quantity of rice, found their best market in the ports of the Mediterranean. In this commerce, which had grown up under the protection of the British flag, there were employed from eighty to a hundred ships, manned by twelve hundred seamen. Early in the war it was entirely abandoned, and its loss was severely felt. In the plan of a treaty furnished to Franklin and his colleagues, the Continental Congress, accommodating its demands to its wishes, proposed that France should take the place of Great Britain as the protector of American vessels; but the King of France went no further than to agree to lend his good offices. During the Revolution the Mediterranean commerce therefore remained in abeyance; but on May 12, 1784, Adams, Franklin, and Jefferson were commissioned to treat with the Barbary powers; and on the 11th of the ensuing March they were authorized to send agents to those countries to negotiate. The government acted none too soon. Before an agent was appointed to Morocco, an American vessel was captured by a cruiser of that state. The Emperor, however, exhibited much mildness. On the friendly interposition of Spain, he restored the vessel and cargo and released the crew; and in January, 1787, he concluded a liberal treaty, at a cost to the United States of less than ten thousand dollars.

The other powers proved to be less tractable, and especially troublesome was the Dey of Algiers, by whose activities the

revival of American commerce with the Mediterranean was for a time effectually prevented. On July 25, 1785, the schooner *Maria*, of Boston, was captured off Cape St. Vincent by an Algerine cruiser, and five days later the ship *Dauphin*, of Philadelphia, was taken. The vessels and their cargoes were carried to Algiers, and all on board, embracing twenty-one persons, were, according to custom, consigned to slavery till they should be ransomed. A new difficulty was thus created. When Congress issued its commission to Adams and his associates, there were thousands of captives in Barbary; but, as there were no Americans among them, the question of ransom was not considered, and the whole expense of the negotiations was limited to eighty thousand dollars. For the liberation of the twenty-one Americans subsequently captured, Algiers demanded two-thirds of that sum. For this emergency no provision had been made. When the new government under the Constitution was formed, Jefferson, as Secretary of State, declared the determination of the United States "to prefer war, in all cases, to tribute under any form," but a navy was wanting to make this declaration effective. By December, 1793, the number of American vessels captured by Algerine corsairs had risen to thirteen, and the number of captives to a hundred and nineteen. From Boston to Norfolk almost every seaport had furnished its victim. Nor was the Dey anxious to make peace with America. So successful had he been in bringing other governments to terms, that he remained at war only with the United States and the Hanse Towns, and he began to grow apprehensive at the prospect of inactivity. "If," he exclaimed, "I were to make peace with everybody, what should I do with my corsairs? What should I do with my soldiers? They would take off my head for the want of other prizes, not being able to live upon their miserable allowance." Reasoning thus, he was not disposed to compromise; but the government of the United States, urged on by the cry of the captives, whom it was then unable to rescue by force, accepted his conditions, and, by the expenditure of nearly eight hundred thousand dollars, obtained the release of its citizens and purchased a peace, which was signed on September 5, 1795. A treaty with Tripoli followed on November 4, 1796, and with Tunis in August, 1797.

The respite thus secured was of brief duration. The Dey of Algiers received, under his treaty with the United States, an annual payment of twelve thousand sequins (equivalent to nearly twenty-two thousand dollars) in naval stores, but, besides this stipulated tribute, there were customary payments that were rigorously counted as regalian rights. Among these were included a present of twenty thousand dollars on the

sending out of a new consul, biennial presents to officers of government estimated at seventeen thousand dollars, and incidental and contingent presents of which no forecast could be made. Tribute was likewise paid to Tripoli and to Tunis; but the potentates of the regencies, though they pursued a common interest, were jealous of one another's prosperity in peace as well as in war, and were hard to content. Early in 1800 the Bashaw of Tripoli, Jusuf Caramanly, a bold usurper who seems to have understood both the principles and the cant of thrifty politics, complained to Mr. Cathcart, the American consul, that the presents of the United States to Algiers and Tunis were more liberal than those to himself; and he significantly added that compliments, although acceptable, were of little account, and that the heads of the Barbary states knew their friends by the value of the presents they received from them. Not long afterwards he intimated that he would like to have some American captives to teach him English, and that, if the United States flag once came down, it would take a great deal of "grease" to raise it again. Finally, lest the seriousness of his grievances might not be appreciated, he addressed himself directly to the President, to whom he pointedly declared that any delay in complying with his demands would be prejudicial to American interests. No response came, and the Bashaw grew impatient. "In Tripoli, consul," said he, to Cathcart, "we are all hungry, and if we are not provided for we soon get sick and peevish." Cathcart, seeing that the Bashaw spoke in metaphors, replied that, when the chief physician prescribed the medicine, he should not object to administering it, but that meanwhile he could promise nothing. "Take care," answered the Bashaw, "that the medicine does not come too late, and, if it comes in time, that it is strong enough." On May 14, 1801, he caused the American flag-staff to be chopped down six feet from the ground, in token of war. The answer of the United States had already been decided upon. Symptoms of unrest had appeared in Tunis and Algiers as well as in Tripoli; and a squadron was sent to the Mediterranean with orders, if any of the Barbary powers should declare war or commit hostilities, to protect American commerce and chastise their insolence. The government had, as President Jefferson declared, determined "to owe to our own energies, and not to dishonorable condescensions, the protection of our right to navigate the ocean freely." For two years the contest with Tripoli dragged wearily along, but its vigorous prosecution with augmented forces, after the summer of 1803, brought it at length to a triumphant close. The midnight destruction by Decatur of the frigate *Philadelphia*,

under the fire of the Bashaw's gunboats and batteries; the fierce and incessant bombardments by Preble of the Tripolitan stronghold; the mysterious fate of the heroic Somers and his fire-ship; and the intrepid march of Eaton across the desert to the capture of Derne, were incidents which taught the rulers of the Barbary coast that a new spirit must be reckoned with. On June 3, 1805, peace was agreed to by a representative of the Bashaw on board the frigate *Constitution*, and next day a treaty was concluded on shore.

During the seven years that followed the second peace with Tripoli, the relations of the United States with the Barbary powers were comparatively uneventful; but their tranquillity was now and then disturbed by incidents which, although they did not produce a rupture, bespoke a sullen dissatisfaction with existing conditions. This feeling promptly flamed out when in 1812 the report was received of war between the United States and Great Britain. The Dey of Algiers, encouraged to believe that the maritime power of America would be annihilated, discovered that the United States had always fallen short in the payment of tribute, and expelled the American consul-general and all American citizens from his dominions. An American brig was captured by an Algerine corsair, and the crew reduced to captivity, while an American passenger was taken out of a Spanish ship and held in bondage. Tripoli and Tunis allowed the prizes of an American privateer to be recaptured by the British in their ports. As the war with England had practically shut the Mediterranean against American vessels, measures of defence were deferred; but on February 23, 1815, five days after peace with Great Britain was proclaimed, President Madison recommended a declaration of war against Algiers. The response of Congress was at once made in an act, approved on March 3d, "for the protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine cruisers." Two squadrons were ordered to the Mediterranean, under Bainbridge and Decatur. Decatur, arriving first on the scene, compelled the Dey on June 30th to agree to a treaty by which it was declared that no tribute, under any name or form whatsoever, should again be required from the United States. No other nation had ever obtained such terms. Tripoli and Tunis were also duly admonished; and the passage of the Straits of Gibraltar was relieved of its burdens and its terrors.

With the suppression of the Barbary exactions tolerated piracy disappeared; but the depredations of lawless freebooters in various parts of the world long continued to furnish occasion for naval and to some extent for diplomatic activity. As late as 1870 the naval forces of the United States were di-

rected, upon the invitation of Prussia, to co-operate with those of the other powers for the suppression of piracy in Chinese waters. Such incidents, however, possess no special significance. No one undertakes to defend confessed lawlessness. Attempts to abridge the freedom of the seas assume a dangerous form, and become important when they are made or sanctioned by governments, on pleas of pretended right or interest. Within this category fell the claim long strenuously asserted that the cruisers of one nation might lawfully visit and search the merchant vessels of another nation on the high seas, in peace as well as in war. To the people of the United States this claim was rendered especially hateful by the practice of impressment, with which it came to be peculiarly identified. From time immemorial the commanders of men-of-war had been in the habit, when searching neutral vessels for contraband or enemy's property, of taking out and pressing into service any seamen whom they conceived to be their fellow-subjects. The practice was essentially irregular, arbitrary, and oppressive, but its most mischievous possibilities were yet to be developed in the conditions resulting from American independence. After Great Britain, in 1793, became involved in the wars growing out of the French Revolution, the nature and extent of those possibilities were soon disclosed. Not only were the native sailors of England and America generally indistinguishable by the obvious test of language, but the crews of American vessels often contained a large proportion of men of British birth, who, even when naturalized in the United States, were, under the doctrine of indelible allegiance then almost universally prevalent, still claimed by Great Britain as her subjects. Native Americans, if mistakenly impressed, ran the risk of being killed in action before an order could be obtained for their release; all others were firmly held to service. Nor was it a slight inconvenience that in this way American crews were sometimes so far depleted as to be unable to navigate their ships. The United States, while freely admitting the belligerent right of search, denied that it might be employed for any but the acknowledged purposes of enforcing blockades, seizing prize goods, and perhaps capturing officers and soldiers in the actual service of the enemy. "The simplest rule," declared Jefferson, when Secretary of State, "will be that the vessel being American shall be evidence that the seamen on board are such." Efforts were repeatedly made by the United States to adjust the controversy, but in vain. President Madison gave it the chief place in his message of June 1, 1812, recommending war against Great Britain; but in the treaty of peace concluded at Ghent, December 24, 1814, it was not

mentioned. Nearly thirty years later, Webster, when Secretary of State, recurring to Jefferson's rule, declared: "In every regularly documented American merchant-vessel the crew who navigate it will find their protection in the flag which is over them." These words were addressed to Lord Ashburton on August 8, 1842. The principle of protection and immunity which they announced was asserted in even broader terms, and was thus impliedly accepted by the British government in 1861. On November 8th in that year the British mail-steamer *Trent*, while on a voyage from Havana to St. Thomas, was overhauled by the American man-of-war *San Jacinto*, Captain Wilkes, and was compelled to surrender the Confederate commissioners Messrs. Mason and Slidell, and their secretaries, Messrs. McFarland and Eustis, all of whom were on their way to England. The sole reason given by Earl Russell for demanding their release was that "certain individuals" had "been forcibly taken from on board a British vessel, the ship of a neutral power, while such vessel was pursuing a lawful and innocent voyage—an act of violence which was an affront to the British flag and a violation of international law." No wonder that Mr. Seward, in assuring Lord Lyons that the demand would be granted, congratulated himself on defending and maintaining "an old, honored, and cherished American cause."

The controversy as to impressment involved no question as to search on the high seas in time of peace. Such a right had been asserted by Spain and other powers for the purpose of enforcing their colonial restrictions. The United States refused to admit it, and conceded a right of search in time of peace only in respect of pirates, who, as enemies of the human race, were held to be outside the pale of national protection. Beyond this the government refused to go. As the war-right of search had been perverted to the purpose of impressment, so it was apprehended that the peace-right, if any were admitted to exist, might be perverted to the same purpose or to purposes equally odious.

To this position the United States tenaciously adhered, even when strongly solicited to depart from it by the promptings of philanthropy. The movement so energetically led by Great Britain during the first half of the nineteenth century, for the suppression of the African slave-trade, found in all civilized lands strong support in public opinion. To its success, however, the voluntary co-operation of nations was discovered to be indispensable. Soon after the close of the Napoleonic wars, Lord Stowell, the greatest judge that ever sat in the English Court of Admiralty, declared in the case of a French vessel,

which had been seized by a British cruiser on a charge of engaging in the slave-trade, that no nation could exercise a right of visitation and search upon the common and unappropriated part of the ocean except from belligerent claim. The vessel was discharged. As if to anticipate such an obstacle, the British government had already entered into treaties with Denmark, Portugal, and Spain, by which a qualified right of search was conceded; and it sought to make the measure universal. So steadfastly was the object pursued that by 1850 the number of such treaties in force between Great Britain and other powers was twenty-four. Among the assenting governments, however, the two most important powers were not found—the United States and France. When the proposal was submitted to the United States, the government at once repulsed it. No man condemned the slave-trade more strongly than did John Quincy Adams; on the other hand, no one more profoundly appreciated the fundamental principles of American policy and the importance of maintaining them. In 1818, when Secretary of State, he declared that the admission of the right of search in time of peace, under any circumstances whatever, would meet with universal repugnance in the United States. He steadily resisted in Monroe's cabinet, even in opposition to the yielding inclinations of Calhoun and other members from slave States, any abatement of this position. The subject was, however, taken up in Congress, and by an act of May 15, 1820, the slave-trade was branded as piracy. This act seemed to constitute the first step on the part of the United States towards the assimilation of the traffic, by the consent of the civilized world, to piracy by law of nations, thus bringing it within the operation of the only acknowledged right of search in time of peace; and by a resolution of the House of Representatives, passed on February 28, 1823, by a vote of 131 to 9, the President was requested to open negotiations to that end. Instructions in conformity with this resolution were given to the diplomatic representatives of the United States; and on March 13, 1824, a convention was signed at London which conceded a reciprocal right of search on the coasts of Africa, America, and the West Indies. The Senate of the United States, however, on May 21, 1824, by a vote of 36 to 2, struck out the word "America," and, the British government declining to accept the amendment, the treaty failed. On December 10, 1824, the Senate rejected a similar convention with Colombia, although it did not apply to the American coasts. Negotiations on the subject were therefore discontinued, and the decision not to concede even a qualified right of search was adhered to.

The government of the United States was not insensible to the crying evils of the traffic in slaves. In the treaty of Ghent, it had concurred in reprobating the traffic as "irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice," and had pledged its best endeavors to accomplish its entire abolition. But, while always acknowledging, as it did in the Webster-Asburton treaty, the duty to employ its naval forces for the redemption of that pledge, it insisted that American vessels on the high seas should be liable to search only by American cruisers; and it conceded a similar exemption to the vessels of other nations. In 1858 this principle was at length formally accepted by the British government; and in the same year the Senate of the United States unanimously reaffirmed it. Since that time, the United States has in three instances consented to a qualified departure from its observance: in the treaties with Great Britain, concluded April 7, 1862, and February 17, 1863, during the civil war, admitting a reciprocal search for slavers within two hundred miles from the African coast southward of the thirty-second parallel of north latitude, and within thirty leagues of the islands of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, and Madagascar; in the general act of Brussels of July 2, 1890, permitting, for the purpose of repressing the slave-trade, a mutual search within a defined zone on the eastern coast of Africa of vessels of less than five hundred tons burden; and in the agreements for the protection of the fur seals in Bering Sea. By the abolition of slavery in the Spanish Antilles, the most doubtful concession made in the treaties with Great Britain soon ceased practically to cause anxiety; nor was the integrity of the general principle impaired by the exceptional and temporary relaxation of its observance by mutual agreement. It may indeed be said that the making of such agreements by the United States was rendered possible by the previous unqualified acceptance of the principle of the freedom of the seas by Great Britain and other maritime powers.

The disposition of the United States to maintain its general and time-honored rule was signally exemplified in the case of the steamer *Virginius*. On October 31, 1873, the *Virginius*, while sailing under an American register and flying the American flag, was chased and seized on the high seas off the coast of Cuba by the Spanish man-of-war *Tornado*. The captive vessel was taken to Santiago de Cuba, where, after a summary trial by court-martial, ostensibly on a charge of piracy, fifty-three of her officers, crew, and passengers, embracing Americans, British subjects, and Cubans, were condemned and shot. The rest were held as prisoners. No foundation was

shown for the charge of piracy beyond the fact that the vessel was employed by Cuban insurgents in conveying arms, ammunition, and men to Cuba, an employment which obviously did not constitute piracy by law of nations. The government of the United States therefore demanded the restoration of the vessel, the surrender of the captives, a salute to the American flag, and the condign punishment of the Spanish officials. On proof that the register of the *Virginis* was fraudulent, and that she had no right to American colors, the salute to the flag was afterwards dispensed with; but the vessel and the survivors of her passengers and crew were duly delivered up; and an indemnity was eventually obtained by the United States for the relief of the sufferers and of the families of those who were put to death, with the exception of the British subjects, for whom compensation was obtained from Spain by their own government. It is often stated that the United States in this case maintained that the *Virginis* was exempt from search merely because she bore the American flag, even though her papers were false and she had no right to fly it. This supposition is contradicted by the fact that the salute to the flag was dispensed with. The demands of the United States in their last analysis rested chiefly upon the ground that the vessel was unlawfully seized on a spurious charge of piracy, and that the proceedings at Santiago de Cuba were conducted in flagrant disregard of law and of the treaties between the two countries. In March, 1895, the American steamer, *Alliança*, bound from Colon to New York, was fired on by a Spanish gunboat off the coast of Cuba outside the three-mile limit. The Spanish government promptly disavowed the act and expressed regret, and, by way of assurance that such an event would not again occur, relieved the offending officer of his command. Incidents such as these serve to show that the principle of the freedom of the seas has lost neither its vitality nor its importance. It may indeed be said that the exemption of vessels from visitation and search on the high seas in time of peace is a principle which rather grows than diminishes in the estimation of mankind; for in the light of history, its establishment is seen to mark the progress of commerce from a semi-barbarous condition, in which it was exposed to constant violence, to its present state of freedom and security. Nor is there any page in American diplomacy more glorious than that on which the successful advocacy of this great principle is recorded.

While maintaining the freedom of the seas, the United States has also contended for the free navigation of the natural channels by which they are connected. On this prin-

ciple, it led in the movement that brought about the abolition, in 1857, of the dues levied by Denmark on vessels and cargoes passing through the sound and belts which form a passage from the North Sea into the Baltic. These dues, which were justified by the Danish government on the ground of immemorial usage, sanctioned by a long succession of treaties, and of the benefit conferred on shipping by the policing and lighting of the waters, bore heavily on commerce, and the United States, after repeatedly remonstrating, at length gave notice that it would no longer submit to them. This action led to the calling of a conference in Europe. The United States declined to take part in it, but afterwards co-operated, by a treaty with Denmark, in giving effect to the plan under which the dues were capitalized and removed.

An artificial channel necessarily involves special consideration; but, reasoning by analogy, Mr. Clay, as Secretary of State, declared that if a canal to unite the Pacific and Atlantic oceans should ever be constructed, "the benefits of it ought not to be exclusively appropriated to any one nation, but should be extended to all parts of the globe upon the payment of a just compensation or reasonable tolls." This principle was approved by the Senate in 1835, and by the House of Representatives in 1839, and was incorporated in the treaty which was concluded at Washington, April 19, 1850, by John M. Clayton, Secretary of State, on the part of the United States, and by Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, British minister at Washington, on the part of Great Britain. Although the ratifications of this treaty were promptly exchanged (July 4, 1850), probably no other diplomatic document to which the United States was a party has given rise to discussions at once so complicated and so prolonged.

The immediate object of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, as stated in the preamble, was the "setting forth and fixing" of the "views and intentions" of the two governments with reference to a ship canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific by what is known as the Nicaragua route. The construction of such a canal by a private company, chartered by the governments through whose territories the route lay, seemed then to be near accomplishment. By the unauthorized convention concluded by Elijah Hise with Nicaragua on June 21, 1849, Nicaragua undertook to grant to the United States the "exclusive right and privilege" to build an interoceanic way through Nicaraguan territory; and it was stipulated (Article III) that if the United States should not do the work, either the President or the Congress should issue a charter to some one for the purpose. The treaty was not submitted to the

United States Senate; and in the debates in that body, in March, 1853, on questions growing out of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, Mr. Clayton, who had then returned to the Senate, found no one to controvert his assertion that the government of the United States had no constitutional power to construct a way in foreign jurisdiction or to charter a company for that purpose.

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was based upon the principle of neutralization. While binding the contracting parties to protect the canal from "interruption, scizure, or unjust confiscation," it also pledged them to "guarantee" its "neutrality," so that it might "forever be open and free," and, for the full attainment of this object, to invite other powers to enter into similar stipulations with them, "to the end that all other states may share in the honor and advantage of having contributed to a work of such general interest and importance." But the treaty went further. It declared (Article VIII) that the contracting parties, in entering into it, had desired not only to accomplish a "particular object," but also to "establish a general principle," and that they therefore agreed "to extend their protection, by treaty stipulations, to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway," across the isthmus connecting North and South America, and especially to the communications then projected by way of Tehuantepec or Panama; it being understood, as a condition of such joint protection, that the "charges or conditions of traffic" should be "just and equitable" to the citizens of every state willing to participate in such protection. In reality, the railway across the Isthmus of Panama was then under construction by American capitalists, and steps had already been taken by the United States and New Granada (afterwards Colombia) towards its neutralization, the treaty of 1846 (Article XXXV) having assured to the United States the "free and open" transit across the isthmus by any mode of communication then or thereafter existing, while the United States, as "an especial compensation," guaranteed to New Granada, "positively and efficaciously," the "perfect neutrality" of the isthmus and her "rights of sovereignty and property" over that territory.

After the Civil War in the United States the tone of public utterances changed. A demand sprang up for a canal under American control. This demand gained in strength after Great Britain's acquisition of virtual control of the Suez Canal and still more after her occupation of Egypt. Eventually the United States took steps to build the canal by its own means. But the stipulations of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty seemed to stand in the way, and particularly, so far as concerned the Nicaragua

route, the stipulation that neither contracting party would "ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control" over the canal in that quarter, or erect or maintain any fortifications commanding or near it, "or occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America."

On February 5, 1900, there was signed at Washington by Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, and Lord Pauncefote, British ambassador, a convention, the object of which was declared to be to remove any objection to the construction of the canal under the auspices of the government of the United States, without impairing the "general principle" of neutralization" established by Article VIII of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. It was therefore agreed that that treaty should be considered as superseded, and that certain rules, substantially the same as those found in the convention of Constantinople of October 29, 1888, relating to the Suez Canal, should be adopted as the basis of "neutralization." The Senate amended the treaty in several essential points, including (1) the elimination of a clause by which the contracting parties agreed to invite the adhesion of other powers, and (2) the insertion of a proviso that the rules should not apply to measures which the United States might "find it necessary to take for securing by its own forces the defence of the United States and the maintenance of public order."

In making these amendments the Senate no doubt was influenced by the consideration that, as stated by Mr. Curzon, British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons, July 22, 1898, the convention of Constantinople had never "been brought into practical operation." The amendments gave rise to further negotiations, which resulted in the signing at Washington, November 18, 1901, of the second Hay-Pauncefote treaty. This arrangement was duly ratified. It did not inhibit the fortification of the canal by the United States, but provided that "no change of territorial sovereignty or of the international relations of the country or countries traversed" by the canal should affect the "general principle of neutralization or the obligations of the high contracting parties" under the "present treaty."

Coincidently with the removal of obstacles to the building and control of the canal by the United States, the Nicaragua was abandoned for the Panama route, and a treaty for a right of way was soon signed with Colombia as sovereign of the isthmus. The Colombian Congress, affirming that the terms of the treaty as concluded infringed the national sovereignty and were contrary to the national constitution and laws,

declined to ratify it. Panama then declared its independence, which was promptly recognized and supported by the United States, and on February 18, 1903, entered into a treaty granting to the latter in perpetuity a zone ten miles wide and certain adjacent islands for the purposes of a canal. Colombia vigorously protested, invoking particularly Article XXXV of the treaty of 1846, and a controversy ensued which is not yet ended. A treaty signed at Bogotá on April 6, 1914, providing for the payment to Colombia of the sum of \$25,000,000, with other compensations, has not as yet passed the United States Senate, where objection is understood to have been made both to the amount of money to be paid and also to a clause expressing, in the name of the government and people of the United States, "sincere regret that anything should have occurred to interrupt or to mar the relations of cordial friendship that had so long subsisted between the two nations."

Meanwhile the canal, begun years ago by the French, has been completed and opened to traffic. It has also been fortified. Its "neutralization" must be admitted to be only nominal. It would indeed be more nearly accurate to say that the term, as applied to existing conditions, is merely a reminiscent misnomer. As against the United States, as sole owner and protector, the present stipulations have no substantial effect beyond assuring the commercial use of the canal on terms of substantial equality.

The Congress of the United States, in legislating (1912) upon the levy of tolls in the canal, authorized the exemption of vessels in the United States coastwise trade on the ground, among others, that, as the coastwise trade was, in conformity with acknowledged right, exclusively reserved to American vessels, the question of equality did not enter into it, and that, so far as the rate of tolls was concerned, American vessels not engaged in the coastwise trade enjoyed no advantage. The Hay-Pauncefote treaty stipulates that the canal shall be open "on terms of entire equality," and that there shall be no "discrimination" in the "conditions or charges of traffic," which must be "just and equitable." The British government, while conceding that the United States might by way of subsidy remit or refund the tolls on its coastwise vessels, claimed that such vessels must, under the terms of the treaty, be included in the computation of the rate. This was in fact done in the schedule actually adopted; but, as the words of the statute were broad enough to authorize their omission, the British government, being apprehensive lest they might not be included in a future computation, filed its remonstrance. In these circumstances Mr. Knox, as Secretary of State, while maintaining that the

claim was not well founded, suggested, in answering it, that further discussion of it might properly be deferred till some actual violation of the right asserted under it was alleged to have taken place, and that, if such a situation should arise, the arbitration of the question might then appropriately be considered. The British ambassador briefly replied, and the diplomatic discussion rested. President Wilson, however, in a brief special address to Congress on March 5, 1914, asked that the provision exempting vessels engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States from the payment of tolls be repealed. No correspondence was submitted with the address; but the President declared that, whatever differences of opinion might exist in the United States, the meaning of the treaty was "not debated outside the United States," that "everywhere else" there was "but one interpretation," and that this interpretation precluded the exemption the repeal of which he requested. Moreover, in concluding the address, he said: "I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the administration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure."

After a prolonged debate, in which the merits of the question were fully examined, Congress, while granting the President's request, coupled the repeal (June 15, 1914) with the declaration that its action was not to be construed or held as a waiver or relinquishment of any right which the United States might have under its treaties with Great Britain and Panama "to discriminate in favor of" its own vessels by exempting either them or its citizens "from the payment of tolls," or as "in any way waiving, impairing, or affecting any right of the United States," either under those treaties or otherwise, "with respect to the sovereignty over or the ownership, control, and management of said canal and the regulation of the conditions or charges of traffic."

This reservation, it will be observed, is even broader than the previously authorized exemption, since it embraces American vessels generally, and not merely vessels engaged in the coastwise trade.

¶ In connection with the freedom of the seas we may mention, as a subject somewhat related to it, the free navigation, secured by certain notable treaties, of various rivers which are international in the sense of passing in their navigable course through the territory of more than one independent country. While the question as to the right freely to navigate such streams has formed the subject of much theoretical discussion, yet its adjustment has continued to rest chiefly upon con-

vventional arrangements. It is not doubted that rivers such as the Hudson and the Mississippi, which are navigable only within the territory of one country, are subject to that country's exclusive control. But with regard to rivers which are navigable within two or more countries, the principle of free navigation, consecrated in the acts of the Congress of Vienna, has been consistently advocated by the United States, and has been embodied in various forms in several of its treaties. When the British government sought to deny to the inhabitants of the United States the commercial use of the river St. Lawrence, Henry Clay, as Secretary of State, appealed to the regulations of the Congress of Vienna, which should, he declared,

be regarded only as the spontaneous homage of man to the superior wisdom of the paramount Lawgiver of the Universe, by delivering His great works from the artificial shackles and selfish contrivances to which they have been arbitrarily and unjustly subjected.

The free navigation of the St. Lawrence was secured temporarily by the reciprocity treaty of 1854, and in perpetuity by the treaty of Washington of 1871, which also declared the rivers, Yukon, Porcupine, and Stikine to be "forever free and open for purposes of commerce" to the citizens of both countries. For many years the government of the United States actively endeavored to secure the free navigation of the Amazon, which was at length voluntarily conceded by the Emperor of Brazil to all nations in 1866. By a treaty between the United States and Bolivia of 1858, the Amazon and La Plata, with their tributaries, were declared to be, "in accordance with fixed principles of international law, . . . channels open by nature for the commerce of all nations." In 1852, General Urquiza, provisional director of the Argentine Confederation, decreed that the navigation of the rivers Parana and Uruguay should be open to the vessels of all nations. In the next year the United States, acting concurrently with France and Great Britain, secured the confirmation of this privilege by treaty. The State of Buenos Ayres, which had sought to control the commercial possibilities which the rivers afforded, protested against the treaties and withdrew from the confederation; but the treaty powers decided to bestow the moral weight and influence of diplomatic relations upon the government which had been prompt to recognize the liberal commercial principles of the age, and the policy of free navigation prevailed.

From Paraguay, which had sought to lead the life of a hermit state, a similar concession was obtained under peculiar circumstances. In 1853 the government of the United States

sent out a naval vessel, called the *Water Witch*, under the command of Lieutenant Thomas J. Page, to survey the tributaries of the river Plate and report on the commercial condition of the countries bordering on their waters. Permission was obtained from the government of Brazil to explore all the waters of the Paraguay that were under Brazilian jurisdiction, and from the provisional director of the Argentine Confederation to explore all rivers within the jurisdiction of his government. The surveys of the Plate, and of the Paraguay and the Parana, had been in progress about a year and a half, when, on January 31, 1855, Lieutenant Page started from Corrientes with a small steamer and two boats to ascend the river Salado, leaving Lieutenant William N. Jeffers in charge of the *Water Witch*, with instructions to ascend the Parana as far as her draught would allow. Lieutenant Jeffers sailed from Corrientes on the 1st of February, and had proceeded only a few miles above the point where the Parana forms the common boundary between Paraguay and the Argentine province of Corrientes, when he ran aground near the Paraguayan fort of Itapiru. An hour later the *Water Witch* was hauled off and anchored; but while the crew were at dinner it was observed that the Paraguayans were getting their guns ready. Lieutenant Jeffers, though not expecting serious trouble, had the *Water Witch* cleared for action and gave directions to proceed up the river at all hazards. While he was weighing anchor, a Paraguayan canoe came alongside and a man on board handed him a paper in Spanish. This paper Jeffers declined to receive, since he did not understand the language in which it was printed, and as soon as the anchor was raised he stood up the river, the crew at quarters. The pilot informed him that the only practicable channel lay close to the fort, on the Paraguayan side of the river, and this he directed the pilot to take. When within three hundred yards from the fort he was hailed, presumably in Spanish, by a person who was said to be the Paraguayan admiral, but not understanding the import of the hail he did not regard it. Two blank cartridges were then fired by the fort in quick succession, and these were followed by a shot which carried away the wheel of the *Water Witch*, cut the ropes, and mortally wounded the helmsman. Lieutenant Jeffers directed a general fire in return, and the action continued for some minutes. In 1858, the government of the United States sent an expedition to Paraguay to obtain reparation for this and other incidents. The American minister, who, accompanied the fleet, obtained "ample apologies," as well as an indemnity of \$10,000 for the family of the seaman who was killed at the wheel; and on February 4, 1859, a treaty

of amity and commerce was concluded at Asuncion, by which Paraguay conceded "to the merchant flag of the citizens of the United States" the free navigation of the rivers Paraguay and Parana, so far as they lay within her dominions.

IV

FISHERIES QUESTIONS

AS the cause of the freedom of the seas advanced, inordinate claims of dominion over adjacent waters naturally shrank and dwindled away. This tendency towards humarer opinions and practices may be traced in the history of fisheries questions. For more than three centuries, Denmark claimed the right, on grounds of sovereignty and dominion, to monopolize the fisheries in all the seas lying between Norway and Iceland. This claim, though eventually resisted by other powers, was acquiesced in by England by treaties made in 1400 and 1523, under which her merchants and fishermen plying their trade in those seas were required to take out licenses from the Danish King. At a later day the Dutch obtained licenses from the British government for the purpose of fishing in the North Sea. These examples serve to illustrate the practices that prevailed in times when exclusive rights were asserted not only as to fishing in gulfs and bays and in vast reaches of the open sea, but also as to particular fisheries, such as those on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland.

We have seen that among the subjects discussed by the peace commissioners of Great Britain and the United States at Paris in 1782, the two that were the most strongly contested and the last disposed of were those of the fisheries and the compensation of the loyalists. The provisional articles of peace were concluded November 30, 1782. On the 25th of that month the British commissioners delivered to the American commissioners a set of articles, containing fresh proposals from the British ministry, and representing the results of many weeks of negotiation. By these articles, the third of which related to the fisheries, the citizens of the United States were forbidden not only to dry fish on the shores of Nova Scotia, but also to take fish within three leagues of the coasts in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and within fifteen leagues of the coasts of Cape Breton outside of that gulf. This proposal was unacceptable to the American commissioners; and on the 28th

of November, John Adams drew up a counter-project, which was submitted in a conference of the commissioners on the following day. It provided that the subjects of his Britannic Majesty and the people of the United States should "continue to enjoy, unmolested, the right to take fish of every kind, on the Grand Bank, and on all the other banks of Newfoundland; also in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and in all other places, where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time heretofore to fish"; and that the citizens of the United States should "have liberty to cure and dry their fish on the shores of Cape Sable, and any of the unsettled bays, harbors, or creeks of Nova Scotia, or any of the shores of the Magdalen Islands, and of the Labrador coast"; and that they should be "permitted, in time of peace, to hire pieces of land, for terms of years, of the legal proprietors, in any of the dominions of his Majesty, whereon to erect the necessary stages and buildings, and to cure and dry their fish." One of the British commissioners objected to the use of the word *right*, in respect of the taking of fish on the Grand Bank and other banks of Newfoundland, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, "and in all other places, where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time heretofore to fish." Another said that "the word *right* was an obnoxious expression." Adams vehemently contended for the right of the people of America to fish on the banks of Newfoundland. "Can there be a clearer right?" he exclaimed. "In former treaties, that of Utrecht, and that of Paris, France and England claimed the right and have used the word." Finally, when he declared that he would not sign any articles without satisfaction in respect of the fishery, the British commissioners conceded the point, and after many suggestions and amendments a stipulation was agreed on which formed the third article of the provisional peace. By this article, which was based on the proposal submitted by Adams, it was agreed that the people of the United States should continue to enjoy the "right" to take fish on all the banks of Newfoundland and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and "at all other places in the sea" where the inhabitants of both countries had been accustomed to fish; and that the inhabitants of the United States should have the "liberty" to take fish on the coast of Newfoundland and on the coasts, bays, and creeks of all other of his Britannic Majesty's dominions in America, and also the "liberty" to dry and cure fish, subject to an agreement with the proprietors of the ground, so soon as any of the coasts should become settled.

When the representatives of the two countries met at Ghent, on August 8, 1814, to negotiate a new treaty of peace, the British plenipotentiaries at once took the ground that the

fishery arrangement of 1782-83 had been terminated by the war of 1812, and declared that, while they "did not deny the right of the Americans to fish generally, or in the open seas," they could not renew the privilege of fishing within British jurisdiction and of drying fish on the British shores without an equivalent. In the discussions that ensued, the question of the free navigation of the Mississippi, which had been secured to British subjects by the treaty of 1782-83, became coupled with that of the fisheries. The American plenipotentiaries were unwilling to renew the stipulation as to the Mississippi; the British plenipotentiaries refused to yield the fisheries without it; and in the end, on motion of the Americans, a treaty of peace was concluded which contained no mention either of the fisheries or of the Mississippi. Both subjects were left for future negotiation.

On June 19, 1815, an American fishing-vessel, engaged in the cod-fishery, was, when about forty-five miles from Cape Sable, warned by the commander of the British sloop *Jaseur* not to come within sixty miles of the coast. This act the British government disavowed; but Lord Bathurst is reported at the same time to have declared that, while it was not the government's intention to interrupt American fishermen "in fishing anywhere in the open sea, or without the territorial jurisdiction, a marine league from the shore," it "could not permit the vessels of the United States to fish within the creeks and close upon the shores of the British territories." John Quincy Adams, who was then minister of the United States in London, maintained that the treaty of peace of 1783 "was not, in its general provisions, one of those which, by the common understanding and usage of civilized nations, is or can be considered as annulled by a subsequent war between the same parties." This position Lord Bathurst denied. He contended that the treaty of 1782-83, like many others, contained provisions of different characters—some irrevocable, and others of a temporary nature, terminable by war; and that the two governments had, in respect of the fisheries, recognized this distinction by describing as a "right" the open sea fishery, which the United States could enjoy merely by virtue of its independence, and as a "liberty," dependent on the treaty itself, what was to be done within British jurisdiction. This position the British government continued to maintain. From 1815 to 1818 many American vessels found fishing in British waters were seized, and much ill feeling was engendered.

Such was the condition of things when, on October 20, 1818, Albert Gallatin and Richard Rush concluded with plenipotentiaries on the part of Great Britain a convention, the first

article of which related to the fisheries. By this article the United States "renounce forever, any liberty heretofore enjoyed or claimed by the inhabitants thereof to take, dry, or cure fish on or within three marine miles" of any of the "coasts, bays, creeks, or harbours" of the British dominions in America, not included within certain limits, within which the right to fish or to dry and cure fish was expressly reserved. It was provided, however, that the American fishermen might "enter such bays or harbours" for the purposes "of shelter and of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood, and of obtaining water, and for no other purpose whatever," subject to such restrictions as might be necessary to prevent them from abusing the privileges thus reserved to them. On June 14, 1819, an act, closely following the language of the article, was passed by the imperial parliament to carry it into effect; and from that time down to 1836, little trouble seems to have occurred. But in that year the legislature of Nova Scotia passed an act, by which the "hovering" of vessels within three miles of the coasts and harbors was sought to be prevented by various regulations and penalties; and claims were subsequently asserted to exclude American fishermen from all bays and even from all waters within lines drawn from headland to headland, to forbid them to navigate the Gut of Canso, and to deny them all privileges of traffic, including the purchase of bait and supplies in the British colonial ports. From 1839 down to 1854 there were numerous seizures, and in 1852 the home government sent over a force of war steamers and sailing vessels to assist in patrolling the coast.

With a view to adjust the various questions that had arisen, the British government in 1854 sent Lord Elgin to the United States on a special mission, and on June 5, 1854, he concluded with Mr. Marcy, who was then Secretary of State, a treaty in relation to the fisheries and to commerce and navigation. By this treaty the United States fishermen temporarily reacquired the greater part of the inshore privileges renounced by the convention of 1818. On the other hand, a reciprocal concession was granted to British fishermen on the eastern coasts of the United States down to the thirty-sixth parallel of north latitude, and provision was made for reciprocal free trade between the United States and the British colonies in North America in various articles of commerce. This treaty came into operation on March 16, 1855. It was terminated on March 17, 1866, on notice given by the United States in conformity with its provisions. All the old questions were thus revived; but a new arrangement was effected by Articles XVIII-XXV of the comprehensive treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871. The Ameri-

can fishermen were again temporarily readmitted to the privileges renounced by the convention of 1818, while the United States agreed to admit Canadian fish and fish-oil free of duty, and to refer to a tribunal of arbitration, which was to meet at Halifax, the question of the amount of any additional compensation which should be paid by the United States for the inshore privileges. On November 23, 1877, an award was made in favor of Great Britain of the sum of five million five hundred thousand dollars, or nearly half a million dollars for each of the years during which the arrangement was necessarily to continue in force. The United States protested against the award, but paid it in due course. Lest, however, the same rate of compensation should subsequently be demanded, the United States in 1883 availed itself of the right to give notice of termination of the fishery articles, and they came to an end in 1885. A temporary arrangement was entered into for that year, under which the American fishermen continued to enjoy the privileges accorded them by the terminated articles, in consideration of President Cleveland's undertaking to recommend to Congress, when it should again assemble, the appointment of a joint commission to consider both the question of the fisheries and that of trade relations. The recommendation was submitted to Congress, but it was not adopted; and on the opening of the fishing season of 1886, seizures of American vessels began to be made. A sharp controversy followed, reviving questions not only as to the construction of the convention of 1818, but also as to the right of fishing vessels to participate in enlarged privileges of intercourse established since that time. What were the "bays" intended by the convention? Did they include only bodies of water not more than six marine miles wide at the mouth, or all bodies of water bearing the name of bays? Were the three marine miles to be measured from a line following the sinuosities of the coast, or from a line drawn from headland to headland, even where there might be no body of water bearing the name of a bay? Were American fishing vessels forbidden to traffic or to obtain supplies, even when they entered the colonial ports for one of the four purposes specified in the convention? All these questions were raised and elaborately argued. By an act of March 3, 1887, Congress authorized the President in his discretion to adopt measures of retaliation. A negotiation was, however, subsequently undertaken, which resulted in the Bayard-Chamberlain treaty of February 15, 1888. Provision was made for delimiting the waters in which American fishermen were to be forbidden to fish. To this end, certain definite lines were expressly drawn; and, apart from these, the rule, followed in the North Sea and

other fishery arrangements, was adopted, of treating as territorial waters all bays not more than ten miles wide at the mouth, the theory being that fishing could not be carried on in a free space of less than four miles, without constant danger of entering exclusive waters. Fishing vessels, when entering bays or harbors for any of the four purposes specified in the convention of 1818, were not to be required to enter or clear, unless remaining more than twenty-four hours or communicating with the shore, or to pay port dues or charges; and they were to be allowed to tranship or to sell their cargoes in case of distress or casualty, and to obtain on all occasions "casual or needful provisions and supplies," as distinguished from original outfits. Each vessel was to be duly numbered; but the penalty of forfeiture was to be imposed only for fishing in exclusive British waters, or for preparing in such waters to fish therein; and for any other violation of the fishery laws the penalty was not to exceed three dollars for every ton of the implicated vessel. It was further stipulated that all restrictions should be removed from the purchase of bait, supplies, and outfits, the transshipment of catch, and the shipping of crews, whenever the United States should remove the duty from the fishery products of Canada and Newfoundland. This treaty enjoys the distinction of being the only one that was ever, by formal resolution of the Senate, discussed in open session, so that the speeches upon it may be found in the daily record of the Congressional debates. Late in August, 1888, after a long and animated debate, it was rejected. President Cleveland then recommended to Congress a definite course of retaliation, looking immediately to the suspension of the bonded-transit system. This recommendation failed; and a *modus vivendi*, which was arranged by the negotiators of the defeated treaty at the time of its signature, and under which a system of licenses was established, continued for the time being to operate by virtue of Canadian orders in council. The fisheries question was one of the subjects considered by the Quebec commission of 1898, but no conclusive results on any matter were reached by that body.

In recent years various efforts have been made to create closer relations between the United States and Canada. In 1908 and 1909 treaties were concluded for the more complete definition and demarcation of the international boundary; for the adoption of measures (which the United States afterwards failed to make effective) for the preservation and propagation of food fishes in the waters contiguous to the two countries; for the conveyance through the one country of persons in lawful custody for trial or punishment in the

other; for reciprocal rights in wrecking and salvage in waters contiguous to the boundary; and for the regulation of the use of boundary waters in such manner as to preserve their navigability while promoting industrial interests.

By an agreement of January 27, 1909, the north Atlantic fisheries dispute was referred to The Hague Court. Five arbitrators sat, and, September 7, 1910, signed the award,¹ holding that Great Britain, or the local colony, might by laws or ordinances designed to preserve the fisheries or public order and morals, but subject to review by a mixed commission of experts, regulate the exercise of the "liberties" not renounced in 1818; that, while persons not inhabiting the United States might be enrolled on American fishing-vessels, they gained no treaty immunities; that such vessels, though exempt from commercial formalities, and from dues not imposed on British fishermen, should, if proper conveniences existed, report their presence, and, even when coming in for shelter, repairs, wood, or water, might be required when staying over forty-eight hours similarly to report, personally or by telegraph. American fishing-vessels, if commercially documented, might, it was held, exercise commercial privileges, but not when on a fishing voyage. The award, adopting the provisions of the Bayard-Chamberlain arrangement, delimited certain waters as exclusively British, and for the rest recommended, as to bays, the ten-mile rule. The right of the Americans to fish on the treaty coasts of Newfoundland and the Magdalen Islands, was affirmed.

On January 6, 1911, a reciprocal commercial agreement was submitted to the legislative bodies of the United States and Canada. Certain incidents, among which were the utterances of American public men, turned the discussion in Canada to the question of preserving "Canadian nationality"; and on an appeal to the country, the agreement was decisively rejected. The wood-pulp and paper schedules had, as the result of anticipatory legislation, at once taken effect in the United States, and, when the agreement failed, other countries exporting those articles made claims for their admission to the United States on the same terms as similar Canadian products. These claims the customs authorities denied, but the courts subsequently upheld them.

In its later phases the discussion of the northeastern fisheries came to involve only to a comparatively slight extent any

1. Dr. H. Lammasch (Austria), who presided; Jonkheer A. F. De Savornin Lohman (The Netherlands); the Hon. George Gray (United States); Sir Charles Fitzpatrick (Canada); Dr. Luis M. Drago (Argentina), who dissented on one point.

question as to the use of the open sea. Very different in that respect was the Bering Sea controversy, which arose in regard to the fur-seals in 1886. By an imperial ukase or edict of July 8, 1799, Paul I of Russia granted to the Russian-American Company various important rights on the Russian coasts in America, including that of fishing. Twenty-two years later —on September 7, 1821—there was issued by the Emperor Alexander another ukase, the apparent effect of which was much more far-reaching, since it purported to exclude foreigners from carrying on commerce and from whaling and fishing on the northwest coast of America, from Bering Strait down to the fifty-first parallel of north latitude, and forbade them even to approach within a hundred Italian miles of the coast. Against this ukase both the United States and Great Britain protested, and it was never enforced. On the other hand, a convention was concluded between the United States and Russia on April 17, 1824, by which it was agreed that "in any part of the great ocean, commonly called the Pacific Ocean, or South Sea," the citizens or subjects of the high contracting parties should be "neither disturbed nor restrained, either in navigation or in fishing." A treaty in similar terms was made by Great Britain in the following year. By a convention signed at Washington on March 30, 1867, the Russian Emperor, in consideration of the sum of seven million two hundred thousand dollars in gold, ceded "all the territory and dominion" which he possessed "on the continent of America and in the adjacent islands" to the United States. Of this cession, the eastern limit was that defined in the treaty between Great Britain and Russia of 1825. The western limit was defined by a water line, which was drawn so as to include in the territory conveyed numerous islands.

In 1886 certain Canadian sealers were seized by United States revenue-cutters in Bering Sea, at a distance of upwards of sixty miles from the nearest land. The United States Court at Sitka pronounced a sentence of condemnation, but the President subsequently ordered the vessels to be released; and on August 17, 1887, Mr. Bayard, as Secretary of State, instructed the American ministers at London, Paris, and certain other capitals, to invite the governments to which they were accredited to co-operate with the United States in measures for the better protection of the fur-seals. It was represented that, as the result of indiscriminate killing, the seals were in danger of extermination, and that the nations had a common interest in preventing this from being done. The responses to this overture were generally favorable, and negotiations with Great Britain had practically reached a favorable conclusion,

when, on May 16, 1888, nine days after the adverse report of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate on the Bayard-Chamberlain treaty, they were arrested on an objection from the Canadian government. On the 12th of the following September, Mr. E. J. Phelps, then American minister in London, in a despatch to Mr. Bayard, suggested that the United States might of its own motion take measures to prevent the destruction of the fur-seals by capturing on the high seas the vessels employed in it. This suggestion was not then adopted; but, after the change of administration in 1889, seizures were renewed. A warm dispute followed, in which Mr. Blaine sought to defend the seizures on the ground that the killing of seals in the open sea was *contra bonos mores*, as well as on the supposition that Russia had asserted and exercised exclusive rights in Bering Sea, and that the treaties of 1824 and 1825 did not apply to that body of water. On February 29, 1892, however, a treaty was signed, by which a tribunal of arbitration,² to sit at Paris, was invested with power to decide: (1) what exclusive jurisdiction, or exclusive rights in the seal-fisheries, in Bering Sea, Russia asserted prior to the cession of Alaska to the United States; (2) how far those claims were recognized by Great Britain; (3) whether Bering Sea was included in the phrase "Pacific Ocean," as used in the treaties of 1824 and 1825; (4) whether all Russia's rights passed to the United States; and (5) whether the United States had any right of protection or property in the fur-seals in Bering Sea outside the ordinary three-mile limit. If the arbitrators found that the exclusive rights of the United States were insufficient, they were to determine what concurrent regulations the two governments should jointly enforce outside territorial waters.

Before the tribunal of arbitration, the representatives of the United States relied much upon a theory of property in fur-seals; but on the various questions of right submitted, the decision of the arbitrators was adverse to the United States. This result was due, however, not to any lack of ability or of effort on the part of the accomplished American agent and counsel, who exhausted every resource of argument, but to certain historical and legal antecedents, among which we may mention the following:

1. That, when the first seizures were reported in 1886, the Department of State not only possessed no information concerning them, but was unable to give any explanation of them, and that, when the circumstances of the seizures were ascer-

2. For the personnel of this tribunal see *infra*, p. 413.

tained, even though the full judicial record had not then been received, the vessels were ordered to be released.

2. That the court in Alaska, in condemning the vessels and punishing their masters and crews, proceeded on a doctrine of *mare clausum*, which the United States had never legally asserted and which the government afterwards disavowed. It is indeed generally supposed, and the supposition apparently is shared by the Supreme Court, that Mr. Blaine in his correspondence claimed that the United States had derived from Russia exclusive dominion over Bering Sea. It is, however, a fact that in a note to Sir Julian Pauncefote, December 17, 1890, Mr. Blaine said: "The government has never claimed it and never desired it; it expressly disavows it." Whether this sweeping denial is or is not altogether justified by the record is a question that need not be here considered.

3. That the treaty ceding Alaska to the United States did not purport to convey the waters of Bering Sea, but in terms conveyed only "the territory and dominion" of Russia "on the continent of America and in the adjacent islands," and drew a water boundary so as to effect a transfer of the islands, many of them nameless, which lay in the intervening seas. The fact was, besides, well known that a declaration, once inadvertently or inconsiderately adopted by the House of Representatives, that the jurisdiction of the United States extended over those seas, was rejected by the Senate.

4. That the ukase of 1821, which contained the only distinctive claim of *mare clausum* ever put forward by Russia, did not assume to treat the whole of Bering Sea as a closed sea, but only to exclude foreign vessels from coming within one hundred Italian miles of the coast, from the fifty-first parallel of north latitude to Bering Strait, without discrimination as to localities.

5. That against this ukase both the United States and Great Britain protested; and that by the treaties of 1824 and 1825 Russia agreed not to interfere with their citizens or subjects either in navigating or in fishing in "any part of the Pacific Ocean," thus abandoning the exclusive jurisdictional claim announced in the ukase.

6. That it was declared by Mr. Blaine in the diplomatic correspondence that if the phrase "Pacific Ocean," as used in those treaties, included Bering Sea, the United States had "no well-grounded complaint" against Great Britain; and that it was unanimously found by the arbitrators that the phrase Pacific Ocean did include Bering Sea.

7. That while the tribunal, by six voices to one, found that there was no evidence to substantiate the supposition that

Russia had asserted exceptional claims as to the fur-seals, there was affirmative evidence that she had not done so in recent years. In reality, most of the specific passages from early Russian documents, given in the case of the United States to substantiate Russia's supposed exclusive claims, proved to be the interpolations of a dishonest translator, and were spontaneously withdrawn by the agent of the United States on his discovery of the circumstances, soon after the cases were exchanged. These interpolations, however, did not figure in the diplomatic correspondence, but were made after its close.

8. That it was admitted that no municipal law of the United States had ever treated the fur-seals, either individually or collectively, as the subject of property and protection on the high seas.

9. That it was also admitted by the representatives of the United States that, for the claim of property and protection on the high seas, there was no precise precedent in international law, though it was strongly maintained that the claim was justified by analogies.

10. That the effort to support this claim was embarrassed by its relation to the subject of visitation and search on the high seas, and especially by the precedents which the United States itself had made on that subject.

The question of regulations stood on different grounds—that of international co-operation, proposed in 1887. The arbitrators, after deciding against the United States on questions of right, proceeded to prescribe regulations, which were afterwards duly put into operation by the two governments. Under a treaty of arbitration signed at Washington on February 8, 1896, the sum of \$473,151.26 was awarded as compensation to be paid by the United States for interference with the Canadian sealers.

In spite of the efforts made for their protection, the number of seals diminished rather than increased. Warm discussions, conducted with epithets as well as with figures, took place as to the respectively injurious effects of pelagic sealing and killing on land. Besides, the controversy tended, like that regarding the suffrage, to follow sexual lines, the killing on land affecting chiefly the fathers of the race, while that on the sea destroyed chiefly the mothers. Eventually, a further treaty was entered into by the United States and Great Britain on February 7, 1911, but its provisions were in the main either duplicated or superseded by the treaty concluded at Washington, on the 7th of the following July, between the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and Russia, for the protection of sea-otters as well as of fur-seals. By this treaty the contracting

parties agreed for a definite period of fifteen years to prohibit all persons subject to their laws and treaties, and also their vessels, from engaging in "pelagic sealing"—which was defined, for the purposes of the convention, as the "killing, capturing, or pursuing" in the waters of the north Pacific above 30° latitude, including the seas of Bering, Kamchatka, Okhotsk, and Japan. The waters thus designated were to be patrolled. Offenders against the treaty were subject to arrest on the high seas by the authorities of any of the contractants, but must be handed over to their own nation for trial; while skins not certified as taken under the authority of the respective powers were excluded from importation. Sea-otters were similarly protected.

On the other hand, the powers undertook to solace one another for foregoing the exercise of the right to kill at sea by furnishing certain compensations, chiefly out of the profits of killing on land. In case the number of seals visiting the United States islands in any year fell below 100,000, or the Russian islands below 18,000, or the Japanese below 6,500, it was permissible to suspend all killing without any allowance in skins or in money till the specified standard should again be exceeded. Subject to this stipulation, each of the powers possessing, within the designated area, islands and shores frequented by seals, agreed to deliver up a certain gross percentage, in number and value, of the skins thereon taken. Of the skins taken on the islands and shores of the United States and of Russia, the governments of Canada and Japan were each to receive 15 per cent, while of those taken on Japanese islands and shores, the United States, Japan, and Russia were each to get 10 per cent; but it was further stipulated that Canada and Japan should each receive from the American herd not less than one thousand skins annually. In case any British islands or shores should become the resort of seals, the United States, Japan, and Russia were each to receive 10 per cent of the skins thereon taken. These stipulations, however, do not limit the right of the territorial sovereigns from time to time altogether to suspend the killing of seals on their respective shores and islands, or to impose restrictions and regulations necessary to protect and preserve the herd and to increase its number. But, if killing is altogether prohibited, for any reason other than that the number of visiting seals has fallen below the standard, then the United States must during such suspension pay Great Britain and Japan each an annual sum of \$10,000, for which it may, after killing is resumed, reimburse itself by retaining skins taken in excess of the minimum of one thousand agreed to be turned over. Russia agreed, during the

last ten years of the conventional term of fifteen, to kill in each year at least 5 per cent of the seals visiting her hauling-grounds and rookeries, provided this did not exceed 85 per cent of the three-year-old male seals hauling in such year. Japan made a similar engagement in regard to the killing of her seals. Finally, the United States agreed, when the treaty took effect, to advance to Great Britain and to Japan, each, on account of the skins to which they would be entitled, the sum of \$200,000, and to repay itself by retaining an equivalent in skins, reckoned by their market value in London less cost of transportation, such reckoning, if disputed, to be made by an "umpire," chosen by the governments concerned.

In explanation of the standard of valuation thus adopted, the fact may be stated that London had for many years been the almost exclusive seat of the industry of dressing sealskins. The undressed skins, therefore, for the most part found their way thither; and it was the only place where a market value of such skins, resulting from public sales at stated seasons, could then be said to exist. These circumstances also help to elucidate the diversity, which prior negotiations had at times disclosed, between the inclinations of the British and those of the Canadian government, the latter having an immediate interest in pelagic sealing, while the former was substantially interested in preserving a flourishing industry which was said to affect the livelihood of ten thousand persons in England, and which was dependent upon a steady and permanent supply of the raw material.

References:

For a history of the North Atlantic Fisheries, see Moore, *Digest of International Law*, I, 767 *et seq.*; Moore, *History and Digest of International Arbitrations*, I, chap. 16 (The Halifax Commission); chap. 18 (Reserved Fisheries); Rush, *Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London*; Gallatin's Writings.

For the Award of The Hague Court (in 1910), see *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1910, p. 544 *et seq.*

For a history of the Bering Sea Dispute, see Moore, *History and Digest of International Arbitrations*, I, chap. 17 (Fur Seal Arbitration).

THE CONTEST WITH COMMERCIAL RESTRICTIONS

WHEN viewed in their wider relations, the early efforts of the United States to establish the rights of neutrals and the freedom of the seas are seen to form a part of the great struggle for the liberation of commerce from the restrictions with which the spirit of national monopoly had fettered and confined it. When the United States declared their independence, exclusive restrictions, both in the exchange of commodities and in their transportation, existed on every side. The system of colonial monopoly was but the emanation of the general principle, on which nations then consistently acted, of regarding everything "bestowed on others as so much withholden from themselves." Prohibitions and discriminations were universal.

Such was the prospect on which the United States looked when they achieved their independence. With exceptions comparatively unimportant, there was not a single port in the Western Hemisphere with which an American vessel could lawfully trade, outside of its own country. But the exclusion most seriously felt was that from the British West Indies. Prior to the Revolution the burdens of the restrictive system were essentially mitigated by the intercolonial trade, the British colonists on the continent finding their best markets in the British islands; but when the United States, by establishing their independence, became to Great Britain a foreign nation, they at once collided with her colonial system. American statesmen foresaw these things and endeavored to guard against them, but in vain. When the provisional articles of peace with Great Britain were later converted into a definitive treaty, without the addition of any commercial clauses, the hope of establishing the relations between the two countries at the outset on the broad basis of mutual freedom of intercourse disappeared.

In the contest with commercial restrictions, the government of the United States adopted as the basis of its policy the principle of reciprocity. In its later diplomacy the term "reciprocity" is much used to denote agreements designed to increase the interchange of commodities by mutual or equivalent reductions of duty. Tested by recent experience, the later "recipro-

ity" might not inaptly be described as a policy recommended by free-traders as an escape from protection, and by protectionists as an escape from free trade, but distrusted by both and supported by neither. It is, however, impossible to doubt that, in the efforts of the United States to bring about the abolition of the cumbersome and obstructive contrivances of the old navigation laws, the policy of reciprocity proved to be an efficient instrument in furthering the tendency towards greater commercial freedom. It was announced by the government at the very threshold of its existence. In the preamble to the treaty of commerce with France of 1778, it was declared that the contracting parties, wishing to "fix in an equitable and permanent manner" the rules that should govern their commerce, had judged that this end

could not be better obtained than by taking for the basis of their agreement the most perfect equality and reciprocity, and by carefully avoiding all those burthensome preferences which are usually sources of debate, embarrassment, and discontent; by leaving, also, each party at liberty to make, respecting commerce and navigation, those interior regulations which it shall find most convenient to itself; and by founding the advantage of commerce solely upon reciprocal utility and the just rules of free intercourse; reserving withal to each party the liberty of admitting at its pleasure other nations to a participation of the same advantages.

John Quincy Adams, in 1823, while avowing the belief that this preamble was "the first instance on the diplomatic record of nations, upon which the true principles of all fair commercial negotiation between independent states were laid down and proclaimed to the world," at the same time declared that it "was, to the foundation of our commercial intercourse with the rest of mankind, what the Declaration of Independence was to that of our internal government. The two instruments," he added,

were parts of one and the same system matured by long and anxious deliberation of the founders of this Union in the ever memorable Congress of 1776; and as the Declaration of Independence was the foundation of all our municipal institutions, the preamble to the treaty with France laid the corner-stone for all our subsequent transactions of intercourse with foreign nations.

The progress of the United States, in the contest thus early begun with commercial restrictions, was painful and slow. Soon after the establishment of independence, Congress took into consideration the entire subject of commercial relations, and on May 7, 1784, adopted a series of resolutions in which the principles by which American negotiators should be guided were set forth. By the first of these resolutions it was declared that, in any arrangements that might be effected, each party

should have the right to carry its own produce, manufactures, and merchandise in its own vessels to the ports of the other, and to bring thence the produce and merchandise of the other, paying in each case only such duties as were paid by the most-favored nation. The second resolution, which related to colonial trade, embodied the proposal that a direct and similar intercourse should be permitted between the United States and the possessions of European powers in America, or at any rate between the United States and certain free ports in such possessions; and that, if neither of these alternatives could be obtained, then each side should at least be permitted to carry its own produce and merchandise in its own vessels directly to the other. When the wars growing out of the French Revolution began, no progress had been made by the United States towards the attainment of the objects of the second resolution. American vessels laden with the produce of their own country, and in some cases when laden with the produce of other countries, were admitted into most of the European ports, including those of Great Britain, on condition of paying the customary alien dues; but the ports of the colonies continued to be closed against them, while some of the most important American products were specifically excluded from the trade which vessels of the dominant country were permitted to carry on between its colonies and the United States. When authorizing Gouverneur Morris, as an informal agent, in 1789, to sound the views of the British ministry concerning relations with the United States, Washington said:

Let it be strongly impressed on your mind that the privilege of carrying our productions in our vessels to their islands, and bringing in return the productions of those islands to our own ports and markets, is regarded here as of the highest importance; and you will be careful not to countenance any idea of our dispensing with it in a treaty.

In the following year Morris reported that no arrangement on the subject could be made. The question was, however, revived in the instructions given to Jay, as special plenipotentiary to England, on May 6, 1794. He was directed to secure for American vessels the privilege of carrying between the United States and the British West Indies the same articles as might be transported between the two places in British bottoms, and, unless he could obtain this, he was to do no more than refer to his government such concessions as might be offered. He submitted to Lord Grenville a proposal in this sense, but, although it was limited to American vessels of not more than a hundred tons burden, it was rejected. So important, however, did Jay conceive it to be to obtain some relief from

the colonial restrictions that, in spite of his instructions, he assented to the incorporation into the treaty, which was signed by him and Lord Grenville on November 19, 1794, of an article by which the privilege of trading between the United States and the British West Indies was for a term of years extended to American vessels of a burden of not more than seventy tons, but only on condition that, during the continuance of the privilege, the United States should prohibit and restrain the carrying of any molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton in American vessels, either from the British islands or from the United States itself, to any port not in the United States. It was argued that this condition, by which American vessels were to be forbidden to transport from their own country any of the specified commodities, even though produced there or in a third country, was essential as a safeguard against abuse of the treaty privilege. American vessels, it was said, might, after importing a cargo from the British islands, carry it on to Europe, under the guise of a feigned American product, and thus destroy the exclusive advantages which were to continue to belong to British shipping. But the price was deemed by the United States to be too high for the limited privilege that was gained. The Senate, in assenting to the ratification of the treaty, struck out the obnoxious article. The treaty, however, provided that the citizens of the two countries might freely pass and repass by land, or by inland navigation, into the territories of the one and the other on the continent of America (the country within the limits of the Hudson's Bay Company only excepted), and carry on trade and commerce with each other in that way. American vessels were expressly excluded from any seaports in such territories; but, by another article of the treaty, they were admitted on certain conditions to a direct trade with the British dominions in the East Indies.

During the long wars that grew out of the French Revolution, colonial restrictions in America were from time to time suspended under military necessity. The home governments, when unable to carry on the trade under their own flag, were at times reluctantly obliged to open it to neutral ships in order that it might not perish altogether. As early as March 26, 1793, the ports of the French colonies in America were opened on certain terms to the vessels of neutral countries. On June 9, 1793, Spain opened the ports of New Orleans, Pensacola, and St. Augustine to friendly commerce, but foreign vessels were required to touch at Corcubion, in Galicia, or at Alicant, and obtain a permit, without which no entry into the specified ports was allowed. Seventeen years later there began, in a conservative revolt against the Napoleonic domination in Spain, the

movement in the Spanish colonies in America that was gradually to be transformed into a genuine struggle for independence, a struggle that was to end in the liberation of Spain's vast continental domain in the Western Hemisphere from the bonds of colonial monopoly. With the concurrent independence of Portugal's great colony, Brazil, the system for the most part disappeared from the American continents, below the northern boundary of the United States. But, emerging from the long Napoleonic struggle triumphant, Great Britain retained her authority over her colonies, and had even added to their number. With her the question of colonial restrictions therefore still remained. It had never ceased, except during the war of 1812, to be a subject of consideration. Monroe and Pinkney had vainly endeavored to settle it in 1806. After the ratification of the treaty of Ghent, the discussion was resumed. John Quincy Adams, with his accustomed energy and dialectic force; Richard Rush, with his wonted tact and wise judgment, and Albert Gallatin, with all his penetrating and persuasive reasonableness, had all essayed to arrange it, but without avail. In 1817, Lord Castlereagh proposed to extend to the United States the provisions of the "free port" acts, the effect of which would have been to admit to a limited trade American vessels of one deck; but this proposal was rejected, and by the act of Congress of April 18, 1818, the ports of the United States were closed against British vessels coming from any British colony which was, by the ordinary laws of navigation and trade, closed against American vessels; and British vessels sailing from the United States were put under bond to land their cargoes elsewhere than in such a colony. By an act of May 15, 1820, these restrictions were specifically made applicable to any British colonial port in the West Indies or America. In 1822 these restrictions were partially suspended, in reciprocal recognition of the opening of certain colonial ports to American vessels under certain conditions. By the act of Congress of March 1, 1823, this suspension was continued, but a claim was also put forth, which had previously been advanced by the United States in negotiation but had always been resisted by Great Britain, that no higher duties should be imposed in the colonial ports on articles imported from the United States in American vessels, than on similar articles when imported in British ships from any country whatsoever, including Great Britain herself and her colonies. This claim had been a favorite one with Mr. Adams, on the supposition that its acceptance was necessary to assure to American vessels their full share of the carrying-trade; and it was now proposed to enforce it by means of discriminating

duties. Its attempted enforcement immediately led to the imposition of countervailing duties by Great Britain. Such was the condition of things when, by the act of July 5, 1825, Parliament opened the trade with the British colonies in North America and the West Indies to the vessels of all nations, on specified conditions. The government of the United States failed to accept these conditions, with the result that on December 1, 1826, direct intercourse between the United States and the British-American colonies, in British as well as in American vessels, was almost wholly suspended.

In learning how an escape was found from this dilemma, we shall see how the unmaking of a minister contributed to the making of a President. When Andrew Jackson was inaugurated as President, in 1829, Martin Van Buren became his Secretary of State, and Louis McLane was sent as minister to the court of St. James. In a speech in the Senate in February, 1827, Van Buren had criticised the administration then in power for its omission to accept the conditions prescribed in the act of Parliament of 1825. The views which he then expressed he embodied on July 20, 1829, in an instruction to McLane. In concluding a long and able review of the controversy with Great Britain, Van Buren declared that there were three grounds on which the United States was assailable. The first was "in our too long and too tenaciously resisting the right of Great Britain to impose protecting duties in her colonies"; the second, "in not relieving her vessels from the restriction of returning direct from the United States to the colonies, after permission had been given by Great Britain to our vessels to clear out from the colonies to any other than a British port"; and the third, "in omitting to accept the terms offered by the act of Parliament of July, 1825." McLane was authorized to say that the United States would open its ports to British vessels coming from the British colonies laden with such colonial products as might be imported in American vessels, on condition that Great Britain would extend to American vessels the privileges offered by that act. In these instructions Van Buren only re-echoed the views which Gallatin had strongly expressed to the Department of State in his despatches in 1826. But Van Buren did not stop here. He directed McLane not to "harass" the British cabinet by the repetition of prior discussions, but, if the course of the late administration should be brought up, to say that its views had been submitted to the people of the United States, that the counsels by which his own conduct was directed represented the judgment expressed by the only earthly tribunal to which the late administration was amenable for its acts, and that to set up those acts as the cause of

withholding from the people of the United States privileges, which would otherwise be extended to them, would be unjust in itself and could not fail to excite their deepest sensibility. McLane duly communicated to the British government the entire purport of his instructions. His negotiations were altogether successful. By a proclamation issued by President Jackson on October 5, 1830, under the authority of an act of Congress of the 29th of the preceding May, the ports of the United States were declared to be open to British vessels and their cargoes coming from the colonies, on payment of the same charges as American vessels coming from the same quarter. An order in council issued November 5, 1830, extended to American vessels reciprocal privileges. The last remnants of the vicious system that was thus broken down were removed in 1849.

In 1831 McLane resigned his post in London, and Van Buren was appointed by the President to fill the vacancy. He arrived in England in September, and entered upon the discharge of the duties of his office. On January 25, 1832, the Senate, of which he had so recently been a member, refused to confirm him. In the memorable debate that preceded his rejection, his pointed and censorious disavowal, in the instructions to McLane, of responsibility for the acts of the preceding administration, formed a principal ground of objection. It was eloquently declared by his Whig opponents that party differences should not be injected into international discussions. The criticism was essentially sound; but, in the popular estimation, the punishment was altogether disproportionate to the offence. A widespread impression that its infliction was inspired by resentment, occasioned by party defeat, greatly enhanced Van Buren's political strength.

While the contest with colonial restrictions was going on, steady progress was made towards the accomplishment of the design, propounded by the Continental Congress in 1776, of placing the foreigner, in respect of commerce and navigation, on an equal footing with the native, and to this end of abolishing all discriminating charges whatsoever. "This principle," once declared John Quincy Adams, "is altogether congenial to our institutions, and the main obstacle to its adoption consists in this: that the fairness of its operation depends upon its being admitted universally." Before the formation of the Constitution, the several States were driven for purposes of retaliation to impose discriminating duties on foreign vessels and their cargoes. The system was continued by the government of the United States, for the same reason. By an act of March 3, 1815, however, Congress offered to abolish all dis-

criminating duties, both of tonnage and of impost, on foreign vessels laden with the produce or manufactures of their own country, on condition of the concession of a reciprocal privilege to American vessels. By "discriminating duties" are meant all duties in excess of what would be charged, in the particular country, one of its own vessels and the cargo imported in it. This principle first found conventional expression in the treaty of commerce and navigation with Great Britain of July 3, 1815; but its operation was therein confined, on the part of that power, to the British territories in Europe. By the act of Congress of March 1, 1817, the offer made in the act of 1815 was enlarged, by including vessels belonging to citizens either of the country by which the goods were produced or manufactured, or of the country from which they could only be, or most usually were, first shipped for transportation. The final step was taken in the act of March 24, 1828, which is still in force, and by which a standing offer was made for the reciprocal abolition of all discriminating duties, without regard to the origin of the cargo or the port from which the vessel came. The provisions of this statute have been extended to many countries by proclamation, and the principle on which they are founded is confirmed by numerous treaties.

With the passing away of the old system of exclusions and discriminations in the West, the activities of American diplomacy were directed more and more to the East, where the expansion of commerce was hindered by various conditions, presenting every phase of obstruction from general insecurity to positive non-intercourse. In 1830 a treaty of commerce and navigation was concluded with the Ottoman Empire, with which a trade had been carried on under the somewhat costly shelter of the English Levant Company. But a wider field awaited the spirit of enterprise in the Far East. In August, 1784, less than a year after the definitive peace with Great Britain, a New York ship, the *Empress of China*, bore the American flag into Canton. Before the close of the century, American vessels had prosecuted their adventures in trading and in fishing into all parts of the Pacific. It was an American ship, fitted out at Boston for the fur-trade, that entered and explored in 1792 the "River of the West" and gave to it its name, Columbia. Even the stern barriers of Spanish colonial exclusion failed to withstand the assaults of American energy in the trade carried on between the shores of America and the shores of Asia. In time, private initiative was powerfully reinforced by the action of government. In 1832 Edmund Roberts, a sea-captain of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was appointed by President Jackson as "agent for the purpose of examining

in the Indian Ocean the means of extending the commerce of the United States by commercial arrangements with the powers whose dominions border on those seas." Taking with him blank letters of credence, he embarked in March, 1832, on the sloop-of-war, *Peacock*, for his long voyage of inquiry and negotiation. If we were to judge by the provision made for his comfort and remuneration, we should infer that little importance was attached to his mission. Rated on the *Peacock* as "captain's clerk," his pay was barely sufficient to defray the cost of an insurance on his life for the benefit of his numerous children; and for three months he was obliged to lie on the sea-washed gun-deck with the crew, all the available space in the cabin being occupied by a *chargé d'affaires* to Buenos Ayres whose name is now forgotten. He touched at all the important countries eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, except those on the Bay of Bengal. He visited Java three times, on one occasion remaining at Batavia nearly two months. At Manila, where the crew were attacked by cholera, the *Peacock* was compelled to put to sea with her deck converted into a hospital. In Siam, and in the countries bordering on the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, Roberts endured many hardships and encountered many perils. But his sacrifices were not in vain. On March 30, 1833, he concluded a treaty of amity and commerce with Siam, and on September 21st signed a similar treaty with the Sultan of Muscat. He returned to the United States, in 1834, on the U. S. S. *Lexington*. His treaties were promptly approved by the Senate. He then returned to the East, sailing again in a man-of-war. His diplomatic career ended in 1836, at Macao, where he fell a victim to the plague. In 1839 Congress, recognizing the gross inadequacy of the recompense that had been made for his exceptional services, granted to his legal representatives a belated requital. If the successful performance of important public duties, unhampered by any thought of personal aggrandizement, forms a just title to remembrance, there can be no doubt that an abiding place in our history belongs to this pioneer of American diplomacy in Asia.

Roberts was empowered to negotiate a treaty with Cochin China, but in this task he made no progress. In all the vast Chinese Empire only one port—that of Canton—was accessible to foreign merchants. The first permanent breach in the wall of seclusion was made by the treaty between Great Britain and China, signed at Nanking, August 29, 1842, at the close of the opium war. By this treaty the ports of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai were opened to British subjects and their commerce, and the island of Hongkong was ceded to Great Britain as an entrepôt. A supplementary treaty

of commerce and navigation was concluded in the following year. The United States soon appeared in the breach. By the act of Congress of March 3, 1843, the sum of forty thousand dollars was placed at the disposal of the President to enable him to establish commercial relations with China on terms of "national equal reciprocity." On May 8th, Caleb Cushing, of Massachusetts, was appointed to the mission with the title of minister plenipotentiary and commissioner. The choice was fortunate. No public character in America has possessed a mind more versatile or talents more varied than Cushing. Lawyer, jurist, politician, soldier, and diplomatist, a student of literature and of science, and an accomplished linguist, he responded to the demands of every situation, promptly and without embarrassment. So prodigious and insatiable was his acquisitiveness that, as the tradition runs in the Department of State, when deprived of other mental pabulum he would memorize the groups of figures in the cipher code. When he set out for China, a squadron of three vessels was placed at his disposal. On February 27, 1844, writing from the flag-ship *Brandywine*, in Macao Roads, he announced to the governor-general of the two Kwang provinces his arrival with full powers to make a treaty. He encountered the usual evasions; but, after an exchange of correspondence, he learned early in May that Tsiyeng, the negotiator of the treaties with Great Britain, had been appointed as imperial commissioner to treat with him. Tsiyeng arrived outside Macao on June 16th, and next day entered the village of Wang Hiya, where with his suite he lodged in a temple that had been prepared for him. On June 21st, after an exchange of official visits, Cushing submitted a project of a treaty. In communicating it he stated that his government desired to treat on the basis of "cordial friendship and firm peace," that it did not desire any part of the territory of China, and that, while it would be happy to treat on the basis of opening all ports, yet, if China so desired, it would be content with a free and secure commerce with the five ports opened by the British treaty. The negotiations proceeded steadily, and on July 3, 1844, a treaty was signed. The point of diplomatic representation at Peking was yielded with the express understanding that, in case it should be conceded to other Western powers, the envoy of the United States should likewise be received. All the commercial privileges obtained by Great Britain for her subjects were, with some variations, extended to citizens of the United States; and American citizens were, like British subjects, exempted from Chinese jurisdiction. A curious light is thrown on American enterprise by a correspondence which Cushing, before his return to the United

States, had with two American citizens who had established a ship-yard on the Chinese coast, opposite Hongkong, and who had been ordered away. Cushing advised them to acquiesce in the action of the Chinese authorities, in view of the stipulations of the treaty which he had just concluded.

A new treaty was made in 1858; and ten years later a special Chinese embassy, headed by Anson Burlingame, signed at Washington the treaty that is known by his name. In entering the service of China, after a notable career of six years as American minister at Peking, Burlingame declared that he was governed by the interests of his country and of civilization; and his course was approved by his government. The rule that the United States will not receive as a diplomatic representative of a foreign power one of its own citizens was in his case gladly waived. As American minister at Peking, he sought "to substitute fair diplomatic action in China for force," a policy which Mr. Seward "approved with much commendation."

Through the vicissitudes of the years that have since elapsed it may be said that the United States has, in its commercial dealings with China, uniformly been guided by the principle of the "open door"; for, although the institution of that policy is popularly associated in the United States with Mr. Hay's circular of September 6, 1899, neither the phrase nor the principle denoted by it in any sense originated with that measure. The phrase was used, as a current form of expression, by the American peace commissioners at Paris in 1898, in the demand, made under instructions from their government, for the cession of the Philippines. In that demand they expressly declared it to be the purpose of the United States to maintain in the islands "an open door to the world's commerce." The phrase "open door" is but a condensed expression of the principle of "equal and impartial trade" for all nations; and in the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain it was precisely exemplified to the extent of the stipulation that the United States would, for the term of ten years, "admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States."

The United States, in espousing the cause of the "open door" in China in 1899, sought, not to establish a new principle there, but to prevent the abandonment of the old for the policy of leases and spheres of influence which the European powers, whether with a view to self-aggrandizement or to the avoidance of war with one another, seemed ready to adopt. The position of the United States was, however, appreciably weakened by its prompt relinquishment of consular jurisdiction within

the leased territories. As Chinese sovereignty was by the terms of the leases professedly reserved, Japan logically took the ground that consular jurisdiction, which was exercised under treaties with China, remained unimpaired; but the European governments, each looking to the exercise of supreme power within its own leased area, yielded to one another's wishes. The United States did not contest their claim, but, on the contrary, accepted it without protest or reservation.

In the disorders following the Boxer Rebellion the United States adhered to its previous declarations of policy. In his celebrated circular of July 3, 1900, while the foreign legations at Peking were besieged and all communication with them was cut off, Mr. Hay declared that the policy of the United States would be

to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve China's territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.

The United States co-operated with the other foreign powers in the military expedition for the relief of the legations; united in the joint demands of December 22, 1900, for the punishment of the principal offenders, the indemnification of the foreign governments and their citizens, and the adoption of measures to assure the preservation of order and the improvement of relations, both commercial and diplomatic; and signed the final protocol of September 7, 1901, by which an indemnity of about \$330,000,000 was assessed upon China. In all these matters the United States had sought to exert a moderating influence; and six years later it returned to China the unexpended remainder, about one-half, of the sum of \$24,000,000 allotted to American claims.

Meanwhile, a complicated and elusive negotiation took place in regard to Manchuria, whose evacuation by Russia the United States continued to urge. On January 16, 1904, however, Japan presented to Russia an ultimatum, embracing the preservation of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria and the exclusion of Korea from the Russian sphere of interest. In the war that ensued the United States, while maintaining its neutrality, expressed to the belligerents the wish that the area of hostilities might as far as possible be localized. They assented except as to Manchuria, which was indeed the principal theatre of military operations. In June, 1905, they accepted a proposal of peace negotiations, which President Roosevelt is said to have made to Russia at the instance of Japan; and on September 5, 1905, they concluded at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, a treaty

by which Manchuria, except the Liaotung peninsula, was to be restored to China, while Port Arthur, Talienshan, and the adjacent territories which had been leased to Russia were, with China's consent, to be transferred to Japan.

While the fate of Manchuria was under discussion at Portsmouth a serious agitation against the United States broke out in China. The treaty of 1880, while assenting to the exclusion from the United States of Chinese "laborers," expressly provided for the admission of teachers, students, merchants, and travellers. The statutes subsequently adopted conformed to these stipulations, but in 1898 their application was broadened by a ruling, contrary to previous opinion and practice, that all persons, such as salesmen, clerks, buyers, storekeepers, and physicians, who were not expressly exempted, were excluded as "laborers." Moreover, the law was often enforced in a harsh and truculent manner, so that eventually a boycott of American goods was undertaken in northern China under the auspices of local guilds and chambers of commerce. Extensive losses were sustained by American merchants before the Chinese government could stay the movement.

In November, 1909, coincidently with efforts to extend American industrial and financial interests in China, especially in connection with the building of railways, the United States, with a view to preserve "the undisputed enjoyment by China of all political rights in Manchuria" as well as the "open door," proposed to the powers the "commercial neutralization" of the Manchurian railways under an international administration. Russia declined to accept the plan, on the ground that it would "seriously injure Russian interests, public and private"; while her former antagonist, Japan, rejected it as involving an important departure from the terms of the treaty of Portsmouth, under which the Japanese and Russian railways in Manchuria were "dedicated exclusively to commercial and industrial uses," as well as the setting up in that part of China of an exceptional system whose operation would not be beneficial.

In October, 1911, an insurrection against the Imperial government broke out in China. In February, 1912, the Manchu Dynasty abdicated, and Yuan Shih Kai, who had held many high governmental positions, military and civil, was elected provisional President of the Republic of China, by a national assembly at Nanking. A provisional constitution was adopted. The United States Senate passed a resolution, which had come from the House, congratulating the people of China on their adoption of a republican form of government. On February 3d Mr. Knox, as Secretary of State, replying to an inquiry of the German government, had reiterated the desire of the United

States to preserve China's territorial integrity as well as to secure the observance of the principle of neutrality, which he proposed to extend to loans. After the 4th of March, 1913, the bankers forming the American group in the "six-power" loan (about \$125,000,000) then contemplated under the auspices of the United States, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and Russia, asked their government whether it would request them to participate. On March 19th President Wilson publicly announced that the administration had declined to make the request, because it did not approve either the "conditions of the loan," which touched "very nearly the administrative independence of China," or "the implications of responsibility," which "might conceivably go the length in some unhappy contingency of forcible interference in the financial, and even the political, affairs" of the country. In the following May the United States formally recognized the republic.

In the recent controversies between China¹ and Japan the

1. By chance, as the result of the mechanical adjustment of the new matter to the plates of the original work, we are enabled to insert, at the last moment, the agreement between the United States and Japan concluded at Washington on November 2, 1917, by exchange of notes between Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State, and Viscount Ishii, head of the Japanese special mission, on the subject of China. Referring to "recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest" to their governments relating to China, and stating that, in order to "silence mischievous reports," a "public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared" by those governments on the subject is believed to be advisable, Mr. Lansing, in his note, declares that the two governments "recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently" that "the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." He then observes that "the territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired," and that the United States "has every confidence in the repeated assurances" of Japan that, while "geographical position" gives her such "special interests," she has "no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers"; that the two governments "deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China"; that they "declare furthermore that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called 'open door,' or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China"; and that they "mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any other government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China, or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity" in such "commerce and industry." Viscount Ishii, repeating the terms of Mr. Lansing's note, confirms, under the authorization of his government, the "understanding" thus reached.

The Chinese government, when promptly furnished by Japan with copies of these notes, lodged at Washington and at Tokyo a declaration to the effect that China, having adopted toward friendly nations the principle of justice, equality, and respect for treaty rights, and recognizing

United States does not appear to have become directly involved. The prestige of Japan in that quarter has, however, been visibly enhanced; and a spontaneous communication lately made by Washington to Peking, upon the importance of maintaining internal political unity, seems to have occasioned some annoyance at Tokyo, whose first impressions may have been formed upon incomplete advices. Possibly the powers of the eminent Japanese commission now on its way (July, 1917) to the United States may be broad enough to admit of a discussion of the situation in China.

When Edmund Roberts was dispatched to the Far East, he was directed to obtain information respecting Japan and the value of its trade with the Dutch and the Chinese. Japan, like China, had been closed to intercourse with the Western powers in the seventeenth century, chiefly on account of foreign aggressions. The seclusion of Japan was, however, even more complete than that of China, since the only privilege of trade conceded to any Western power was that granted to the Dutch, who maintained a factory on the island of Deshima, at Nagasaki, and who were allowed to fit out two ships a year from Batavia to that port. In 1845 Alexander Everett, when he went as commissioner to China, took with him a full power to negotiate a treaty with Japan. This power he afterwards transferred to Commodore James Biddle, who in 1846 paid an ill-fated visit to the bay of Yedo. In 1849 Commander Glynn, of the United States navy, while stationed in the western Pacific, made a voyage in the *Preble* to Nagasaki to inquire as to the fate of certain American whalers, said to have been shipwrecked, who were reported to be held as prisoners by the Japanese. Commander Glynn found that the men were in reality deserters, but he obtained their release; and on his return to the United States he urged that another effort be made to open an intercourse between the two countries, especially with a view to the use of a Japanese port for the accommodation of a line of steamers which was then expected to be established between California and China. On June 10, 1851, Commodore Aulick was instructed to proceed to Yedo in his flag-ship, accompanied by as many vessels of his squadron as might be conveniently employed. His health, however, soon afterwards became impaired, and he was relieved of the mission. His powers were then transferred to Commodore Matthew C. Perry, by whom elaborate preparations were made for the expedition.

On the afternoon of Friday, July 8, 1853, Perry, in command of special relations created by territorial propinquity only so far as expressed in treaties, would not permit herself to be bound by any agreement made between other nations.

of a squadron of four vessels, anchored in the bay of Yedo. His proceedings were characterized by energy and decision. He had, as he said, determined to demand as a right and not to solicit as a favor those acts of courtesy which are due from one civilized nation to another, and to allow none of the petty annoyances that had been unsparingly visited on those who had preceded him. He declined to deliver his credentials to any but an officer of the highest rank. When he was asked to go to Nagasaki, he refused; when ordered to leave the bay, he moved higher up; and he found that the nearer he approached the imperial city "the more polite and friendly they became." After delivering his letters to two princes designated by the Emperor to receive them, he went away, announcing that he would return in the following spring to receive a reply to his propositions. He returned with redoubled forces in February, 1854, and, passing by the city of Uraga, anchored not far below Yedo. The Emperor had appointed commissioners to treat with him, four of whom were princes of the empire. They desired him to return to Uraga, but he declined to do so. The commissioners then consented to treat at a place opposite the ships. Here the Japanese erected a pavilion, and on March 8th Perry landed in state, with an escort of five hundred officers, seamen, and marines, embarked in twenty-seven barges. "With people of forms," said Perry, "it is necessary either to set all ceremony aside, or to out-Herod Herod in assumed personal consequence and ostentation. I have adopted the two extremes." Perry submitted a draught of a treaty; and, pending the negotiations, he established a telegraph-line on shore, and laid down and put in operation a railway with a locomotive and cars, "carrying around the circle many of the astonished natives." A treaty was signed on March 31, 1854. American ships were allowed to obtain provisions and coal and other necessary supplies at Simoda and Hakodate, and aid and protection in case of shipwreck were promised. No provision for commercial intercourse was secured, but the privilege was obtained of appointing a consul to reside at Simoda. Such was the first opening of Japan, after two centuries of seclusion. On July 17, 1901, there was unveiled at Kurihama, a monument in commemoration of Perry's advent. In Japan his name is to-day a household word, and is better known than that of any other foreigner.

On September 8, 1855, the government of the United States, availing itself of the privilege secured by the Perry treaty, appointed Townsend Harris as consul-general to reside at Simoda. He was chosen in the hope that by reason of his knowledge of Eastern character and his general intelligence and ex-

perience in business, he might be able to induce the Japanese to enter into a treaty of commerce. On July 29, 1858, his efforts were crowned with success. A provision for diplomatic representation at Yedo was obtained; rights of residence and of trade at certain ports were secured; duties were regulated; the privilege of extraterritoriality was granted to Americans in Japan; and religious freedom in that country was promised. Harris's triumph was won by a firm, tactful, honest diplomacy, and without the aid of a fleet, though it was no doubt true that he invoked the then recent humiliation of China by the European allies as an argument in favor of a voluntary intercourse. Before the end of the year, the fleets of the allies appeared in Japanese waters, and treaties similar to that of the United States were obtained by France and Great Britain. Treaties between Japan and other powers followed in due time. Harris's treaty provided for the exchange of ratifications at Washington. For this purpose the Japanese government sent a special embassy to the United States. Including servants, it comprised seventy-one persons. They were conveyed to America in a United States man-of-war, and Congress provided for their expenses. The ratifications of the treaty were exchanged at Washington on May 22, 1860, and the members of the embassy were afterwards conducted to some of the principal American cities. They were sent back to Japan on the man-of-war *Niagara*. To the shallow and sectarian reasoner, the Japan of to-day, once more possessed of full judicial and economic autonomy, and in the potent exercise of all the rights of sovereignty, presents an astounding spectacle of sudden, if not miraculous development; but in reality Japan is an ancient and polished nation, the roots of whose civilization, though its outward forms may have changed, strike deep into the past.

During the Russo-Japanese war the relations of the United States with Japan continued to be of the friendliest character. Popular subscriptions to Japanese war loans were made with an enthusiasm which purchasers sometimes refused to ascribe solely to the expectation of profit. The American public was therefore startled when, in the autumn of 1906, there arose a sudden diplomatic crisis, occasioned by the action of the San Francisco board of education in passing an ordinance by which Chinese, Japanese, and Korean children were required to be segregated together in an Oriental school. President Roosevelt, in his annual message of December 3, 1906, strongly reprobated this measure, and it was afterwards essentially modified. In reality, the incident was one of the results of an active agitation in California for the exclusion of Japanese laborers. This agitation the two governments, acting in a spirit of co-opera-

tion, dealt with by means of a friendly informal understanding. Japan, while permitting her laborers to emigrate to Hawaii, Canada, and Mexico, had adopted the policy of refusing to provide them with passports for the United States. This course she continued to follow. Congress, on the other hand, by the Immigration Act of February 20, 1907, authorized the President to exclude from the continental territory of the United States persons having passports for the insular possessions, for the Canal Zone, or for another country. By an executive order of March 14, 1907, this power was duly exercised.

In 1913 relations again became strained as the result of steps taken in the California legislature to prohibit certain classes of aliens, including Japanese, from holding lands in that State. President Wilson deemed the occasion to be of sufficient importance to justify the sending of the Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, to California to confer with the governor and the legislature. The bill, though eventually passed, was materially modified. As approved on May 19, 1913, it permitted aliens, unless they were "eligible to citizenship" of the United States, to own and transmit real property only so far as the right was secured by treaty, except that they might lease agricultural lands for a term not exceeding three years. As Japanese are among the classes of aliens for whose naturalization the federal laws have been held not to provide, the statute curtailed the local rights as to land-ownership which they had previously enjoyed. Japan protested against the act as involving a racial discrimination. The United States, while contending that it reflected local economic competition rather than racial discrimination, maintained that it preserved all rights under the treaty of 1911 and, in permitting agricultural leases, even went beyond them. The Japanese government, however, declined to accept these explanations as satisfactory, declaring that it regarded the act as involving an "unjust and obnoxious discrimination," and that it could not regard the question as closed "so long as the existing state of things was permitted to continue."

The situation in the Far East has beyond a doubt been profoundly affected by the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which has been twice renewed, with amendments.

By the first alliance, which was signed at London January 20, 1902, the contracting parties, declaring that they were actuated solely by the desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the Far East, but that they were also specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations,

agreed that if either party should, in defence of its interests in those countries become involved in war with another power, the other party would maintain a strict neutrality and use its efforts to prevent any other power from taking part in hostilities against its ally, but that if these efforts were not successful it would at once come to its ally's assistance and make war and peace in common with it.

This agreement was replaced by the treaty of August 12, 1905, the objects of which were declared to be (*a*) the consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of eastern Asia and of India; (*b*) the preservation of the common interests of all the powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunity for their commerce and (*c*) the maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting parties in the regions of eastern Asia and of India and the defence of their special interests in those regions. To this end they agreed that if by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action by any other power either party should be involved in war in defence of such territorial rights or special interests the other party would come to its assistance and conduct the war and make peace in common with it. Great Britain then explicitly recognized the paramount political, military, and economic interests of Japan in Korea, while Japan reciprocally recognized Great Britain's special interests in all that concerned the security of the Indian frontier. As regarded the war then in progress between Japan and Russia, it was, however, agreed that Great Britain would continue to maintain a strict neutrality unless some other power should join in hostilities against Japan.

The foregoing treaty was replaced with a new alliance signed at London July 13, 1911. The same general objects are professed as in the treaty of 1905, but it is stated that "important changes" have taken place since that time. This phrase no doubt embraced the absorption of Korea, where Japan's "paramount interests," which are no longer mentioned, had ripened into territorial rights. And as regarded the "territorial rights" or "special interests" of the allies in eastern Asia and in India, their obligation to aid each other in war in defence of such rights or interests was now declared to become effective upon "unprovoked attack" or "aggressive action" by any power "wherever arising." This obligation was potentially qualified by a stipulation to the effect that, "should either . . . party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third power," it should not be obliged to go to war with the power with which such treaty was "in force." This clause is understood to have

been intended to refer to a treaty of general arbitration between the United States, on the one part, and Great Britain and France, respectively, on the other, concluded in August, 1911, which was in process of negotiation when the alliance was signed; but, as this treaty never came into force, the scope of the alliance did not prove to be affected by it.

Korea, the Land of the Morning Calm, continued, long after the opening of China and Japan, to maintain a rigorous seclusion. Efforts to secure access had invariably ended in disaster. On May 20, 1882, however, Commodore Shufeldt, U. S. N., invested with diplomatic powers, succeeded, with the friendly good offices of Li Hung-Chang, in concluding with the Hermit Kingdom the first treaty made by it with a Western power. The last great barrier of national non-intercourse was broken down.

The results that followed were unforeseen. Beset by the rival pretensions of China and Japan to suzerainty, Korea, leading a feeble and uncertain existence, formed the immediate occasion of the war between those countries in 1894. At the end of this war China relinquished her claims, but France, Germany, and Russia intervened to stay the hand of Japan. Subsequently, the Korean government made to eminent Russians large timber concessions on the Yalu River. It was chiefly these concessions, which were regarded as exposing Korea to Russian domination, that precipitated the war between Russia and Japan of 1904.

Immediately after the peace of Portsmouth Japan proceeded formally to absorb Korea. The direction of Korean external relations was taken over by the Japanese Foreign Office; and on November 24, 1905, Mr. Root, as Secretary of State, informed the minister of the United States at Seoul that the diplomatic representation of matters affecting American persons, property, and treaty rights was transferred to the American legation at Tokyo, and directed him to return home. Korea as an independent state ceased to exist.

References:

As to "Reciprocity" and the Abolition of Discriminating Duties,
see
Moore, *Digest of International Law*, II, 69-76;
Trescot, *Diplomacy of the American Revolution*, and his *Diplomacy of the Administrations of Washington and Adams*;
Schuyler, *American Diplomacy and the Furtherance of Commerce*;
The Foreign Policy of the United States, Political and Commercial (American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1899);
Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations*.

As to Diplomacy with the Far East, see

Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient*;

Griffis, *Matthew Galbraith Perry* (Boston, 1887) and *Townsend Harris, First American Envoy to Japan* (Boston, 1893);

Mahan, *Problem of Asia and Its Effect on International Policies*;

Roberts, Edmund, *Embassy to the Eastern Courts* (New York, 1837);

Williams, *Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese Mission to Foreign Powers*.

See, also, for Diplomatic Relations with China, Moore, *Digest of International Law*, V, 416 *et seq.*; with Japan, *idem*, p. 733 *et seq.*; with Korea, *idem*, p. 567.

VI

NON-INTERVENTION AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

AMONG the rules of conduct prescribed for the United States by the statesmen who formulated its foreign policy, none was conceived to be more fundamental or more distinctively American than that which forbade intervention in the political affairs of other nations. The right of the government to intervene for the protection of its citizens in foreign lands and on the high seas never was doubted; nor was such action withheld in proper cases. But, warned by the spectacle of the great European struggles that had marked the attempts of nations to control one another's political destiny, the statesmen of America, believing that they had a different mission to perform, planted themselves upon the principle of the equality of nations as expounded by Grotius and other masters of international law. This principle was expressed with peculiar felicity and force by Vattel, who declared that nations inherited from nature "the same obligations and rights," that power or weakness could not in this respect produce any difference, and that a "small republic" was "no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom." The same thought was tersely phrased by Chief-Justice Marshall, in his celebrated affirmation: "No principle is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights." And as the Declaration of Independence proclaimed life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to be "inalienable rights" of individual men, so the founders of the American republic ascribed the same rights to men in their aggregate political capacity as independent nations.

While the principle of non-intervention formed an integral

part of the political philosophy of American statesmen, its practical importance was profoundly impressed upon them by the narrowness of their escape from being drawn, by the alliance with France, into the vortex of the European conflicts that grew out of the French Revolution. Even before American independence was acknowledged by Great Britain, American statesmen scented the dangers that lurked in a possible implication in European broils. "You are afraid," said Richard Oswald to John Adams, "of being made the tool of the powers of Europe." "Indeed, I am," said Adams. "What powers?" inquired Oswald. "All of them," replied Adams; "it is obvious that all the powers of Europe will be continually manœuvring with us to work us into their real or imaginary balances of power. . . . But I think that it ought to be our rule not to meddle." In 1793, the revolutionary government of France, apparently doubting the applicability of the existing alliance with the United States to the situation in Europe, submitted a proposal for "a national agreement, in which two great peoples shall suspend their commercial and political interests and establish a mutual understanding to defend the empire of liberty, wherever it can be embraced." This proposal the American government declined; and its response found practical embodiment in its acts. The reasons for the policy of non-intervention and neutrality, to which the administration of the time so sedulously adhered, were eloquently summed up by Washington in that immortal political legacy, his Farewell Address. "The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations," said Washington, "is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop." The same thought was conveyed by Jefferson, in his first inaugural address, in the apothegm—"Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."

The policy of non-intervention embraced matters of religion as well as of politics. By the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Congress was expressly forbidden to make any law "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." This inhibition against governmental interference with religious opinions and practices was in its spirit extended to the intercourse of the United States with foreign nations. In Article IX of the treaty between the United States and Tripoli, which was concluded on November 4, 1796, during the administration of Washington, we find this significant declaration:

As the Government of the United States of America is not in any

sense founded on the Christian Religion; as it has in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion, or tranquillity of Mussulmen, . . . it is declared by the parties, that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries.

With the omission of the introductory phrase, a similar declaration was inserted in the treaty with Tripoli of 1805, and in the treaties with Algiers of 1815 and 1816. A stipulation less broad in its tolerance appears in Article XXIX of the treaty between the United States and China, signed at Tientsin, June 18, 1858. This article, after reciting that the principles of the Christian religion are "recognized as teaching men to do good, and to do to others as they would have others do to them," provides that "any person, whether citizen of the United States or Chinese convert, who, according to these tenets, peaceably teach and practice the principles of Christianity, shall in no case be interfered with or molested." By Article IV, however, of the Burlingame treaty of 1868, this stipulation is mentioned as an introduction to the declaration that it is

further agreed that citizens of the United States in China of every religious persuasion, and Chinese subjects in the United States, shall enjoy entire liberty of conscience, and shall be exempt from all disability or persecution on account of their religious faith or worship in either country.

In harmony with this principle was the simple declaration in the treaty with Siam of 1856, and in the treaty with Japan of 1858, that Americans in those countries should "be allowed the free exercise of their religion." They were to be protected, not as the adherents or the propagandists of any particular faith, but as American citizens. As was well said by Mr. Cass, it was the object of the United States "not merely to protect a Catholic in a Protestant country, a Protestant in a Catholic country, a Jew in a Christian country, but an American in all countries."

The policy of non-intervention, which guided the United States during the wars growing out of the French Revolution, was severely tested in the struggle of the Spanish colonies in America for independence; but, under the guardian care of Monroe and John Quincy Adams, it was scrupulously adhered to. In view of this circumstance, it is strange that one of the gravest perils by which, after the days of the alliance with France, the maintenance of the policy was ever apparently threatened should have grown out of a political contest in Europe. The struggle of the Greeks for independence evoked much sympathy in America as well as in England; but the struggle of the Hungarians, under the leadership of Kossuth,

for emancipation from Austrian rule, gave rise in the United States to manifestations of feeling that were unprecedented. The Hungarian revolution came at a time when the spirit of democracy, which distinguishes the political and social development of the nineteenth century, was especially active; but the wide-spread interest felt in the United States in the Hungarian movement was greatly intensified by reason of the popular assumption that the declaration of Hungary's independence, although it in reality left the question of a permanent form of government wholly in abeyance, was the forerunner of a republic. It was, however, only after the arrival of Kossuth in the United States that the excitement reached its greatest height. In June, 1849, Mr. A. Dudley Mann was appointed by the President as a "special and confidential agent of the United States to Hungary"; but, before he reached his destination, Russia had intervened in aid of Austria, and the revolution had practically come to an end. When the revolution was crushed, Kossuth and many of his associates sought refuge in Turkey. By a joint resolution of Congress of March 3, 1851, the President was requested, if it should be the wish of these exiles to "emigrate" to the United States, to authorize the employment of a public vessel to convey them to America. In conformity with this request the U. S. S. *Mississippi* was sent to the Dardanelles; but the exiles had scarcely embarked, when it was found that Kossuth had other views than that of coming to America as an emigrant. At Gibraltar he left the *Mississippi* and proceeded to London, for the purpose of conferring with revolutionary exiles in that city; and he afterwards sailed for America in the steamer *Humboldt*, from Southampton. He arrived at New York on the night of December 14, 1851, after a stormy passage. He soon dissipated all doubts as to the objects of his mission. In his public addresses he cast off all reserve, and in his "official capacity" as the representative of Hungary made an appeal for aid. He affirmed that the consideration of distance should not deter the United States in the case of Hungary any more than in that of Cuba from interfering against European invasion. Cuba was six days' distant from New York; Hungary was eighteen. Was this, he asked, a circumstance to regulate the conduct and policy of a great people? The people, wherever he went, seemed enthusiastically to give a negative answer. His journey to Washington was in the nature of a triumphal progress. When presented to the President, he made a direct appeal for intervention. President Fillmore, with courtesy and dignity, but with equal candor, repelled the solicitation. But, for his disappointment at the White House, Kossuth found consolation in his reception by Congress,

though it in the end proved to be wholly illusory. He was received both by the Senate and by the House, and was banqueted by Congress. The first effective check to the popular excitement was given by Henry Clay, who refused to countenance the prevailing agitation. Kossuth more than once expressed a desire to meet him, and Clay, though in feeble health, at length granted him an interview. "For the sake of my country," said Clay, addressing Kossuth, "you must allow me to protest against the policy you propose to her." "Waiving the grave and momentous question of the right of one nation to assume the executive power among nations, for the enforcement of international law," Clay pointed out the practical difficulties that stood in the way of affording to Hungary effective aid against Austria and Russia. He also enlarged upon the evil example that would be afforded by the United States to other powers in departing from its "ancient policy of amity and non-intervention"; and, after declaring that the United States had, by adhering to that policy, "done more for the cause of liberty in the world than arms could effect," he concluded:

Far better it is for ourselves, for Hungary, and for the cause of liberty, that, adhering to our wise pacific system and avoiding the distant wars of Europe, we should keep our lamp burning brightly on this Western shore, as a light to all nations, than to hazard its utter extinction, amid the ruins of fallen or falling republics in Europe.

The Kossuth danger passed away even more suddenly than it had arisen. After he left Washington, he addressed a letter to the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress, in which he expressed the hope that the United States would pronounce in favor of the law of nations and of international rights and duties. A motion to print this letter was carried in the Senate by only one vote, and the arguments in support of the motion were almost exclusively confined to considerations of courtesy. Indeed, the sudden collapse of Kossuth enthusiasm in high places, after his departure from the capital, would have been inexplicable if the open opponents of his policy of intervention had found any one to meet them on that ground.

It may be said that the most pronounced exception ever made by the United States, apart from cases arising under the Monroe Doctrine, to its policy of non-intervention, is that which was made in the case of Cuba. At various times, since the United States became an independent nation, conditions in Cuba had been such as to invite interference either for the purpose of correcting disorders which existed there, or for the purpose of preventing Cuba from falling a prey to some of Spain's European enemies. During the Ten Years' War in

Cuba, from 1868 till 1878, intervention by the United States was prevented on several occasions only by the powerful influence of President Grant, counselled and supported by his Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish. In its abstention, the administration was aided by the situation at home, which afforded daily admonition of the difficulties that might attend the re-establishment of order in a large and populous island where the process of emancipation was still going on. In 1895 the situation was changed in the United States as well as in Cuba. American interests in the island had also increased. The second insurrection was, besides, more active than the first, and spread over a wider area. If the conflict were left to take its course, the ruin of the island was apparently assured. The United States tendered its good offices; but the offer was not productive of any tangible result. In his annual message of December 7, 1896, President Cleveland declared that, when Spain's inability to suppress the insurrection had become manifest, and the struggle had degenerated into a hopeless strife involving useless sacrifice of life and the destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation would be presented in which the obligation to recognize the sovereignty of Spain would be "superseded by higher obligations." Conditions continued to grow worse. The distress produced by the measures of concentration, under the rule of General Weyler, excited strong feeling in the United States, and prompted President McKinley to request Spain to put an end to existing conditions and restore order. General Weyler was afterwards succeeded by General Blanco, and it was announced that an autonomous régime would be instituted. But neither the offer of autonomy nor the actual institution of an autonomous government produced peace. The insurgents, embittered by the three years' conflict, rejected the programme of autonomy with substantial unanimity, while the distinctively Spanish element of the population viewed it with disapprobation and withdrew from politics. In this delicate situation the intervention of the United States was precipitated by certain startling events. The incident created by the surreptitious publication of the letter of Señor Dupuy de Lome, Spanish minister at Washington, to Señor Canalejas, in which President McKinley was aspersed and the reciprocity negotiations between the two countries were exhibited as a sham, had just been officially declared to be closed, when the U. S. S. *Maine* was blown up at Havana, and two hundred and sixty-six of her crew perished. Superficial reasoners have wished to treat the destruction of the *Maine* as the justification and the cause of the intervention of the United States. The government of the United States, however,

did not itself take that ground. It is true that the case of the *Maine* is mentioned in the preamble to the joint resolution of Congress, by which the intervention of the United States was authorized; but it is recited merely as the eulmination of "abhorrent conditions," which had existed for more than three years. The destruction of the *Maine* doubtless kindled the intense popular feeling without which wars are seldom entered upon; but the government of the United States never charged—on the contrary, it refrained from charging—that the catastrophe was to be attributed to "the direct act of a Spanish official." Its intervention rested upon the ground that there existed in Cuba conditions so injurious to the United States, as a neighboring nation, that they could no longer be endured. Its action was analogous to what is known in private law as the abatement of a nuisance. On this ground the intervention was justified by the late Alphonse Rivier, one of the most eminent publicists in Europe, and on this ground its justification must continue to rest.

Any exposition of the American doctrine of non-intervention ✓ would be incomplete that failed specially to notice the rule of the United States with regard to the recognition of new governments—a rule which is indeed a corollary of that doctrine. In Europe, governments had been treated as legitimate or illegitimate, according to what was conceived to be the regularity or the irregularity of the succession of their rulers. The attitude of the United States on this question was early defined, when the National Convention in France proclaimed a republic. On that occasion Jefferson, as Secretary of State, in a letter to Gouverneur Morris, of March 12, 1793, which has become a classic, said:

We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own government is founded, that everyone may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will; and that it may transact its business with foreign nations through whatever organ it thinks proper, whether king, convention, assembly, committee, president, or anything else it may choose. The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded.

In a word, the United States maintained that the true test of a government's title to recognition is not the theoretical legitimacy of its origin, but the fact of its existence as the apparent exponent of the popular will. And from this principle, which is now universally accepted, it necessarily follows that recognition can regularly be accorded only when the new government has demonstrated its ability to exist. Recognition extended at an earlier stage of the revolution savors of an act of intervention, and as such must be defended on its merits, as

is clearly set forth in President Roosevelt's message of January 4, 1904, in relation to the recognition of the Republic of Panama. Conversely, to refuse recognition of an actually established government merely because of its form, or the non-constitutional or revolutionary character of its origin or antecedents, also savors of intervention. Thus the United States, in 1849, in approving the act of its minister at Paris in promptly recognizing the short-lived republican government then suddenly set up in France, said :

In its intercourse with foreign nations the government of the United States has, from its origin, always recognized *de facto* governments. We recognize the right of all nations to create and re-form their political institutions according to their own will and pleasure. We do not go behind the existing government to involve ourselves in the question of legitimacy. It is sufficient for us to know that a government exists capable of maintaining itself; and then its recognition on our part inevitably follows. This principle of action, resulting from our sacred regard for the independence of nations, has occasioned some strange anomalies in our history. The Pope, the Emperor of Russia, and President Jackson were the only authorities on earth which ever recognized Dom Miguel as King of Portugal.

In the case of the so-called Rivas-Walker government, set up in Nicaragua in 1855 by William Walker in conjunction with a Nicaraguan citizen, Don Patricio Rivas, who was styled provisory president of the republic, unusual complications were presented. Not only was the revolution initiated by Walker at the head of a filibustering expedition from the United States, but there were doubts as to the character and stability of the foundations on which the government claimed to rest. When, therefore, a person appeared in Washington in December, 1855, with credentials as minister plenipotentiary from Rivas, the United States declined to receive him, and instructed its minister in Nicaragua to report upon the situation there, some of the accounts representing that the existing political "organization" was "satisfactory to the people," while others indicated that the people would "shake off the power of Walker if it were possible for them to do so." The reports of the minister were favorable to the "organization," and in May, 1856, a new minister from it was duly received. The recognition was, however, a few months later withdrawn, and the further consideration of its renewal was soon rendered unnecessary by the suppression of the Walker-Rivas power by the Nicaraguans, aided by Costa Rica.

During and after the Civil War the United States not unnaturally practised greater deliberation than it had sometimes done before in recognizing revolutionary governments in other countries. Indeed, Mr. Seward, as Secretary of State, once

went so far as to instruct the minister of the United States in Bolivia not to recognize any government which "was not adopted through the free will and the constitutionally expressed voice of the people." He also informed the minister of the United States in Peru that "revolutions in republican states ought not to be accepted until the people have adopted them by organic law with the solemnities which would seem sufficient to guarantee their stability and permanency." Subsequently, however, he explained that, far from denying the right of a nation to change its republican constitution by force, the United States, when a change was so made, merely required, before recognizing the new administration, that it should be "sanctioned by the formal acquiescence and acceptance of the people." In the case of Bolivia, he had already found it expedient to "recognize the actual government," if it had become "truly and in fact consolidated." In no instance was it assumed that, in the concession or withholdment of recognition, there was involved the right to prescribe or control the course of political action in other countries. In the main the chief object of solicitude appeared to be the probable stability of the new authority, as indicated by its popular acceptance, of which the substantial cessation of armed opposition was treated as cogent proof. In the case of the Diaz revolutionary government in Mexico, in 1876, formal recognition was deferred for almost a year after recognition had been accorded by the other American and the European governments then represented at the Mexican capital. The reason of the delay, as explained by President Hayes in his annual message of December 3, 1877, was, however, "the occurrences on the Rio Grande border," which, together with the non-payment of certain sums due under the claims convention of 1868, created doubts as to the ability and disposition of the new government to fulfil the "obligations of treaties" and perform the duties of "international friendship." It was not suggested that other tests, such as that of constitutional regularity, might be applied, although the new government, which was in fact eventually recognized, was confessedly the result of an armed revolution. On the contrary, apart from the special considerations of an international character above noted, the attitude of the United States, then and thereafter maintained, is well expressed by the formula employed, for instance, in the case of the revolutionary government of General Crespo in Venezuela in 1892, when the American minister at Caracas was instructed to recognize it if it was "accepted by the people, in possession of the power of the nation, and fully established."

In 1913 the policy of the United States entered upon a some-

what distinct phase when, on the 12th of March, President Wilson issued a statement as to Latin America. This statement, which was sent to all the diplomatic officers of the United States in those countries, was also given to the public. "To cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of Central and South America, and to promote . . . the interests which are common to the people of the two continents," President Wilson declared to be one of the chief objects of his administration. While he earnestly desired "the most cordial understanding and co-operation between the peoples and leaders of America," co-operation was, he said, possible "only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government" based "not upon arbitrary or irregular force," but upon "law," upon the "consent of the governed," and upon "the public conscience and approval." Having no sympathy with those "who seek to seize the power of government to advance their personal interests or ambition," we should, he said, as friends, "prefer those who act in the interest of peace and honor, who protect private rights and respect the restraints of constitutional provision."

Upon this statement adverse comments were made by various South American journals, which professed to detect in it not only a tone of admonition, but also an assumption that irregular political conditions marked the countries of Central and South America as a group. It is altogether probable, however, that the country uppermost in the President's thoughts at the moment was Mexico. Some months later the government of Peru was suddenly overthrown and its chief executive seized and imprisoned. The explanation given of this violent change was that the kidnapped President, Señor Billinghurst, had been acting "unconstitutionally." The *junta* by which the transformation was brought about was recognized by the United States with a promptitude not incompatible with a rigorous application of the *de facto* principle. But, from the point of view of a policy designed to discourage irregular political action in foreign countries by refusing to countenance those who seek power by it, the case must be regarded as exceptional. What may be regarded as an application of the new policy was then in process of development in Mexico, where revolutionary conditions had again come to prevail.

When, on December 1, 1910, Porfirio Diaz was inaugurated as President for an eighth term of four years, strong discontent was manifested against the continuance of his rule. An insurrectionary provisional government was set up in the State of Chihuahua, under the presidency of Francisco Madero, who demanded Diaz's retirement, "honest elections" and new

land laws. The revolt spread to the neighboring States of Sonora, Coahuila, and Durango, while disturbances occurred in Lower California and in Yucatan. Concessions and promises of further concessions proved to be unavailing. Madero continued to demand Diaz's resignation. On April 23, 1911, under apprehension of intervention by the United States, an armistice was concluded; and on May 18th, after a renewal of fighting, peace was proclaimed on the basis of the resignation of the President and Vice-President, and the designation of Señor Francisco de la Barra as President *ad interim*, with a cabinet to be selected in consultation with Madero. A "free election" was to be held within six months. The election was held on October 15th. Francisco Madero was "unanimously" chosen as President and Pino Suarez as Vice-President by a total popular vote of somewhat more than twenty thousand, but order was not fully re-established. Zapata continued active in the State of Morelos, and uprisings occurred in the north. In the city of Juarez, Emilio Vasquez Gomez was proclaimed as President, and in the following year General Orozco, governor of Chihuahua, "pronounced" for him and took command of his forces. In order to prevent the giving of aid to the enemies of the government at the City of Mexico the Congress of the United States adopted a joint resolution empowering the President to stop the exportation of arms and munitions of war. President Taft approved this resolution on March 14, 1912, and on the same day put it into effect. The export of military supplies for the Mexican government continued to be lawful.

The government of Madero became more and more insecure. On February 8, 1913, General Victoriano Huerta, commander-in-chief of its forces, went over to its enemies. Generals Reyes and Felix Diaz, whom Madero had imprisoned, were released, and a new revolt was declared. Fighting in the city ensued, in which General Reyes was killed. Madero and Pino Suarez were arrested and forced to resign. A few days later they were shot and killed. By Article 85 of the Mexican Constitution a vacancy in the presidency is filled by the members of the cabinet in a specified legal succession. When Madero resigned, Pedro Lascurain, Minister of Foreign Affairs, became provisional President, and appointed General Huerta Minister of the Interior. Lascurain then resigned, and, his resignation being accepted by the Congress, Huerta, by virtue of his cabinet position, became provisional President. The American ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, as dean of the diplomatic corps, congratulated him on his accession, and he was later formally recognized by the European powers and by some of the American. The United States withheld its recognition, and received

the concurrence of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and certain other governments.

Meanwhile a revolt was begun in the north by Venustiano Carranza, governor of the State of Coahuila, who, on March 26, 1913, proclaimed the "Plan of Guadalupe," which was signed by sixty-four officers of the Coahuila military forces. After reciting that Huerta, by arresting Madero and Pino Suarez and forcing them to resign, had been guilty of treasonable acts which the legislative and judicial powers of the country, as well as various governors of States, had recognized and protected, the proclamation repudiated all those officials and named Venustiano Carranza as first chief of the Constitutionalist Army and depositary of the executive power when that army should occupy the City of Mexico.

As the Constitutionalists extended their operations in northern Mexico numerous leaders of armed bands joined their standard. Among these was Francisco Villa, who quickly attained the leading place among their military chieftains. Although he probably never followed Carranza in the sense of actually recognizing his authority, there was no doubt as to his fighting instincts or as to his ability to attract the peon class from which he recruited his men.

In July, 1913, the Hon. John Lind, formerly governor of Minnesota, was dispatched to the City of Mexico. In an address to Congress (August 27th), explanatory of the mission, President Wilson declared that the development of Mexico could be "sound and lasting only if it be the product of a genuine freedom, a just and ordered government founded upon law." Conditions had not improved, but had rather "grown worse," and the pacification of the country by the authorities at the capital was "evidently impossible by any other means than force." As friends it was, he said, our duty "at least to volunteer our good offices—to offer to assist" in effecting some arrangement "which would bring relief and peace and set up a universally acknowledged political authority." He had therefore sent Mr. Lind as his "personal spokesman and representative," who, while paying "the most scrupulous regard to the sovereignty and independence of Mexico," was to offer "counsel and assistance." The conditions of a "satisfactory settlement," as specified in his instructions to Mr. Lind, were an immediate armistice, an "early and free election" in which all would "agree to take part," a pledge by Huerta not to be a candidate for the presidency, and "the agreement of all parties to abide by the results of the election and co-operate in the most loyal way in organizing and supporting the new administration."

Mr. Lind, said President Wilson, "executed his delicate and difficult mission with singular tact, firmness, and good judgment," but "the proposals he submitted were rejected," partly, as was believed, because the authorities at Mexico City "had been grossly misinformed and misled" as to the "earnest friendliness and yet sober determination" of the American people "that some just solution be found for the Mexican difficulties," and as to the fact that "the present administration spoke, through Mr. Lind, for the people of the United States." The effect of this "unfortunate misunderstanding" on the part of those authorities was, said President Wilson, "to leave them singularly isolated and without friends" who could "effectually aid them." We could not, he declared, "thrust our good offices upon them"; and having, as was our duty, offered our "active assistance," it had become "our duty to show what true neutrality will do to enable the people of Mexico to set their affairs in order again and wait for a further opportunity to offer our friendly counsels." For the rest, the President said he deemed it his duty to exercise the authority conferred upon him by the act of March 14, 1912, to the end that neither side to the struggle should receive any assistance from the United States, and he should "follow the best practice of nations in the matter of neutrality by forbidding the exportation of arms or munitions of war of any kind from the United States to any part of the Republic of Mexico." "We cannot," he declared, "in the circumstances be the partisans of either party to the contest that now distracts Mexico, or constitute ourselves the virtual umpire between them." In conclusion, he adverted to the support given by several governments in securing for Mr. Lind a hearing.

The attitude of the Mexican authorities was set forth in a note addressed to Mr. Lind (August 16th) by Señor F. Gamboa, Secretary for Foreign Affairs. In this note Señor Gamboa affirmed the regularity of the provisional government under Article 85 of the Mexican constitution, and adverted to the fact that diplomatic correspondence between the two countries had continued without interruption. The provisional government, he declared, exercised control over eighteen of the twenty-seven Mexican States, over the three territories and the federal district, and over the custom-houses. The restoration of order was, he said, impeded by assistance derived by rebels from the United States; and as to the intimation of a purpose to respect Mexico's "sovereignty and independence," he remarked that it could hardly be dealt with in writing. An immediate armistice could not, he said, be proposed without tolerating bandits and recognizing as belligerents the rebels

styling themselves Constitutionalists. As to the request for the exclusion of Huerta as a candidate, he suggested that, besides being "strange and unwarranted," there was the risk that it "might be interpreted as a matter of personal dislike." In conclusion Señor Gamboa declared that, but for his government's feeling of sincere esteem and friendliness, the proposals borne by Mr. Lind would, "because of their humiliating and unusual character, hardly admissible even in a treaty of peace after a victory," have been immediately rejected; and in response to the intimation that if Mexico could suggest a better way the United States would consider it, he proposed the "equally decorous arrangement" of the reciprocal and unconditional reception of ambassadors, thus restoring relations to the basis of "mutual respect, which is indispensable between two sovereign entities wholly equal before law and justice."

In October, 1913, Huerta committed a *coup d'état*, arresting a number of members of the Congress and assuming dictatorial powers. For some weeks the press was filled with forecasts of immediate armed intervention by the United States for his elimination, but these were not confirmed. On December 2d, however, President Wilson, in his opening address to Congress, said that there could be "no certain prospect of peace in America" until General Huerta had "surrendered his usurped authority in Mexico"; until it was indeed on all hands understood "that such pretended governments will not be countenanced or dealt with" by the United States. Of "constitutional government in America, we are," President Wilson affirmed, "more than its friends, we are its champions," since in no other way could our neighbors "work out their own development in peace and liberty. Mexico," he declared, "has no government." The "mere military despotism" set up in the City of Mexico "originated," he said, "in the usurpation of Victoriano Huerta, who, after a brief attempt to play the part of constitutional President," had "at last cast aside even the pretence of legal right and declared himself dictator." Even if he had succeeded in his purposes, he would, said President Wilson, "have set up nothing but a precarious and hateful power, which could have lasted but a little while, and whose eventual downfall would have left the country in a more deplorable condition than ever." But he had not succeeded.

He has [declared President Wilson] forfeited the respect and the moral support even of those who were at one time willing to see him succeed. Little by little he has been completely isolated. By a little every day his power and prestige are crumbling, and the collapse is not far away. We shall not, I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of

watchful waiting. And then, when the end comes, we shall hope to see constitutional order restored in distressed Mexico by the concert and energy of such of her leaders as prefer the liberty of their people to their own ambitions.

Mr. Lind left the City of Mexico on November 12, 1913, and for some time afterwards remained with the United States squadron at Vera Cruz. On April 9, 1914, a boatload of sailors from the U. S. gunboat *Dolphin*, on landing at Tampico within the federal lines and zone of military operations, were placed under arrest, but were soon released. Both the Mexican federal commander and Huerta expressed their regret. Rear-Admiral Mayo, however, demanded a salute of twenty-one guns, which Huerta refused unless the United States would in writing agree to return it, maintaining that his expression of regret and the punishment of the officer by whom the arrest was made should suffice. The United States insisted on compliance with the demand. On April 14th the North Atlantic fleet was ordered to Tampico, and on the following day Rear-Admiral Fletcher proceeded, under orders, to occupy Vera Cruz, which he did with the loss of twelve killed and fifty wounded, the Mexican losses being much greater. President Wilson, in an address to Congress on April 20th, said he had deemed it his duty "to insist that the flag of the United States should be saluted in such a way as to indicate a new spirit and attitude on the part of the Huertistas." He stated that, if the tests of the Mexican constitution were accepted, the country had "no government," but added: "We would not wish even to exercise the good offices of friendship without their (the Mexican people's) welcome and assent. The people of Mexico are entitled to settle their own domestic affairs in their own way, and we sincerely desire to respect their right." He therefore asked Congress to approve his use of the armed forces of the United States in such ways and to such an extent as might be necessary "to obtain from General Huerta and his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States."

There can [said President Wilson, in conclusion] in what we do be no thought of aggression or of selfish aggrandizement. We seek to maintain the dignity and authority of the United States only because we wish always to keep our great influence unimpaired for the uses of liberty, both in the United States and wherever else it may be employed for the benefit of mankind.

By a joint resolution, approved April 22d, Congress declared that, "in view of the facts presented by the President . . . with regard to certain affronts and indignities committed against the United States in Mexico," he was "justified in the employment of the armed forces of the United States to en-

force his demand for unequivocal amends" for such "affronts and indignities." The joint resolution at the same time disclaimed "any hostility to the Mexican people or any purpose to make war upon Mexico."

April 30th General Funston, with nine thousand regulars, occupied Vera Cruz, the sailors returning to their ships. Meanwhile, diplomatic relations had been severed, and passports were handed to the *chargé d'affaires* of the United States at the City of Mexico and to the Mexican *chargé d'affaires* at Washington. On April 23d Huerta issued a general amnesty, and Carranza, in a note to Mr. Bryan, protested that the hostile acts of the United States would "drag us into an unequal war." On the same day, however, the ambassadors of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile tendered their mediation. This offer was accepted on both sides, and the mediators met at Niagara on May 20th. On June 14th a protocol was signed. It provided that a new government, constituted by agreement between the Mexican factions, should be recognized by the United States; that the United States should demand no war indemnity or other material satisfaction, and that an amnesty should be extended to foreigners in Mexico for all political offences.

July 15th Huerta resigned, and a makeshift administration was locally set up under Francisco Carbajal. At a convention then in session at Aguascalientes, composed of representatives of Carranza, Villa, and Zapata, it was proposed to entrust the government to a provisional committee; but, as Carranza refused to yield his claims to the presidency, the convention proclaimed General Gutierrez as provisional President. To this act Villa and Zapata announced their adhesion, but General Obregon, whose support proved to be of great value, adhered to Carranza. The City of Mexico was occupied first by one party and then by another. The Villistas continued to be active in the north, but their leader's prestige was broken by his defeat by General Obregon at Celaya on April 2, 1915.

On June 2d President Wilson issued a public statement in regard to Mexico. In the hour of their success the leaders of the revolution had, he said, disagreed and turned their arms against one another, with the result that Mexico was "starving and without a government." In these circumstances the United States must, he said, presently do what it had not felt at liberty to do,

lend its active moral support to some man or group of men, if such may be found, who can rally the suffering people of Mexico to their support in an effort to ignore, if they cannot unite, the warring factions of the country, return to the constitution of the republic so

long in abeyance, and set up a government at Mexico City which the great powers of the world can recognize and deal with.

He therefore "publicly and very solemnly" called upon the leaders of factions to act together, and warned them that unless they did so within a very short time the United States would be constrained to decide what means should be employed "in order to help Mexico save herself and serve her people."

Villa, who had suffered yet another defeat, made overtures to the Constitutionalists for a conference, but denied the right of the United States to intervene. The situation did not improve, and several weeks later the six ranking Latin-American representatives—the ambassadors of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and the ministers of Bolivia, Guatemala, and Uruguay—were called into consultation by the United States, with a view to find a solution. After the first conference, which was held on August 5th, an appeal was issued to the leaders of factions to come together and compose their differences. The appeal failed, but, as Secretary Lansing afterwards explained, it was found that the chiefs associated with Villa answered independently, while those associated with Carranza referred the appeal to him; and from this it was inferred that, while the Villistas lacked a central organization, there existed among the Carrancistas "a unity and loyalty which indicated the ultimate triumph of that faction," especially as they controlled approximately seventy-five per cent of the territory of Mexico. In consequence, recognition was on October 19th extended to the Carranza government. In the note of the United States it was styled the "*de facto* government of Mexico."

On March 9, 1916, an attack was made on the town of Columbus, New Mexico, by a force of about fifteen hundred men under the command of Villa, and a number of Americans, including some soldiers, were killed, and various acts of destruction committed before the invaders were driven back into Mexico. The next day President Wilson publicly announced that an adequate force would "be sent at once in pursuit of Villa, with the single object of capturing him and putting a stop to his forays," and that this could and would be done "in entirely friendly aid of the Constitutional authorities of Mexico, and with scrupulous respect for the sovereignty of that republic." Five days later, what was called a "punitive expedition" was sent into Mexico, under command of General Pershing.

A question thus arose as to the extent to which the basal principle of the inviolability of the territory of an independent state may be held to yield to the right of self-defence. In the

classic case of the steamer *Caroline*, which, while in the service of Canadian insurgents, a British force from Canada, making a sudden incursion across the Niagara River, destroyed in American waters, Mr. Webster, as Secretary of State, declared that the exceptions to the principle of inviolability, growing out of the necessity of self-defence, should be confined to cases in which that necessity was "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means; and no moment for deliberation." In the case at Columbus, complaint was made that the punitive force was sent into Mexico without formal notice to the government and without its consent. Discussions had taken place at Washington as to a possible arrangement on the lines of the agreements entered into from 1882 to 1896, which provided that under specified conditions the regular troops of the two governments might, when in pursuit of savage Indians, reciprocally cross the boundary, but stipulated that they should not remain longer than was necessary to enable them to pursue the band whose trail they followed. The negotiations at Washington having failed to result in a definitive understanding, the discussions were continued on the frontier by Generals Scott and Funston on the part of the United States, and by Gen. Alvaro Obregon, Secretary of War and Marine, on the part of Mexico. Various proposals were exchanged, but the insistence of Mexico on the withdrawal of the force sent in pursuit of Villa proved to form an obstacle to an agreement. The situation was then further complicated by a raid made by a band of Mexican outlaws on the night of May 5th on Glenn Springs, Texas, twenty miles north of the border. American troops were subsequently sent in pursuit of the raiders. They penetrated one hundred and sixty-eight miles into Mexico, without encountering any Mexican troops, and twelve days later recrossed the line into the United States.

On the same day—May 22d—the Mexican government, being then unaware of their return, dispatched to the United States an extended protest, which, while declaring that their entrance into Mexico constituted a violation of the national sovereignty and gravely endangered the harmony and good relations between the two countries, asked for their immediate withdrawal and complete abstention from the dispatch of similar expeditions. The Mexican government, said the note, understood its obligation to protect the frontier, but expected the United States also to protect its side; and, if incursions should take place, they should be regarded as a subject of "pecuniary reparation" and a reason for adopting "a combined defence." Mexico, it was asserted, could not be held responsible for the incursions of outlaws, while doing everything possible

to prevent them; but the United States, in sending regulars into Mexico against the express will of the government, committed an act for which it was manifestly responsible. In these circumstances the Mexican government not only would have to consider the sending of further troops into its territory as an act of invasion against which it would be forced to defend itself, but also must insist upon the withdrawal of those remaining in Chihuahua on account of the Columbus raid; and in this relation the note appealed to Article 21 of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848, which provides that, in case of disagreements between the two governments, resort shall not be had to "reprisals, aggression, or hostility of any kind," until the government that deems itself aggrieved "shall have maturely considered, in the spirit of peace and good neighborship, whether it would not be better that such difference should be settled by the arbitration of commissioners appointed on each side or by that of a friendly nation," and that, should this be proposed by either party, it shall be accepted by the other, "unless deemed by it altogether incompatible with the nature of the difference or the circumstances of the case."

Having thus dealt with the legal aspects of the subject, the note proceeded to request a more categorical explanation of the "real intentions" of the United States, especially in view of the repeated protestations of friendship for Latin-American countries, and of the absence of any intention to intervene in their internal affairs, or to acquire their territory, or to launch into a conflict with Mexico, protestations with which, said the note, the acts of the military authorities were in conflict. More than two months had elapsed since the Columbus expedition was dispatched; its presence and movements gave rise to popular feeling, as was shown in the collision with the people at Parral; and if the retention of the troops in Mexico, after the dispersal of the Villa bands, was due to political causes or reasons of "internal policy of the United States," the discrepancy was only accentuated. As further grounds of suspicion, the note specified the "decided support given at one time to Villa by General Scott and the State Department," this support being, so the note declared, "the principal cause of the prolongation of the civil war in Mexico for many months"; the refusal to define by agreement the number, kind, and operations of the American forces to be used in Mexico, and the sending of infantry and artillery, which indicated regular Mexican forces as their object; and the detention of shipments of arms and ammunition purchased in the United States by the Mexican government, as well as of machinery for the manufacture of ammunition. If the United States was thus

seeking to protect itself against the emergency of a future conflict, it would, said the note, "be preferable to say so." Mexico could not wish war with the United States; war could occur only in consequence of the "deliberate purpose" of the latter. The Mexican government therefore formally invited the United States "to support its declarations and protests of amity with real and effective action" such as would "convince the Mexican people of the sincerity of its purposes"; and this action, declared the note, could not be other than "the immediate withdrawal of the American troops which are now in Mexican territory."

Before this note was answered, the Republican National Convention was held at Chicago. The platform, adopted June 8th, denounced "the indefensible methods of interference" employed by the administration "in the internal affairs of Mexico," and referred with "shame" to its permitting existing conditions to continue, first, by "failure to act promptly and firmly," and secondly, "through recognition of one of the factions responsible" for them.

We pledge our aid [declared the platform] in restoring order and maintaining peace in Mexico. We promise to our citizens on and near the border, and those in Mexico, wherever they may be found, adequate and absolute protection in their lives, liberty, and property.

Governor Hughes, in a telegram accepting the nomination, declared that the country had

suffered incalculably from the weak and vacillating course which has been taken with regard to Mexico, a course lamentably wrong with regard to both our rights and our duties. We interfered without consistency; and, while seeking to dictate when we were not concerned, we utterly failed to appreciate and discharge our plain duty to our own citizens.

The platform subsequently adopted by the Democratic National Convention at St. Louis, on June 16th, makes, in regard to Mexico, the following declaration:

The want of a stable, responsible government in Mexico, capable of repressing and punishing marauders and bandit bands, who have not only taken the lives and seized and destroyed the property of American citizens in that country, but have insolently invaded our soil, made war upon and murdered our people thereon, has rendered it necessary temporarily to occupy, by our armed forces, a portion of the territory of that friendly state.

Until, by the restoration of law and order therein, a repetition of such incursions is improbable, the necessity for their remaining will continue. Intervention, implying as it does military subjugation, is revolting to the people of the United States, notwithstanding the provocation to that course has been very great, and should be resorted to, if at all, only as a last resort. The stubborn resistance of

the President and his advisers to every demand and suggestion to enter upon it, is creditable alike to them and to the people in whose name he speaks.

The declaration that it had been necessary to "occupy," even though "temporarily," a part of the territory of Mexico, evidently carried the controversy to a point beyond that which was reached in the original pursuit of Villa. This phase of the situation is manifest in the answer made by Mr. Lansing, on June 20th, to the Mexican protest of the 22d of May. After speaking of the "discourteous tone and temper" of the protest, Mr. Lansing animadverts upon the chaotic conditions that had prevailed in Mexico during the past three years; upon the apparent protection given by the government to some of the bandit leaders; upon the failure of the Mexican forces to co-operate or assist in the pursuit of Villa; and upon the attitude of the Mexican representatives in the discussions regarding the presence of American troops in that country, an attitude from which, he declared, the conclusion "might be drawn" that Carranza did not intend or desire that the outlaws should be captured, destroyed, or dispersed. Replying to the statement that Villa at one time had the support of American officers and of the State Department, Mr. Lansing remarked that the Carranza government had, "from the moment of its recognition," had the "undivided support" of the United States, as shown in many ways. In discussing the original crossing of the expedition in pursuit of Villa, Mr. Lansing observed that there was no time to reach an agreement "other than that of March 10-13, now repudiated by General Carranza"; but, in the course of his answer, he subsequently "admitted" that the American troops had "crossed the international boundary in hot pursuit of the Columbus raiders and without notice to or the consent of" the Mexican government, and added that the protestations made by the President, the State Department, and other American authorities, "that the object of the expedition was to capture, destroy, or completely disperse the Villa bands of outlaws or to turn this duty over to the Mexican authorities when assured that it would be effectively fulfilled," had been "carried out in perfect good faith by the United States." The circumstances of the crossing were, he declared, such that "immediate action alone could avail." Nor could the request made in the note of May 22d for the immediate withdrawal of the American forces be entertained. While the inability of the Mexican government to check the outrages complained of might, said Mr. Lansing, excuse its failure to do so, it only made stronger the duty of the United States to check them. The United States had not, he affirmed, sought the duty

"of pursuing bandits who, under fundamental principles of municipal and international law, ought to be pursued and arrested and punished by Mexican authorities"; the United States would be glad to have this obligation fulfilled by Mexico; but if the "*de facto* government" was pleased to ignore this obligation and to believe that, if the American troops were not retired, there was, as it had been intimated, "no further recourse than to defend its territory by an appeal to arms," the United States must impress upon it the fact that the execution of this threat would "lead to the gravest consequences." While the United States "would deeply regret such a result," it could not, declared Mr. Lansing, recede from its

settled determination to maintain its national rights and to perform its full duty in preventing further invasions of the territory of the United States and in removing the peril which Americans along the international boundary have borne so long with patience and forbearance.

Meanwhile, orders had been given to the Mexican commanders

not to permit American forces from General Pershing's column to advance farther south, nor to move either east, south, or west, from the points where they are located, and to oppose new incursions of American soldiers into Mexican territory.

These orders were, it seems, brought by General Trevino to the attention of General Pershing, who replied to the effect that he received orders only from his own government. On June 22d a detachment moving eastward, at some distance from its base, became engaged with Mexican troops at Carrizal, and as a result of the encounter several men on both sides were killed and wounded and seventeen Americans were made prisoners. The incident is thus explained in a communication handed to Mr. Lansing by Mr. Arredondo, the Mexican diplomatic representative at Washington. The United States replied that it could regard the explanation only as a formal avowal of "deliberately hostile action" and demanded "the immediate release of the prisoners, together with any United States property taken with them." It was added that the United States expected an early statement from the Mexican government through diplomatic channels, and not through subordinate military commanders, as to the course of action which it wished the United States to understand had been determined upon. The prisoners were subsequently released. In this way a final crisis was averted, but the strain of the situation was by no means ended.

Subsequently a joint commission, consisting of three American and three Mexican members, was organized for the pur-

pose of seeking a solution of the pending complications. This commission continued in existence through the remainder of the year, but the formulation on comprehensive lines of an acceptable plan of action was found to be unattainable. The American troops were, however, gradually withdrawn from Mexico, and early in 1917 an ambassador was sent by the United States to the Carranza government, under whose auspices a new national constitution was adopted.

In connection with the principle of non-intervention, a prominent place must be given to the Monroe Doctrine, the object of which was to render intervention unnecessary by precluding the occasions for it. On September 26, 1815, the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and the King of Prussia, signed at Paris a personal league commonly called the Holy Alliance, the design of which was declared to be the administration of government, in matters both internal and external, according to the precepts of justice, charity and peace. To this end the allied monarchs, "looking upon themselves as delegated by Providence" to rule over their respective countries, engaged to "lend one another, on every occasion and in every place, assistance, aid, and support." In the course of time, as revolt against the arrangements of the Congress of Vienna spread and grew more pronounced, the alliance came more and more to assume the form of a league for the protection of the principle of legitimacy—the principle of the divine right of kings as opposed to the rights of the people—against the encroachments of liberal ideas. Congresses were held at Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau and Laybach, for the purpose of maturing a program to that end. The league was joined by the King of France; but England, whose Prince Regent had originally given it his informal adhesion, began to grow hostile. Her own government, with its free and parliamentary institutions, was founded on a revolution; and the allies, in the circular issued at Troppau, had associated "revolt and crime," and had declared that the European powers "had an undoubted right to take a hostile attitude in regard to those states in which the overthrow of the government might operate as an example." In a circular issued at Laybach they denounced "as equally null, and disallowed by the public law of Europe, any pretended reform effected by revolt and open force." In October, 1822, they held a congress at Verona for the purpose ofconcerting measures against the revolutionary government in Spain; and in yet another circular announced their determination "to repel the maxim of rebellion, in whatever place and under whatever form it might show itself." Their ultimate object was more explicitly stated in a secret treaty in which

they engaged mutually "to put an end to the system of representative governments" in Europe, and to adopt measures to destroy "the liberty of the press." Popular movements were forcibly suppressed in Piedmont and Naples; and in April, 1823, France, acting for the allies, invaded Spain, for the purpose of restoring the absolute monarch Ferdinand VII. Before the close of the summer such progress had been made in this direction that notice was given to the British government of the intention of the allies to call a congress with a view to the termination of the revolutionary governments in Spanish America. At this time Lord Castlereagh, who had always been favorably disposed towards the alliance, had been succeeded in the conduct of the foreign affairs of England by George Canning, who reflected the popular sentiment as to the policy of the allied powers. The independence of the Spanish-American governments, which had now been acknowledged by the United States, had not as yet been recognized by Great Britain. But English merchants, like those of the United States, had developed a large trade with the Spanish-American countries, a trade which the restoration of those regions to a colonial condition would, under the commercial system then in vogue, have cut off and destroyed.

In view of this common interest, Canning, in the summer of 1823, began to sound Richard Rush, the American minister at London, as to the possibility of a joint declaration by the two governments against the intervention of the allies in Spanish America. Canning once boasted that he had called into being the New World to redress the balance of the Old. The meaning of this boast can be understood only in the light of his proposals. In a "private and confidential" note to Rush, of August 23, 1823, he declared:

1. We conceive the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless.
2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them, as independent states, to be one of time and circumstances.
3. We are, however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother-country by amicable negotiation.
4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves.
5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other power with indifference.

If these opinions and feelings were shared by the United States, Canning thought that the two governments should declare them in the face of the world, as the best means of defeating the project, if any European power should cherish it, of subjugating the colonies in the name of Spain, or of acquiring any part of them itself by cession or by conquest. He therefore desired Rush to act upon his proposals at once, if he possessed

the power to do so. It was said of Richard Rush by an eminent Senator that, in the course of an unusually long and important diplomatic career, he "never said a word that was improper, nor betrayed a thought that might peril his country's fortunes." On the present occasion, he acted with his usual good judgment. His powers did not embrace the making of such a declaration as Canning desired; but, while he expressed the opinion that Canning's sentiments, except as to independence, which the United States had already acknowledged, were shared by his government, he lost no time in reporting the matter to the President. Monroe, on receiving the correspondence, hastened to take counsel upon it. Jefferson, whose opinion was solicited, replied: "Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with eis-Atlantic affairs." He was disposed to look with favor upon co-operation with England in the direction suggested. Madison shared his opinion. In the cabinet of Monroe, Calhoun inclined to invest Rush with power to join England in a deelaration, even if it should pledge the United States not to take either Cuba or Texas. The President at first inclined to Calhoun's idea of giving Rush discretionary powers, but this was opposed by John Quincy Adams, who maintained that we could act with England only on the basis of the acknowledged independence of the Spanish-American states. The views of Adams prevailed. His basal thought was the right of self-government, which he believed it to be the duty and the interest of the United States to cherish and support. He thought that the United States should let England make her own deelaration. This England did, without waiting for the decision of the United States. On October 9, 1823, Canning, in an interview with Prince de Polignac, French ambassador, declared that while Great Britain would remain "neutral" in any war between Spain and her colonies, the "junction" of any foreign power with Spain against the colonies would be viewed as constituting "entirely a new question," upon which Great Britain "must take such decision," as her interests "might require."

In his annual message to Congress of December 2, 1823, President Monroe devoted to the subject a long passage. The substance of it is, however, conveyed in a few sentenees. After adverting to the abstention of the United States from European wars and to the dangers to be apprehended from the system of the allied powers, he declared:

We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to

any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.

The sentences just quoted specially relate to the aims of the Holy Alliance; but there is another passage in the message which is also often cited as embodying the Monroe Doctrine. In 1821 the Emperor of Russia, as we have seen, issued a ukase, by which he assumed, as owner of the shore, to exclude foreigners from carrying on commerce and from navigating and fishing within a hundred Italian miles of the northwest coast of America, from Bering Straits down to the fifty-first parallel of north latitude. As this assertion of title embraced territory which was claimed by the United States as well as by Great Britain, both those governments protested against it, as well as against the exorbitant jurisdictional pretension with which it was associated. In consequence the Russian government proposed to adjust the matter by amicable negotiation; and instructions to that end were prepared by John Quincy Adams for the American ministers at London and St. Petersburg. At a meeting of the cabinet on June 28, 1823, while the subject was under discussion, Adams expressed the opinion that the claim of the Russians could not be admitted, because they appeared to have no "settlement" upon the territory in dispute; and on July 17 he informed Baron Tuyl, then Russian minister at Washington,

that we [the United States] should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for *any* new European colonial establishments.

With reference to this subject, President Monroe, in the message above quoted, said:

In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

By the term "future colonization," President Monroe evidently intended to convey the same meaning as was expressed by the terms "settlement" and "colonial establishments" pre-

viously employed by Adams. They were used to denote, what they were then commonly understood to mean, the acquisition of title to territory by original occupation and settlement. But in the course of time the phrase "future colonization" came to receive a broader interpretation. President Polk, in his annual message of December 2, 1845, declared that, while existing rights of every European nation should be respected, it should be "distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy, that no future European colony or dominion shall, with our consent, be planted or established on any part of the North American continent." By pronouncing against the establishment by a European power of any "dominion"—a term which included even the voluntary transfer of territory already occupied—President Polk expressed a conception which has come generally to prevail, and which is embodied in the popular phrase: "No more European colonies on these continents." The same meaning is conveyed in the phrase—"America for the Americans," which signifies that no European power shall be permitted to acquire new territory or to extend its dominions in the Western Hemisphere.

In this sense, but apparently with the qualification in the particular case that only a forcible acquisition of territory was forbidden, the Monroe Doctrine was invoked by President Cleveland in respect of the Venezuelan boundary question. This incident, as is well known, grew out of a long-standing dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, which was the continuation of a dispute two centuries old between the Netherlands and Spain as to the limits of the Dutch and Spanish settlements in Guiana. In 1844 Lord Aberdeen proposed to Venezuela a conventional line, beginning at the river Moroco. This proposal was declined; and, chiefly in consequence of civil commotions in Venezuela, negotiations remained practically in abeyance till 1876. Venezuela then offered to accept the Aberdeen line; but Lord Granville suggested a boundary farther west; and in subsequent negotiations the British demand was extended still farther in that direction. Venezuela, representing that this apparent enlargement of British dominion constituted a pure aggression on her territorial rights, invoked the aid of the United States on the ground of the Monroe Doctrine. Venezuela asked for arbitration, and in so doing included in her claim a large portion of British Guiana. Great Britain at length declined to arbitrate unless Venezuela would first yield all territory within a line westward of that offered by Lord Aberdeen. In these circumstances, Mr. Olney, as Secretary of State, in instructions to Mr. Bayard, American ambassador at London, of July 20, 1895, categorically inquired

whether the British government would submit the whole controversy to arbitration. In these instructions Mr. Olney declared that the Monroe Doctrine did not establish a "protectorate" over other American states; that it did not relieve any of them "from its obligations as fixed by international law nor prevent any European power directly interested from enforcing such obligations or from inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them"; but that its "single purpose and object" was that "no European power or combination of European powers" should "forcibly deprive an American state of the right and power of self-government and of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and destinies." This principle he conceived to be at stake in the dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, because, as the dispute related to territory, it necessarily imported "political control to be lost by one party and gained by the other." "Today," declared Mr. Olney, "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." All the advantages of this superiority were, he affirmed, at once imperiled if the principle should be admitted that European powers might convert American states into colonies or provinces of their own. Lord Salisbury declined unrestricted arbitration; and, when his answer was received, President Cleveland, on December 17, 1895, laid the correspondence before Congress. "If a European power, by an extension of its boundaries, takes possession of the territory of one of our neighboring republics against its will and in derogation of its rights," it was, said President Cleveland, the precise thing which President Monroe had declared to be "dangerous to our peace and safety"; but he added that "any adjustment of the boundary which that country [Venezuela] may deem for her advantage and may enter into of her own free will cannot of course be objected to by the United States." He then recommended the appointment by the United States of a commission to investigate the merits of the controversy, and declared that, if the title to the disputed territory should be found to belong to Venezuela, it would be the duty of the United States

to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which, after investigation, we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela.

This declaration produced great excitement, in the United States as well as in England. So far as it seemed to imply, as the language has often been construed to do, that the United

States possessed the right, by means of an *ex parte* commission, appointed by itself and composed of its own citizens, authoritatively to fix the boundary between two other independent nations, it went beyond the immediate necessities of the case. If the commission had ever reported, it is probable that its conclusions, which conceivably might not have been entirely acceptable either to Great Britain or to Venezuela, would have been treated as advisory rather than definitive, and would have been made the basis of further correspondence with both those governments. The actual position intended to be insisted upon, as appears by Mr. Olney's instructions to Mr. Bayard, as well as the rest of President Cleveland's message, was that the United States would resist the palpable and substantial encroachment upon and appropriation by Great Britain of Venezuelan territory. This position was quite in harmony with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. Congress unanimously provided for the appointment of a commission of investigation; but the commission, immediately after its organization, addressed to Mr. Olney, through its president, Mr. Justice Brewer, a letter setting forth its peaceful and non-partisan character and the desirability of securing the co-operation of Great Britain and Venezuela in obtaining evidence. At the close of his letter, Mr. Justice Brewer observed: The purposes of the pending investigation are certainly hostile to none, nor can it be of advantage to any that the machinery devised by the government of the United States to secure the desired information should fail of its purpose.

This statement was communicated to Great Britain as well as to Venezuela, and both governments promptly responded to the appeal. The labors of the commission were, however, brought to a close by the conclusion of a treaty of arbitration, signed by Great Britain and Venezuela, but negotiated between Great Britain and the United States, the predominant feature of which was the application of the principle of prescription, under the definite rule that fifty years' adverse holding of a district, either by exclusive political control or by actual settlement, should suffice to constitute national title. The adoption of the principle of prescription, on which the arbitrators would necessarily have acted, even if it had not been incorporated into the treaty, at once rendered nugatory the greater part of the Venezuelan claim. Although the extreme British claim was not allowed, the territorial results of the arbitration were decidedly favorable to that government. It must, however, be conceded that the most important political result of the Venezuelan incident was not the decision upon the territorial question, but the official adoption of the Monroe Doctrine by

the Congress of the United States, and its explicit acceptance by the principal maritime power of Europe.

An official exposition of the Monroe Doctrine was given by President Roosevelt in his annual message of December 3, 1901, in which he said:

The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. . . . This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American power, save that it in truth allows each of them to form such as it desires. . . . We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power.

An occasion for the practical application of this definition soon arose. On December 11, 1901, the German ambassador at Washington, in a promemoria reviewing the German claims against Venezuela and the latter's refusal to admit diplomatic interposition in the matter, stated that, if Venezuela should persist in this refusal, the German government, after delivering an ultimatum, would have to consider as a measure of coercion the blockade of the more important Venezuelan ports and, if this did not suffice, their "temporary occupation" and the "levying of duties" therein, but especially declared "that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory." In acknowledging the receipt of this memorandum, on December 16th, Mr. Hay adverted to the fact that the German ambassador, on his then recent return from Berlin, had conveyed personally to the President, and had afterwards repeated to himself, the assurance of the German Emperor that the Imperial government had no purpose or intention to make even the smallest acquisition of territory on the South American continent or the adjacent islands; and in view of this circumstance, and of the further assurance given in the memorandum, Mr. Hay, quoting in his note President Roosevelt's definition of December 3d, replied that the President, "appreciating the courtesy of the German government in making him acquainted" with the situation, but "not regarding himself as called upon to enter into the consideration of the claims in question," believed that "no measures" would be taken which were "not in accordance with the well-known purpose" of the German Emperor, as set forth in the promemoria.

No coercive measures were taken till a year later, when Germany, Great Britain, and Italy instituted a blockade of certain Venezuelan ports. Prior to taking this step Great Britain, on

November 13, 1902, also gave an assurance similar to that of Germany regarding the permanent occupation of territory, to which Mr. Hay replied that the government of the United States, although it

regretted that European powers should use force against Central and South American governments, could not object to their taking steps to obtain redress for injuries suffered by their subjects, provided that no acquisition of territory was contemplated.

The blockade, which was instituted only in December, 1902, ended on February 14–15, 1903, after President Castro had abandoned his previously persistent refusal to arbitrate. When the blockade was begun the minister of the United States at Caracas, with the permission of his government and the assent of Venezuela, took charge of British and of German interests in that country; and he afterwards assisted in arranging terms of arbitration. It was agreed that the claims of all the foreign governments against Venezuela should be referred to mixed commissions at Caracas, sitting under conventions severally concluded by those governments with Venezuela; and that a demand made by the blockading powers for the preferential payment, in point of time, of awards made in their favor, as against awards made in favor of the non-blockading powers, should be referred to the Permanent Court at The Hague. The Permanent Court, in a suit to which the United States was a party, sustained this demand; and, in setting forth the grounds of its decision, particularly recited the fact that the non-blockading powers, including the United States, had never, pending the employment of measures of coercion, protested against the assertion by the blockaders of a right to special securities. It also adverted to the circumstance that, prior to the blockade, the Venezuelan government "categorically refused to submit its dispute with Germany and Great Britain to arbitration, which was proposed several times, and especially by the note of the German government of July 16, 1901."

Of the blockade and its ending, and of his own part in the transaction, President Roosevelt gave, in a speech at Chicago, April 2, 1903, the following narrative:

The concern of our government was of course not to interfere needlessly in any quarrel so far as it did not touch our interests or our honor, and not to take the attitude of protecting from coercion any power unless we were willing to espouse the quarrel of that power, but to keep an attitude of watchful vigilance and see that there was no infringement of the Monroe Doctrine, no acquirement of territorial rights by a European power at the expense of a weak sister republic—whether this acquisition might take the shape of an outright and avowed seizure of territory or of the exercise of control

which would in effect be equivalent to such seizure. . . . Both powers assured us in explicit terms that there was not the slightest intention on their part to violate the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and this assurance was kept with an honorable good faith which merits full acknowledgment on our part. At the same time, the existence of hostilities in a region so near our own borders was fraught with such possibilities of danger in the future that it was obviously no less our duty to ourselves than our duty to humanity to endeavor to put an end to that. Accordingly, by an offer of our good services in a spirit of frank friendliness to all the parties concerned, a spirit in which they quickly and cordially responded, we secured a resumption of peace—the contending parties agreeing that the matters which they could not settle among themselves should be referred to The Hague Tribunal for settlement.¹

In popular discussions the position has sometimes been urged that it is a violation of the Monroe Doctrine for a European power to employ force against an American republic for the purpose of collecting a debt or satisfying a pecuniary demand, no matter what may have been its origin. For this supposition there appears to be no published official sanction. It is true that a certain color is given to it by the citation in Wharton's *International Law Digest*, under the head of the "Monroe Doctrine," of two alleged manuscript instructions of Mr. Blaine to the American minister at Paris, of July 23 and December 16, 1881, as authority for the statement that "the government of the United States would regard with grave anxiety an attempt on the part of France to force by hostile pressure the payment by Venezuela of her debt to French citizens." The statement, however, is wholly inadvertent. Both instructions are published in the volume of *Foreign Relations* for 1881; and they refer, not to "hostile pressure," but to a rumored design on the part of France of "taking forcible possession of some of the harbors and a portion of the territory of Venezuela in compensation for debts due to citizens of the French Republic." Even in regard to this they nowhere express "grave anxiety," but merely argue that such a proceeding would be unjust to other creditors, including the United States, since it would deprive them of a part of their security; while they avow the "solicitude" of the government of the United States "for the higher object of averting hostilities between two republics for each of which it feels the most sincere and enduring friendship." In 1861 the government of the United States admitted the right of France, Spain, and Great Britain to proceed jointly against Mexico for the satisfaction of claims.

1. *Addresses and Presidential Messages of Theodore Roosevelt, 1902-4*, pp. 117-120.

France [said Mr. Seward on that occasion, in an instruction to the American minister at Paris, of June 26, 1862] has a right to make war against Mexico, and to determine for herself the cause. We have the right and interest to insist that France shall not improve the war she makes to raise up an anti-republican or anti-American government, or to maintain such a government there.

In a similar vein, Mr. Seward, writing to the American minister in Chile, on June 2, 1866, with reference to the hostilities then in progress between Spain and the republics on the west coast of South America, and particularly to the bombardment of Valparaiso by the Spanish fleet, declared that the United States did not intervene in wars between European and American states "if they are not pushed, like the French war in Mexico, to the political point"; that the United States had "no armies for the purpose of aggressive war; no ambition for the character of a regulator."

The supposition is further discredited by the course of President Roosevelt and Mr. Hay in the case of the Venezuelan blockade. In addition to the declarations and acts which have already been mentioned, it is important to recall their response on the same occasion to the note of the Argentine government of December 29, 1902, signed by Señor Luis M. Drago, then Minister of Foreign Relations, enunciating the "doctrine" that "the public debt cannot give rise to armed intervention nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power." Mr. Hay, on February 17, 1903, quoting President Roosevelt's definition of the Monroe Doctrine in the annual message of December 3, 1901, and an analogous passage in the annual message of December 2, 1902, declined to commit the United States to the Drago declaration.²

A tendency is often exhibited to attach decisive importance to particular phrases in President Monroe's message of 1823, or to the special circumstances in which it originated, as if they furnished a definitive test of what should be done and what should be omitted under all contingencies. The verbal literalist would, on the one hand, make the United States an involuntary party to all controversies between European and American governments, in order that the latter may not be "oppressed"; while the historical literalist would, on the other hand, treat Monroe's declarations as obsolete, since the conditions to which they specially referred no longer exist. But, when we consider the mutations in the world's affairs, these modes of reasoning must be confessed to be highly unsatisfactory. The "Monroe Doctrine" has in reality become a con-

2. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1903, pp. 1-6.

venient title by which is denoted a principle that doubtless would have been wrought out if the message of 1823 had never been written—the principle of the limitation of European power and influence in the Western Hemisphere. We have seen, in the first paper in this series, that, as early as 1778, the Continental Congress, in the treaty of alliance with France, obtained from its ally the renunciation of any claim to the British possessions in North America. When Washington, in his Farewell Address, observed that Europe had “a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation,” he lent emphasis to the thought that it was desirable, so far as possible, to dissociate America from the vicissitudes of European politics. Giving to this thought a further reach, Jefferson, while President, in 1808, declared :

We shall be satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remain in their present dependence; but very unwilling to see them in that of either France or England, politically or commercially. We consider their interests and ours as the same, and the object of both must be to exclude European influence from this hemisphere.

On January 15, 1811, twelve years before Monroe’s message was published, Congress, in secret session, “taking into view the peculiar situation of Spain and her American provinces,” and “the influence which the destiny of the territory adjoining the southern border of the United States might have upon their security, tranquillity, and commerce,” resolved that the United States could not, “without serious inquietude, see any part of said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power”; and the President was authorized to occupy all or any part of the Floridas, “in the event of an attempt to occupy the same, or any part thereof, by any foreign government.” These incidents and avowals, although they detract nothing from the force of Monroe’s declarations, with which they are indeed in entire harmony, point to the rational conclusion that those declarations are to be considered rather as an important expression than as the exclusive and final test of American policy. In the long struggle, which was eventually crowned with success, to exclude European domination from the inter-oceanic canal routes, and to secure the construction of a neutralized canal under American auspices, American statesmen no doubt were aided by the authority of Monroe’s declarations, but were by no means dependent upon them. It is a remarkable fact that Seward, neither in the formal demand upon France in 1865 to desist from armed intervention in Mexico for the purpose of overthrowing the domestic republican government under Juarez and establishing on its ruins the foreign imperial government under Maximilian, nor in any of the official corre-

spondence relating to the subject, mentioned the Monroe Doctrine, although his action came within the letter as well as the spirit of the message of 1823. President Polk, on the other hand, in pronouncing against the acquisition of new dominion in North America by a European power, although he was well within the limits of the Monroe Doctrine as it is now understood, invoked a passage that fell far short of sustaining his position. It would be easy to cite many similar examples.

The Monroe Doctrine, as a limitation upon the extension of European power and influence on the American continents, is now generally recognized as a principle of American policy. To its explicit acceptance by Great Britain and Germany there may be added the declaration which was spread by unanimous consent upon the minutes of The Hague Conference, and which was permitted to be annexed to the signature of the American delegates to the convention for the peaceful adjustment of international disputes, that nothing therein contained should be so construed as to require the United States "to depart from its traditional policy of not entering upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or internal administration of any foreign state," or to relinquish "its traditional attitude towards purely American questions."

An important development of the Monroe Doctrine was made by President Roosevelt in the case of Santo Domingo. In a letter read in New York, in May, 1904, at a dinner held to celebrate the anniversary of Cuban independence, he said:

Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendliness. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency in industrial and political matters; if it keeps order and pays its obligations—then it need fear no interference from the United States. Brutal wrong-doing, or impotence which results in the general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore its duty.

These declarations President Roosevelt repeated, with only slight changes in phraseology, in his annual message to Congress in the following December. On February 15, 1905, he transmitted to the Senate, for its advice and consent, a treaty concluded at Santo Domingo City on the 7th of the same month, under which the United States agreed to undertake the adjustment of all Dominican debts, foreign and domestic, and to that end to take charge of and administer the custom-houses. In the message accompanying the treaty, President Roosevelt stated that conditions in Santo Domingo had for many years been growing steadily worse, that there had been many disturbances and revolutions, and that debts had been contracted

beyond the power of the republic to pay. Those who profited by the Monroe Doctrine must, he affirmed, accept certain responsibilities along with the rights which it conferred; and the justification for assuming the responsibility proposed in the present instance was to be found in the fact that it was incompatible with international equity for the United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their citizens and yet to refuse itself to take any such steps. Under the Monroe Doctrine the United States could not, said President Roosevelt, see any European power "seize and permanently occupy" the territory of an American republic, and yet such seizure might eventually offer the only way in which such a power could collect any debts, unless the United States should interfere. Under such circumstances the United States should take charge of the custom-houses. In the course of his message he further said:

Either we must abandon our duty under our traditional policy towards the Dominican people, who aspire to a republican form of government while they are actually drifting into a condition of permanent anarchy, in which case we must permit some other government to adopt its own measures in order to safeguard its own interests, or else we must ourselves take seasonable and appropriate action.

And in conclusion he avowed the belief that the proposed treaty afforded a "practical test of the efficiency of the United States government in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine." The Senate adjourned without taking a vote on the treaty, final action on which was thus deferred. Meanwhile, under a *modus vivendi* concluded by President Roosevelt, an American citizen designated by him was placed by the Dominican government in charge of the collection of the revenues, a certain proportion of which was to be deposited in a bank in New York, on account of the claims of creditors, till the question of ratification of the treaty should be definitely determined.

Subsequently, negotiations were taken up on different lines, to the extent of endeavoring to bring about a prior settlement of debts between Santo Domingo and her creditors, instead of leaving them to future adjustment by the United States. By a protocol between the United States and the Dominican Republic of January 31, 1903, the latter had already agreed to pay the sum of \$4,500,000, on terms to be fixed by arbitrators, in full settlement of the claims of the San Domingo Improvement Company and certain other American companies allied with it, including indemnity for their relinquishment to the government of their properties and interests, including a railway. The arbitrators, on July 14, 1904, with the concurrence of their

Dominican colleague, unanimously awarded that the stipulated sum should be paid in certain monthly instalments, and assigned as security the revenues of the custom-houses within a definite district. They also authorized the appointment of a financial agent by the United States to supervise the collection of such revenues, the San Domingo Improvement Company having previously exercised a general supervision over the customs under its contracts with the Dominican government.

It was estimated that the total debts of the Dominican Republic amounted nominally to more than \$30,000,000. An adjustment was in the end conditionally effected by the Dominican government of substantially all its debts, internal as well as foreign; and on this basis there was concluded on February 8, 1907, a new treaty by which the government was to issue new bonds to the amount of \$20,000,000, payable in fifty years, if not sooner redeemed, and bearing interest at the rate of five per cent. On the other hand, it was agreed that the President of the United States should appoint a general receiver of Dominican customs to collect, with the aid of assistants similarly appointed, all the customs duties of the republic till all the bonds should be paid or retired, the United States engaging to give to the general receiver and his assistants "such protection" as it might "find to be requisite for the performance of their duties." No intervention beyond this in Dominican affairs was provided for.

This treaty was ratified by the Senate of the United States and by the Dominican Congress, and the ratifications were exchanged on July 8, 1907. It was duly carried into effect.

December 1, 1909, Mr. Knox, as Secretary of State, notified Señor Rodriguez, Nicaraguan *chargé d'affaires* at Washington, that the United States had decided no longer to recognize the government of President Zelaya in Nicaragua, and that Señor Rodriguez's functions as the diplomatic representative of that government were at an end. Passports were enclosed to him, in case he should wish to leave the United States; but he was informed that, in case he should remain in Washington, he would be received on the same footing as the representatives of the revolutionary factions in control of the eastern and western parts of the country; that is to say, as an "unofficial channel" of communication with "*de facto* authorities," who, pending the establishment in Nicaragua of a government with which the United States could maintain diplomatic relations, would be held severally accountable for the protection of American interests in the districts which they respectively occupied. The reasons given for this step were (1) that President Zelaya had repeatedly violated the Washington conventions of 1907,

which were designed to preserve the neutrality of Honduras and maintain peace in Central America, and had kept Central America in continuous turmoil; (2) that he had practically destroyed republican institutions and free and orderly government in Nicaragua; (3) that he had caused two American citizens, concerned in a revolutionary movement, to be executed with "barbarous cruelties," had menaced the American consulate at Managua, and had by "petty annoyances and indignities" made it impossible for the American minister longer to reside there; (4) that his rule had produced a condition of anarchy in which, responsible government having ceased to exist, the United States was obliged to look to factions in *de facto* control of particular districts for the protection of American life and property.

January 10, 1911, Mr. Knox signed a loan convention with Honduras, for the purpose of rehabilitating the national finances. The Senate of the United States failed to ratify it. A similar fate awaited a treaty concluded with Nicaragua, June 6, 1911, which contemplated a loan by American bankers and followed the lines of the Dominican receivership. These efforts were popularly assailed as "dollar diplomacy." The aid of American bankers was indeed to a certain extent actually obtained. In August, 1912, in the midst of disorders, the United States, on the request of the Nicaraguan President, landed marines, explaining that it did so for the defence of its legation and the protection of American life and property, but declaring that the conditions that had prevailed under President Zelaya could not be restored. The marines had several encounters with revolutionists, and a detachment remained at the capital.

Subsequently Mr. Knox made a tour of the countries of Central America, as well as of Panama, Venezuela, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Cuba. He sought to dispel apprehensions concerning the attitude of the United States, and particularly concerning the application of the Monroe Doctrine, which, in a speech at Panama, he said, would "reach the acme of its beneficence when it is regarded by the people of the United States as a reason why we should constantly respond to the needs of those of our Latin-American neighbors who may find necessity for our assistance in their progress towards better government or who may seek our aid to meet their just obligations and thereby to maintain honorable relations to the family of nations."

In his opening address to the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress on December 27, 1915, Mr. Lansing, as Secretary of State, observing that the Monroe Doctrine was "founded on the principle that the safety of this Republic would be im-

periled by the extension of sovereign rights by a European power over territory in this hemisphere," said that the United States had "within recent years . . . found no occasion, with the exception of the Venezuelan boundary incident, to remind Europe that the Monroe Doctrine continues unaltered a national policy of this Republic." Meanwhile, the American republics had "attained maturity"; and from the feeling that they constituted "a group, separate and apart from the other nations of the world" and "united by common ideals and common aspirations," there had resulted the "international policy of Pan-Americanism."

Addressing the same body on January 6, 1916, President Wilson, while declaring that the United States had proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine "on her own authority," and always had maintained and always would maintain it "upon her own responsibility," stated that it "demanded merely that European governments should not attempt to extend their political system to this side of the Atlantic." But, as it did not "disclose the use which the United States intended to make of her power," there had come to exist among the States of America an uncertainty which must be removed by establishing "the foundations of amity so that no one will hereafter doubt them."

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VII

THE DOCTRINE OF EXPATRIATION

THE Declaration of Independence enumerates as among the "inalienable rights" with which "all men" are "endowed by their Creator," "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." It has often been remarked that this dogma, like the associated affirmation that "all men are created equal," was evidently considered as an abstraction, since its announcement was not conceived to render inadmissible the continued holding in bondage of a large servile population. This criticism, however, cannot, certainly in its more sinister sense, be accepted as just. All general declarations of human rights to a large extent represent aspirations, for the perfect fulfilment of which conditions altogether ideal would be requisite. So long as human conditions are imperfect, the realization of the highest human aspirations will be imperfect. Even admitting, therefore, that the enumerated rights belonged to "all men" and were "inalienable," there yet remained the task of determining what they actually included and what were their practical limitations. No argument, beyond the common experience of daily life, was needed to demonstrate that the unregulated pursuit by each individual of his own will was incompatible with the existence of social order; and it was therefore freely conceded, even by the most extreme proponents of the theory of natural rights, that men, when living in society, must be considered as having yielded up a part of those rights for the sake of the common welfare. But the question still remained, to what extent had this been done?

We are now concerned with the answer to this question in only one particular. Does the right to "liberty" and the "pursuit of happiness," in the sense in which they may be called "inalienable," embrace, incidentally, a right on the part of the individual to expatriate himself at will? This was a question that was destined, in the growth and development of American policy, to give rise to important international controversies, some of which yet remain unadjusted. In order to grasp the meaning of these controversies, it is necessary at the outset clearly to understand just what was the point at issue. The word expatriation is often employed to denote merely the giving up of one's country, and more particularly one's native

country, by a permanent change of abode; but, as used in diplomatic discussions, it signifies the change both of home and of allegiance, and more especially of allegiance. By the laws of all civilized countries, provision is made for the admission of aliens to citizenship. The process by which this is done is called naturalization. What is the effect of this process? Does it confer upon the individual a new political character, without divesting him of that which he previously had, thus exposing him, unless his original sovereign consent to the change, to the conflicting claims of a dual allegiance? or does it of its own force not only invest him with a new allegiance, but also free him from the obligations of the old? By the laws of the United States the alien was required, at the time of his admission to citizenship, to forswear all allegiance to his former sovereign; and no inquiry was made as to whether that sovereign had, either by general or by specific permission, consented to the act. It might therefore be inferred that they were framed upon the theory that the individual possessed an absolute and unrestricted right to change his allegiance, without regard to the claims which his country of origin might assert, even within its own jurisdiction. This would, however, be a hasty inference, so far, at any rate, as the omission to inquire concerning the claims of prior allegiance is concerned. Other countries had naturalization statutes, by which no such inquiry was authorized; and yet those countries conceded to their own subjects the right of expatriation only with substantial qualifications or not at all. While they granted naturalization, they did not claim that it dissolved the ties of prior allegiance and made its recipient an alien to his native country, without regard to the latter's laws on the subject. And we shall see that a long time elapsed before the United States advanced to the full assertion of this position in its diplomatic correspondence, and a still longer time before it embodied the claim in its legislation.

Nor is this surprising. The courts, and the most authoritative jurists, repeatedly expressed the opinion that the United States had inherited, as part of the common law, the English doctrine with regard to the change of allegiance. Chancellor Kent, reviewing in his *Commentaries* the decisions of the American courts, said that "the better opinion would seem to be, that a citizen cannot renounce his allegiance to the United States without the permission of government, to be declared by law," and that, as there was "no existing legislative regulation" on the subject, "the rule of the English common law" remained "unaltered." Mr. Justice Story, delivering in a certain case the judgment of the Supreme Court, laid down the general rule

that individuals could not, "by any act of their own, without the consent of the government, put off their allegiance and become aliens"; while, in his work on the *Conflict of Laws*, he declared that every nation had "an exclusive right to regulate persons and things within its own territory, according to its own sovereign will and public policy." To this general current of legal authority there was just one exception, and that was a decision rendered by the court of appeals of Kentucky, in 1839, a decision in which there seemed to breathe the free and untrammeled spirit of the West. In this case it was declared that expatriation might be "considered a practical and fundamental doctrine of America"; but the qualification was immediately added that "the political obligations of the citizen, and the interests of the Republic," might "forbid a renunciation of allegiance by his mere volition or declaration at any time, and under all circumstances," and that for this reason "the government, for the purpose of preventing abuse and securing public welfare," might "regulate the mode of expatriation." Even as thus qualified, Chancellor Kent expressed disapproval of the decision, and maintained not only that "the weight of American authority" was "in favor of the opposite doctrine," but also that the opposite doctrine was "founded . . . upon the most safe and reliable principles."

In the earlier diplomatic correspondence of the United States, we find no radical dissent from the views generally expressed by the courts. It is true that Jefferson, as Secretary of State, in a letter to Gouverneur Morris, minister to France, of August 16, 1793, said that citizens of the United States were "certainly free to divest themselves of that character by emigration and other acts manifesting their intention," and might "then become the subjects of another power" and be "free to do whatever the subject of that power may do"; but this was far from saying that other countries were obliged to act upon the same doctrine. John Marshall, as Secretary of State, a few years later, in commenting upon the effects of naturalization, observed that no nation had a right to question its validity, "unless it be one which may have a conflicting title to the person adopted."

It is constantly stated that the United States maintained the right of expatriation in its controversies with Great Britain concerning the impressment of seamen. This is true, but only in a very limited sense. Taking the dispute over impressment as a whole, it did not involve the crucial point of the later controversies as to expatriation. The burden of the complaint in regard to impressment, as defined in Madison's war message of June 1, 1812, was that Great Britain sought, under cover of

belligerent right, to execute her municipal law of allegiance on board the ships of other countries on the high seas, where no laws could operate "but the law of nations, and the laws of the country to which the vessels belong." Precisely the same position was maintained by Webster in his correspondence with Lord Ashburton in 1842. Ships on the high seas are treated, for purposes of jurisdiction, as if they were part of the territory of the nation to which they belong. The complaint that the British government enforced the English law of allegiance on board American vessels on the high seas was manifestly a different thing from objecting to her enforcement of the same law within British jurisdiction.

A comprehensive examination of our unpublished diplomatic records enables me to say that the first Secretary of State to announce the doctrine of expatriation in its fullest extent—the doctrine that naturalization in the United States not only clothes the individual with a new allegiance but also absolves him from the obligations of the old—was James Buchanan. In an instruction to George Bancroft, then American minister in London, of December 18, 1848, Buchanan, referring to the duty of protecting American citizens, naturalized as well as native, said: "We can recognize no difference between the one and the other, nor can we permit this to be done by any foreign government, without protesting and remonstrating against it in the strongest terms. The subjects of other countries who from choice have abandoned their native land, and, accepting the invitation which our laws present, have emigrated to the United States and become American citizens, are entitled to the very same rights and privileges as if they had been born in the country. To treat them in a different manner would be a violation of our plighted faith as well as our solemn duty." The same doctrine was asserted by Buchanan, in terms equally unequivocal, on prior occasions. As early as November 25, 1845, he informed an inquirer that the fact of his having become a citizen of the United States by naturalization entitled him "to the same protection from this government that a native citizen would receive."

Buchanan's innovation was not, however, accepted by any of his successors as Secretary of State till he himself became President. Webster, as Secretary of State under Fillmore, fully adopted the view expressed by the eminent American publicist, Wheaton, when minister to Prussia, that naturalization would entitle its recipient to protection everywhere but in his native country. Edward Everett, Webster's successor under Fillmore, held to the same opinion. Nor did any reversal of it take place when Pierce succeeded Fillmore, and that Democrat of Demo-

crats, William L. Marcy, became Secretary of State. In an instruction to the American minister to Sardinia, of November 10, 1855, Marcy, while declaring that a naturalized citizen of the United States had all the rights of a native, went on to observe that the vindication of those rights could not require or authorize

an interference in his behalf with the fair application to him of the municipal laws of his native country when he voluntarily subjects himself to their control in the same manner and to the same extent as they would apply if he had never left that country. A different view of the duties of this government would [added Marcy] be an invasion of the independence of nations, and could not fail to be productive of discord; it might, moreover, prove detrimental to the interests of the States of this Union.

Views similar to these were expressed by Caleb Cushing, Attorney-General under Pierce, in 1856, in an opinion which he gave upon a question propounded by the Bavarian minister at Berlin as to the law in the United States. The results of an examination of judicial decisions, both Federal and State, Cushing summarized thus: "Expatriation a general right, subject to regulation of time and circumstances according to public interests; and the requisite consent of the state presumed where not negatived by standing prohibitions." Subject to "the conditions thus indicated," and to "such orders as the public interest might seem to Congress to require to be imposed," he thought that the right of expatriation existed and might be freely exercised by citizens of the United States. He took occasion, however, to observe that opinion on the subject in the United States had always been

a little colored . . . by necessary opposition to the assumption of Great Britain to uphold the doctrine of indefeasible allegiance, and in terms to prohibit expatriation. Hence [he continued] we have been prone to regard it hastily as a question between kings and their subjects. It is not so. The true question is of the relation between the political society and its members, upon whatever hypothesis of right and in whatever form of organization that society may be constituted. The assumption of a natural right of emigration, without possible restriction in law, can be defended only by maintaining that each individual has all possible rights against the society and the society none with respect to the individual; that there is no social organization, but a mere anarchy of elements, each wholly independent of the other, and not otherwise consociated save than by their casual coexistence in the same territory.

A pronounced change in the tone and language of the government was now impending, and for reasons altogether intelligible. In March, 1857, Buchanan became President, and conditions were ripe for the further development of the position

which he had taken as Secretary of State ten years before. For several decades after the formation of the government of the United States, the immigrant element of the population was comparatively unimportant. It is estimated that the whole number of immigrants from 1790 to 1820 was only about 250,000. During the twenties it continued to be small; but in the next decade it grew rapidly. In the year 1842 the number reached 100,000. In 1846, there began the movement due to the Irish famine; and this movement, combined with bad times in Germany, produced in 1854 the enormous maximum of 427,833, which was not again reached till after the Civil War. In 1860 the foreign-born population of the United States was 4,138,697. In 1870 it was 5,567,229. Immigrants and the children of immigrants had come to form a large percentage of the country's citizenship. Such a condition of things inevitably produced an effect on the policy of the United States, just as it must have done on the policy of any other government founded on popular suffrage. The foreign-born citizen who desired to revisit the country of his origin, represented an interest so wide-spread and so powerful that its wishes could not be disregarded, no matter what the courts and publicists, or even what Secretaries of State, had said.

As the largest immigration prior to 1857 was from Ireland and the German states, controversies as to allegiance most frequently arose in those quarters. By the law of England, a British subject could not put off his natural allegiance except by act of Parliament, and of such an act there was no record. The law in Germany was more liberal. A Prussian subject, for example, might lose his allegiance in various ways, one of which was by living ten years in a foreign land. But this did not suffice to prevent a collision, since the laws of the United States required for naturalization only a five years' residence, and sometimes less; and since, above all, in Prussia as well as in other European states, the discharge from allegiance was always subject to the performance of military duties, whether the individual had at the time of his emigration reached the age of actual service or not.

In 1859 the issue was broadly made. In February of that year a native of Hanover, named Christian Ernst, who had emigrated to the United States eight years before, at the age of nineteen, was admitted to citizenship; and in the following month he procured a passport and returned to Hanover on a visit. On arriving in his native village he was arrested and forced into the army. President Buchanan gave to the case his immediate personal attention, and submitted it to Judge Jeremiah S. Black, his Attorney-General, for an opinion. Judge

Black's opinion bore the significant date of the 4th of July. He advised that it was the "natural right of every free person, who owes no debts and is not guilty of crime, to leave the country of his birth in good faith and for an honest purpose," and to throw off his natural allegiance and substitute another for it; that, although the common law of England denied this right, and "some of our own courts, misled by British authority, have expressed, though not very decisively, the same opinion," this was not to be taken as settling the question; that "natural reason and justice, writers of known wisdom," and "the practice of civilized nations" were "all opposed to the doctrine of perpetual allegiance," and that the United States was pledged to the right of expatriation and could not without perfidy repudiate it; that expatriation "includes not only *emigration* out of one's native country, but *naturalization* in the country adopted as a future residence"; that "naturalization does *ipso facto* place the native and the adopted citizen in precisely the same relations with the government under which they live, except in so far as the express and positive law of the country has made a distinction in favor of one or the other"; that there was no law in the United States that made any difference between native and naturalized citizens with regard to protection abroad; that the opinion held by "persons of very high reputation," that a naturalized citizen ought to be protected everywhere except in the country of his birth, had "no foundation to rest upon . . . except the dogma which denies altogether the right of expatriation without the consent of his native country"; that, even assuming that Hanover had a municipal regulation by which the right of expatriation was denied to those of her subjects who failed to comply with certain conditions, and that this regulation was violated by Ernst when he came away, the unlawfulness of his emigration would not make his naturalization void as against the King of Hanover; that, if the laws of the two countries were in conflict, the law of nations must decide the question upon principles and rules of its own; and that, "by the public law of the world we have the undoubted right to naturalize a foreigner, whether his natural sovereign consented to his emigration or not"; and, finally, that the government of Hanover could justify Ernst's arrest only by proving that the original right of expatriation depended upon the consent of the natural sovereign—a proposition which, said Judge Black, "I am sure no man can establish."

On July 8, 1859, the views of the President in relation to the case of Christian Ernst and analogous cases were communicated to Mr. Wright, American minister at Berlin, in a paper

that at once acquired great celebrity. In this paper the views announced by Judge Black, which in reality were but a reiteration of those held by Buchanan as Secretary of State, were fully adopted. What right, it was asked, did the laws of the United States confer upon a foreigner by granting him naturalization? The answer was, all the rights, privileges, and immunities which belonged to a native citizen, except that of eligibility to the office of President.

With this exception [it was affirmed] the naturalized citizen, from and after the date of his naturalization, both at home and abroad, is placed upon the very same footing with the native citizen. He is neither in a better nor a worse condition . . . The moment a foreigner becomes naturalized, his allegiance to his native country is severed forever. He experiences a new political birth. A broad and impassable line separates him from his native country. He is no more responsible for anything he may say or do, or omit to say or do, after assuming his new character than if he had been born in the United States. Should he return to his native country, he returns as an American citizen, and in no other character. In order to entitle his original government to punish him for an offence, this must have been committed while he was a subject and owed allegiance to that government.

This instruction was signed by Mr. Cass, but in its citations of the law of Pennsylvania, as well as in its sentiments and style, it bears Presidential ear-marks. On August 20, 1859, the Hanoverian government stated that a "full pardon" had been granted to Ernst, and that he had been "dismissed" from the military service, but added that similar conflicts could be prevented in the future only by the United States "renouncing its own views on the subject, which did not agree with international relations," or by concluding a special arrangement. President Buchanan, however, in his annual message of December 3, 1860, declared:

Our government is bound to protect the rights of our naturalized citizens everywhere to the same extent as though they had drawn their first breath in this country. We recognize no distinction between our native and naturalized citizens.

The instruction to Mr. Wright was printed and issued by the Department of State in circular form, for the purpose of defining the position which the United States would in future maintain. It was so used by Seward, as Secretary of State, after Lincoln had succeeded Buchanan as President. But, as the Civil War grew more serious and the United States was forced to adopt a policy of conscription, Seward permitted the controversy to rest. Writing to Motley, who was then minister to Austria, on April 21, 1863, he adverted to the perplexities in which the United States had become involved by refusing, on

the one hand, to exempt from its military service persons whom foreign powers claimed the right to protect, while demanding, on the other, the exemption of a like class from military service in the country of their origin on the ground of their having become citizens of the United States. The President had, he said, decided that it was not expedient in the crisis then existing to urge questions of the latter sort beyond the limits of an appeal to the good-will and friendly disposition of foreign powers. It was, besides, deemed necessary to discourage rather than encourage the return of naturalized foreigners to their native country, as well as the emigration of American citizens to Europe.

But, soon after the close of the war, Seward was somewhat violently torn away from this position by the outbreak, in 1866, of the Fenian agitation, and the arrest in British jurisdiction of naturalized American citizens, natives of Ireland, for acts done in furtherance of that movement. Among the numerous cases of this kind, the most notable one, historically, was that of Warren and Costello, who were members of the discordant and ill-starred expedition on the brigantine *Jacmel* to the coast of Ireland, and who were afterwards tried and convicted at Dublin on a charge of treason-felony. At that time an alien charged with crime in British jurisdiction was by law entitled to be tried by what was technically called a jury *de medietate linguae*—a jury composed half of British subjects and half of foreigners. Warren and Costello applied for such a jury, on the ground that they were American citizens. Had they been native citizens of the United States, their request would have been granted, but, as they were British subjects by birth, it was refused, the court citing Blackstone, Kent, and Story to show that their original allegiance still survived.

The trial and conviction of Warren and Costello, as well as of other prisoners, under these circumstances produced an excitement that, to borrow Seward's picturesque phrase, extended "throughout the whole country, from Portland to San Francisco and from St. Paul to Pensacola." Public meetings attended by immense crowds were held in many cities, and resolutions were adopted calling upon the government for vigorous measures. In this agitation the leading spirit was William E. Robinson, then a member of Congress from Brooklyn, popularly known as "Richelieu" Robinson, "Richelieu" being the name under which he practised journalism. Robinson was a native of Ireland and an advocate of her independence, or, as he once declared in Congress, of her purchase and annexation by the United States. When in the latter part of 1867 Congress assembled, he at once brought up the subject of the Irish-

American prisoners. He offered resolutions of inquiry looking to the impeachment of the American minister at London, and of the American consul at Dublin, for neglect of duty; and declared that unless every American citizen then confined in a British jail, against whom a charge of crime had not already been filed, should not on demand be instantly released, the American minister should "come home and breathe his native air, and be prepared to stand up like a man, and not be trembling all over like a jelly." As the minister thus described was no other than Charles Francis Adams, who, in the dark hours of the great American conflict, could quietly say to Earl Russell, with reference to the apprehended escape of "Lairds' Ironclads," "It would be superfluous in me to point out to your lordship that this is war," it is obvious that Mr. Robinson was a man of fancy, though tastes will necessarily differ as to the quality of his wit. On a subsequent occasion he proposed a resolution, which was at once voted by the House of Representatives, requesting the President to obtain the release of Warren and Costello and "their return to our flag, with such ceremonies as are appropriate to the occasion." Warren and Costello were eventually released, but without special ceremonial incidents.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, spurred on by ninety-six resolutions and memorials that had been adopted at public meetings in different sections of the country, all demanding that action be taken to secure to citizens of the United States protection abroad, had been wrestling with various proposals designed to accomplish that end; and on January 27, 1868, the chairman, General Banks, brought in a bill, accompanied by an elaborate report. The report was both able and temperate. It pertinently declared that the claim of "indefeasible allegiance and perpetual service" was the symbol of "feudalism and force," but it also affirmed that "the law of allegiance and of service" was "as essential to a republic as it is to a monarchy," and that the "extinction of the mutual obligations between a government and its subject" should depend upon "the express or implied consent of both parties," under proper regulations. The bill was less carefully reasoned, and, after some discussion, was recommitted. It was reported again, in a form much altered, on March 10th. In its new form it declared that the "right of expatriation" was "a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and that "any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision," of any officer of the government, which denied, restricted, impaired, or questioned that right, was "inconsistent with the fundamental principles" of the government. It further pro-

vided that naturalized citizens of the United States should while abroad receive the same protection as native citizens in like circumstances ; and empowered the President, whenever a citizen of the United States should be arrested and detained by a foreign government upon the allegation that naturalization in the United States did not operate to dissolve his original allegiance, to retaliate by arresting and detaining any subject of that government found within the national jurisdiction.

The bill, after discussion and amendment, passed the House on April 20, 1868, by a vote of 104 to 4, 81 members not voting. In the Senate it was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, from which it was reported by the chairman, Mr. Sumner, on June 23d, with two amendments, one of which struck out the provision for reprisals and made it the duty of the President, in cases of improper arrest and detention, merely to report the facts to Congress. In the debate that ensued, Mr. Williams, of Oregon, moved to substitute for this amendment a clause making it the duty of the President, before reporting the facts to Congress, to use all means, not amounting to acts of war, to obtain the prisoner's release. This amendment was eventually adopted. The bill, as amended, passed the Senate on July 25, 1868, by a vote of 39 to 5, 20 Senators not voting. On the same day the amendments of the Senate were concurred in by the House, and on July 27th the bill, with the approval of the President, became a law.

An examination of the debates shows that the passage of the bill was greatly facilitated by two circumstances, which were repeatedly mentioned. One was that, while the bill was pending, both the great political parties held their national conventions and adopted declarations in favor of the equal protection of all citizens, both native and naturalized, at all times and in all places. The other was that George Bancroft had, with the kindly and powerful co-operation of Bismarck, concluded on February 22, 1868, with the North German Union his epoch-making naturalization treaty, which was soon followed by similar treaties with Baden and Bavaria, and by the promise or well-founded expectation of treaties with yet other powers, including Great Britain. Indeed, the principles of a naturalization treaty with Great Britain were settled in a protocol signed in London as early as October 9, 1868, though they were not embodied in a formal convention till May 13, 1870, when Parliament had by an act of the preceding day adopted the necessary legislation. Before the close of 1872, naturalization treaties were made with Hesse (1868), Belgium (1868), Sweden and Norway (1869), Austria-Hungary (1870), Ecuador (1872), and Denmark (1872). Of all these treaties, however,

that with Great Britain is the most liberal, since it recognizes the fullest possible effects of naturalization, whether American or British, whenever acquired, while all the rest make a five years' residence in the country of adoption a necessary condition of expatriation, even though naturalization should, as in some cases it may, be sooner obtained. The treaty with Great Britain is therefore the only one that meets the full exactions of the act of July 27, 1868; but they were all promptly ratified.

Since 1872 the government of the United States has earnestly and constantly striven to secure naturalization treaties with other powers, but its efforts have been rewarded only in the single and unimportant case of Hayti. For this failure there are several reasons, first among which we may mention the controversies that have arisen under the existing treaties, in consequence of the return to their native country, immediately after their naturalization in the United States, of young men who emigrated just before arriving at the age when they were subject to military duty. While the number of such persons from year to year has been comparatively small, yet it has, as the volumes of diplomatic correspondence amply testify, been large enough to produce incalculable mischief. This unfortunate complication, which has in some instances put in jeopardy subsisting arrangements, has naturally served as an obstacle to the formation of new ones. Besides, the increasing pressure of the military system in Europe has made the non-treaty powers more and more reluctant to recognize the expatriation of any citizen or subject who has not performed the entire military service which the law prescribes. This tendency is clearly seen in the case of France, who, abandoning a less stringent rule formerly applied, now enforces her military laws upon Frenchmen naturalized abroad who were at the time of their naturalization subject to military service in the active army or in the reserve of that army. By the Italian civil code of 1866, citizenship of that country is lost by naturalization abroad, but it is expressly declared by the same code that this does not carry with it exemption from the obligation of military service or from the penalties inflicted on those who bear arms against their native country. Other countries, including Switzerland, have laws of similar purport; but the Swiss laws contain a provision under which a native of that country may, if he sees fit to do so, renounce his natural allegiance. The most difficult case, however, to deal with is that of Russia, by whose laws any native of that country who enters a foreign service without the permission of his government, or takes the oath of allegiance to a foreign power, is ex-

posed to the loss of all civil rights and perpetual banishment from the empire, or, in case of his unauthorized return to Russia, to deportation to Siberia. In addition to this, he is required to perform his term of military service. Turkey, prior to 1869, recognized the right of expatriation, but has since refused to do so. Referring to the situation thus created, President McKinley, in his annual message of December 5, 1899, said:

Our statutes do not allow this government to admit any distinction between the treatment of native and naturalized Americans abroad, so that ceaseless controversy arises in cases where persons, owing in the eye of international law a dual allegiance, are prevented from entering Turkey or are expelled after entrance. Our law in this regard contrasts with that of the European states. The British act, for instance, does not claim effect for the naturalization of an alien in the event of his return to his native country, unless the change be recognized by the law of that country or stipulated by treaty between it and the naturalizing state.

It may be doubted whether this statement, so far as it relates to a "dual allegiance," was made with full appreciation of its significance; for if it be admitted that an alien naturalized in the United States, as a result owes, under international law, a dual allegiance, it necessarily follows that the doctrine of voluntary expatriation has no foundation in international law. No one has ever contended that the naturalization of an alien is ineffective in the country in which it is granted. The only question that has existed is as to its effect in other countries, and especially in the country of origin. The doctrine embodied in the act of 1868 is that naturalization invests the individual with a new and single allegiance, and by consequence absolves him from the obligations of the old. The position of governments and of publicists who deny the American contention is that naturalization merely adds a new allegiance to the old, so that the individual becomes subject to a dual allegiance, and may be held to all the obligations of his original citizenship if he returns to his native country. The doctrine of dual allegiance is, in a word, the precise test the acceptance of which distinguishes those who reject the doctrine of voluntary expatriation from those who support it.

But, quite apart from conditions existing in other countries, it would be uncandid not to admit that the failure of the United States since 1872 to extend the operation of the doctrine of expatriation may in a measure be ascribed to certain acts that have seemed to discredit the declarations made in the act of 1868. By the naturalization laws of the United States prior to 1870, admission to citizenship was restricted to "free white" persons. By the act of July 14, 1870, Congress, after the adop-

tion of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, changed the laws so as to embrace persons of "African" nativity or descent. While this act was under discussion in Congress, Senator Sumner made repeated efforts to strike from the laws the word "white," but in this he was unsuccessful. In the preparation of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the word "white" was omitted, but by the act of February 18, 1875, Congress corrected this omission by expressly restricting the right of naturalization to "white" persons and to persons of "African" nativity or descent. This legislation, under which Chinese, Japanese, and persons of various other races, being neither "white" nor "African," have been held to be incapable of naturalization in the United States, necessarily impaired the moral if not the legal authority of the act of 1868. The act of 1868 declared expatriation to be "a natural and inherent right of all people," and the right of expatriation, as correctly held by Judge Black, includes both emigration and naturalization. It is obvious therefore that the right of expatriation is only imperfectly recognized where people, not individually because of misconduct, but in the mass because of their race, are excluded from naturalization. Some of the very words of the act of July 27, 1868, declaratory of the right of expatriation, were embodied on the following day in the treaty with China, commonly called the Burlingame treaty.

By the act of Congress of June 29, 1906, which has been only slightly amended by subsequent legislation, important changes were made in the laws relating to naturalization in the United States. The process was made far more stringent than it had been. As the result of the provision that, while the petition for admission to citizenship must be accompanied with proof that the applicant has resided in the United States at least five years, final action on it cannot be taken till at least ninety days after it is filed and publicly posted, the normal period of residence was in effect extended from five years to five years and three months. Nor may a certificate of naturalization be issued within thirty days preceding the holding of a general election. The candidate must file his petition not more than seven years after making his declaration of intention, which otherwise ceases to be effective. The petition must also be signed by him in his own handwriting, and the hearing upon it must be held in open court before the judge or judges. The applicant, except in certain specified cases, must be able to speak the English language. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy are excluded from admission to citizenship. So also are persons disbelieving in or opposed to organized government, or belonging to or affiliated with organizations en-

tertaining and teaching such disbelief or opposition, as well as persons who advocate or teach "the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing" of an officer or officers, either specifically or generally, "of the government of the United States, or of any other organized government, because of his or their official character." Power is expressly given for the cancellation of certificates improperly obtained. A bureau of naturalization is established at Washington, where certified copies or duplicates of naturalization records are kept. It is further provided that where a person shall, within five years after his naturalization, return to his native country, or go to any other foreign country, and take up there a "permanent residence," this shall be considered presumptive evidence that he did not, when he filed his application, intend to become "a permanent citizen of the United States," and shall, in the absence of countervailing evidence, authorize the cancellation of his certificate as fraudulent. The diplomatic and consular officers of the United States are required to co-operate in the enforcement of this provision by reporting the names of any such persons within their respective jurisdictions.

Important changes were also made by the act of March 2, 1907, in the law relating to the expatriation of citizens of the United States and their protection abroad. Such expatriation is declared to be effected either by naturalization abroad or by the taking of an "oath of allegiance" to any foreign state. In the case of a "naturalized citizen," however, residence of two years in the state from which he came, or of five years in any other foreign state, creates a presumption that he "has ceased to be an American citizen." This presumption may be overcome by proof. It is explicitly provided that "no American citizen shall be allowed to expatriate himself when this country is at war." The act further expressly provides that an American woman marrying a foreigner takes the nationality of her husband; but that, when the marital relation ends, she may "resume" her American citizenship, if she is abroad, either by registering within a year as an American citizen at an American consulate or by returning to the United States to reside, or, if she is already in the United States, by continuing to reside there. Conversely, if a foreign woman married to an American continues, after the marital relation ends, to reside in the United States, she is assumed to retain her adoptive citizenship, unless she renounces it before a competent court; but, if she is residing abroad, she is permitted to retain it by registering within a year at an American consulate.

The act of 1907, contrary to previous well-considered legislation, contains a novel provision for the issuance of passports,

under certain conditions and limitations, to persons who are not citizens of the United States, but who have only declared their intention to become so. The conditions and limitations are (1) that the declarant must have resided in the United States for three years, (2) that the passport is good for only six months, (3) that it cannot be renewed, and (4) that it does not entitle the holder to the protection of the United States in the country of which he was a citizen when he made his declaration of intention. It is superfluous to point out that this clause recognizes the fact that the holder is not entitled to the rights of a citizen of the United States. It is equally obvious that even the third country in which he happened to be might decline to recognize any protective claim of the United States, especially as against a claim of the country whose citizenship he has not yet renounced, and that in taking such a position, such third country might at least argumentatively invoke the stipulation, usually found in the naturalization treaties of the United States, that "the declaration of an intention to become a citizen of the one or the other country has not for either party the effect of naturalization."

In truth, much confusion in the discussion of this subject has resulted from the supposition that, in making the declaration of intention to become a citizen, the declarant is required to forswear, and in fact does forswear, his allegiance to the government of the country from which he came. Not only is this a popular supposition; it has even found expression now and then in official documents. But it is quite destitute of foundation. In this respect it may be classed with the impression which has widely prevailed, and of which traces also may now and then be found in official documents, that the United States has on some occasions contended that a declaration of intention to become a citizen clothed the individual with American nationality and gave him the same right to protection abroad as if he had been naturalized. This impression is altogether erroneous, and is directly opposed to the positive declarations of a long line of Secretaries of State, including Buchanan, Marcy, Cass, Fish, Evarts, Frelinghuysen, Bayard, Blaine, Olney, Hay. The Department of State, in issuing passports, exacted proof of citizenship. In 1856 this rule was enacted into law; and, save a guarded relaxation from 1863 to 1866 for declarants subject to military duty, it remained till 1907 unmodified, except that those whom Congress after 1898 declared to be "citizens" of certain insular possessions and so entitled to protection, received passports in that character. But their national allegiance to the United States was undivided. The erroneous impression with regard to the effect of a declaration of inten-

tion seems to have grown out of a popular misconception of the case of Martin Koszta, in which Marcy is supposed to have maintained that by such a declaration an alien acquired American nationality. Marcy, however, took no such ground. The only purpose for which he referred to Koszta's declaration of intention was that of showing that Koszta was domiciled in the United States. He did maintain that a person's domicil, by which is meant his permanent home, may in certain relations invest him with a nationality. But even in this regard the position of Marcy has been much misapprehended. A brief explanation of the case will conduce to a clearer understanding of it.

Martin Koszta, a Hungarian by birth and an Austrian subject, was an active participant in the Hungarian revolution of 1848-49. At its close he, with many others, took refuge in Turkey. Their extradition was demanded by Austria but was resisted by Turkey, backed up by England and France; and they were at length released on the understanding that they would go into foreign parts. Many of them emigrated to the United States. Among these was Koszta, who, on July 31, 1852, declared his intention to become a citizen. Nearly two years later he temporarily returned, on private business, to Turkey, and placed himself under the protection of the American consul at Smyrna, by whom he was furnished with a *tezkereh*, a kind of passport or safe-conduct given by foreign consuls in Turkey to persons whom they assume to protect. While waiting for an opportunity to return to the United States, Koszta was seized and thrown into the sea, where he was picked up by a boat's crew, lying in wait for him, and taken on board the Austrian man-of-war *Huszar*, where he was confined in irons. It afterwards transpired that his seizure was instigated by the Austrian consul-general at Smyrna, and that the Turkish officials had refused to grant any authority for the purpose. The American consul at Smyrna and the American *chargé d'affaires* at Constantinople sought to effect his liberation, but in vain. Just then, however, the American sloop-of-war *St. Louis* arrived at Smyrna, and her commander, Captain Ingraham, after inquiring into the circumstances of the case, demanded Koszta's release, and intimated that he would resort to force if the demand was not complied with by a certain hour. An arrangement was then made by which Koszta was delivered into the custody of the French consul-general, until the United States and Austria should agree as to the manner of disposing of him.

When a report of the transaction was received at Washington, Marcy justified Captain Ingraham's conduct, chiefly on the ground that Koszta, while at Smyrna, had, according to the

local custom, which was recognized by international law, the right, as a Frank or sojourner, to place himself under any foreign protection that he might select; that he did in fact place himself under the protection of the American consul at Smyrna; and that, having thus been clothed with the nationality of the protecting power, he became entitled to be regarded while in that situation as a citizen of the United States. These views Marcy afterwards elaborated in his answer to the protest lodged by Austria against Captain Ingraham's action. The links in Marcy's chain of reasoning, in this celebrated paper, were that, as the seizure and rescue of Koszta took place within the jurisdiction of a third power, the respective rights of the United States and of Austria, as parties to the controversy that had arisen concerning that transaction, could not be determined by the municipal law of either country, but must be determined by international law; that, as the previous political connection between Koszta and the Austrian government had, by reason of the circumstances of his emigration and banishment, been, even under the laws of Austria, dissolved, he could not at the time of his seizure be claimed as an Austrian subject, nor could his seizure as such be justified by Austria, either under international law or her treaties with Turkey; that the seizure in its method and circumstances constituted an outrage so palpable that any by-stander would have been justified, on elementary principles of justice and humanity, in interposing to prevent its consummation; that there were, however, special grounds on which the United States might, under international law—that being under the circumstances the only criterion—assert a right to protect Koszta; that, although he had ceased to be a subject of Austria, and had not become a citizen of the United States, and therefore could not claim the rights of a citizen under the municipal laws of either country, he might under international law derive a national character from domicil; that even if Koszta was not by reason of his domicil invested with the nationality of the United States, he undoubtedly possessed, under the usage prevailing in Turkey, which was recognized and sanctioned by international law, the nationality of the United States from the moment when he was placed under the protection of the American diplomatic and consular agents and received from them his *tezkereh*; that, as he was clothed with the nationality of the United States, and as the first aggressive act was committed by the procurement of the Austrian functionaries, Austria, if she upheld what was done, became in fact the first aggressor, and was not entitled to an apology for the measures adopted by Captain Ingraham to secure his release; that Captain Ingraham's action was further

justified by the information which he received of a plot to remove Koszta clandestinely, in violation of the amicable arrangement under which he was to be retained at Smyrna while the question of his nationality was pending; and finally, that, as the seizure of Koszta was illegal and unjustifiable, the President could not consent to his delivery to the Austrian consul-general at Smyrna, but expected that measures would be taken to cause him to be restored to the condition he was in before he was seized.

On October 14, 1853, the American consul and the Austrian consul-general at Smyrna, acting under instructions from the American and Austrian ministers at Constantinople, requested the French consul-general to deliver Koszta over into the custody of the United States; and on the same day Koszta took passage on the bark *Sultana* for Boston.

References:

For documents and discussions relating to the historical and legal development of the Doctrine of Expatriation, see Moore, *Digest of International Law*, III, 552 *et seq.*

As to the doctrine of double nationality, or double allegiance, see *idem*, p. 518 *et seq.*

VIII

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

ALTHOUGH the independence of the United States was won by the sword, the founders of the American Republic were accustomed to look upon war as a measure that could be justified only as a choice of evils. Standing armies and elaborate preparations for war they deprecated as a menace to liberty. Having proclaimed as the basis of their political system the consent of the governed, they cherished as their ideal a peaceful nation, always guided by reason and justice. In order that this ideal might be attained, they perceived the necessity of establishing international relations on definite and sure foundations. To that end they became ardent expounders of the law of nations; and their predilection for legal methods naturally found expression in the employment of arbitration for the settlement of international differences.

By arbitration we mean the determination of controversies by international tribunals judicial in their constitution and powers. Arbitration is not to be confounded with mediation. Mediation is an advisory, arbitration a judicial, process. Media-

tion recommends, arbitration decides. And while it may be true that nations have for this reason sometimes accepted mediation when they were unwilling or reluctant to arbitrate, yet it is also true that they have settled by arbitration questions which mediation could not have adjusted. It is, for instance, hardly conceivable that the question of the *Alabama* claims could have been settled by mediation. The same thing may be said of many boundary disputes. The importance of mediation, as one of the forms of amicable negotiation, should not, indeed, be minimized. A plan of mediation even may, as in the case of The Hague convention for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, form a useful auxiliary to a system of arbitration; but the fact should nevertheless be understood that the two processes are fundamentally different, and that, while mediation is only a form of diplomacy, arbitration consists in the application of law and of judicial methods to the determination of international disputes.

The government of the United States had been in existence only five years, when it found occasion to employ arbitration for the settlement of serious differences with the mother-country. Important provisions of the treaty of peace remained unexecuted. Various posts along the northern frontier were still held by the British forces, and the British government refused to evacuate them because of the failure of the United States to render effectual the engagement that British creditors should meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of their confiscated debts. Moreover, almost immediately after the ratification of the treaty of peace, a question arose as to what was the "River St. Croix," which was to form the eastern boundary of the United States in its course northward from the Bay of Fundy. Such a river appeared on the map used by the negotiators of the treaty, but no stream answering to the name was afterwards found. The uncertainty as to the boundary was embarrassing, while the controversy as to the surrender of the posts and the recovery of debts formed a prolific source of irritation. But a still more acute cause of quarrel arose when, in 1793, the governments of France and Great Britain began to fulminate and enforce measures invasive of the rights of neutral trade. The situation then became so tense that, apparently as the only alternative to measures of force, Washington decided to send a special mission to England. John Jay, who was chosen for that delicate task, submitted his first formal representations to Lord Grenville on July 30, 1794. In the treaty concluded on the 19th of the following November, provision was made for three arbitrations. The first of these related to the boundary question; the second, to the claims on

account of confiscated debts; the third, to the subject of neutral rights and duties.

The boundary question was referred to a mixed commission of three persons, which met at Halifax, Nova Scotia, on August 30, 1796, and rendered its award at Providence, Rhode Island, on October 25, 1798, holding that the Schoodiac, or Schoodic, was the river intended under the name of the St. Croix.

The claims of British subjects, on account of the impediments which they had encountered in their efforts to collect in the State courts their confiscated debts, were referred to a mixed commission of five persons, which met at Philadelphia in May, 1797. The proceedings of this body were inharmonious, and its sittings were suspended on July 31, 1798, by the withdrawal of the two American members. Differences of opinion on questions of law were to be expected, but the discussions at the board also developed personal feeling. This appears to have been largely due to the action of Mr. Macdonald, one of the British commissioners, a gentleman who no doubt deserved all the commendations bestowed upon him at the time of his appointment for rectitude and good-will, but who seems unfortunately to have possessed a sense of duty unmitigated by a sense of proportion. Wishing to be entirely candid with his associates, he made it a rule freely to acquaint them with all his opinions; and he adopted the practice of presenting to the board, when it was not otherwise occupied, memoranda expressive of his views. The final rupture was caused by his submitting a resolution which declared that from the beginning of the Revolution down to the treaty of peace the United States, whatever may have been their relation to other powers, stood to Great Britain in an attitude of rebellion. As it has always been the doctrine of the United States that the treaty of peace did not grant their independence, but merely recognized it as a condition existing from July 4, 1776, the date of its declaration, the American commissioners regarded the resolution as gratuitously offensive and withdrew. The claims which the commission failed to adjust were settled by a treaty concluded January 8, 1802, under which the British government accepted the sum of £600,000 in satisfaction of its demands.

But the most important, as well as the most interesting, of the arbitral tribunals under the Jay treaty, was that which sat at London for the purpose of disposing of American claims against Great Britain on account of captures made under the orders in council, and of British claims against the United States on account of the latter's failure completely to enforce its neutrality. The membership of this board was worthy of the great questions submitted to its determination. The American

commissioners were Christopher Gore, who, although popularly known as the legal preceptor of Daniel Webster, achieved an eminence of his own; and William Pinkney, of Maryland, who, besides winning distinction in diplomacy and statesmanship, was the acknowledged leader of the American bar of his time. The British commissioners were Sir John Nicholl, an eminent civilian, who was afterwards succeeded by Maurice Swabey; and John Anstey. The fifth commissioner was Colonel John Trumbull, of Connecticut, who had accompanied Jay to England when he negotiated the treaty. The mode by which Trumbull was chosen is worthy of mention. The treaty provided that in case the four commissioners, two of whom were to be appointed by each government, could not agree upon the fifth, he should be chosen by lot. In execution of this stipulation, the commissioners on each side presented to the others a list of four persons; but, as neither side would yield, it became necessary to resort to the casting of lots. The next step, according to common practice, would have been for each side to place in the urn a name of its own independent selection, with the chances in favor of his being a partisan. But at London each side selected its name from the list of four made out by the other with a view to a mutual agreement, and the result was that a well-disposed man became the fifth commissioner.

The board had not been long in session when a serious controversy arose as to its power to determine its own jurisdiction in respect of the several claims presented for its decision. The division of opinion was so pronounced that for a time the British commissioners absented themselves from the meetings, but the difficulty was eventually submitted to Lord Chancellor Loughborough, who ended it by declaring "that the doubt respecting the authority of the commissioners to settle their own jurisdiction was absurd, and that they must necessarily decide upon cases being within or without their competency."

Important questions of law came before the commissioners in relation to contraband, the rights of neutrals, and the finality of the decisions of prize courts. These were all discussed with marked ability, especially by Pinkney. His opinions as a member of the board Wheaton justly pronounced to be "finished models of judicial eloquence, uniting powerful and comprehensive argument with a copious, pure, and energetic diction"; and they are almost all we possess in a complete and authentic form of the legal reasoning of the great master by whom they were delivered. The sessions of the board were brought to a close on February 24, 1804, all the business before it having been finished. There was, however, an interruption in its proceedings from July 30, 1799, to February 15,

1802, pending the diplomatic adjustment of the difficulty caused by the breaking up of the commission at Philadelphia.

By reason of the fact that the proceedings of the London commission for a century remained unpublished, its labors have not received from writers the attention which they deserve. It was estimated that, through the operation of the stipulations under which the commissioners sat, American claimants recovered from the British government the enormous sum of \$11,650,000.

The whole of this sum [says Trumbull] was promptly and punctually paid to each claimant, or his assignee; for, after a careful and accurate examination of the merits of every case of complaint, the awards of the board were made in favor of each individual, in the form of an order to pay, and payable at the treasury of Great Britain; nor do I recollect even to have heard a single complaint, of the delay of an hour, in any instance of an award presented for payment.

The aggregate of the awards against the United States appears to have been \$143,428.14; but although this amount was relatively small, its payment established the principle that a government is liable in damages for neglect to perform its neutral duties, and thus laid the foundation of the award made in 1872 at Geneva.

Since the close of the arbitral proceedings under the Jay treaty, arbitration has, except in the case of the extraordinary train of events that led up to the war of 1812, been almost habitually employed by the United States and Great Britain for the settlement of controversies that could not be adjusted by negotiation. Like the Jay treaty, the treaty of Ghent, of December 24, 1814, which restored peace between the two countries, provided for three arbitrations. The first related to the ownership of certain islands in Passamaquoddy Bay and the Bay of Fundy; the second, to the ascertainment of the boundary of the United States from the source of the river St. Croix to the river St. Lawrence; the third, to the determination of the boundary along the middle of the Great Lakes and of their water communications to the most northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods. In 1818, a difference as to the performance by Great Britain of her obligation under the treaty of Ghent, not to carry away from United States territory then in her possession "any slaves or other private property," was referred to the Emperor of Russia. He rendered a decision in favor of the United States, and in 1822 a mixed commission was erected in order to fix the amount to be paid. In 1827 a dispute as to the northeastern boundary was referred to the King of the Netherlands; but as his award was recommendatory rather

than decisive, both governments agreed to waive it, and the question was settled by the Webster-Ashburton treaty. In 1858 a convention was entered into for the settlement by means of a mixed commission of all outstanding claims. The commission sat in London, and disposed of many important controversies, including the celebrated case of the *Creole*, which so nearly caused a rupture of relations in 1842. For the peculiarly satisfactory results of the board's labors, credit was perhaps chiefly due to the umpire, Joshua Bates, an American by birth, but then the head of the house of the Barings, who exhibited in his decisions the same broad intelligence and sound judgment as had characterized his exceptionally successful career in business. By the reciprocity treaty of 1854, by which the troubles as to the northeastern fisheries were temporarily allayed, arbitration was employed for the purpose of determining what fisheries were exclusively reserved to the inhabitants of the two countries under the agreement. In 1863 another arbitral board was erected for the purpose of deciding upon the claims of the Hudson's Bay Company and the Puget's Sound Agricultural Company against the United States for damages to their property and rights in connection with the treaty of 1846, by which the limits between the United States and the British possessions west of the Rocky Mountains were established.

This board was still in session when the relations between the United States and Great Britain were seriously disturbed by the controversies growing out of the civil war, the northeastern fisheries, and the disputed San Juan water boundary. These differences were all composed by the great treaty signed at Washington on May 8, 1871, on the part of the United States by Hamilton Fish, Robert C. Schenck, Samuel Nelson, Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar, and George H. Williams; on the part of Great Britain, by the Earl de Grey and Ripon, Sir Stafford H. Northcote, Sir Edward Thornton, Sir John A. Macdonald, and Mountague Bernard. This treaty provided for four distinct arbitrations, the largest number ever established under a single convention, and, by reason of this fact as well as of the magnitude of the questions submitted, was undoubtedly the greatest treaty of arbitration that the world had ever seen.

Of the four arbitrations for which it provided, the first in order and in importance was that at Geneva. On the part of the United States, the arbitrator was Charles Francis Adams; on the part of Great Britain, Sir Alexander Cockburn. There were three other arbitrators, Count Frederic Sclopis, a distinguished jurist; Jacques Staempfli, afterwards President of Switzerland; and the Viscount D'Itajuba, an eminent diplo-

matist, respectively designated by the King of Italy, the President of the Swiss Confederation, and the Emperor of Brazil. The American agent was J. C. Bancroft Davis; the British agent, Lord Tenderden. Caleb Cushing, William M. Evarts, and Morrison R. Waite appeared as counsel for the United States. Sir Roundell Palmer, afterwards Lord Selborne, appeared for Great Britain, assisted by Mountague Bernard and Mr. Cohen.

The demands presented by the United States to the tribunal, arising out of the acts of Confederate cruisers of British origin, and generically known as the *Alabama* claims, embraced (1) direct losses growing out of the destruction of vessels and their cargoes by such cruisers, (2) the national expenditures in pursuit of the cruisers, (3) the loss for the transfer of the American commercial marine to the British flag, (4) the enhanced payments of insurance, and (5) the prolongation of the war and the addition of a large sum to its cost. As to classes 3, 4, and 5, Great Britain denied the jurisdiction of the tribunal; but without deciding this question, the tribunal disposed of these three classes by expressing an opinion that they did not, upon the principles of international law, constitute a good foundation for an award of compensation, and that they should be excluded from consideration, even if there were no difference between the two governments as to the board's competency. In regard to the second class of claims, the tribunal held that they were not properly distinguishable from the general expenses of the war carried on by the United States; and further, by a majority of three to two, that no compensation should be awarded to the United States on that head. On claims of the first class, the tribunal awarded the sum of \$15,500,000. Its first session was held December 15, 1871; its last, September 14, 1872.

The dispute as to the San Juan water boundary was submitted to the German Emperor, who rendered, on October 21, 1872, an award in favor of the United States. Claims of British subjects against the United States, and of citizens of the United States against Great Britain (other than the *Alabama* claims), arising out of injuries to persons or property during the civil war in the United States, from April 17, 1861, to April 9, 1865, were referred to a mixed commission, which sat in the United States. The fourth arbitration under the treaty of Washington, to determine the compensation, if any, due to Great Britain for privileges accorded by the treaty to the United States in the northeastern fisheries, was conducted by a commission of three persons—a citizen of the United States, a British subject, and a Belgian—which met at Halifax, June 15, 1877, and on the 23d of the following November

awarded to Great Britain (the American commissioner dissenting) the sum of \$5,500,000.

Questions of great moment, as affecting the free use of the seas, were involved in the fur-seal arbitration, which was held in Paris under the treaty of February 29, 1892; and eminent men were chosen to discuss and decide them. On the part of the United States, the arbitrators were John M. Harlan, of the Supreme Court, and John T. Morgan, of the Senate; on the part of Great Britain, Lord Hannon, of the High Court of Appeal, and Sir John Thompson, Minister of Justice and Attorney-General of Canada. The neutral arbitrators were the Baron Alphonse de Courcel, a senator and ambassador of France; the Marquis Emilio Visconti Venosta, a senator of Italy, who had held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Gregers Gram, a Minister of State of Sweden. The American agent was John W. Foster; the British agent, Sir Charles H. Tupper. As counsel for the United States, there appeared Edward J. Phelps, James C. Carter, Henry W. Blodgett, and Frederic R. Coudert; for Great Britain, Sir Charles Russell, Sir Richard Webster, and Christopher Robinson. The award which, so far as questions of jurisdiction were concerned, was unfavorable to the United States, is conceded to have been based upon existing rules of international law, the tribunal deeming its duties to be judicial rather than legislative. The commission, however, under powers expressly conferred upon it, prescribed regulations for the protection of the fur-seals by joint action. The claims of British subjects for the previous seizure of their vessels by American cruisers in Bering Sea were afterwards adjusted by a mixed commission.

The proceeding of 1903, by which the Alaskan boundary dispute was settled, can scarcely be classed as an arbitration, since the tribunal, which contained an equal number of the citizens or subjects of each contracting party, was unable to render a decision unless an appointee of one government should give his decision in favor of the other. This proved in the particular instance to be possible, Lord Alverstone (formerly Sir Richard Webster), Chief-Justice of England, one of the British members, having given the highest proof of the independence and impartiality of the British bench by joining in a decision favorable to the United States. I do not hesitate to say this, although it has been insinuated both in Canada and in the United States that Lord Alverstone accepted a place on the commission with at least the tacit understanding that he was to decide in favor of the United States, thus ending a troublesome controversy. Lord Alverstone did not shrink from denouncing this insinuation when it first appeared; and this denunciation he repeated

in his autobiography, in which he affirms that he acted "purely in a judicial capacity" and was influenced solely by a sense of duty to his position. In reality, the Canadian contentions in regard to the Alaskan boundary fundamentally lacked merit, and, like those of the United States in the fur-seal arbitration, derived color chiefly from the fact that a government was willing to take the chance of presenting them.

We have elsewhere mentioned the termination of the age-long dispute between the United States and Great Britain as to the north Atlantic fisheries by the award of the Permanent Court at The Hague in 1910.

Down to 1898, when the controversy as to Cuba was at length settled by the sword, all differences between the United States and Spain, which could not be adjusted by diplomacy, were, beginning with the mixed commission under the Pinckney-Godoy treaty of 1795, settled by arbitration. The most important of the arbitral tribunals between the two countries was that which was established under the diplomatic agreement of February 11-12, 1871, touching claims growing out of the insurrection in Cuba. There were two other arbitrations between the two countries, held respectively in 1870 and 1880.

As between the United States and France, many important questions, including large pecuniary claims, have been settled by direct negotiation. But from November, 1880, to March, 1884, a mixed commission, sitting in Washington, disposed of the claims of citizens of France against the United States for injuries to their persons and property during the American Civil War, and of the claims of citizens of the United States against France for injuries during the war between that country and Germany.

On various occasions, as under the treaties of 1839 and 1868, arbitrations have been held between the United States and Mexico. The claims submitted under the treaty of 1868 were remarkable both in number and in amount, those presented by the United States aggregating one thousand and seventeen, and those by Mexico nine hundred and ninety-eight, while the total amount claimed on one side and the other exceeded half a billion dollars. The total amount allowed was, however, about \$4,250,000. Two of the awards against Mexico, which embraced nearly or quite a third of the total amount awarded against her, were alleged to have been procured by fraudulent testimony. The government of the United States investigated this allegation, and eventually returned to Mexico all the money that had been paid by her on the awards in

question, even paying out of its own treasury such part as had already been distributed among the claimants.

Arbitrations have also been held by the United States with Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Salvador, Santo Domingo, Siam, and Venezuela. The total number of the arbitrations of the United States down to 1914 was sixty-eight, twenty-two of which were with Great Britain, while the President of the United States had acted as arbitrator between other nations in five cases, and ministers of the United States, or persons designated by the United States, had acted as arbitrator or umpire in nine cases. The number of the arbitrations of the United States during that period was equalled only by those of Great Britain, the total of which appears to have been about the same.

In adopting arbitration as a means of settling its disputes the government of the United States has no doubt been influenced by the manifestation in various forms of public sentiment in favor of that method. As early as February, 1832, the senate of Massachusetts, by a vote of 19 to 5, resolved that "some mode should be established for the amicable and final adjustment of all international disputes instead of resort to war"; and in 1837 a like resolution was passed by the house of representatives unanimously. Similar declarations were adopted by the legislatures of other States. In 1874 a resolution in favor of general arbitration was passed by the House of Representatives of the United States.

On November 29, 1881, Mr. Blaine, as Secretary of State, extended, in the name of the President, an invitation to all the independent countries of North and South America to participate in a general congress to be held in Washington on November 24, 1882, "for the purpose of considering and discussing methods of preventing war between the nations of America." Action upon this proposal was postponed chiefly because of the continuance of the Chile-Peruvian war, but the project was never entirely relinquished, and on May 28, 1888, the President gave his approval to the act under which was convoked the International American Conference of 1889-1890. Of this conference one of the results was the celebrated plan of arbitration adopted April 18, 1890. By this plan it was declared that arbitration, as a means of settling disputes between American republics, was adopted "as a principle of American international law"; that arbitration should be obligatory in all controversies concerning diplomatic and consular privileges, boundaries, territories, indemnities, the right of navigation,

and the validity, construction, and enforcement of treaties; and that it should be equally obligatory in all other cases, whatever might be their origin, nature, or object, with the sole exception of those which, in the judgment of one of the nations involved in the controversy, might imperil its independence; but that even in this case, while arbitration for that nation should be optional, it should be "obligatory upon the adversary power." As yet this plan represents but an aspiration, since it failed to receive the approval of the governments whose representatives adopted it.

On February 14, 1890, the Senate of the United States, and on the 3d of the following April the House of Representatives, adopted a concurrent resolution by which the President was requested to invite, from time to time as fit occasions might arise, negotiations with any government with which the United States maintained diplomatic relations, "to the end that any differences or disputes arising between the two governments which cannot be adjusted by diplomatic agency may be referred to arbitration, and be peaceably adjusted by such means." On July 16, 1893, the British House of Commons formally declared its cordial sympathy with the purpose of this resolution, and expressed the hope that her Majesty's government would "lend their ready co-operation to the government of the United States" upon the basis indicated.

Nothing tangible had been accomplished in that direction when the controversy over the Venezuelan boundary disclosed the importance of arbitration as a possible means of avoiding a conflict between the two countries. Under these circumstances, Mr. Olney, as Secretary of State, negotiated with Sir Julian Pauncefote, then British ambassador at Washington, concurrently with the negotiation of a special treaty of arbitration for the settlement of the Venezuelan question, a general arbitration treaty. By this treaty, provision was made for three classes of tribunals, two of which were to be boards of three or five members, as the case might be, while the third was to be, not in strictness a tribunal of arbitration, but a joint commission, in the form lately employed in the Alaskan boundary dispute, specifically to deal with territorial claims. This treaty failed to receive the approval of the necessary two-thirds of the Senate, but only by a few votes.

In the peace conference that met at The Hague, in 1899, on the invitation of the Czar of Russia, the United States was one of the participants. Of this conference, the most notable achievement was the convention for the peaceful adjustment of international differences. This convention embraces stipulations, first, as to mediation, and secondly, as to arbitration.

In the part relating to mediation, the signatory powers agree that, in case of "grave difference of opinion or conflict," they will, before appealing to arms, have recourse, "as far as circumstances permit," to the good offices of one or more friendly powers, and that such powers even may of their own motion offer mediation, without incurring the odium of performing an unfriendly act. The functions of the mediator are, however, declared to be purely conciliatory, and his recommendations "advisory" and not "obligatory." As an adjunct to the system of mediation the convention recommends in certain cases the appointment of an international commission of inquiry, the mode of whose appointment, as well as its jurisdiction and procedure, is to be regulated by a special convention between the disputing states.

By the arbitral stipulations, the object of international arbitration is declared to be "the settlement of disputes between nations by judges of their own choice and in accordance with their reciprocal rights"; and arbitration is recognized as specially applicable to questions of law, and of the interpretation and execution of treaties, which cannot be settled by diplomacy. The resort to arbitration is voluntary, but the convention furnishes a plan by which it is intended to be systematized and made easy. Of this plan the basal feature is what is called the permanent court of arbitration, which is constituted by the designation by each of the signatory powers of not more than four persons "recognized as competent to deal with questions of international law, and of the highest personal integrity." The persons so designated, who are known as "members of the court," constitute a list from which any of the signatory powers, in the event of a controversy, may, if they see fit to do so, choose a tribunal for the decision of the particular case.

To the existence of this convention there is, no doubt, to be ascribed the remarkable agreement between Great Britain and Russia for the settlement, by means of a mixed court of inquiry, of the Dogger Bank incident.

The subject of general arbitration between American nations, which remained in abeyance after the Washington conference of 1890, was again taken up by the Second International Conference of American States, which met at the city of Mexico on October 22, 1901. There appeared to be, as the American members of the conference reported, a unanimous sentiment in favor of "arbitration as a principle," but a great contrariety of opinion as to the extent to which the principle should be carried. A plan was finally adopted in the nature of a compromise. A protocol looking to adhesion to The Hague

convention was signed by all the delegations except those of Chile and Ecuador, who are said, however, afterwards to have accepted it in open conference. A project of a treaty of compulsory arbitration was also signed by the delegations of certain countries, not including the United States, and a treaty was also adopted covering the arbitration of pecuniary claims.

By the treaty last mentioned, which was signed January 19, 1902, the contracting parties agreed to submit to the permanent court at The Hague, unless they should prefer to create a special jurisdiction,

all claims for pecuniary loss or damage which may be presented by their respective citizens, and which cannot be amicably adjusted through diplomatic channels, when said claims are of sufficient importance to warrant the expenses of arbitration.

The existence of the treaty being limited to five years, the question of its renewal came before the Third International American Conference, at Rio de Janeiro, in 1906. The treaty had then been ratified by eight of the signatory states—namely, the United States, Mexico, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Peru, and Bolivia. A new treaty, incorporating the text of the old with some amendments, was concluded on August 13, 1906. When the Fourth International American Conference met at Buenos Aires in July, 1910, the treaty of 1906 had been ratified by twelve governments. These, in the order of their ratification, were the United States, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Salvador. On August 11, 1910, the treaty was renewed, with certain amendments, one of which provided that it should continue in force indefinitely, subject to the right of a ratifying power to withdraw after two years' notice. The attitude of the governments which had failed to ratify the treaty, after their representatives in the previous conferences had signed it, was undoubtedly affected by the question, the discussion of which had not failed to attend its consideration on any and all occasions, as to the proper limits of diplomatic intervention and as to what might be said to constitute a "denial of justice," rendering such intervention permissible. This question becomes peculiarly difficult and delicate where the claim is founded on an alleged miscarriage of justice in the courts. In the report of the committee at Buenos Aires, which had the treaty in charge, it is admitted to be hardly practicable "to lay down in advance precise and unyielding formulas by which the question of a denial of justice may in every instance be determined," and it is left to be disposed of by the amicable methods of diplomacy and arbitration.

The assumptions often made as to the recent progress of

international arbitration and as to the part lately taken by the United States in its development render appropriate a simple statement of the facts. The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, concluded at the Peace Conference at The Hague in 1899, was renewed at the Second Peace Conference in 1907. This convention was justly hailed as a memorable achievement; and although it does not in terms make arbitration obligatory in any case, it does not, on the other hand, by general exceptions, exclude or discredit in advance the submission of any question or class of questions or facilitate the entire evasion of the process by rhetorical formulas. Nevertheless, in order, as was said, to make arbitration "obligatory" a form of treaty was afterwards widely adopted which, while ostensibly requiring the submission, preferably to the Permanent Court at The Hague, of differences "of a legal nature or relating to the interpretation of treaties," excepts even from this restricted obligation questions affecting "the vital interests," "the independence," or the "honor" of the parties, or the "interests of third powers"—in effect, every question concerning which there could be a serious difference. So far as the United States and Great Britain are concerned this clause ran far behind their actual practice, since they had on numerous occasions, and notably in the case of the Alabama claims, submitted to arbitration questions which had been declared to affect the "honor" of the parties. Moreover, the Senate, in acting upon the treaties, amended them, by providing that the "special agreement" defining the question submitted, the arbitrators' powers, and the procedure, should always be subject to its advice and consent, thus in effect requiring a new treaty to be made in each case. Because of this amendment the President, in 1904, withdrew the treaties from the Senate, and they were for the moment abandoned; but in 1908 they were again taken up and the amendment was accepted.

The result is that, so far as the United States is concerned, it is in practice now more difficult to secure international arbitration than it was in the early days of our independence. Prior to 1908 the United States constantly arbitrated pecuniary claims against foreign governments without concluding a formal treaty. As examples we may take the agreement between the United States and Spain, effected by an exchange of notes on February 11-12, 1871, under which all claims of citizens of the United States against Spain, for wrongs and injuries committed against their persons and property by the Spanish authorities in Cuba since the beginning of the insurrection in 1868, were submitted to a mixed commission composed of two arbitrators and an umpire. These claims involved

questions of great international importance, including the validity of decrees of the Spanish government and of legal proceedings against both persons and property in Cuba. Indeed, questions analogous to those involved in the celebrated case of the *Virginius* eventually came before the commission, as well as many delicate questions of nationality or citizenship. The commission remained in existence more than ten years, and the claims presented to it amounted to more than \$30,000,000, exclusive of interest. The awards amounted to nearly \$1,300,000.

The first case submitted to the Permanent Court at The Hague under the convention of 1899—the well-known case of the Pious Fund of the Californias—was submitted under a simple executive agreement. Other examples might readily be given; but it suffices to say that, where the settlement embraced claims against the foreign government alone and not against the United States, twenty-seven of our international arbitrations up to 1908 were held under executive agreements as against nineteen under treaties. The former method is now forbidden by the treaties of 1908 so far as they apply.

Again, it was formerly the practice of the United States to make general claims treaties or conventions for the submission of all claims of the one government against the other arising during a certain number of years—perhaps as many as thirty or forty years—to a mixed commission, without discrimination and without specification of particular claims. Reference has already been made to the great arbitration under Article VII of the Jay treaty of 1794. This article provided for the reference to a mixed commission of all complaints made by citizens of the United States for loss and damage by reason of irregular or illegal captures or condemnations of vessels or other property under color of authority of his Britannic Majesty, and of all complaints of British subjects on account of loss and damage suffered by reason of the failure of the United States to enforce neutrality within its jurisdiction. Here there was no specification or limitation, the two governments being evidently anxious to remove every cause of controversy by a sweeping arbitral settlement. By the convention of 1853 it was agreed that "all claims" on the part of citizens of the United States against the British government, and "all claims" on the part of British subjects against the United States, which had arisen since the signature of the treaty of peace of December 24, 1814, should be referred to a mixed commission. This convention, as has been seen, was duly carried into effect with great satisfaction to both governments. But when, in 1910, a treaty for the arbitration of claims was

made with Great Britain, it was found to be necessary to agree to obtain the Senate's prior consent to the submission of each particular claim, with the result that when, on the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1914, the sittings of the tribunal were suspended, there was every prospect that, after its labors were ended, many important claims would remain unsettled.

It has been stated, and probably is a fact, that there was opposition to a general claims convention with Great Britain because bond claims perhaps might be presented to the commission. But it may be observed that claims were presented to the commission under the convention of 1853 growing out of the non-payment of the bonds of Florida and of Texas, and were disposed of by the decision of the umpire, who disallowed the claims. The same thing took place in respect of claims on account of the Confederate debt which were presented to the commission under the treaty of 1871.

With a view to remove existing limitations and set an example of confidence in amicable processes there were signed at Washington on August 3, 1911, two remarkable agreements, commonly called the Taft-Knox treaties, between the United States, on the one part, and France and Great Britain, respectively, on the other, by which (Article I) all future unadjusted differences, involving a "claim of right" and "justiciable in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law or equity," were to be submitted to arbitration. In each case the United States was to submit a "special agreement" to the Senate, while, if the subject affected the interests of a self-governing dominion, the British government reserved the right to obtain its concurrence. It was further agreed (Article II) to institute, on occasion, a Joint High Commission of Inquiry, to which controversies might be referred for investigation, including any as to whether a difference was "justiciable"; and it was stipulated (Article III) that if all or all but one of the members of the commission should report that the difference was of that character, it should be referred to arbitration. The Senate amended these treaties (1) by making it certain that a "special agreement," requiring its approval, must be effected in each case of arbitration; (2) by denying to the Joint High Commission of Inquiry any power finally to decide that a difference was arbitrable; and (3) by excluding from the arbitral obligation any question affecting the admission of aliens into the United States or to State educational institutions, the territorial integrity of any State or of the United States, the alleged indebtedness or monied obligation of any State, or any question involving the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine,

"or other purely governmental policy." The treaties were then abandoned.

In the spring of 1913 a paper, later published under the title of "President Wilson's Peace Proposal," was handed by Mr. Bryan to members of the Diplomatic Corps in Washington. It proposed that all disputes which diplomacy should fail to adjust should be submitted to an international commission, pending whose investigation and report war should not be declared nor hostilities begun. In a memorandum accompanying the proposal Mr. Bryan suggested that the international commission, which was to have the power to act on its own initiative, should be composed of five members, each government choosing two, only one of whom should be its own citizen, while the fifth should be agreed on by the contracting parties. A year was to be allowed for the investigation and report. It was further stated that the United States was prepared to consider the question of maintaining the *status quo* as to military and naval preparations during the period of investigation; and it was tentatively suggested that, pending such period, there should be no change in the military and naval program of either party unless danger from a third power should compel a change, in which case a confidential written statement of the fact by the party menaced was to release both parties from the obligation.

Salvador was the first power to sign the plan in treaty form. She accepted it in its entirety, including the clause as to military and naval programs, as did Guatemala, Panama, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Treaties, without this clause, were concluded with various powers. Up to July, 1917, the ratifications of treaties embracing the essentials of the plan have been exchanged with Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Great Britain, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Uruguay. They do not, as sometimes is apparently supposed, bind the parties to arbitration, but expressly reserve to them entire freedom of action after the report of the commission shall have been made. The underlying thought of the plan is threefold: (1) That it furnishes an honorable means of suspending controversy; (2) that the suspension of controversy will tranquillize the minds of the disputants; and (3) that the report of the commission of investigation probably will point the way to a fair and equitable adjustment. The plan, it may be observed, makes no distinction between different kinds of rights. It embraces "all disputes" as to "questions of an international character," no matter what may be the nature of the right asserted or denied. A point which it appar-

ently does not cover, a point which it is indeed very difficult to meet in advance by any specific provisions, is that of what may be called a continuing injury, consisting of a wilful and persistent aggression upon substantial rights either as to persons, or as to property, or as to jurisdiction, or as to commerce, rights in whose deliberate and prolonged invasion other governments cannot lawfully or properly be asked to acquiesce.

When we consider the future of international arbitration, whether in America or elsewhere, we are at once confronted with the question as to its limitations. Is it possible to fix any precise bounds, beyond which this mode of settling international disputes may be said to be impracticable? If we consult the history of arbitrations during the past hundred years, we are obliged to answer that no such lines can be definitely drawn; but this is far from affirming that the use of force in the conduct of international affairs will soon be abolished. It signifies merely that phrases such as "national honor" and "national self-defence," which have been employed in describing supposed exceptions to the principle of arbitration, convey no definitive meaning. Questions of honor and of self-defence are, in international as in private relations, matters partly of circumstance and partly of opinion. When the United States, in 1863, first proposed that the differences that had arisen with Great Britain, as to the fitting out of the *Alabama* and other Confederate cruisers, should be submitted to arbitration, Earl Russell rejected the overture on the ground that the questions in controversy involved the "honor" of her Majesty's government, of which that government was declared to be "the sole guardian." Eight years later there was concluded at Washington the treaty under which the differences between the two governments were submitted to the judgment of the tribunal that met at Geneva. This remarkable example serves to illustrate the fact that the scope and progress of arbitration will depend, not so much upon special devices, or upon general declarations or descriptive exceptions, as upon the dispositions of nations, dispositions which, although they are subject to the modifying influence of public opinion, spring primarily from the national feelings, the national interests, and the national ambitions.

References:

See Moore, *History and Digest of International Arbitrations* (Washington, 1898). 6 vols.

As to The Hague Conferences, see the works of Holls and James Brown Scott (the latter covering both conferences, 1899, 1907); also *The Memoirs of Andrew D. White*.

See also the Reports of the International American Conferences.

IX

THE TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF THE UNITED STATES

AS conventionalized in the annual messages of Presidents to Congress, the American people are distinguished chiefly by their peaceful disposition and their freedom from territorial ambitions. Nevertheless, in spite of these quiet propensities, it has fallen to their lot, since they forcibly achieved their independence, to have had, prior to that whose existence was declared April 6, 1917, four foreign wars (three general and one limited), and the greatest civil war in history, and to have acquired a territorial domain almost five times as great as the respectable endowment with which they began their national career. In reality, to the founders of the American Republic the question of territorial expansion did not present itself as a matter of speculation, or even of choice. There was not a single European power having possessions in America that did not lay claim to more territory than it had effectively occupied, nor was there a single one whose claims were not contested by some other power; and these contests were interwoven with the monopolistic struggle then in progress for colonial commerce and navigation. The Spaniards and the Portuguese, the English and the French, the Swedes and the Dutch, contended with one another in Europe as well as in America for empire on the American continents. Their colonists knew no rule of life but that of conflict; and they regarded the extension of their boundaries as a measure of self-defence rather than of aggression. We have seen that, by the treaty of alliance with France of 1778, the remaining British possessions in North America, if they should be wrested from the mother-country, were to be "confederated with or dependent upon" the United States; and in harmony with this stipulation, provision was made in the Articles of Confederation (Article XI) for the full admission of Canada into the Union. No other colony was to be so admitted without the consent of nine States; and unless they consented, the colony, if seized, was to remain in a "dependent" position. With the independence of the United States, a new force entered into the territorial contests in America, but it did not stay their course. On the north of the new republic lay the possessions of Great Britain; on the west,

the possessions of France; on the south, the possessions of Spain. With all these powers there were questions of boundary, while the colonial restrictions in commerce and in navigation were as so many withes by which the limbs of the young giant were fettered.

It was in order to obtain relief from such conditions that the United States acquired Louisiana. To the inhabitants of the West, the Mississippi River was, as Madison once declared, the Hudson, the Delaware, the Potomac, and all the navigable rivers of the Atlantic States formed into one stream. During the dark hours of the American Revolution, the Continental Congress seemed to be ready to yield to Spain, in return for her alliance, the exclusive right to navigate the Mississippi; but fortunately this was not done. After the re-establishment of peace, Spain continued to maintain her exclusive claims. But the opposition to them in the United States steadily grew stronger and louder; and at length, on October 27, 1795, encompassed by many perils in her foreign relations, Spain conceded to the United States the free navigation of the Mississippi, together with the privilege of depositing merchandise at New Orleans and thence exporting it without payment of duty. The incalculable advantage of this arrangement was daily growing more manifest when, early in 1801, rumors began to prevail that Spain had ceded both Louisiana and the Floridas to France. As a neighbor, Spain, because of the internal weakness of her government and the consequent unaggressiveness of her foreign policy, was not feared; but an apprehension had from the first been exhibited by the United States as to the possibility of being hemmed in by colonies of England and France. If the rumored cession should prove to be true, the arrangement with Spain with regard to the Mississippi was threatened with extinction. Jefferson was therefore hardly extravagant when he declared that the cession of Louisiana and the Floridas by Spain to France would completely reverse all the political relations of the United States, and would render France, as the possessor of New Orleans, "our natural and habitual enemy."

The treaty of cession was in fact signed at San Ildefonso, on October 1, 1800; but it was not published and even its existence was officially denied. It did not embrace the Floridas, but included the whole of the vast domain then known as Louisiana. The administration at Washington, though in the dark as to what had actually been done, felt the necessity of action. It desired if possible to prevent the transfer of the territory; or, if this could not be accomplished, to obtain from France the Floridas, if they were included in the cession, or at least West

Florida, so as to give the United States a continuous stretch of territory on the eastern bank of the Mississippi. With these objects in view, Jefferson appointed Robert R. Livingston as minister to France. Livingston set out on his mission early in October, 1801. On his arrival in Paris he soon became convinced that the cession of Louisiana, if not of the Floridas, had been concluded; and he hinted to Talleyrand, who was then Minister of Foreign Affairs, that Louisiana might be transferred to the United States in payment of debts due by France to American citizens. Talleyrand replied, "None but spend-thrifts satisfy their debts by selling their lands," and then, after a pause, blandly added, "But it is not ours to give." Livingston was not deceived by this evasion; on the contrary, he endeavored to obtain, by appeal to the First Consul himself, Napoleon, the cession, not of the whole but of a part of Louisiana, or at any rate an assurance that the transfer of the territory by Spain to France would not be permitted to disturb the arrangement as to the use of the Mississippi. On February 11, 1802, Talleyrand informed Livingston that he had been instructed by the First Consul to give the most positive assurance on this subject; but it had barely been given, when a report reached Washington that the Spanish intendant at New Orleans had suspended the right of deposit. It was soon learned that the suspension was not authorized by the Spanish government, but the act of the intendant gave rise to energetic discussions in Congress. A resolution was adopted by the House declaring that the stipulated rights of the United States in the Mississippi would be inviolably maintained, while a resolution was offered in the Senate to authorize the President to take forcible possession of such places as might be necessary to secure their full enjoyment. The state of public feeling was such that every branch of the government felt obliged to take measures not only to preserve existing rights, but also, if possible, to enlarge and safeguard them. With this end in view, James Monroe was joined with Livingston in an extraordinary commission to treat with France, and with Charles Pinckney in a like commission to treat, if necessary, with Spain. The specific objects of the mission, as defined in the instructions given by Madison, as Secretary of State, on March 2, 1803, were the cession to the United States of the island of New Orleans and the Floridas.

Meanwhile, Livingston had, if possible, redoubled his exertions. His favorite plan was to obtain from France the cession of the island of New Orleans and all that part of Louisiana lying northward of the Arkansas River; and he also urged the

cession of West Florida, if France had obtained it from Spain. On Monday, April 11th, he held with Talleyrand a memorable and startling interview. Livingston was expatiating upon the subject of New Orleans, when Talleyrand quietly inquired whether the United States desired the "whole of Louisiana." Livingston answered that their wishes extended only to New Orleans and the Floridas, though policy dictated that France should also cede the country above the river Arkansas; but Talleyrand observed that, if they gave New Orleans, the rest would be of little value, and asked what the United States would "give for the whole." Livingston suggested the sum of 20,000,000 francs, provided the claims of American citizens were paid. Talleyrand declared the offer too low, but disclaimed having spoken of the matter by authority. In reality Napoleon had, on the preceding day, announced to two of his ministers his final resolution. The expedition to Santo Domingo had miserably failed; colonial enterprises appeared to be no longer practicable; war with England was at hand; and it seemed wiser to sell colonies than go down with them in disaster. In this predicament Napoleon decided to sell to the United States not only New Orleans but the whole of Louisiana, and only a few hours before the interview between Talleyrand and Livingston was held, had instructed Barbé Marbois, his Minister of Finance, to negotiate the sale.

Monroe arrived in Paris on April 12th. On the next day Marbois informed Livingston that Napoleon had authorized him to say that, if the Americans would give 100,000,000 francs and pay their own claims, they might "take the whole country." Noting Livingston's surprise at the price, Marbois eventually suggested that the United States should pay to France the sum of 60,000,000 francs and assume the claims of its own citizens to the amount of 20,000,000 more. Livingston declared that it was in vain to ask a thing so greatly beyond their means, but promised to consult with Monroe. The American plenipotentiaries were thus confronted with a momentous question concerning which in its full extent their instructions did not authorize them to treat; but properly interpreting the purposes of their government and the spirit of their countrymen, they promptly and boldly assumed the responsibility. They accepted Marbois's terms, excessive as they at first seemed, and took the whole province. Speaking in a prophetic strain, Livingston, when he had affixed his name to the treaty of cession, exclaimed :

We have lived long, but this is the noblest work of our lives. . . .

To-day the United States take their place among the powers of the first rank. . . . The instrument we have signed will cause no tears to flow. It will prepare centuries of happiness for innumerable generations of the human race.

Time has verified Livingston's prevision. The purchase of Louisiana has contributed more than any other territorial acquisition to make the United States what is is today.

Though the whole of Louisiana was ceded, its limits were undefined. The province was retroceded by Spain to France in 1800 "with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it," and by the treaty of April 30, 1803, the territory was ceded to the United States "in the same manner," but the boundaries had never been precisely determined. Livingston and Monroe assured their government that the cession extended to the river Perdido, and therefore embraced West Florida. This claim was not sanctioned by France, but Congress, acting upon Livingston's and Monroe's assurance, authorized the President in his discretion to erect "the bay and river Mobile" and the adjacent territory into a customs district. Spain strongly protested, and the execution of the measure was held in suspense. In the summer of 1810, however, a revolution took place in West Florida. Eaton Rouge was seized; the independence of the province was declared; and an application was made for its admission into the Union. The President repulsed this application, but occupied the territory, as far as the river Pearl, as part of the Louisiana purchase. The country lying between that stream and the Perdido was permitted still to remain in the possession of Spain.

On January 3, 1811, President Madison, incited by the political situation in America as well as in Europe, sent to Congress a secret message, in which he recommended that the Executive be authorized to take temporary possession of any part of the Floridas, in certain contingencies. As to West Florida, Congress had already clothed the Executive with ample powers; but as East Florida unquestionably still belonged to Spain, Congress authorized the President to occupy all or any part of the country, either under arrangements with the local authorities or in case a foreign government should attempt to seize it. Under this act, East Florida was taken possession of all the way from Fernandina to St. Augustine; but the manner in which it was done was disapproved by the government at Washington, and in May, 1813, the country was finally evacuated by the American forces. During the war of 1812, West Florida was the scene of hostilities between the British and the American forces, and in 1817 and 1818 it was the theatre of

the famous Seminole war. Meanwhile the government of the United States was endeavoring to obtain from Spain the relinquishment of her provinces. The negotiations, which were conducted on the part of the United States by John Quincy Adams, were brought to a close by the treaty of February 22, 1819, by which Spain ceded to the United States not only the Floridas, but also all the Spanish titles north of the forty-second parallel of north latitude from the source of the Arkansas River to the Pacific Ocean. In return, the United States agreed to pay the claims of its citizens against Spain to an amount not exceeding \$5,000,000, and to indemnify the Spanish inhabitants of the Floridas for injuries suffered at the hands of American forces, besides granting to Spanish commerce in the ceded territories, for the term of twelve years, exceptional privileges.

While the United States retained under the treaty of 1819 all the territory to the eastward that it claimed as part of Louisiana, it relinquished by the same treaty its claim to the imperial domain called Texas, a province long in dispute between France and Spain, and after 1803 between Spain and the United States. Only a brief time, however, elapsed when efforts began to be made to recover Texas, either in whole or in part. Two such attempts were made during the Presidency of John Quincy Adams, in 1825 and 1827. The effort was renewed by President Jackson in 1829, and again in 1833. In August, 1835, the American minister in Mexico was directed to persevere in the task, and also to offer half a million dollars for the bay of San Francisco and certain adjacent territory as a resort for American vessels in the Pacific. On March 2, 1836, the people of Texas, through a convention of delegates, declared their independence. In the following year President Van Buren repelled an overture for annexation. The independence of Texas was, however, acknowledged not only by the United States, but also by France and Great Britain; and treaties were made with Texas by all those powers. On April 12, 1844, a treaty of annexation was concluded at Washington. This treaty having failed in the Senate, Congress, by a joint resolution approved March 1, 1845, took action looking to the admission of Texas into the Union as a State. The terms offered in the resolution were accepted by Texas, and by a joint resolution of Congress, approved December 29, 1845, the admission was formally accomplished. No acquisition of territory by the United States has been the subject of so much honest but partisan misconception as that of the annexation of Texas. By a school of writers whose views have had great currency, the annexation has been denounced as the result of a plot of the

slave-power to extend its dominions. But, calmly surveying the course of American expansion, we are forced to conclude that no illusion could be more complete. It would be more nearly correct to say that, but for the controversy concerning slavery, there would have been no appreciable opposition in the United States to the acquisition of Texas. Such local antagonism as might have existed to the disturbance of the balance of power in the Union would have been overwhelmed by the general demand for an extension of boundaries so natural and, except for the slavery question, in every respect so expedient.

Six months after the annexation of Texas, the long dispute as to the Oregon territory was brought to a close. This territory was bounded, according to the claim of the United States, by the 42d parallel of north latitude on the south, by the line of $54^{\circ} 40'$ on the north, and by the Rocky or Stony Mountains on the east. It embraced, roughly speaking, an area of 600,000 square miles. The claim of the United States was founded upon the discovery by Captain Robert Gray, of the American ship *Columbia*, in 1792, of the River of the West, which he named from his ship the Columbia River; the exploration of the main branch of that river by Lewis and Clark; the establishment of the fur-trading settlement of Astoria, by John Jacob Astor, in 1811, and its restoration to the United States under the treaty of Ghent; and finally, the acquisition in 1819 of all the territorial rights of Spain on the Pacific above forty-second degree of north latitude. By the Democratic national platform of 1844 the title of the United States to the whole of Oregon was declared to be "clear and unquestionable." This declaration was popularly interpreted to mean "fifty-four forty or fight"; but on June 15, 1846, under the shadow of the Mexican war, the dispute was terminated by a nearly equal division of the territory along the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude.

This title had barely been assured, when, as the result of the war with Mexico, the United States, by the treaty signed on its behalf by Nicholas P. Trist, in defiance of instructions, at Guadalupe-Hidalgo, on February 2, 1848, came into possession of California and New Mexico. In consideration of these cessions, the United States paid to Mexico \$15,000,000, and assumed the payment of claims of American citizens against Mexico to an amount not exceeding \$3,250,000. The acquisitions thus made were enlarged by the convention of December 30, 1853, by which Mexico, for the sum of \$10,000,000, released the United States from liability on account of certain stipulations of the treaty of 1848 and ceded the Mesilla Valley. This cession, which is often called the Gadsden purchase, was strongly desired by the United States, not only for the purpose

of establishing a safe frontier against the Indians, but also for the purpose of obtaining a feasible route for a railway near the Gila River.

By the treaty signed at Washington on March 30, 1867, the Emperor of Russia, in consideration of the sum of \$7,200,000, conveyed to the United States all his "territory and dominion" in America. Many strange conjectures have been made as to the motives of this transaction. It has been suggested that it was merely a cover for the reimbursement to Russia of the expenses of her "friendly naval demonstration" during the American civil war. This explanation may be placed in the category of the grotesque. Robert J. Walker has been given as authority for the statement that the Emperor Nicholas was ready to give Alaska to the United States during the Crimean war, if the United States would, in spite of the treaty of 1846, reassert its claim to the whole of Oregon. In reality, the territory was of comparatively small value to Russia, who had for years leased an important part of the coast to the Hudson's Bay Company. In the hands of the United States its potential value was obviously greater. Its acquisition was, besides, gratifying to the spirit of continental dominion, which has always been so strongly manifested by the people of the United States.

The acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands, under the joint resolution of Congress of July 7, 1898, marked the natural consummation of the special relations that had long subsisted between the United States and that island group. As early as 1853 the United States, while William L. Marcy was Secretary of State, sought to annex the islands. A treaty of annexation was negotiated, but, as its form was unacceptable to the United States, it was put aside for a treaty of reciprocity. This treaty failed to receive the approval of the Senate, but the agitation for annexation or reciprocity continued; and at length, on January 30, 1875, a reciprocity treaty was concluded by which the islands were virtually placed under an American protectorate. This treaty was renewed in 1887, the United States then acquiring the right to establish a naval station in the harbor of Pearl River. On February 14, 1893, a treaty of annexation was signed at Washington, but on the change of administration it was withdrawn from the Senate. Another treaty of annexation, signed on June 16, 1897, was still before the Senate when the joint resolution was passed by which the acquisition was definitively accomplished.

Alaska and Hawaii were far distant from the United States, but the greater part of Alaska was on the continent of North America, and the Hawaiian Islands had so long been the subject of special protection as to have come to be considered within

the sphere of American influence. The war with Spain opened a new vista. Even the remotest of the Spanish possessions in the West Indies fell within the conception of America, but the Spanish possessions in the Far East lay beyond the accustomed range of American political thought. For some weeks after the destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila, the views of the United States seemed scarcely to extend beyond the possible acquisition of a naval station in the Philippines for strategic purposes. The desire for a naval station, however, soon grew into the desire for an island—perhaps the island of Luzon. When news came of the capture of Manila by the American forces, with some American casualties, the desire for the whole group received a marked impulse. In his instructions to the American peace commissioners at Paris, President McKinley said that the United States would not be content with "less than" the island of Luzon. More than two months elapsed before instructions were given to take the whole group; and even then, as the records show, the American commissioners were divided on the question. For my own part, I venture to express the opinion that the problem was simplified by taking all the islands. Though the group is vast in extent, it is physically continuous, and, if a considerable part of it had been retained by Spain, the dangers attendant upon native revolt and discontent would have been incalculably increased. The acquisition of Puerto Rico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies provoked no division of opinion.

There is no incident in the history of the United States that better prepares us to understand the acquisition of the Philippines than the course of the government towards the Samoan Islands. As early as 1853, if not earlier, the United States was represented at Apia by a commercial agent; but the islands and their affairs attracted little attention till 1872, when the great chief of the bay of Pago-Pago (pronounced Pango-Pango), in the island of Tutuila, desirous of obtaining the protection of the United States, granted to the government the exclusive privilege of establishing a naval station in that harbor. A special agent, named Steinberger, was then despatched to Samoa, and, after making a report, he was sent back to convey to the chiefs a letter from President Grant and some presents. Subsequently he set up, on his own responsibility, a government in the islands and administered it. But as ruler of Samoa he fell into difficulties, and, with the concurrence of the American consul, was deported on a British man-of-war. On January 16, 1878, a treaty between the United States and Samoa was concluded at Washington, by which the privileges of the United States in the harbor of Pago-Pago were confirmed, and by

which it was provided that, if differences shall arise between the Samoan government and any other government in amity with the United States, the latter would "employ its good offices for the purpose of adjusting those differences upon a satisfactory and solid foundation." It was under this clause that the conference, which was held in Washington in June and July, 1887, between Mr. Bayard, as Secretary of State, and the British and German ministers, on Samoan affairs, was brought about. The conference failed to produce an agreement. Germany intervened in the islands, and became involved in hostilities with a part of the natives. Steps were taken to protect American interests, and the relations between the United States and Germany had become decidedly strained when, on the invitation of Prince Bismarck, the sessions of the conference were resumed at Berlin. They resulted in the treaty of June 14, 1889, by which the islands were placed under the joint protection and administration of the three powers. One of the first acts of the United States after the war with Spain was the termination of this cumbersome system of tripartite government, which, apart from an adjustment of claims to land, had yielded no beneficial result. Disorders had increased rather than diminished, while local complications at times threatened to disturb the good understanding of the intervening powers. At length there was suggested, to take the place of the treaty of 1889, a "condominium" under which the functions of sovereignty were to be exercised by unanimous consent of the three powers. Fortunately, this device was not tried. A radical solution was wisely adopted. By a convention between the three powers, signed at Washington, December 2, 1899, the group was divided, the United States securing all the islands east of the meridian of 171° west of Greenwich, while Germany obtained all west of that line. Great Britain retired for compensation from Germany in other directions. The principal islands, Savaii and Upolu, fell to Germany, her preponderant commercial and landed interests being thus recognized, as those of the United States in Hawaii had been by Germany in the days of Prince Bismarck. The island of Tutuila, with the much-coveted harbor of Pago-Pago, was among the islands that passed exclusively to the United States. The significance of the Samoan incident lies, however, not in the mere division of territory, but in the disposition shown by the United States, long before the acquisition of the Philippines, to have a voice in determining the fate of a remote island group in which American commercial interests were so slight as to be scarcely appreciable.

By the convention with the Republic of Panama, November

18, 1903, the United States acquired in perpetuity the use, occupation, and control of a zone ten miles wide on the Isthmus of Panama, and certain adjacent islands, for the purposes of an interoceanic canal. Within these lands and the adjacent waters the United States possesses "all the rights, powers, and authority" which it would have if it were the sovereign of the territory within which the lands and waters lie. It may be observed that an unsuccessful effort was made in 1856 to obtain from New Granada the cession of five islands in the bay of Panama, with a view to protect the isthmian route.

In 1903 Cuba leased to the United States coaling and naval stations at Guantanamo and Bahia Honda. While the United States agreed to recognize the continuance of the "ultimate sovereignty" of Cuba over the areas of land and water thus leased, Cuba agreed that the United States should exercise "complete jurisdiction and control" over them.

By the treaty of August 5, 1914, Nicaragua leased to the United States, for the term of ninety-nine years, the Corn Islands and also a naval base, to be selected by the United States, in the territory of Nicaragua bordering on the Gulf of Fonseca. The treaty also gives the United States the option of renewing the leases, and declares that the leased places "shall be subject exclusively to the laws and sovereign authority of the United States during the terms of such lease and grant and of any renewal or renewals thereof."

As early as January, 1865, Mr. Seward began to sound the Danish government as to the cession of its islands in the West Indies. His advances were discouraged, but they were renewed officially in July, 1866. A convention for the cession of St. Thomas and St. John for \$7,500,000, leaving Santa Cruz to Denmark, was signed at Copenhagen on October 24, 1867. As stipulated in the treaty, a vote was taken in the islands; it was almost unanimously in favor of annexation to the United States. This circumstance greatly increased the embarrassment of the Danish government when the United States Senate failed to approve the treaty. On January 24, 1902, a convention was signed at Washington for the cession to the United States of the islands of St. Thomas, St. John, and Santa Cruz, with the adjacent islands and rocks, all for the sum of \$5,000,000. It was approved by the Senate on February 17, 1902. It was approved by the lower house of the Danish Rigsdag; but on October 21, 1902, it failed in the upper house, by an even division. The cession was, however, eventually effected by a treaty, concluded August 4, 1916, by which the United States agreed to pay \$25,000,000. The transaction was completed. The United States has named the group the Virgin Islands.

Besides the annexations above detailed the United States has acquired or assumed jurisdiction over many islands in various parts of the world. In 1850 the cession was obtained from Great Britain of Horse-Shoe Reef, in Lake Erie, for the purposes of a lighthouse. In 1867, Brooks or Midway Islands, lying eleven hundred miles west of Honolulu, were formally occupied by the commander of the U. S. S. *Lackawanna*. In like manner the atoll called Wake Island, lying in latitude $19^{\circ} 17' 50''$ north and longitude $166^{\circ} 31'$ east, was taken possession of in 1899 by the commander of the U. S. S. *Bennington*. But the greatest extension of jurisdiction over detached islands or groups of islands has taken place under the Guano Islands Act of August 18, 1856. By this act, where an American citizen discovers a deposit of guano on an island, rock, or key, not within the jurisdiction of any other government, and takes peaceable possession and gives a certain bond, the President may, at his discretion, treat the territory as "appertaining to the United States"; but the government is not obliged to retain possession after the guano shall have been removed. Under this statute more than eighty islands, lying in various parts of the Atlantic and the Pacific, have been brought within American jurisdiction.

The actual acquisitions of territory by the United States by no means indicate the scope of its diplomatic activities in that direction. Efforts have been made to annex territory which has not eventually been obtained. As late as 1870 the annexation of Canada, to which the Articles of Confederation looked, was the subject of informal discussions between British and American diplomatists. In December, 1822, the government of Salvador, acting under a decree of its Congress, dispatched three commissioners to Washington to offer the sovereignty of the country to the United States, but before their arrival the situation had changed and the proposal was abandoned. Ever since the foundation of the American Republic, the annexation of Cuba has formed a topic of discussion and of diplomatic activity. John Quincy Adams in 1823 declared that Cuba, if forcibly disjoined from Spain, and incapable of self-support, could gravitate only towards the North American Union; and Jefferson confessed that he had "ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states." In 1848 an offer was made to Spain to purchase the island for \$100,000,000, but it was summarily repulsed. During the Civil War in the United States, the discussion of the Cuban question, which had actively continued during the administrations of Pierce and Buchanan, was suspended; but it was revived by the breaking out of the Ten

Years' War in Cuba, in 1868. In the next year a vigorous effort was made to secure the separation of Cuba from Spain either by annexation to the United States or by the grant of independence under the guarantee of the United States. This was the last definite proposal made to Spain for annexation, and, when the United States eventually intervened, it was for the purpose of establishing Cuban independence. In the peace negotiations at Paris, the Spanish commissioners proposed to cede the island to the United States. The proposal was declined; and the manner in which the resolution of intervention was kept, by the establishment of an independent government under safeguards which cannot hamper the exercise of the island's sovereignty for any legitimate purpose, forms one of the most honorable chapters in diplomatic history.

In 1848 an offer of the sovereignty of Yucatan was made to the United States, but the occasion for its consideration soon passed away.

In negotiations with the Dominican Republic, in 1854, for a commercial treaty, an effort was made to obtain for the United States a coaling station in Samana Bay. An examination of the bay had been made by Captain George B. McClellan, whose report may be found among the Congressional documents. The effort to obtain the desired privilege was renewed in 1855, but without success. In 1866, Mr. F. W. Seward, Assistant Secretary of State, was sent to Santo Domingo for the purpose of securing a cession or lease of the peninsula of Samana as a naval station. His mission was not successful, but its object was not abandoned, and his powers were transferred to the commercial agent at Santo Domingo City. In 1868 the President of the Dominican Republic requested the United States immediately to take the country under its protection and occupy Samana Bay and other strategic points as a preliminary to annexation. In his annual message of December 9, 1868, President Johnson, Mr. Seward still being Secretary of State, advocated the acquisition of "the several adjacent continental and insular communities as speedily as it may be done peacefully, lawfully, and without any violation of national justice, faith, or honor," and declared that, while foreign possession or control of them had "hindered the growth and impaired the influence of the United States," "chronic revolution and anarchy would be equally injurious." A joint resolution was introduced in the House of Representatives for the annexation of the Dominican Republic. An agent from Santo Domingo was then in Washington awaiting action. The project was warmly espoused by President Grant, and on November 29, 1869, two treaties were concluded, one for the

annexation of the Dominican Republic and the other for the lease of Samana Bay. Both instruments were communicated to the Senate on January 10, 1870. They failed to receive that body's approval. In his last annual message to Congress, in 1876, President Grant recurred to the subject, reaffirming his belief in the wisdom of the policy that he had proposed.

In 1867 George Bancroft was instructed, while proceeding as minister to Berlin, to call at Madrid and sound the Spanish government as to the cession of the islands of Culebra and Culebrita, in the Spanish West Indies, to the United States as a naval station. The results of his inquiries were so discouraging that the subject was peremptorily dropped; but the islands came into the possession of the United States under the treaty of peace with Spain of 1898.

The Môle St. Nicolas, in Hayti, was leased by the United States during the Civil War as a naval station. In 1891, however, the Haytian government declined to let the harbor again for a similar purpose.

References:

For a review of the Territorial Expansion of the United States,
see
Moore, *Digest of International Law*, I, 429 *et seq.*;
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X

PAN AMERICANISM

THE American republics number just twenty-one. The youngest, Panama, which suddenly came into being late in 1903, was very shortly preceded in existence by Cuba. With the exception of the United States they are all, politically speaking, of "Latin" origin, and constitute what is for that reason called Latin America, occupying the vast region formerly ruled by Spain and by Portugal. The Portuguese dominions, though greater in extent than the connected continental area of the United States, are comprised in what was for sixty-seven years the empire, but is now the republic, of Brazil. The remaining nineteen countries were once colonies or provinces of Spain. When we speak of Pan Americanism we associate the countries of Spanish and of Portuguese derivation with the United States, and thus link together in our thoughts all the independent governments of America.

The chief significance to Spain of the American Revolution lay in the fact that it marked the beginning of the end of the old system of colonial monopoly. In the Orient, as well as in America, colonies had been held by European nations purely for purposes of national exploitation. The movement for independence in America indicated the fact that the time would come when, with the development of colonial resources, dependence would be succeeded by independence.

For a number of years after the American Revolution the Spanish colonies in America continued to be comparatively quiet and contented. Grave misfortunes, however, awaited the mother country. In 1808 Spain was invaded. Her King, Charles IV, was forced to abdicate and to transfer to Napoleon all right and titles to the Spanish Crown and to its colonial possessions. On June 15, 1808, Napoleon's brother, Joseph Bonaparte, was crowned King of Spain at Bayonne. The people of Spain refused to bow to alien rule. Juntas were formed in various parts of the country for the purpose of resisting in the name of Ferdinand VII, son of the dethroned monarch, the new government. Not long afterwards similar movements took place in South America. Loyalist juntas were formed, modeled on those that were organized in Spain. But owing to various causes, among which was the refusal of the Regency at Cadiz to recognize the American juntas, the loyalist movement in the colonies, although originally leveled against the Napoleonic government in Spain, was gradually transformed into a genuine movement for independence. As a result Spain, after her legitimate government was restored, found herself at war with her American colonies.

In 1815 Simon Bolivar, then living in poverty and exile at Kingston, Jamaica, wrote the famous "prophetic" letter in which he declared that the destiny of America to be independent was "irrevocably fixed." On July 9, 1816, a congress at Tucuman declared the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, of which Buenos Aires was the head, to be a free and independent nation. In February of the following year the Chilean revolutionists gained at Chacabuco a decisive victory which presaged a similar declaration. On December 6, 1817, Henry Clay announced in the House of Representatives that he intended to move the recognition of Buenos Aires and probably of Chile.

In the struggle between Spain and her colonies the United States maintained a neutral position, although the sympathies of the people naturally ran strongly in favor of the revolutionists. In 1817 a commission consisting of Cæsar A. Rodney, John Graham, and Theodoric Bland, with Henry M. Brackin-

ridge as secretary, was sent out to examine into the conditions existing in South America, and particularly in Buenos Aires and Chile. The views of the commissioners, which in many respects differed, were embodied in separate reports. These reports were duly submitted to Congress, as was also a special report from Joel R. Poinsett, who had acted as an agent of the United States at Buenos Aires. The general tenor of the reports was unfavorable to the recognition of independence at that time; but this did not deter Mr. Clay from moving in the House of Representatives in March, 1818, an appropriation for the salary of a minister to the government which had its seat at Buenos Aires. This motion was lost by one hundred and fifteen noes to forty-five ayes. On May 10, 1820, Clay submitted in the House a resolution declaring it to be expedient to provide by law for the sending of ministers to any of the governments of South America that had established their independence. This resolution was carried by a vote of eighty to seventy-five, but it did not provide an appropriation. On February 9, 1821, a motion for an appropriation was lost by only seven votes. A year later, the President having expressed to Congress the opinion that recognition should no longer be withheld, an appropriation was duly made; and the recognition of the independence of the new American nations was begun. Against such recognition the Spanish minister at Washington, in the name of his government, solemnly protested, but the action of the United States was vindicated, with his accustomed ability, by John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, on grounds both of right and of fact.

On December 2, 1823, there came, as has elsewhere been seen, the celebrated pronouncement of President Monroe. When that pronouncement was made the danger of interference by the Allied Powers of Europe in the affairs of Spanish America had in reality passed away. But a great question still remained. Recognition had been accorded; but the character of the relations of the United States with the other independent countries of the hemisphere remained to be determined and defined.

In a letter written at Lima on December 7, 1824, Bolivar, then at the head of the Republic of Peru, suggested the holding of a conference of representatives of the independent governments of America at Panama. The object of the conference was declared to be "the establishment of certain fixed principles for securing the preservation of peace between the nations of America, and the concurrence of all those nations in defence of their own rights." Bolivar's invitation embraced Colombia, Mexico, Central America, Buenos Aires, Chile, and

Brazil. It did not include the United States. For this omission a sufficient reason may be found in the circumstance that the United States was not a party to the conflict then still in progress between Spain and her former colonies, but it has also been conjectured that the existence of African slavery in the United States was regarded by Bolivar as an obstacle to the free discussion of some of the matters of which the congress might be obliged to treat. The first intimation that the presence of the United States was desired was made by the representatives of Colombia and Mexico in conversations with Clay, who had become Secretary of State. The President, John Quincy Adams, although he had warmly espoused the cause of the American nations as against any hostile projects of the Holy Alliance, felt obliged to proceed with caution, since the United States was maintaining in the Spanish-American conflict a neutral position; but Clay warmly urged that the invitation be accepted. The idea of a common interest arising from a similarity of political principles had taken a profound hold upon him. He was in reality the great champion of this conception. The invitation to the congress was accepted.

The subjects to be discussed were divided into two classes: First, those peculiarly and exclusively concerning the countries which were still at war with Spain; and secondly, those between belligerents and neutrals. In the discussion of the former, it was not expected that the United States would take part, but the occasion was thought to be opportune for the establishment of fixed principles of international law in matters in respect of which the previous uncertainty had been the cause of many evils.

The President appointed as plenipotentiaries of the United States two eminent men, Richard C. Anderson of Kentucky and John Sergeant of Pennsylvania. Their instructions, dated May 8, 1826, were drawn by Clay and were signed by him as Secretary of State. Covering a wide range, they disclosed the broad and far-reaching views to which, in co-operation with the President, now a sturdy advocate of Pan Americanism, he sought to give effect. At the very threshold they declared that the President could not have declined the invitation to the congress "without subjecting the United States to the reproach of insensibility to the deepest concerns of the American hemisphere," and perhaps of a want of sincerity in regard to Monroe's solemn declarations. Moreover, the assembling of a congress would, so the instructions declared, "form a new epoch in human affairs." Not only would the fact itself challenge the attention of the civilized world, but it was confidently hoped that the congress would "entitle itself to the

affection and lasting gratitude of all America, by the wisdom and liberality of its principles" and by the establishment of a new guarantee for the great interests which would engage its deliberations. At the same time the fact was emphasized that the congress was to be regarded as a diplomatic body, without powers of ordinary legislation. It was not to be "an amphictyonic council, invested with power finally to decide controversies between the American states or to regulate in any respect their conduct," but was expected to afford opportunities for free and friendly conference and to facilitate the conclusion of treaties.

After these preliminary explanations, the instructions proceeded to point out that it was not the intention of the United States to challenge its "pacific and neutral policy." While, therefore, the congress probably would consider the future prosecution of the war with Spain by the existing belligerents, the delegates of the United States were not to enter into the discussion of that subject but were to confine themselves strictly to subjects in which all the American nations, whether belligerent or neutral, might have an interest. One of these was the maintenance of peace, which was declared to be "the greatest want of America." In regard to European wars, confidence was expressed that the policy of all America would be the same, that of "peace and neutrality," which the United States had consistently labored to preserve. On this supposition the greatest importance was, said the instructions, attached to questions of maritime neutrality. The delegates were to bring forward "the proposition to abolish war against private property and noncombatants upon the ocean," as formerly proposed by Dr. Franklin; but, as this might not be readily adopted, they were authorized to propose that free ships should make free goods and that enemy ships should make enemy goods, both rules being considered to operate in favor of neutrality. The delegates were also to seek a definition of blockade, and were, besides, to deal with the subject of contraband, whose vital relation to the preservation of neutral trade is, it may be remarked, not always fully appreciated.

In regard to commercial intercourse, the instructions incorporated the most liberal views. The delegates of the United States were not to seek exclusive privileges, even as against the European powers. They were to observe the most-favored-nation principle, so that any favors in commerce or in navigation granted by an American nation to any foreign power should extend to every other American nation; and were to oppose the imposition of discriminating duties on importations or exportations on account of the flag. As for the Monroe

declarations, the delegates of the United States, without committing the parties to the support of any particular boundaries or to a joint resistance in any future case, were desired to propose a joint declaration that each American state, acting for and binding only itself, would not allow a new European colony to be established within its territories. Another subject, closely related to commerce as well as to politics, was that of a canal to connect the Atlantic and the Pacific. Treating of this subject in a spirit of liberality, the instructions said:

What is to redound to the advantage of all America should be effected by common means and united exertions, and should not be left to the separate efforts of any one power. . . . If the work should ever be executed so as to admit of the passage of sea vessels from ocean to ocean, the benefits of it ought not to be exclusively appropriated to any one nation, but should be extended to all parts of the globe upon the payment of a just compensation or reasonable tolls.

In only one passage of this remarkable state paper did its author seem to labor. This was where he was obliged to discuss the troublesome question that so persistently marred the prospect in which his fancy loved to range. The congress might perhaps consider the question of Cuba and of Haiti. With regard to the latter, he expressed the opinion that the subject was not one that required concert of action between all American powers. The case of Cuba was more complex. The United States, it was said, would prefer the unaided establishment of Cuban independence, but was convinced that the island was incompetent to sustain self-government without assistance. An independence guaranteed by other powers, European or American, or both, would on the other hand involve difficulties almost insuperable. Likewise fraught with danger was the design which rumor ascribed to Colombia and to Mexico to conquer and annex the island. Such an attempt would, declared the instructions, change the whole character of the war and involve continual fears as to the future stability of conditions. The delegates of the United States were therefore authorized to state without reserve that their government, having too much at stake to see with indifference a war against Cuba prosecuted in a desolating manner, or one race employed against another probably with the most shocking excesses, would be constrained to employ all means necessary to defend itself against the "contagion" of such near and dangerous examples.

Having thus dealt with a vexed question, the instructions passed to other topics. It was suggested that a joint declaration be made in favor of the free toleration of religious worship. If

questions of boundary and other controverted matters among the new American powers should be presented, the delegates of the United States were to manifest a willingness to give their best counsel and advice, and, if it were desired, to serve as arbitrator. Finally, as to forms of government and the cause of free institutions, it was declared that the United States were not and never had been "animated by any spirit of propagandism." They preferred "to all other forms of government . . . their own confederacy"; but, allowing, as they did, "no foreign interference" either in the formation or in the conduct of their own government, they were "equally scrupulous in refraining from all interference in the original structure or subsequent interior movement of the governments of other independent nations."

The views of Clay were strongly reënforced by the utterances of the President.

Having been the first [said Adams] to recognize their independence and to sympathize with them, so far as was compatible with our neutral duties, in all their struggles and sufferings to acquire it, we have laid the foundation of our future intercourse on the broadest principles of reciprocity and the most cordial feelings of fraternal friendship. To extend those principles to all our commercial relations with them, and to hand down that friendship to future ages, is congenial to the highest policy of the Union, as it will be to that of all those nations and their posterity.

Entering into the matter more particularly, he placed the interest of the United States in the congress on four grounds: First, that of promoting "the principles of a liberal commercial intercourse"; second, the adoption of liberal principles of maritime law, including the rule that free ships make free goods, and the proper restriction of blockades; third, an agreement between all the parties that each would "guard by its own means against the establishment of any future European colony within its border," as had already been announced in the message of Monroe; and fourth, the promotion of religious liberty.

Nevertheless, the plans of the administration in regard to the assembly at Panama encountered in the Congress of the United States a determined and able opposition. It was argued that the proposed mission involved a departure from the wise policy of non-intervention established by Washington. Another ground of opposition was that one of the questions proposed for discussion in the congress was "the consideration of the means to be adopted for the entire abolition of the African slave trade." An apprehension was also felt that the congress would be called upon to consider plans of international con-

solidation which would commit the United States to a more hazardous connection with the fortunes of other countries than was desirable.

In the end, the nominations of the President were confirmed; but when the representatives of the United States reached the Isthmus of Panama the congress had adjourned. Four governments were represented in it—namely, Colombia, Central America, Mexico, and Peru. The assembly held ten meetings, the last of which took place on July 15, 1826. Representatives of Great Britain and of the Netherlands were present on the Isthmus and, although not admitted to the congress, no doubt freely advised with its members.

Four agreements were signed at Panama: (1) A treaty of perpetual union, league, and confederation; (2) an engagement for the assembling of the congress every two years, and, while the war with Spain lasted, every year; (3) a convention specifying the contributions in men, in ships, and in money, which the parties should make for the prosecution of the war against Spain; and (4) a plan for the organization of their common force. To a great extent these agreements related to the interests which the parties had, as belligerents, but there were some of the stipulations which had a far wider scope. An attempt was made to establish a council for the interpretation of treaties and for the employment of conciliation and mediation in the settlement of international disputes. It was provided that all differences between the contracting parties should be amicably compromised, and that if this were not done, such differences should be submitted to the General Assembly, as it was called, for the formulation of an amicable recommendation. In case of complaints or injuries the parties were not to declare war or to resort to reprisals without first submitting their grievances to the decision of the General Assembly. Nor was any of the parties to go to war against an outsider without soliciting the good offices, interposition, and mediation of the allies. Any contracting party violating these stipulations, either by going to war with another or by failing to comply with the decision of the General Assembly, was to be excluded from the confederation and was to be incapable of restoration except by a unanimous vote. The contracting parties also pledged themselves to co-operate to prevent colonial settlements within their borders, and as soon as their boundaries were determined mutually to guarantee the integrity of their respective territories.

These benevolent proposals, which strongly remind us of some that are put forth to-day, were not destined to be carried into effect. The agreements were ratified by one only of the

contracting parties—Colombia—and by Colombia only in part. In reality the conditions at the time were such that effective co-operation was scarcely possible.

The practical failure of the United States to be represented at the Congress of Panama was an unfortunate omen. Indicative in itself of an attitude somewhat unsympathetic, this impression was deepened by the arguments by which the opposition to the mission was sustained. But, in addition to this, the continuance of the war with Spain and the prevalence of revolutionary conditions in the new states gave rise to frequent complaints and controversies. In the southern part of the hemisphere an unfavorable sentiment was no doubt created by the breaking up by the United States of the establishment which the government at Buenos Aires had made on the Falkland, or, as the Argentines call them, the Malvinas Islands, the title to which was generally believed to belong to Great Britain, by whom they were afterwards effectively occupied. But the greatest source of disturbance was that which existed at the north, where Mexico labored in the constant throes of revolution. This cause of divergence was greatly accentuated by the revolt in Texas and the cry which sprang up in the United States for the "re-annexation" of that imperial domain, which was alleged to have been a part of the Louisiana territory. As I have elsewhere remarked,¹ no acquisition of territory ever made by the United States was more natural or more completely in conformity with the aspirations and habits of thought of the American people. But, no matter how natural it may have been, it created a sense of apprehension, which was deepened and greatly intensified by the war with Mexico, which, resulting as it did in the conquest and annexation by the United States of a vast extent of Mexican territory, produced upon the attitude of the countries of Central and South America towards the United States a more pronounced and more unfavorable effect than any other event that has ever occurred. Of this fact, practically nothing is said in our histories, nor has it been clearly understood in the United States; but its influence may easily be traced in the acts and utterances of the Central and South American governments.

For some years after the Congress of Panama steps were from time to time taken to bring about another meeting. In this movement Mexico was the chief factor, no doubt because of her apprehension as to the continued retention of her northern territory. The object which she proposed was a union and close alliance,

for the purposes of defence against foreign invasion, the acceptance

1. *Four Phases of American Development*, p. 174.

of friendly mediation in the settlement of all disputes . . . between the sister republics, and the framing and promulgation of a code of public law regulating their mutual relations.

Sixteen years later, in 1847, a congress composed of representatives of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, New Granada (now Colombia), and Peru assembled at Lima for the purpose of adopting measures to insure "the independence, sovereignty, dignity, and territorial integrity" of the republics concerned. Other American republics were to be admitted to the deliberations of the congress or to adhere to the agreements which it might conclude. The congress even decided to extend an invitation to the United States, but a favorable response could hardly have been expected, the United States being then at war with Mexico and in occupation of California and New Mexico, besides having annexed Texas. The invitation probably was intended to convey to the United States a pointed intimation of the views and objects of the congress.

On September 15, 1856, there was signed at Santiago, in Chile, the so-called "Continental Treaty," between Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, for the purpose, as the text declared, of cementing upon substantial foundations the union which exists between them, as members of the great American family . . . and promoting moral and material progress, as well as giving further guarantees of their independence and territorial integrity.

The government of Peru was authorized to communicate the treaty to other American governments and to request their adhesion. Brazil, although then a monarchy, was invited to join the union. The United States was not approached.

In reality the chief cause of the attempted alliance was the feeling of continued apprehension towards the United States caused by the expeditions of William Walker and other filibusters to Central America and Mexico in the years following the Mexican War.

The alarm created by these expeditions, and particularly by those of Walker to Central America, was profound, nor can it be said to have been destitute of foundation. Costa Rica, apprehensive as to her own future, undertook the necessary sacrifices of men and of money for the expulsion of the so-called Walker-Rivas government from Nicaragua. In their extremity the countries of Central America then looked for help to Europe rather than to the United States, and they felt that, so far as thanks were due to any foreign power for aid in the suppression of filibustering, they were due chiefly to France and Great Britain, who eventually took concerted action in that direction.

Moreover, ten years after the close of the war with Mexico

a serious condition of affairs again arose between the United States and that country. By the so-called Gadsden treaty of 1853 the United States acquired by purchase the Mesilla Valley from Mexico. Five years later, in 1858, President Buchanan, referring in his second annual message to Congress to the unhappy condition of affairs existing along the southwestern frontier of the United States, earnestly advised Congress "to assume a temporary protectorate over the northern parts of Chihuahua and Sonora, and to establish military posts within the same."

This protection might [he said] be withdrawn as soon as local governments should be established in those states capable of performing their duties to the United States, of restraining lawlessness and of preserving peace along the borders.

The disorders continuing to increase, he recurred to the subject in his third annual message and recommended that he be authorized to "employ a sufficient military force to enter Mexico for the purpose of obtaining indemnity for the past and security for the future." In making this recommendation he referred to Mexico as "a wreck upon the ocean, drifting about as she is impelled by different factions." In these circumstances he intimated that if the United States should not take appropriate action it would not be surprising if some other nation should undertake the task.

Having discovered that his recommendations would not be sustained by Congress, he sought to accomplish the same object by means of treaties, but the United States was then on the verge of the great convulsion which was to shake the structure of its own government to the very foundations, and attention was drawn from affairs in Mexico and other American countries to the approaching crisis in affairs at home.

But for the occurrence of the Civil War in the United States there is every reason to believe that the relations between this country and the other independent nations of the hemisphere would have been radically different from those that came to prevail. The opposition to the extension of slavery having always operated as a force antagonistic to expansion towards the south, the outbreak of the Civil War put a sudden end to the tendencies in that direction, besides serving to create a readier sympathy with countries afflicted with domestic dissensions. The attitude of the United States underwent an instantaneous and profound change. The government of Costa Rica, when discussing with the government of Colombia in 1862 a proposal for a "Continental League," observed that there was not always at the head of the great Republic of the North "moderate, just, and upright men such as those who now

form the administration of President Lincoln." This utterance is highly significant, not only of the impression that had so long prevailed, but also of the change which was taking place. The feeling of sympathy was also quickened by the sense of common danger which followed the French invasion of Mexico. And later, when Spain went to war with the republics on the west coast of South America, the good offices of the United States were employed for the purpose of bringing about a termination of the conflict.

This was done by means of a conference, which was opened at the Department of State at Washington, on October 28, 1870, under the presidency of Hamilton Fish, who was then Secretary of State. Representatives of Spain, Peru, Chile, and Ecuador attended. And on April 11, 1871, the contending parties agreed upon an armistice which was to continue indefinitely, and which could not be broken by any of the belligerents except after three years' notice given through the government of the United States of its intention to renew hostilities. During the continuance of this armistice all restrictions on neutral commerce which were incident to a state of war were to cease. Mr. Fish signed these articles "in the character of mediator."

This important act affords a notable illustration of the change which had supervened in the relations between the United States and the other independent nations of this hemisphere. But it was only an augury of what was to take place in the future.

Towards the close of the decade in which the perpetual armistice was signed there broke out what is commonly known as the War of the Pacific between Chile on the one side and Peru and Bolivia on the other. This unfortunate conflict naturally revived the thoughts which had so often been cherished of the formulation of a plan for the preservation of peace among the American nations. A step in this direction was taken when, on September 3, 1880, the representatives of Chile and Colombia, on the initiative of the latter, signed at Bogotá a treaty by which they bound themselves "in perpetuity to submit to arbitration . . . all controversies and differences" of every nature whatsoever which could not be settled by diplomacy. And it was further agreed that if they should be unable to concur in the choice of an arbitrator the arbitral function should be discharged by the President of the United States—a provision which bore eloquent testimony to the growth of friendly sentiments. The two governments further engaged at the earliest opportunity to conclude similar conventions with the other American nations to the end, as they said, "that the

settlement by arbitration of each and every international controversy shall become a principle of American public law." On the strength of the signing of this treaty the Colombian government, on October 11, 1880, issued an invitation for a conference to be held at Panama; but, as Chile and Peru continued at war, action upon the invitation was deferred.

The project, however, was not abandoned. On November 29, 1881, James G. Blaine, as Secretary of State, extended, in the name of the President of the United States,

to all the independent countries of North and South America an earnest invitation to participate in a General Congress to be held in the City of Washington on the twenty-fourth day of November, 1882, for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America.

"To this one great object," Blaine declared it to be the desire of the President that "the attention of the congress should be strictly confined." The continuance of the war between Chile and Peru led to the subsequent withdrawal of this invitation. But, in reality, the accomplishment of its great design was only postponed, for, after the submission and consideration from time to time of many proposals, the Congress of the United States, at length, by an act of May 25, 1888, authorized the President to invite the republics of Mexico, Central and South America, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and the empire of Brazil, to join the United States in a conference to meet at Washington on October 2, 1889. The subjects proposed for the consideration of the conference were: (1) Measures tending to preserve the peace and promote the prosperity of the American nations; (2) measures towards the formation of a customs union; (3) the establishment of frequent communications between the various countries; (4) uniform customs regulations; (5) a uniform system of weights and measures; (6) laws for the protection of patents, copyrights, and trade-marks; (7) extradition; (8) the adoption of a common silver coin; (9) the formulation of "a definite plan of arbitration of all questions, disputes, and differences that may now or hereafter exist" between the American nations, "to the end that all difficulties and disputes between such nations may be peaceably settled and wars prevented."

When the conference assembled Mr. Blaine again occupied the post of Secretary of State. His address of welcome to the delegates was worthy of the occasion, and he was chosen to preside over the deliberations of the assembly. This was the first of what have come to be distinctively known as the International American Conferences, of which four have already been held. The fifth would have met in Santiago, Chile, in

1914, but for the breaking out of the unfortunate conflict in Europe.

The first conference continued to sit until the 19th of April, 1890. Various important international agreements were formulated. Among these, one of the most notable was the plan for international arbitration, which was adopted on April 18, 1890. By this plan it was declared that arbitration as a means of settling disputes between the American nations was adopted "as a principle of American international law"; that arbitration should be obligatory in all controversies concerning diplomatic and consular privileges, boundaries, territories, indemnities, the right of navigation, and the validity and enforcement and construction of treaties; and that it should be equally obligatory in all other cases, whatever might be their origin, nature, or object, with the sole exception of those which, in the judgment of one of the nations involved in the controversy, might imperil its independence. But it was provided that even in this case, while arbitration for that nation should be optional, it "should be obligatory upon the adversary power." As yet this plan represents but an aspiration, since it failed to receive the approval of the governments whose representatives adopted it. In connection with it there was also adopted a declaration against the acquisition of title by conquest, which was designed to form, in effect, an integral part of the arbitral plan.

An agreement destined to produce practical results was that by which was constituted the Bureau of the American Republics, now known as the Pan-American Union. This organization, after twenty years of active usefulness, had the good fortune to be installed at Washington in a building which is one of the finest examples of architecture in the country.

Another measure that has yielded definite results was the agreement for the prosecution of surveys for what is popularly known as the Inter-Continental Railway. Although it is not probable that such a railway will in the near future furnish an actual means of transportation between, for instance, New York and Buenos Aires, yet the various links in the chain of railways to which the name of inter-Continental is applicable have been steadily progressing and many of them are in actual use for purposes of transportation.

A notable event of the first International American Conference was the transformation of the empire of Brazil into the republic of Brazil. This transition from a monarchical to a republican form of government was brought about by a revolution which was substantially bloodless. The wise and patriotic ruler, Dom Pedro II, scarcely more eminent as a

statesman than as a student of science and of philosophy, retired without a contest before the demonstration on the part of his people of a desire for a change in the form of their government. There was thus fulfilled the aspiration, manifested in Brazil just a hundred years before, when, in 1789, a movement for independence was started in the state of Minas Geraes by a group of Brazilian students, one of whom had met and talked with Thomas Jefferson in France in 1786. And in this relation it is interesting to note that, by the constitution of Brazil, the republic is forbidden to undertake, directly or indirectly, a war of conquest either by itself or in alliance with another government.

Between the first and the second International Conference of American States an interval of more than eleven years elapsed. The second conference sat in the City of Mexico from October 22, 1901, to January 31, 1902. One of its notable results is the fact that, by means of it, the American nations became parties to The Hague Convention of 1899 for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Moreover, a project of a treaty was adopted for the arbitration, as between American nations, of pecuniary claims. This treaty was signed by the delegations of all the countries represented in the conference. It obligated the contracting parties for a period of five years to submit to the Permanent Court at The Hague all claims for pecuniary losses or damage which might be presented by their respective citizens, when such claims were of sufficient importance to justify the expense of arbitration; but it also permitted the contracting parties to organize a special jurisdiction in case they should so desire.

The Third International American Conference was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1906, and resulted in the conclusion of certain treaties or conventions, two of which may be specially mentioned. One was the convention for the renewal of the treaty concluded at Mexico for the arbitration of pecuniary claims. The other is the convention providing for the creation of what is known as the International Commission of Jurists, to formulate codes of international law for the American nations. This commission held its first meeting at Rio de Janeiro in the summer of 1912, and was to have held a second meeting at the same place in the summer of 1915. Because of the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1914, this meeting was postponed. At the first meeting the commission was divided into committees, to each of which is entrusted the preparation of drafts of statutes on certain designated subjects. The work of the commission is to be submitted for final approval to the governments concerned or to the International American Conference, and, so

far as its provisions may be of general application, it is not improbable that they may be brought before the Peace Conference at The Hague when conditions are such as to admit of the revival of that assembly.

A notable incident of the third conference was the visit of Mr. Root, then Secretary of State of the United States, while on a tour of South America. From his address to the conference the following words have often been quoted:

We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights, or privileges, or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic.

The Fourth International American Conference was held at Buenos Aires in 1910. It was notable for having dealt with all the subjects on its program, including treaties relating to patents, trademarks, and copyrights. A treaty was also made for the indefinite extension of the agreement for the arbitration of pecuniary claims. In the report of the delegates to the fourth conference special reference is made to the harmony which characterized its deliberations. There can be no doubt that, quite apart from the actual work accomplished, the free interchange of views in friendly conference between representative men from all parts of America cannot fail to create a better understanding and to draw closer the relations between the countries concerned. This is indeed one of the chief benefits of the International American Conferences. The process of assimilating or harmonizing legal rules and remedies in countries whose systems of jurisprudence are derived from different sources is necessarily slow and uncertain. But this by no means implies the existence of a serious obstacle to the promotion of a free and beneficial intercourse.

By the diplomatic and consular appropriation act, approved March 4, 1915, the President of the United States was authorized to invite the governments of Central and South America to be represented by their Ministers of Finance and some of their leading bankers at a conference with the Secretary of the Treasury, at Washington, with a view to establish "closer and more satisfactory financial relations" between their countries and the United States. The invitation was accepted by eighteen governments—namely, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama,

Paraguay, Peru, Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The conference met in Washington on Monday, May 24, 1915, and adjourned on the following Saturday. It was called the Pan-American Financial Conference, and was attended not only by the foreign official delegates, but also by the members of the diplomatic corps from Central and South America, by the Secretary of State of the United States and other members of the cabinet, by the chairmen of the foreign affairs committees of the Senate and House, by the assistant secretaries of the Treasury, by the members of the Federal Reserve Board and officers of the Federal Reserve Banks, by members of the Federal Trade Commission, and by representative bankers and business men from all parts of the United States. It was presided over by the Hon. W. G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury.

The immediate occasion of the assembly was the derangement of commerce and finance by the great European war, the effects of which were acutely felt not only in the dislocation of exchanges between Europe and America, but also in the relations between the American countries themselves, which, although their interdependence had been greatly increased, found it necessary to make numerous readjustments. The original program embraced the monetary and banking situation, the financing of public improvements and private enterprises, the extension of inter-American markets, and the improvement of transportation facilities, including postal exchanges, money-orders, and the parcel post. For the purpose of considering these questions the members of the conference were assigned to group committees, such a committee being created for each country. The reports of these committees, which show that, next to transportation, the subjects that attracted most attention were improved banking facilities and the extension of credits, were referred to a general committee on uniformity of laws relating to trade and commerce, which was charged with the duty of reporting upon the subjects with which the conference should deal and the organization necessary to carry the resolutions of the conference into effect. The report of this committee, which was unanimously adopted by the conference, included, in the order here given, seven subjects: (1) the establishment of a gold standard of value; (2) bills of exchange, commercial paper, and bills of lading; (3) uniform (a) classification of merchandise, (b) customs regulations, (c) consular certificates and invoices, (d) port charges; (4) uniform regulations for commercial travellers; (5) further legislation concerning trade-marks, patents, and copyrights; (6) the establishment of a uniform low rate of

postage and of charges for money-orders and parcels post, and (7) the extension of the process of arbitration, by chambers of commerce and other agencies, of private commercial disputes. Because of variances of view as to methods and measures and the complications of local legislation the subject of marine transportation, in spite of the deep and general interest which it excited, was not for the moment placed upon the program.

For the purpose of carrying its resolutions into effect the conference recommended the establishment of an International High Commission, to be composed of not more than nine members resident in each country, to be appointed by the Minister of Finance of such country, these local bodies, composed of jurists, financiers, and technical administrators, constituting the national sections of the International High Commission. This recommendation was promptly carried into effect in the countries concerned; and by the act of Congress of February 7, 1916, the United States section was endowed with a specific legislative status.

The International High Commission, which, besides carrying on its work locally through various national sections, had conducted its work internationally by exchange of correspondence, held its first general meeting at Buenos Aires from April 3 to April 12, 1916. The program included, in addition to those acted upon by the Washington conference, six different subjects: (a) international agreements on uniform labor legislation; (b) uniformity of regulations concerning the classification and analysis of petroleum and other mineral fuels with reference to national policy on the development of natural resources; (c) the betterment of transportation facilities between the American countries; (d) banking facilities, extension of credit, financing public and private enterprises, and the stabilization of international exchange; (e) telegraph facilities and rates, and the use of wireless telegraphy for commercial purposes; (f) uniform legislation as to conditional sales and chattel mortgages. All these topics were discussed and were the subject of reports by appropriate committees.

The International High Commission, at its meeting in Buenos Aires, besides dealing with questions of finance and administration, constituted a Central Executive Council for the purpose of systematizing and co-ordinating its work, carrying out its recommendations, and preparing the programs of future meetings. This council consists of three members—a president, vice-president, and a secretary-general. These three places are occupied by the chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary of the national section of the country chosen for the time

being as headquarters of the International High Commission. On motion of a member from Argentina, Washington was unanimously designated as the headquarters of the commission till the next meeting, and the chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary of the United States section thus became the constituent members of the Central Executive Council.

The Central Executive Council, on entering upon its labors, decided that the best plan of procedure would be, while pressing the work of the conference as a whole, to select certain subjects for more immediate, definite treatment. With this view, it selected five subjects: (1) The establishment of an international gold clearance fund; (2) an international agreement to facilitate the work of commercial travellers; (3) legislation concerning negotiable instruments (including The Hague rules on bills of exchange), checks and bills of lading and warehouse receipts; (4) the arbitration of commercial disputes; (5) the ratification of the conventions adopted by the Fourth International American Conference at Buenos Aires in 1910 on trade-marks, copyrights, and patents.

In pursuance of this plan the Central Executive Council has formulated drafts of treaties concerning commercial travellers and the establishment of an international gold clearance fund, and these drafts have been submitted through the Department of State of the United States to the governments concerned, together with explanatory memoranda.

In December and January, 1915-16, there was held at Washington the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress, the first having been held in Santiago, Chile, in December and January, 1907-8.

The Washington Congress, which was presided over by His Excellency Eduardo Suárez Mujica, ambassador of Chile and chairman of the Chilean delegation, embraced in its program anthropology and allied subjects; astronomy, meteorology, and seismology; conservation of natural resources, agriculture, irrigation, and forestry; education; engineering; international law, public law, and jurisprudence; mining and metallurgy, economic geology, and applied chemistry; public health and medical science; transportation, commerce, finance, and taxation. In order to discuss these subjects the Congress, whose sessions opened on the 27th of December and closed on the 8th of January, was divided into nine sections and forty-five subsections.

In an address before the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile, Alabama, October 27, 1913, President Wilson, recurring to the subject of Pan Americanism, said that the future was "going to be very different for this hemisphere from the

past"; that the states lying to the south would be "drawn closer to us by innumerable ties," and, he hoped, chief of all, by the tie of a common understanding, into a spiritual union, so that the opening of the Panama Canal would open the world to "a commerce that she has not known before, a commerce of intelligence, of thought and sympathy between North and South." The states of Latin America were, he said, also going to see an emancipation from subordination to foreign enterprise, such as had resulted from the granting of "concessions" to foreign capitalists. The United States "ought to be the first to take part in assisting in that emancipation." "Human rights, national integrity, and opportunity as against material interests"—this was the issue to be faced. The United States, he declared, would "never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." Making "honorable and fruitful use" of what she already had, she "must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity," the true relationship of the Americas being that "of a family of mankind devoted to the development of true constitutional liberty."

Speaking in a similar strain, Secretary Lansing, in addressing the Second Pan American Scientific Congress, finely observed that the "essential qualities" of Pan Americanism were "those of the family—sympathy, helpfulness, and a sincere desire to see another grow in prosperity, absence of covetousness of another's possessions, absence of jealousy of another's prominence, and above all absence of that spirit of intrigue which menaces the domestic peace of a neighbor"; that, while the Monroe Doctrine is the "national policy of the United States," Pan Americanism is the "international policy of the Americas"; that Pan Americanism "extends beyond the sphere of politics and finds its application in the varied fields of human enterprise"; that it is "an expression of the idea of internationalism" and the "most advanced" and "most practical form of that idea," and has been "made possible" by our "geographical isolation," "similar political institutions," and "common conception of human rights."

Nevertheless, when one surveys the actual relations between the countries of the Western Hemisphere he cannot be blind to the fact that, as elsewhere in the world, the power and influence which nations wield tend to be proportionate to their population and resources, their political stability, and their financial strength; and that, although the term Pan Americanism is often said to denote a union of independent and co-equal American commonwealths, some of the members occupy

a special position. This is clearly the case with Cuba and with Panama under the treaties, coeval with their origin, by which the United States guarantees their independence, subject to specified conditions. Special situations, partly conventional, but also partly *de facto*, have since come to exist in Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo; and a progressive tendency has been manifested towards the growth of such situations.

We have seen elsewhere that American marines were landed in Nicaragua in August, 1912, and that a detachment remained at the capital for the purpose of lending support to the government in the maintenance of order. In February, 1913, towards the close of President Taft's administration, a treaty was signed with Nicaragua, granting to the United States the exclusive right to build a canal by what is called the Nicaragua route, as well as the lease of the Corn Islands as a naval station, the United States agreeing to pay \$3,000,000. This measure met the approval of the administration of President Wilson; and, after an ineffectual attempt to incorporate in the treaty the terms of the Platt Amendment, a new treaty was signed August 5, 1914, by which the United States acquires, together with the other concessions mentioned, a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca. This treaty has been ratified. Protests have been made against it by Costa Rica, Honduras, and Salvador, because, as they affirm, it forms an obstacle to Central American union; by Honduras and Salvador, because it infringes their jurisdictional rights in the Gulf of Fonseca; by Costa Rica alone, because Nicaragua, in granting the canal concession without her concurrence, disregarded the terms of President Cleveland's award of May 22, 1888, as to their common boundary.

On the grounds thus jointly or severally maintained by them, Costa Rica and Salvador, in order judicially to test the legality of the treaty, each brought a suit against Nicaragua in the Central American Court of Justice, the international tribunal organized by the Central American states under the treaty of December 20, 1907. This treaty, which was concluded at the Central American Peace Conference held at Washington in that year through the mediation of the United States and Mexico, provided for the creation, as between the Central American states, of an International Court of Justice. The court was duly established, and the published reports of its proceedings now occupy five volumes. In the suits above mentioned it rendered judgment against Nicaragua, holding that the treaty violated existing international engagements and undertook to grant to the United States rights which Nicaragua was not competent alone to convey. Nicaragua declined to

accept the decision. The Corn Islands, it may be remarked, are claimed by Colombia. In the award of President Loubet, on the boundary between Colombia and Costa Rica, they are enumerated as belonging to Colombia. Nicaragua, however, was not a party to the arbitration.

In 1911 France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy made a joint demand on the Haitian government for the settlement of claims within three months or their submission to arbitration. Political conditions then were and thereafter continued to be unsettled. In 1914 revolutionary disturbances occurred; in January, 1915, American troops were landed at Port au Prince. A civil war took place, and the ruling president was compelled to resign and leave the country. Five months later his successor was killed, and American marines were again landed at Port au Prince. They remained; reinforcements were sent, and gradually the military occupation of the United States was extended to the whole republic and the customs administration was taken over. On September 16, 1915, a treaty was signed, by which the United States agreed by its good offices to aid in the development "of the agricultural, mineral, and commercial resources" of the country, and in the establishment of its finances on a firm and solid basis. The collection and administration of the customs were to be committed to a general receiver and to other persons to be appointed by the President of Haiti, upon the nomination of the President of the United States, while a financial adviser similarly appointed was to be attached to the Ministry of Finance, for the purpose of devising an adequate system of public accounting, increasing and adjusting revenues, inquiring into the validity of debts, and making to the Minister of Finance such recommendations as might be deemed necessary for the welfare and prosperity of the country. Furthermore, the Haitian government engaged to create an efficient constabulary composed of natives, who should, in the first instance, be organized and officered by Americans appointed upon the nomination of the President of the United States. This constabulary was to have the supervision and control of arms, ammunition, and military supplies throughout the country. Haiti also agreed not to surrender any of her territory or jurisdiction by lease or otherwise to any foreign power nor to enter into any treaty or contract such as would impair her independence. She further undertook to carry out measures of sanitation. The United States engaged to lend efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian independence and "the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty." The

Senate approved the treaty on February 28, 1916; on May 3d the ratifications were exchanged.

We have elsewhere discussed the treaty concluded with Santo Domingo in 1907 in relation to the collection of the Dominican customs and the discharge of the government's outstanding financial obligations. The results of this voluntary arrangement were highly beneficial to Santo Domingo as well as to her creditors. For some time it also exerted a tranquillizing influence on Dominican politics, but the tendency to unrest eventually reappeared; and in October, 1912, when relations between Haiti and Santo Domingo were disturbed over their unsettled boundary, a force of American marines was sent to protect the customs-houses along the Haitian frontier.

Towards the end of 1913 a step somewhat different and somewhat in advance was taken, when it was announced that, in view of the turbulence prevailing in Santo Domingo, the United States would send thither commissioners to supervise the elections then about to be held. This did not fall within the terms of the existing treaty, but seemed rather to be a development of President Wilson's statement to Latin America of the 12th of the preceding March, and the Mobile address. The persons to perform the supervisory task were detailed chiefly from Porto Rico. To the protests of the Dominican government, Mr. Bryan, then Secretary of State of the United States, replied that the commissioners would act "as a body of friendly observers." But in the course of time measures of another kind were adopted, when forces were landed for the purpose of opposing a revolutionary change in the Dominican government and restoring order under the supervision of the United States. In a proclamation issued in June, 1916, by the admiral in command of the intervening forces, it was declared that they had entered the republic "for the purpose of supporting the constituted authorities and of putting a stop to revolutions and consequent disorders impeding the progress and prosperity of the country." Any purpose on the part of the United States to "acquire by conquest" Dominican territory or to "attack" the republic's "sovereignty" was disclaimed; but it was declared that the troops would remain "until all revolutionary movements" had been "stamped out," and such "reforms" as were "deemed necessary to insure the future welfare of the country" had been initiated and were "in effective operation." The hope was expressed that "all this" might be "accomplished peacefully and without bloodshed," and "all true Dominican patriots both in public and private life" were called upon to "co-operate . . . to the fullest extent" in the accomplishment of the objects of the intervention.

In the winter of 1914-15 the representatives of some of the South American countries at Washington were sounded as to the conclusion with the United States of a treaty for the "mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and of political independence under republican forms of government" and for other purposes. Steps were afterwards taken to make the proposal Pan American.

President Wilson, addressing the Second Pan American Scientific Congress, January 6, 1916, observed that, while the Monroe Doctrine placed an inhibition on European governments, it did not disclose what the United States would do "with the implied and partial protectorate which she apparently was trying to set up on this side of the water"; and that "fears and suspicions on this score" had prevented greater intimacy, confidence and trust between the Americas. Latterly there had, he said, been an "interchange of views" between the authorities at Washington and the representatives of the other American states, an interchange "charming and hopeful," because of an "increasingly sure appreciation of the spirit" in which it was undertaken; and those representatives had seen that if America was "to come into her own . . . in a world of peace and order, she must establish the foundations of amity so that no one will hereafter doubt them." Summarizing then, as the means to that end, the provisions of the proposal above mentioned, he stated that his thought was not only the "international" but also the "domestic" peace of America; that if the American states, or any of them, were "constantly in ferment," there would be a "standing threat to their relations with one another," and that "it is just as much to our interest to assist each other to orderly processes within our own borders as it is to orderly processes in our controversies with one another."

A number of the American governments accepted the proposal "in principle." Some indicated a willingness to go further, but none of them in fact signed the treaty. An unfavorable influence seems to have been exerted by the feeling, which found expression in certain quarters, that the proposal, though strictly reciprocal in terms, involved unequal responsibilities and opportunities. Some, while doubting the disposition of the United States to accept suggestions from other American countries in such matters, seemed to dread lest the treaty might lead to discussions as to whether particular constitutions of government, or even particular administrations, satisfied the condition of republicanism, thus opening the door to constant foreign intrusions into internal affairs. Especially was this the case with those who, while fundamentally questioning the

wisdom or the feasibility of undertaking to establish in the Americas a static condition by international action, believed that the attempt to do so would necessarily involve the exercise over governments of a certain measure of foreign supervision and control; while others yet, holding the opinion that no international need at the moment existed for such a treaty or made its signature urgent, thought that it should not be pressed upon reluctant governments.²

No doubt one of the chief impediments to the development and preservation of relations of amity and intimacy between the United States and the other independent nations of this hemisphere is the want of information as to the conditions which actually exist in the various countries and the consequent prevalence of erroneous impressions in regard to those conditions. As the result of the fact that the countries to the south of the United States have not all a common origin, and that, while all but one formerly belonged to Spain, the largest of them all, Brazil, was once a colony of Portugal, it has become the fashion to group them indiscriminately as "Latin America." The employment of this phrase, although it may be neces-

2. For an account of this proposal and its reception, including the draft of the proposed treaty, see an article by David Lawrence, in the New York *Evening Post* of April 1, 1916. The draft reads as follows:

"ARTICLE I. That the high contracting parties to this solemn covenant and agreement hereby join one another in a common and mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and of political independence under republican forms of government.

"ARTICLE II. To give definite application to the guarantee set forth in Article I the high contracting parties severally covenant to endeavor forthwith to reach a settlement of all disputes as to boundary or territory now pending between them by amicable agreement or by means of international arbitration.

"ARTICLE III. That the high contracting parties further agree: First, that all questions, of whatever character, arising between two or more of them which cannot be settled by the ordinary means of diplomatic correspondence shall, before any declaration of war or beginning of hostilities, be first submitted to a permanent international commission for investigation, one year being allowed for such investigation; and second, that, if the dispute is not settled by investigation, to submit the same to arbitration, provided the question in dispute does not affect the honor, independence or vital interests of the nations concerned or the interests of third parties.

"ARTICLE IV. To the end that domestic tranquillity may prevail within their territories the high contracting parties further severally covenant and agree that they will not permit the departure from their respective jurisdictions of any military or naval expedition hostile to the established government of any of the high contracting parties, and that they will prevent the exportation from their respective jurisdictions of arms, ammunition or other munitions of war destined to or for the use of any person or persons notified to be in insurrection or revolt against the established government of any of the high contracting parties."

sary, has tended to confirm two radically erroneous impressions, one being that all the countries called Latin are really Latin; and the other, that all the countries called Latin are alike. In saying this I do not advert to the fact that the supposition seems widely to prevail that Spanish, and not Portuguese, is the language of Brazil. What I mean is that it seems to be generally supposed that in population, in institutions, and in administration they are all alike. In reality, in these respects, and particularly in the constituents of their population, they exhibit as between themselves differences more pronounced than those that exist between the United States and some of them. The circumstance has already been mentioned that Brazil, on severing her connection with Portugal, continued, till 1889, under a monarchial form of government—a fact that constituted not the slightest hindrance to the maintenance of the most cordial relations with that country.

As a result of the misapprehensions to which I have adverted little has been understood in the United States of the causes of the internal disorders by which some of the American republics have been afflicted. Regarding all Latin-American countries as one, a tendency has existed to assume that government in all of them is equally unstable. That this impression is inaccurate may be demonstrated by a few examples. In more than one of the states of Central America, for instance, revolutions have been frequent and have seemed at times to be chronic, but the very opposite is the case in Costa Rica, sometimes called the "Athens of Central America." Till the recent sudden change of government in that country no revolution had taken place since 1870. Habits of statesmanship had developed there, and when, in 1913, a question arose under their local law as to the presidential succession, the problem was solved in a manner that would have done credit to any country. Her people are intensely devoted to the maintenance of their national independence and are proud of the skill which they have achieved in government. In Chile there has been but one serious civil disturbance in a long stretch of years—namely, the Balmacedist or Congressional Revolution in 1891. Chile has justified the prediction of Bolivar that the spirit of liberty there would never be extinguished. In Argentina one government has now for many years followed another in orderly succession. Her capital is one of the world's finest cities and boasts of a press which may well share our admiration with that of Rio de Janeiro. In Brazil, since the sudden governmental change of 1889, there has been but one civil disturbance of serious proportions, and this lasted only a little more than six months. Nor should we forget that

there is no country that can boast a constant and assured immunity from disturbances, either domestic or foreign.

I have already adverted to the bloodless character of the transition in Brazil from monarchical to republican government. This fortunate issue may largely be ascribed to the element of idealism which has so often distinguished the political conduct of American statesmen, an idealism which can be fully appreciated only when we reflect upon the struggles in which they at times have been compelled to engage, in their efforts to maintain liberal institutions such as exist in the United States. The same tendency accounts for the peaceful abolition of slavery in South America, and particularly in Brazil, where the system, having gained a strong foothold, tended to linger, but where it was eventually destroyed without forcible resistance. While it would be going too far to say that those whose material interests were directly injured accepted emancipation with universal gratitude, they at any rate accepted it intelligently as a duty to country and to humanity.

Another misconception that more or less prevails in regard to the countries of Latin America is that which relates to the personal integrity of their statesmen. Certain bad examples, which it is unnecessary to enumerate, have served to spread the supposition that the chief cause of revolutions in those countries is the desire for the possession of the custom-houses. Here, as elsewhere, it is necessary to exercise discrimination. Perhaps there is no country in which the desire for the emoluments of office does not influence the conduct of individuals or where the desire even for illicit gains does not furnish an occasional motive. The existence of such conditions and the extent to which they prevail necessarily depend upon the character of the society and the general state of the population. The supposition, however, that in the countries of Latin America a want of integrity in public officials is general involves an error of fact and a serious injustice. Personal integrity is the rule, and not the exception, among the statesmen of the American republics, even outside the United States. I have often thought of one of my colleagues in the Fourth International American Conference, Señor Gonzalo Ramirez, as one of the finest examples I have ever known of public integrity; and I feel at liberty particularly to mention him because he has since passed away. A jurist, a professor in the University of Montevideo, and also a diplomatist, he spent his life largely in public service, holding at the end the important and responsible position of Uruguayan minister at Buenos Aires. I saw his modest home at Montevideo, whose dimensions betokened a life in which fortune had been sacrificed to fame, and private interest

to public duty. At the conference at Buenos Aires he was appointed chairman of the committee on the renewal of the treaties between the American republics for the arbitration of pecuniary claims. At that time he was in the last stage of his fatal illness. In consequence of his infirm physical condition, regular sessions of the committee could not be held, and it was agreed among the members that its meetings should take place at his lodgings at any time during the day or evening when he might notify us that he should be able to preside. He did his share, and, indeed, more than his share of the work of the committee, making himself the first draft of its report. I can see him before me now, seated in an invalid's chair, his mind alert, his interest eager, his sense of duty supreme, devoting the last efforts of his fast-ebbing life to the promotion of justice, mutual respect, and friendship among the American nations.

Many other illustrations might be given, but I will mention only one—the case of the late Baron Rio-Branco, of Brazil, who died in February, 1912, after having held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs for a longer period than a similar position has been held by any other person in this hemisphere. At the time of his decease he was serving under his fourth President. Having passed many years in the public service, it was a well-known fact that, although he was the son of another eminent Brazilian statesman, he was destitute of private fortune and depended for his support upon the rewards which had been voted by a grateful nation. After his death his library was purchased by the government for the benefit of his family, as an additional mark of the national gratitude.

Lastly, I desire to refer to the misapprehensions which have existed in regard to the Monroe Doctrine. The Third International American Conference, which sat at Rio de Janeiro, was held in what is known as the Monroe Palace, named in honor of the enunciator of the famous American policy. Brazil was one of the first, perhaps the first, of the American nations to applaud that doctrine. The Baron Rio-Branco, of whom I have just spoken, was a strenuous asserter of it. But he asserted it, not as the exclusive concern of any one nation, but as the direct and immediate concern of all the American nations. When, therefore, a so-called Anglo-American syndicate, incorporated in one of the States of the United States, proposed, in the exercise of extraordinary political powers and commercial privileges granted by a neighbor of Brazil, to introduce European colonists into the upper reaches of certain affluents of the Amazon, he protested against what he called "the first attempt to introduce in our continent the African and Asiatic system

of chartered companies," or government by foreign "semi-sovereign entities," and took the necessary measures to obtain from the syndicate the renunciation of all rights and claims under its concession, the effect of which was thus completely nullified.

So far as the Monroe Doctrine is held to guard the political system of this hemisphere against external subversion or attack, the American nations cordially accept it and look to the United States as its author and mainstay. In this sense it is eulogized by the statesmen of Latin America. In closing the Fourth International American Conference in 1910, one of Argentina's great orators, who, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, presided as honorary president at the final session, paid an eloquent tribute to American solidarity and to the United States as the proponent of the Monroe Doctrine.

In this year [said Dr. Rodriguez Larreta] the majority of our republics complete a century of independent life. We can now say, with Washington, "America for humanity," because we are sovereign nations and the place we occupy in the world we owe to the strength of our own arms and our blood heroically shed. But let my last words be to send a message of acknowledgment to the great nation which initiated these conferences, which preceded us in the struggle for independence, which afforded us the example of a fruitful people organized as a republican nation, which, on a day memorable in history, declared "America for Americans," and covered as with a shield our hard-won independence.

In this sense the Monroe Doctrine is received in South America with sentiments of the most friendly and cordial concurrence. But there is another sense in which the other independent nations, and especially such powerful states as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, find themselves unable to accept it. This sense, which is said to represent the view of the "man in the street," has been editorially expressed in these terms:

Whatever its interest at stake or wrong suffered in Latin America, we sternly enjoin every European power to keep its hands off of what we make our international business and what we decree must be the business of nobody else.

In other words, the United States is said in effect to have decreed that other American countries are so far subject to its control that non-American powers cannot even demand from them the redress of grievances.

Of this view it is to be observed that it must, in the first place, arouse resentment in the independent countries of America, since it places them all in the subordinate position of protectorates, subject to external dictation. And it must, in the second place, provoke the opposition of non-American powers, since they find it difficult to admit that they cannot conduct

their affairs directly with states which are professedly, and in law and in fact, independent.

Considered in its practical aspects, the conception appears to be equally superficial and extravagant. The area of the United States embraces less than three million square miles; and within these limits the national and local governments combined often have difficulty in preserving order and insuring the protection of foreigners, although the territory is within their exclusive legal control. The countries of Latin America comprise an area of more than eight million square miles, or almost three times as much; and over these more than eight million square miles the United States exercises no governmental control. And yet, within this vast area, it is asserted that the protection of aliens and the redress of their grievances is a matter that concerns the United States alone, to the exclusion of any and all of the governments on whose diplomatic protection such aliens would normally rely. The responsibility thus proposed to be thrust upon the United States is unexampled.

Examined historically, the assumption that the American nations are in effect protectorates, with which non-American powers have been denied the right to conduct relations directly, is equally unjustified. In numerous instances, indeed, force has been employed—a contingency to which even the United States might itself be exposed. In the fourth decade of the nineteenth century France and Great Britain blockaded the ports of Buenos Aires and Uruguay. France resorted to reprisals against Mexico in the same decade. From 1846 to 1848 the United States was at war with Mexico for the redress of its own grievances. In 1861, France, Great Britain, and Spain resorted to reprisals against Mexico without protest. Later, when France (Great Britain and Spain having withdrawn) essayed to set up and maintain a monarchy in Mexico, the United States protested and eventually brought the attempt to an end. The war between Spain and the republics on the west coast of South America has heretofore been mentioned. In 1894 Great Britain seized the port of Corinto, in Nicaragua, to collect an indemnity. In 1903 Germany, Great Britain, and Italy blockaded the ports of Venezuela, with the acquiescence of the United States, it being expressly understood that there should be no permanent occupation or acquisition of Venezuelan territory. These incidents are recalled not for the purpose of advocating or justifying the employment of force in any particular instance, or of intimating that the United States is not justified in exhibiting special concern in regard to what may tend to jeopardize the independence of states for whose preserva-

tion it has assumed a contingent responsibility. They are cited only for the purpose of demonstrating that the Monroe Doctrine has not been understood to involve the denial by the United States to other American nations of the primary rights and liabilities of independent states.

The establishment of the relations between independent American states on the basis of mutual confidence, respect, and co-operation is, as has been seen, an aspiration long cherished by generous minds. But, although this aspiration forms the central thought of Pan Americanism, it is not easily realized. On the contrary, its realization is a highly difficult task beset with complicated problems and intricate obstructions. Nor will the time ever come when it will not afford ample opportunity for the exercise of an informed and discriminating judgment, of well-directed and intelligent helpfulness, and of consideration for the opinions and feelings of others, to say nothing of the reciprocal recognition of rights and occasional forbearance. These qualities, so vital to the preservation of amity and confidence elsewhere, are no less essential in the Western Hemisphere.

References:

Reports of the four International American Conferences, and particularly the Historical Appendix (Vol. IV) to the report of the first conference; the works of Bolivar; "Henry Clay and Pan Americanism," *Columbia University Quarterly*, September, 1915; Latané, *Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America*.

The relations between the United States and the other American countries are comprehensively presented in Moore, *Digest of International Law*.

XI

INFLUENCE AND TENDENCIES

NOTHING could have been further from the thoughts of the wise statesmen who guided the United States through the struggle for independence and laid the foundations of the government's foreign policy than the institution of a philosophical propagandism for the dissemination of political principles of a certain type in foreign lands. Although the Declaration of Independence loudly proclaimed the theory of the natural rights of man, they gave to this theory, in its application to their own concerns, a qualified interpreta-

tion, and, as practical men, forbore to push it at once to all its logical consequences. On the continent of Europe, the apostles of reform, directing their shafts against absolutism and class privileges, spoke in terms of philosophical idealism, while the patriots of America, though they did not eschew philosophy, debated concrete questions of constitutional law and commonplace problems of taxation. In Europe, the revolution meant first of all a destructive upheaval; in America, where the ground was clear, it meant a constructive development. And yet, in spite of this difference, the American Revolution operated as a powerful stimulus to political agitation in Europe. There was in the very existence of American independence, permeated as it was with democratic republicanism, a force that exerted a world-wide influence in behalf of political liberty. Of this fact European statesmen betrayed their appreciation when they deprecated the course of the King of France in subordinating what appeared to them to be a permanent general interest to the gratification of a feeling of enmity towards Great Britain. Spanish diplomatists were not alone in expressing this sentiment. The Emperor Joseph II of Austria, in a letter to his minister in the Netherlands, in 1787, remarked that "France, by the assistance which she afforded to the Americans, gave birth to reflections on freedom." That the assistance thus given hastened her own revolution, there can be no doubt. Nor did the visible effect of the example of the United States end here. It has been manifest in every European struggle for more liberal forms of government during the past hundred years—in Spain, in Italy, in Germany, and in Hungary. It penetrated even to Russia, where there was found among the papers of one of the leaders who planned a revolution for 1826 a constitution for that country on the model of the Constitution of the United States. And it may also be traced in the lives of those who have striven to advance, sometimes under adverse and discouraging conditions, the cause of self-government on the American continents.

While the United States refrained from aggressive political propagandism, the spirit of liberty that resulted from its independence was necessarily reflected in its diplomacy. It is true that the attitude of the government on certain special questions was for a long while affected by the survival in the United States of the institution of African slavery. It was for this reason that the recognition of Hayti, Santo Domingo, and Liberia as independent states did not take place till the administration of Abraham Lincoln, although such recognition had long before been accorded by European powers. But the attitude of the United States towards those countries was exceptional, and

was governed by forces which neither diverted nor sought to divert the government from the general support of the principles on which it was founded.

The influence of the United States in behalf of political liberty was clearly exhibited in the establishment of the principle, to which we have heretofore adverted, that the true test of a government's right to exist, and to be recognized by other governments, is the fact of its existence as the exponent of the popular will. This rule, when it was announced, appeared to be little short of revolutionary, since it was in effect a corollary of the affirmation made in the Declaration of Independence, that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of the ends for which governments are instituted, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its affairs in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Nor was the free spirit of American diplomacy less manifest in its opposition to the system of commercial monopoly; in its espousal of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine; or in its advocacy of the freedom of the seas, of the rule that free ships make free goods, and of the exemption of private property at sea from capture. The weight of its influence was also constantly lent in favor of the maintenance of the independence of the countries of the Far East. In the treaty with China of June 18, 1858, made at a time when the Chinese government appeared to be peculiarly friendless, we find the remarkable stipulation that "if any other nation should act unjustly or oppressively" towards that country, the United States would "exert its good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement of the question, thus showing their friendly feelings."

But, besides exerting an influence in favor of liberty and independence, American diplomacy was also employed in the advancement of the principle of legality. American statesmen sought to regulate the relations of nations by law, not only as a measure for the protection of the weak against the aggressions of the strong, but also as the only means of assuring the peace of the world. The conception of legality in international relations lay at the foundation of the system of neutrality, which was established during the administration of Washington. It also formed the basis of the practice of arbitration, which was so auspiciously begun at the same time. Half a century later it received an accession of strength in the development of the process of extradition. It is true that in the development

of this process in modern times the credit of the initiative belongs to France; but, beginning with the Webster-Ashburton treaty of August 9, 1842, the United States, at an important stage in the history of the system, actively contributed to its growth by the conclusion of numerous conventions. The twenty-seventh article of the *Jay* treaty provided for the surrender of fugitives charged with murder or forgery; but it proved to be for the most part ineffective, and expired by limitation in 1808. The Webster-Ashburton treaty provided for the extradition of fugitives for any of seven offences, and proved to be efficacious. Similar treaties with other countries were soon afterwards made, ten being concluded while William L. Marcy was Secretary of State, during the administration of Pierce. Since that time our extradition arrangements have grown both in number and in comprehensiveness. We cannot afford, however, to rest on our laurels. In recent times other nations, and especially Great Britain since 1870, observing the propensity of criminals to utilize improved facilities of travel, have by legislation as well as by negotiation vastly increased the reach and efficiency of the system. It will therefore be necessary, if we would fulfil the promise of our past and retain a place in the front rank, steadily to multiply our treaties and enlarge their scope. No innovation in the practice of nations has ever more completely discredited the woful predictions of its adversaries than that of surrendering fugitives from justice. The Webster-Ashburton treaty was loudly denounced as a mere trap for the recovery of political offenders. Other treaties encountered similar opposition. In no instance have these direful forebodings been justified by the event.

American diplomacy has also been characterized by practicality. It has sought to attain definite objects by practical methods. Even in its idealism, as in the advocacy of the exemption of private property at sea from capture, it has shown a practical side. The same disposition has been exhibited in the American consular service. Consuls have been described by publicists as agents of commerce; but for a long while their functions were passive rather than active, and to some extent were ornamental. The government of the United States conceived the idea of employing its consuls not only for the protection of commerce, but also for its extension. In 1880, while Mr. Evarts was Secretary of State, there was begun the monthly publication of consular reports, which has been continued with useful results up to the present time. The example thus set has been followed in other countries, so that we find to-day among the publications of the British, French, and German governments consular reports on the commerce and industries of for-

eign countries. In 1897, on the recommendation of Mr. Frederic Emory, then chief of the Bureau of Foreign Commerce of the Department of State, the usefulness of the American series was greatly enhanced by the establishment of the system of publishing daily advance sheets of the monthly issues. It is obvious that this development constituted a highly important step towards making the consular service of practical value to the business interests of the country.

American diplomacy has also exerted a potent influence upon the adoption of simple and direct methods in the conduct of negotiations. Observant of the proprieties and courtesies of intercourse, but having, as John Adams once declared, "no notion of cheating anybody," American diplomatists have usually relied rather upon the strength of their cause, frankly and clearly argued, than upon a subtle diplomacy, for the attainment of their ends. Indeed the framework of government adopted in the United States, by which important powers affecting, both directly and indirectly, the control of foreign affairs were confided to the Senate and to the Congress, was not understood to admit of the practice of secrecy and reserve, such as characterized the diplomacy of monarchs whose tenure was for life and who were unvexed by popular electorates and representative assemblies. Hence, as it was in the beginning, so American diplomacy in the main continued to be a simple, direct, and open diplomacy, the example of which has had much to do with shaping the development of modern methods. Nor should we forbear to remark that while it has, by reason of the directness with which it expresses its sentiments, sometimes been disrespectfully dubbed "shirt-sleeves" diplomacy, it may confidently invite a comparison as to the propriety of its speech and conduct with the diplomacy of other nations.

In at least one instance, however, the attempt at simplicity was carried further than in the end proved to be practicable. Washington, while President, once observed that, although he was not accustomed to impede the dispatch of business "by a ceremonious attention to idle forms," it would not be prudent for a young state to dispense altogether with rules of procedure which had "originated from the wisdom of statesmen" and were "sanctioned by the common consent of nations." But Jefferson, late in his first administration, sought to abolish all social forms and precedence. The occasion of this action was the claim of Mrs. Merry, the wife of the British minister, of the right to be taken in to dinner by the President. In order to avoid this claim, Jefferson adopted what he called the rule of pell-mell, the meaning of which was that no particular place was to be assigned to anybody, but that each was to take what

was at hand; and he sought to enforce this measure not only at his own entertainments, but also on all public occasions, such as inaugurations. This innovation was hotly resented by certain members of the diplomatic corps, and gave rise to controversies which, by reason of their spicy and entertaining quality, have enjoyed a prominence out of proportion to their historical importance. Experience soon demonstrated that social equality was not always best assured by committing the determination of questions of etiquette to individual inclination and enterprise, which perchance might seek in confusion an undue exaltation. No one could have more fully exemplified simplicity in character and in bearing than did President Madison; but on entertaining the new British minister, F. J. Jackson, in 1809, he settled the question of procedure by escorting Mrs. Jackson to dinner, while Jackson took in Mrs. Madison. Nothing could better illustrate Madison's indifference to forms than his official reception of Jackson on the latter's presentation. The affair was conducted in the same manner as a private meeting between gentlemen. After Jackson was introduced, Madison asked him to have a chair, and, says Jackson, while they were talking a negro brought them "some glasses of punch and a seedcake."

The effect of democratic tendencies on American diplomacy is seen in the course of the government of the United States with regard to diplomatic uniform. As early as 1817 American ministers had a prescribed dress which was fixed by the mission at Ghent. This dress consisted of a blue coat lined with white silk; a straight cape, embroidered with gold, and single-breasted; buttons plain, or, if they could be had, with the artillerist's eagle stamped upon them; cuffs embroidered in the same manner as the cape; white cashmere breeches; gold knee-buckles; white silk stockings, and gold or gilt shoe-buckles; a three-cornered chapeau bras, not so large as that used by the French nor so small as that used by the English; a black cockade with an eagle attached, and a sword. On galas-days and other occasions of extraordinary ceremony the American ministers were allowed to wear more embroidery, as well as a white ostrich-feather, not standing erect, but sewed around the brim, in their hats. A description of the costume, together with a plate, was given to the minister as a part of his instructions. At the beginning of the administration of President Jackson the prescribed uniform was changed so that it consisted of a black coat, with a gold star on each side of the collar near its termination; underclothes of black, blue, or white, at the option of the wearer; a three-cornered chapeau bras; a black cockade and eagle; and a steel-mounted sword with a

white scabbard. This dress, which was supposed to correspond with the simplicity of American institutions, was recommended but not prescribed. These instructions were, however, done away with by a circular issued by William L. Marcy, as Secretary of State, on June 1, 1853, by which American ministers were desired, as far as practicable without impairing their usefulness, to appear at court "in the simple dress of an American citizen." If this could not be done without detriment to the public interest, the nearest approach to it, compatible with the requisite performance of duties, was earnestly recommended. "The simplicity of our usages and the tone of feeling among our people is," said Marcy, "much more in accordance with the example of our first and most distinguished representative at a royal court than the practice which has since prevailed. It is to be regretted that there was ever any departure in this respect from the example of Dr. Franklin." Wharton, in his *International Law Digest*, states that the dress worn by Franklin "was Quaker full dress, being court dress in the time of Charles II"; it was, at any rate, comparatively simple. The experiences of the American ministers in carrying out Marcy's instructions were varied. The greatest difficulty was encountered by Buchanan, at London, where his proposal to appear at court without some mark indicative of his rank was the subject of peremptory objection. He finally compromised upon appearing in the dress which he wore at the receptions of the President of the United States, with the addition of a very plain black-handled and black-hilted dress sword. With this addition, he declared that he never felt prouder as a citizen of his country than when he stood amid the brilliant circle of foreign ministers and other court dignitaries "in the simple dress of an American citizen." At Paris, Henry S. Sanford, who was then acting as *chargé d'affaires ad interim* of the United States, was permitted to appear at the Tuilleries in citizen's dress. When, however, the new minister, John Y. Mason, arrived, he decided, after consultation with the French officials, to adopt a uniform, and had a costume devised which was described by Sanford as "a coat embroidered with gilt tinsel, a sword and cocked hat, the invention of a Dutch tailor in Paris, borrowed chiefly from the livery of a subordinate *attaché* of legation of one of the petty powers of the Continent." Sanford, conceiving Mason's conduct to involve an oblique censure of his own course, resigned his position as secretary in disgust.

At The Hague, August Belmont was permitted to appear in citizen's dress, although it was stated that his appearance in uniform "would have been better liked." At Lisbon, John L. O'Sullivan appeared at court in "an ordinary evening suit,"

consisting of a blue coat and black trousers, with "a simple American button" indicating his representative capacity. At Berlin it was declared that the King "would not consider an appearance before him without costume respectful"; and the American minister thereupon provided himself with a court dress which he described as "very plain and simple." At Stockholm, the King expressed his willingness to receive the representative of the United States in an audience for business in any dress his government might prescribe, but added, "In the society of my family and on occasions of court no one can be received but in court dress, in conformity with established custom." The minister therefore appeared at court in the costume which he had previously worn. By a joint resolution, approved March 27, 1867, Congress prohibited persons in the diplomatic service of the United States "from wearing any uniform or official costume not previously authorized by Congress." By Section 34 of the act of July 28, 1866, however, officers who have served in the Civil War as volunteers in the armies of the United States are authorized to bear their official title, and upon occasions of ceremony to wear the uniform of the highest grade they have held, by brevet or other commissions, in the volunteer service. In spite of these statutes, diplomatic officers of the United States, while not adopting what might be called a uniform, have often worn, as Buchanan did in London, some article of apparel suggestive of their official station and rank.

The subject of diplomatic dress has been introduced, not because it was in itself of great moment, but because it illustrates the development of that democratic spirit, often described in contemporary writings as "American feeling," which was perhaps most ebullient in the middle of the last century. Since that time great changes have taken place, and with the increased complexity of social activities, the extraordinary growth of private fortunes, and the wonderful advance of the nation as a whole in wealth and power, simplicity has become less and less a distinctive trait of the life of the Republic, either at home or abroad. On the other hand, there has grown up a visible tendency towards conformity to customs elsewhere established, and the progress of this tendency has been accelerated by the natural drift of a great and self-conscious people towards participation in what are called world-affairs.

The first joint international treaty, with reference to a question not distinctively American, to which the government of the United States became a party, was the convention concluded on October 22, 1864, jointly with Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands, in relation to the payment by Japan of

the Shimonoseki indemnity. Three years later a joint convention was concluded between the same powers and Japan for the establishment of tariff duties in the latter country. By reason of a common interest, the United States was thus led in the Far East to depart from its usual policy of making only separate or independent agreements with other nations. No similar departure had then been made in China, but the policy of concerted action with other powers had already been entered upon in that country as well as in Japan—a policy which has eventuated in the allied march to Peking in 1900 and in the conclusion of the convention of September 7, 1901, between the allies and China. This convention, which embraces questions of politics as well as of commerce, is the most comprehensive joint arrangement to which the United States has ever become a signatory. The United States has, however, as a member of the great family of nations, become a party to other joint international agreements, such as the Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded in the field; the convention for the protection of submarine cables outside territorial waters; the Madrid convention with reference to the protégé system in Morocco; the international union for the protection of industrial property; the international postal union; and the treaties concluded at The Hague with reference to the laws and customs of war on land, the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva convention, and the pacific adjustment of international disputes.

Intimacy of association, though it does not destroy the spirit of emulation, tends to produce uniformity in manners and customs. Of the operation of this rule, a striking example may be seen in the act of Congress by which provision was made for the appointment of ambassadors. Prior to the passage of this act it had been assumed to be undesirable to introduce into the American diplomatic service a grade of officials deriving extraordinary ceremonial privileges from the fact that they were supposed in a peculiar sense to represent the "person" of the "sovereign." William L. Marcy, when Secretary of State, naturally declined to recommend the creation of such a class. Secretary of State Frelinghuysen, viewing the matter in a practical light, thought it would be unjust to American ministers to increase their rank without raising their salaries, and that Congress could not with propriety be asked to make them "an allowance commensurate with the necessary mode of life of an ambassador." Mr. Bayard, who was afterwards to become the first American ambassador, declared, when Secretary of State, that "the benefits attending a higher grade of ceremonial treatment" had not "been deemed to outweigh the inconveniences

which, in our simple social democracy, might attend the reception in this country of an extraordinarily privileged foreign class." Nevertheless, in 1893 the higher grade was introduced. For this measure it will scarcely be claimed that there was any necessity. In the days before American ambassadors existed, a visitor to London sought to learn who was the most important "ambassador" at the English court. A European member of the diplomatic corps, to whom the inquiry was addressed, promptly responded, "the American minister." From time to time, however, American representatives abroad, wishing to enjoy the ceremonial privileges of the ambassadorial rank, recommended its creation; and eventually their recommendation was adopted. But it was done without any increase of compensation, so that to-day none but a man of fortune can afford to be an American ambassador. When we scan the list of those who have thus far held the position, it is not difficult to believe that the Republic has as yet suffered no detriment by reason of this moral limitation upon the choice of its agents; but the creation of conditions under which persons of moderate means are excluded from the highest public employments, except at a sacrifice which they can ill afford to make or cannot make at all, is not in harmony with what have been conceived to be American ideals.

To this incongruity it is within the power of Congress at any time to apply a corrective; but there is yet another innovation the remedy for which lies with the executive branch of the government. Among the extraordinary privileges commonly said to belong to the ambassador, by reason of his representing the "person" of the "sovereign," is that of personal audience on matters of business with the head of the state. In Europe, with the substitution of constitutional governments for absolute monarchies, this privilege had become merely nominal, but in Washington it was revived in something like its pristine rigor, direct intercourse with the President, without regard to the Secretary of State, having frequently been demanded and practised. In the days when the highest rank was that of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, the privilege of transacting diplomatic business directly with the President was rarely accorded to a foreign minister, not only because the time of the President was supposed to be already sufficiently occupied, but also because the White House is not an office of record, the custodian of the diplomatic archives being the Secretary of State, who is the legal organ and adviser of the President in foreign affairs, and who, by reason of his preoccupation with the business of his own department, is supposed to possess that mastery of its details which is so essential to the care of

public as well as of private interests. The President, with his multifarious duties and responsibilities, is certainly entitled to all the freedom of discretion which the rulers of other countries enjoy with regard to the direct management of diplomatic business.

But without regard to methods, which from time to time may change, there is no doubt that the importance of the United States as a factor, not in the "concert of Europe," but in that wider concert which embraces all civilized powers, Eastern as well as Western, is destined to grow. In 1871 a conference at Washington, presided over by the Secretary of State, resulted in the conclusion of a permanent truce between Spain and the allied republics on the west coast of South America, thus formally ending an unfortunate conflict in the Western Hemisphere. In 1905 the whole world rang with praise of the President of the United States, who lent his good offices for the opening of negotiations to terminate the titanic struggle between Russia and Japan in the Far East. From his fortunate station as the head of a great power holding itself aloof from any connection with the political issues involved he was able to speak with an impartial and authoritative benevolence which no other ruler could invoke.

Judged by phrases current at the time, there prevailed, after the war with Spain, a disposition to assume that the United States would, as the result of that conflict, break with its past and enter upon a new career in which previous guides and limitations would be discarded. This hasty supposition was by no means strange. On the contrary, it was merely an illustration of a common phase of thought, which is constantly manifested in the tendency to regard existing things, no matter how lacking in essential novelty they may be, as wholly new, and, as a natural consequence, to estimate them in an absolute rather than in a relative sense. But, in the acquisition of Porto Rico and the establishment of a virtual protectorate over Cuba, there was nothing to jar the nerves of even the most cursory reader of American history, while the acquisition of the Philippines could not be altogether startling to one who had reflected upon the detached situation of remote Alaska, with its chain of islands flung across the Pacific, or upon the incongruous condominium which had for a number of years been attempted in the Samoan group in the distant South Pacific. It is, therefore, not surprising that abnormal vaticinations and proposals due to excitement or to a want of information gradually faded away, while realities, with the aid of a certain continuity in thought and in temper on the part of the less vocal element of the population, eventually regained their normal sway.

In the relations of the United States with Europe after 1898 there were, if we except acts such as the termination of the commercial treaty with Russia in 1912 because of the Jewish question, and the adjustment of questions relating to Liberia with France, Germany, and Great Britain, few striking developments prior to 1914. In the Anglo-Boer war neutrality was, as usual, maintained. At the Peace Conference at The Hague in 1899 the United States delegation, in signing the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, made, as has been seen, the express reservation that the treaty was not to be construed as requiring the United States "to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or policy or internal administration of any foreign state," or to relinquish "its traditional attitude towards purely American questions." When, in 1907, the convention was renewed, the Senate reaffirmed this reservation in its original terms. Likewise, in approving the Act of Algeciras (1906) in relation to Morocco, the Senate declared that it was done solely for "commercial and friendly purposes," and without any purpose "to depart from the traditional American foreign policy which forbids participation by the United States in the settlement of political questions which are entirely European in their scope." Had The Hague Convention of 1907, respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land, required the contracting parties to resist by force any attempt to violate its provisions, it would have received few, if any, votes in the United States Senate. Unlike the treaty of 1839, by which certain European powers undertook to assure the neutrality of Belgium, it is a concurrent declaration of general principles, not savoring of an alliance to compel their observance. While it declares that "a neutral power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality," cannot be regarded as committing a hostile act, yet it does not purport to give to a state desirous to remain neutral an assurance of protection against a declaration of war. Colonel Roosevelt, under whose administration as President the treaty was ratified by the United States, was, therefore, altogether justified in declaring, in September, 1914, that the United States had not "the smallest responsibility" for what had befallen Belgium. The situation of the United States in this regard was, as he pointed out, essentially different from that of England, one of the parties to the treaty of 1839.¹

1. While declaring that, when Belgium was invaded, "every circumstance of national honor and interest forced England to act precisely as she did act," and quoting in this relation passages referring to England's

Since 1914, however, various proposals, inspired by the horrors attending the great conflict which broke out in Europe in that year, have been put forward for the formation of leagues or alliances with the design of preventing the recurrence of such a calamity. These proposals differ in their statement of details, but are to a great extent alike in suggesting an international combination for the use of force for the accomplishment of the end in view. This conception is enlarged in President Wilson's peace proposal of December 18, 1916, in which he suggests "the formation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world"; and in his address to the Senate of January 22, 1917, in which he declares that the people of the United States desire and are in honor bound to render a "service" to mankind, "nothing less than this, to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world."²

The plans and proposals put forward since 1914, like those published from time to time in previous years, present, so far as concerns their central thought, nothing to surprise the student of such subjects. The assurance of peace by means of a concert of nations, designed to moderate or to control the propensity of men in the mass to gain their ends by violence, has stimulated the speculations of philosophers and baffled the skill of statesmen since the dawn of international relations. The general statement of such a design offers no difficulties; but the definite formulation of a plan to render the design effective would involve, no less than heretofore, the consideration of questions both numerous and varied, concerning which it would be as unsafe to count upon a ready unanimity of senti-

position as a party to the neutralization of Belgium under the treaty of 1889, Colonel Roosevelt said:

"A deputation of Belgians has arrived in this country to invoke our assistance in the time of their dreadful need. What action our government can or will take I know not. It has been announced that no action can be taken that will interfere with our entire neutrality. It is certainly eminently desirable that we should remain entirely neutral, and nothing but urgent need would warrant breaking our neutrality and taking sides one way or the other. . . . We have not the smallest responsibility for what has befallen her (Belgium), and I am sure that the sympathy of this country for the suffering of the men, women, and children of Belgium is very real. Nevertheless, this sympathy is compatible with full acknowledgment of the unwisdom of our uttering a single word of official protest unless we are prepared to make that protest effective; and only the clearest and most urgent national duty would ever justify us in deviating from our rule of neutrality and non-interference" ("The World War: Its Tragedies and its Lessons," *The Outlook*, September 23, 1914, pp. 169-170, 178).

2. *Supra*, pp. 288-290.

ment and of opinion as to presuppose the sudden cessation of the human wants and human passions in which wars have immemorially originated. The extent to which divisions of sentiment and of opinion would occur probably would bear an appreciable relation to the extent to which it was proposed to deal with questions of a contentious nature, such as national and racial groupings and other political arrangements, and above all that prolific and continuing source of strife—commercial and industrial competition. Moreover, when we remember that force and its effective exercise are subject to physical limitations, and that proximity and remoteness, by which all human relations are so profoundly affected, have often been recognized as furnishing the test and the measure of political and other interests, it is not strange that the readiness to assume and even more to perform responsibilities, or to admit others to share them, has not infrequently been found to depend upon considerations of that character, as well as upon other conceptions, in regard to which habits of thought have more or less been formed and preserved. Even in the United States, where "society" is sometimes slightly said to "lack traditions," such habits are not unknown in public affairs. We have seen that when the Executive Council of France, during the turbulent aftermath of the great revolution, proposed through Genêt to replace the then existing alliance with the United States with an agreement "to defend the empire of liberty wherever it may be embraced," and "to guaranty the sovereignty of the people,"³ the proposal was not entertained. In the circumstances the proposal was not inexplicable. In making it the Executive Council frankly stated that, besides "the advantages which humanity in general" would draw from such a measure, France had a "particular interest" in preparing to act against England and Spain, who were believed to be about to attack her, because of what Gouverneur Morris called "those general declarations against all kings, under the name of tyrants," which the National Assembly had enunciated. Nor did the Executive Council lose sight of the restrictions to which the then prevailing system of colonial monopoly subjected the foreign trade of both countries, when, in order to reinforce its proposal, it included in it the suggestion that France and the United States, by excluding from their ports the ships of powers that still maintained "an exclusive colonial and commercial system," would "quickly contribute to the general emancipation of the new world," even though it coupled with the suggestion an appeal to the United States to make "common cause" with France in taking such steps as exigencies

3. *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, folio I, 705, 708-709.

might require "to serve the cause of liberty and the freedom of the people."

The attitude of the United States towards questions of this character, as expressed by successive administrations, assumed in the popular as well as in the official mind the form of an established rule of policy. Especially was this the case in regard to the political arrangements of Europe, which, as we have seen, were treated as belonging to what was called the European system, while those of the independent nations of America were jealously guarded as belonging to the "American system." This distinction the United States, as its author, proponent, and champion, sought not to efface, but to impress upon the world as a derivative of the principle of political non-intervention and a pledge of its consistent observance. No other principle has so distinguished the foreign policy of the United States; and while policies are proverbially subject to mutation, it is probable that the ramifications of that principle will not be wholly overlooked in the consideration of any future plan of concert.

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